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Revelations from Vasiliy Mishin's Technical Notations of July 1969 N-1 Preparations

Perhaps the most veracious source of materials presently (outside of the launch logs of the Strategic Rocket Forces at Tyuratam) are the technical notations written down by former TsKBEM director Vasiliy Mishin.[17]

They were written contemporaneously with events and, for the purposes of our discussion here, I will be concentrating on launch preparations of the 5L rocket for its trip to the Moon.  What was not known previous to the examination of these notes was the fact that the Council of Chief Designers met on a regular basis in the run-up to the launch of the N-1 rocket in the early hours of July 3, 1969. 

Mishin's hand-written enumerations (which cover 11 pages) include major meetings on June 19, July 2, as well as on July 3, 1969 prior to the launching of the rocket.

Interestingly, the rocket mission and its payload is identified in Mishin's notations as "N1-L3S-5L,"  pointing the way to the fact that the payload was not--as presently promulgated by the Russians-merely a single piece of spacecraft equipment.

The "L3S" moniker indicates that the payload was more complex and included, in addition to a variant of a manned spacecraft, an LK of some form on board.

Boris Chertok in his reminiscences does describe the payload "L3S" as "this hybrid complex," with the delineation of the payload using elements of the L-1, "new hardware being developed for the future LOK," the standard rocket stages for the payload section "G and D," as well as "a 'mass mock-up' of the LK lunar lander."[18]

Currently, most Russian sources promulgate the idea that a 7K-L1S was the sole manned-related payload for 5L. 

However, Mishin's technical notes do make an interesting amplification of Chertok's commments in regards to the non-surface-landing vehicle. Within the discussion framework that Mishin made of 5L's preparations and transport to the launch pad, there is mention made of a serial-numbered spacecraft labeled "[11F]93."

As space historians know, the 11F93 identifier is for a complete LOK spacecraft, the more complex Zond-type variant that would be capable of actually orbiting the Moon.  This new revelation comes together where Mishin mentions a discussion with a "Vladislav Semenovich Patrushev" and that there was concerns about the "fittings, flanges" inside the 11F93 serial-numbered spacecraft.[17]

But Charles Vick urges caution: "The notations do mention the associated '93' equipment-but without much elaboration.  At this time, we have to presume that it means '11F93,' and that does mean an LOK.  Mishin's mention of this can, I think, only refer to an LOK orbital module as the 11F93 component in this context, unless alternatively the Zond descent module on board was in fact an LOK descent module.

"Or, since we are engaging in educated guessing here, perhaps it was a form of LOK but with a number of component elements that differed from an operational LOK, such as a service module that didn't contain fuel cells, but outright solar panels.  That would make it the 'hybrid' that Chertok speaks of. However, we don't have the data right now to clear this up. However, what is clear to me is that 5L did not carry a full LOK, but it possibly carried a Zond variant with 'something very special' added."[19]

If there was some form of an LOK spacecraft on board 5L as well as an LK in some sort of operational condition, this would help to explain and place in context the seemingly "wild" statements made by Mishin during the contentious June 3, 1969 meeting of the State Commission recorded by colleague Boris Chertok in his recollections.

Chertok writes that, in discussion of plans for late 1969, Mishin "promised that N-1 No. 6L would have the complete regular spacecraft, which would make it possible not only for the LOK to brake into lunar orbit, but also to ensure the automatic landing of the LK on the surface of the Moon."[20] 

 The testing of specific components of an LOK and in some manner the LK lander on board the 5L flight would have advantageously paved the way for such claimed development objectives by Mishin being accomplished for mission 6L.

Overall, the notations discuss in précis format the feverish activity at Tyuratam in those waning days leading up to the launch.  The meeting of the State Commission of Spaceflight began at 1600 Moscow Time on June 19.[17] 

The meeting highlights discussed that the "entire volume of work at the technical site [at the two assembly and test buildings-one for the main rocket, the other for the payload components] envisioned by the technical documentation, fulfilled."  These comments indicate that there were no problems during the checks of the main sections and component systems of both the rocket and payload.[17]

Interestingly, the main thread through the notes that Mishin took during the meeting indicate that there were pressurization leak "irregularities" due to an incomplete hermetic sealing in "the transfer section of the head block [the payload with the upper stages and nose fairing]" but it was felt that the "available non-hermeticity should not influence operability of the equipment in the transfer section (pressure will be 500 mm of Mercury after 10 days)," meaning that the mission objectives could still be carried out, even with a reduced pressurization in that segment.[17]

But the leak issue was serious enough that it led to an agreement among the attendees that the leak would be searched for out on the pad after the booster's erection, and also to come up with contingency plans to have a variant way of pressurizing the section if the leak continued during the outbound journey to the Moon.

Two further notes are of interest that refer to plans for the first three days of the rocket out at the pad:  The first, "three days for furnishing the tail section of Block A and for the investigation of the non-hermeticity of the transfer section of the head block"; and the second, "[we] need a strict regime of work, especially for the first three days. (People will be inside.)"  As it turned out during a launch rehearsal on the pad on July 2, the engineers found out more and were able to identify the leak probably stemmed from the "non-hermeticity of the helium system."[17]

This comment that "People will be inside" during the final three days of pad preparations poses other intriguing questions.  For example, does such a comment mean that there would be payload experts getting into and out of the 7K-L1S craft, and the LK lander (a logical place for on-pad verifications to take place)?  Or perhaps it meant that cosmonauts may have been doing pre-flight checks while on board? 

At 800 Moscow time on July 3, 1969, Mishin wrote down "the beginning of prelaunch preparation."  At 1205, the "console of fueling" was mentioned, and at 1593 (probably a mis-wrote time in the minutes column) the members of the State Commission met at the N-1 launch pad's Guest room.  At 1705 Moscow time, "Finished fueling the blocks of the third, second and first stages [with oxidizer]."[17]

With these new details of the launch preparations (as well as the payload), space historians are one step closer to placing in context the story of events on July 3, 1969 in terms of the Moon race.

With such a singular source as Mishin's technical notations, we get a window into the decision-making processes for the entire duration of the Moon race.  And when the entire set of Mishin's notations are published for general reading, much of what has been written in the "official" Russian histories will have to be substantially revised. The excerpts detailed here at Globlsecurity.org  show how definitive our information can be when appropriate sources are made available from the Russians.