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"The Russians Still Have an Outside Chance": What US Intelligence Expected of the USSR Before Apollo 11

Six days after Soviet engineers transported N-1 rocket 5L to its launch pad at Tyuratam to join its sister 1M1 training booster in readiness, an article about the Moon race appeared in the Western press that had telling import.  In the Stars and Stripes, a daily newspaper issued to US servicemen and their families around the world--including at military bases, posts, ships and US embassies--an interview was featured (in its "Pacific edition" issued out of Tokyo, Japan).  The interview was with an American intelligence analyst who discussed the current status of the Moon race between the USA and Soviet Union in late June 1969, from the perspective of the US intelligence community.  The article had the provocative title "Russia could beat us to the Moon if." and the first sentence was equally so:  "Will the Russians be on the Moon to greet us?"[1] (The associated cartoon illustration with the article shows a Soviet cosmonaut getting on board a very large fireworks-configured sky rocket that has windows on varying parts of the central body.  A fur-capped Russian is also shown at the base of the sky rocket, ready to light it off.  Additionally, the buildings of the Kremlin reside in the distance.)

The intelligence analyst's name was Dr. Charles Sheldon II, perhaps better known to space historians and Globalsecurity.org readers as the person who oversaw the US Congressional series of publications entitled "Soviet Space Programs," that were issued on an approximately quintennial basis from the early 1960s through the 1980s. As of the interview date of late June 1969, Sheldon already had a distinguished career as a Federal civil servant. Sheldon had previously been the technical director of the US House of Representatives Science and Astronautics Committee through 1961, when he subsequently joined President Kennedy's advisory staff for the National Aeronautics and Space Council-a posting in which he served through 1966, well into the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson. Additionally, Sheldon was also at the time in 1969 the acting chief of the Science Policy Division of the US Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, as well as being its senior specialist in space and transportation technology.  Earlier, Sheldon had also shared in the drafting of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as well as the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.[2]

One further little-known fact was that Sheldon had the security clearances to see all US-generated space intelligence, including that about the USSR.  It was his access to these classified reports that helps provide the basis of and insight into Sheldon's thoughts and comments that were provided to the Stars and Stripes reporter.

What is notable is that the selenocentric scenario that Sheldon was commenting about throughout the article was not an expected crewed circumlunar mission by the Soviets, but an actual manned lunar landing.  All of the themes discussed by the intelligence analyst emanated from that specific expectation.

As reporter Tom Tiede wrote,

"Dr. Sheldon doesn't think the USSR will beat us to the Moon.  He feels that time, good judgement, and the odds work against the competitors.

But still, on the other hand..

'Well,' says Sheldon, a thin, gray, enthusiastic man, 'I suppose the odds of us landing first on the Moon are 98 percent or better.  However, I must say this:  I think the Russians still have an outside chance.'

The Russians' chance, according to Sheldon, is based on their willingness to gamble.  Sheldon says their space history shows an aversion to open risk, but for the sake of prestige they might now be willing to try.

What they would have to do, Sheldon explains, is make a grand, unannounced, terribly dangerous Moon shot without preliminary test flights."[1]

Sheldon then goes on to talk about the scenarios in which such a plan could unfold.  The first considered concept would be the firing into orbit of "a launch vehicle large enough to propel a lunar landing payload (285,000 pounds).Sheldon says this possibility is pregnant.  In fact, Sheldon probably knows if the vehicle is real or not.  He has access to all US space intelligence, which is classified information."[1] After the N-1 would be launched into Earth orbit, "[t]hen a Proton rocket might fire a rendezvous [space ship], with inhabitants, to link in space.  And a continuing Moon trip might follow."[1]  Additionally noteworthy, in a direct counter-juxtaposition to what was concluded in the aftermath of the July 3, 1969 N-1 launch failure, a Proton rocket is specifically mentioned by Sheldon (rather than the final perception that it would be a Soyuz booster, which indicates that the Proton/N-1 scenario eventually fell from favor) as the second launcher component involved in the anticipated Soviet manned lunar attempt.  However, it is also noticeable that the overall idea mentioned by Sheldon still encompassed the two-rocket scenario and remained the expected mission theme by a consensus within US intelligence even prior to the actual N-1 launch attempt.

The second plan envisioned by US intelligence to be within the capabilities of the Soviet engineers was the idea of multiple firings into Earth orbit of a series of Proton-launched missions containing lunar payload components.  "It would require incredible dexterity, but if all could be linked up in orbit, a side trip to the Moon might be the result."[1] 

The third scenario described by the analyst was an unmanned lunar soil sample return.  As Sheldon notes, "I suppose it's possible that rather than send men to the Moon, they would send robots. Then they could fly up there, without any human risk, pick up Moon samples and thereby steal our thunder."[1]

As Tiede further reports, Sheldon additionally commented about rumors in Moscow: 

"..Sheldon notes that rumors of a 'big' Russian space spectacular have been circulating for days.  Also, a Russian cosmonaut has told Japanese officials that the USSR would have Moon rock samples on display when the Japanese world fair opens early next year.. 'You can add these signs up,' says Sheldon, 'any way you like.'"[1]

Sheldon's comments, coupled with now-revealed information about the US intelligence community's network data matrix-including SIGINT from Tyuratam, COMINT from the tracking ships on station in the world's oceans, as well as HUMINT information coming from Moscow-based reportage--indicated to US policy makers that there was a distinct possibility of a manned Soviet upstaging attempt of Apollo 11.  Based on information imparted to me by retired US intelligence analysts, there may have been a number of reports (including SITREPs-"Situation Reports") generated in the waning days of June 1969 that discussed not only the accumulating rumors, but also the much firmer data of countdown preparations at Tyuratam as well as associated actions noticed elsewhere.  The accumulating information appears to have caused at least some US intelligence analysts to have qualms about the upcoming weeks prior to Apollo 11's scheduled launching in mid-July 1969, as well as the certainty of the anticipated American lunar success.[3]

END

1.      Tiede T.  "Russia could beat us to the Moon if."  Pacific Stars and Stripes (Tokyo edition) June 25, 1969. p. 9.

2.      Sheldon CS.  "The Soviet space program: A growing enterprise." "TRW Space Log: Winter-1968-69" 8(4):23. (Redondo Beach, CA: TRW Systems Group, 1968)

3.      Interviews with US intelligence sources, beginning in Summer 2004.