ALARM Alert, Locate and Report Missiles
In September 1991, Grumman and TRW Inc. teamed to compete for the US Air Force's Follow-on Early Warning System (FEWS) - a space-based system that would provide tactical warning and assessment of missile launches. Grumman, which was to be the principal subcontractor to TRW, established a new subsidiary, Grumman Sensor Systems, Inc. for FEWS and other sensor applications. TRW has made significant investments in capital and equipment and holds a minority equity position in Grumman Sensor Systems, Inc. In July 1992, the TRW/Grumman team was awarded a $240 million demonstration/validation contract from the US Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center for FEWS. In November 1993, the FEWS program received formal notification from the Air Force of a stop work order on the demonstration/validation contract.
Following the cancellation of the FEWS program, the Air Force moved forward to initiate a competitive Defense Support Program Follow-On program and cancel two or more DSP systems currently under contract. The program will be renamed ALARM (Alert, Locate and Report Missiles) with more than $1 billion in the Pentagon's 1995 thru 1999 budget. Before the ALARM program could really get started, however, it was replaced in its turn by the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS).
ALARM was to be designed to provide warning of theater baliistic missile launches to a greater degree than DSP. Revised requirements for this new purpose was essential to initiate program development. DOD's efforts to do so may be delayed by the 1994 architecture review of space-based early warning being led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communictions, and Intelligence. The Air Force planned to have users comment on the desired performance characteristics of the new system and tasked the Air Force Space Command to complete the requirements development by the end of fiscal year 1994.
Air Force documents show that it was almost as expensive as the previous Follow-on Early Warning System (FEWS). Early life-cycle cost estimates identified the total cost of ALARM at about $11.3b illion, and that of FEWS at about $11.7 billion. However, ALARM was selected following the termination of FEWS because it was deemed to be significantly cheaper than FEWS in the future years defense program. The ALARM yearly funding profile was kept at levels signifcantiy lower than those for FEWS to make the program affordable by sacrificing short-term capability. In this regard, DOD proposed to build a series of Block I satellites to form the first ALARM constellation before upgrading the design with additional capabilities. DOD used a FEWS cost model to estimate ALARM life cycle costs, suggesting that this could be a reason for the nearly equivalent ALARM costs.
The Air Force stated that ALARM can be accelerated by 2 years from 2004 to 2002 without significant risks. However, the additional costs associated with acceleration may put DODin a similar unaffordable position when it rejected the FEWSpr ogram. The program office has tentatively identified an additional $434 million that would be needed during fiscal years 1995 through 2001. More firm cost data may not be available until the program progresses beyond the generation of requirements.
Accelerating ALARM had advantages and possibly a few disadvantages that should be further analyzed. Accelerating ALARMc ould obviate the need to procure an additional DSP satellite (number 24), its launcher (Titan IV), and an inertial upper stage. If DSP satellites can last for about 6 years, as indicated in a study (by the Everett Panel) on space-based early warning, DSP 23 would not have to be launched until 2001 or 2002. In that case, the first ALARM satellite may not have to be launched until the year 2902 or 2003, and DOD may not need DSP 24. This could save as much as $700 million dollam in acquisition costs. However, accelerating the program could create program risks by (1) shortening the demonstration and validation phase of the acquisition process by 10 months-from 28 months to 18 months and (2) performing the critical design review a full year ahead of the original schedule. Air Force representatives claimed, however, that previous engineering efforts on earlier programs (the Roost Surveillance and Tracking System, the Advanced Warning System, and FEWS) provide enough experience to offset this risk.
DOD maintained that it had identiCed a majority of critical technologies required for capabilities specified for ALARM. However, there were areas that required additional funding and continuing development. As of 1994 the two most important elements were an infrared focal plane array and radiation-hardened electronics. These two technology development efforts are critical to ALARM. These technologies would have to be funded by the government because of the unique applications. No private sector funds would be available for these technologies because there are no returns on the investment.
In 1994, DOD initiated the Office of the Secretary of Defense Space-Based Warning Summer Study to consolidate various infrared space requirements. Based on the study results, it selected the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to replace DSP. By January 2005 the Pentagon had drawn up plans for a new missile warning system, designated Space-Based Infrared (SBIR). The program called for layers of satellites from low orbits to geosynchronous positions 22,000 miles up. SBIR would replace satellites now in the Defense Support Program and sharply revised plans for an Alert, Locate and Report Missiles program, now known as SBIRS-GEO.
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