Military
Space Culture
Lt Col J. Kevin McLaughlin
Commission Staff Member
Prepared
for the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization
The
information presented in this paper is based on research done
by the author. Although it was prepared for the Commission in
conjunction with its deliberations, the opinions expressed in
this paper are those of the author alone and do not represent
those of the Commission or any of the Commissioners.
|
I. Introduction
II. Experience of Space Leadership
III. Developing a Military Space Culture
Since its inception, the hallmark of the U.S. military space program has
been world-class scientists, engineers and operators. Sustained excellence
in these disciplines is essential to the future of the nation's national
security space program. It cannot be taken for granted.
Today, space is becoming a medium for military operations in its own right--much
the same as land, air and sea--not simply a place from which information
is acquired and transmitted or through which objects pass. New capabilities
will be developed that can deter attack on and defend U.S. national interests
and many of these capabilities will be based in space. Our nation will
need to project power from space and respond to events anywhere on earth.
A military space plane could use non-nuclear means to attack terrestrial
targets within minutes, depending on its launch characteristics, ability
to maneuver, or number deployed. Lasers from space could conduct strike
operations against terrestrial targets at the speed of light. Unlike weapons
from ships, aircraft, or land forces, space missions could occur with
almost no transit, information or weather delay. In the future, the true
advantage will belong to the first nation that best learns how to effectively
build and use these advanced space capabilities. As in the past, ultimate
success will depend on the experience, training, education, and vision
of the leaders responsible for the success of our national security space
program.
The space capabilities described above will cause military space professionals
in the future to shoulder a heavier burden than their predecessors. To
wring the greatest capability out of the medium of space they will have
to master highly complex technology; develop new doctrine and concepts
of operations for space launch, defensive space operations, power projection
in, from and through space and other military uses of space; and operate
some of the most complex systems ever built and deployed. Space leaders
will need to understand how space power interacts with all U.S. capabilities
in the pursuit of national objectives, as well as how U.S. space capabilities
might be used as the primary instrument of power in pursuit of U.S. objectives.
To ensure the needed talent and experience, the Department of Defense
(DoD), the Intelligence Community and the nation as a whole must place
a high priority on intensifying its investments in career development,
education, and training to develop and sustain a cadre of highly competent
and motivated military and civilian space professionals.
This paper examines military space culture issues addressed by the Commission
to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization
in more detail than possible in the Commission's main report. The paper
expands upon issues pertinent to and supportive of the Commission's tasks.
Specifically, it explores steps required to recruit and develop the cadre
needed to lead future military space activities.
The Department of Defense is not yet on course to develop or maintain
the space cadre the nation needs. DoD must create a stronger military
space culture through focused recruitment, career development, education,
and training within which the space leaders for the future can be developed.
In highly valued operational military career fields, such as Air Force
pilots and Navy nuclear submariners, military leaders have spent about
ninety percent of their careers within their respective fields. In contrast,
among those holding military leadership positions in DoD's largest space
organizations, there is little space experience. The lack of experience
is most acute at the senior levels of DoD's operational space organizations.
A review by the Commission of over 150 personnel in key space jobs found
that over 80 percent of the flag officers come from non-space backgrounds
and that as a group they average only about 8 percent of their career
in space-related duties (Figure 1).
The merger in 1994 of the Air Force's space operations and intercontinental
ballistic missile career fields offered more opportunities for operational
positions, but at the same time it had an impact on the overall level
of experience of space personnel. This was especially true of officers
commanding operational space wings, groups, and squadrons. A review
of records shows that roughly two-thirds of the commanders had spent
less than ten percent of their careers in space assignments (Figure
2). New space personnel management policies and new career paths
are needed to develop leaders with greater depth and breadth in the
space career field.
The American people will expect the leaders of tomorrow's space organizations
to have extensive experience in their field, especially in an era where
space weapons are likely. However, existing space career paths within
the DoD do not provide the depth and breadth of experience necessary
to support future space operations.
The Army and the Navy have each developed space cultures, but their
small relative size limits their impact on the overall military space
culture. Because of the overwhelming size of the Air Force space program
relative to the other Services, it has the dominant impact on military
space culture.
Eighty-five percent of space-related budget activity within the Department
of Defense, approximately $7 billion per year, resides in the Air
Force.
The Air Force provides the facilities and bases and operates and maintains
its assigned space systems to support the operational requirements
of the U.S. Combatant Commands. These activities include surveillance,
missile warning, nuclear detection, position, navigation, timing,
weather, and communications. The U.S. Air Force launches satellites
for DoD and other government agencies and is responsible for air and
missile defense and space control operations. The Air Force does not
develop, acquire, or operate the space-based reconnaissance satellites
on which it and the other Services rely for precision targeting, location,
and battlespace awareness. Those systems are developed, acquired,
and operated by the National Reconnaissance Office.
Within the Air Force, space-related activity is centered primarily
in four elements. Space systems operations and requirements are organized
under Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). The 14th Air Force launches
the NRO, DoD and selected civil satellites and provides range support
for commercial satellite launches. The 14th Air Force also provides
space-based support to the CINCs, and supports NORAD by providing
missile warning and space surveillance information. Air Force Space
Command develops all Air Force space requirements and works with the
other Services in developing their requirements.
Personnel assigned to the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) under
Air Force Materiel Command design, develop, and acquire space launch,
command and control, and satellite systems. The Program Executive
Officer for Space and the SMC Commander, who also serves as the Designated
Acquisition Commander, report to the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition on the cost, schedule and performance for the
programs in their portfolios. The Air Force Research Laboratory, also
part of Air Force Materiel Command, conducts advanced technology research.
The Air Force role as the lead service for space dates to the 1950s
with the creation of the Air Force Research and Development Command--the
predecessor to Air Force Systems Command.
The Air Force has since made a series of adjustments in the organization
of its space activities. In many cases, these responded to a growth
in responsibilities for space operations and space mission management.
In 1982, for example, the Air Force Space Command was created because
of growing dependence on space, the evolving threat from the Soviets,
the growing space budget, and a perceived need to "operationalize"
space.(
Despite official doctrine that calls for the integration of space
and air capabilities, the Air Force does not treat the two equally.
The Commission heard testimony that there is a lack of confidence
that the Air Force will fully address the requirement to provide space
capabilities for all the Services. Many believe the Air Force treats
space as a supporting capability that enhances the primary mission
of the Air Force, which is to conduct offensive and defensive air
operations. Instead, the Air Force should take steps to foster the
full development of space power by placing space on an equal footing
with air. One of these steps must be the creation of a culture dedicated
to developing new space power theory, system concepts, and doctrine.
It has only been 43 years since the Soviet Union launched the world's
first satellite into orbit, 18 years since the creation of Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC), 15 years since the creation of U.S. Space
Command, and 10 years since the Persian Gulf War, often called the
first space war. When compared to other career fields, space is
relatively young and immature. In addition, the space culture in
the Air Force has undergone continuous change. To chart the best
course for the future, it is helpful to understand the past and
how changes have affected the space culture.
The
Formative Era
In 1954, General Hap Arnold assigned General Bernard Schriever to command
the Western Development Division (WDD) in Los Angeles, CA with initial
responsibility to develop the nation's Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) program.
This organization was the forbearer of all Air Force space programs
and played a key role in early space reconnaissance capabilities. General
Schriever and his early space pioneers built the Air Force's first launch
vehicles and earliest missile warning, weather, and communications satellites.
The Air Force in Los Angeles was also a major contributor to the National
Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) early satellite reconnaissance efforts.
Geographically, the hub was Los Angeles, but other key locations were
developed such as the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) at
Sunnyvale, California, several world-wide Remote Tracking Stations,
and launch bases at Cape Canaveral, FL and Vandenberg AFB, CA.
The space professionals at these locations had strong engineering and
technical backgrounds. They gained depth of experience by rotating through
key jobs building satellites, launching satellites, and operating satellites.
Rotational assignments were facilitated because all functions were under
the same leadership using the cradle-to-grave approach. Cradle-to-grave
meant that a single organization was responsible for all activities
spanning the lifetime of a satellite program to include research, development,
acquisition, launch, operations, and disposal. From the beginning, there
was a cross flow of personnel between the Air Force acquisition organization
in Los Angeles and the NRO's Air Force element, known as Program A.
A strong bond existed between early Air Force space pioneers. Their
common focus was to win the "Cold War" in an era when our
Nation's survival was thought to be at stake. As a result, they developed
a common culture and sense of connectedness.
The Growth of Tribes
During
the mid 1960s until the late 1970s some key changes occurred within
the Air Force space community and three separate space cultures began
to emerge. The largest and most mature remained the group that had originated
in Los Angeles under Gen Schriever, but smaller space communities began
to grow within Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Aerospace Defense
Command (ADCOM).
-
Air
Force and NRO space activities in Los Angeles, Sunnyvale, and the
launch bases continued much as they did in the early 1960s. In addition
to space research, development, and acquisition activities, the
Air Force continued to conduct all satellite command and control
activities at the AFSCF and Remote Tracking Stations. They also
maintained their responsibility for most aspects of the satellite
launch mission. Cross flow of some space personnel continued between
the Air Force and the NRO's Program A, also located in Los Angeles.
In many ways, the organizations were quite different, but they shared
similar cultural and organizational philosophies. Coordination was
facilitated because the Director of Program A was dual hatted as
one of the deputy commanders within the Air Force organization.
-
The
most significant change during this era involved the assigning of
new space missions to two additional Air Force commands, Strategic
Air Command (SAC) in Omaha, NE and Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM)
in Colorado Springs, CO. Unlike their counterparts in Los Angeles,
SAC and ADCOM did not conduct research, development, or acquisition
of satellites. Their roles involved more operational space missions.
In these early days, SAC and ADCOM conducted a wide range of space
activities such as:
-
Operating satellite systems (such as the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program (DMSP) weather satellites and the Defense
Support Program (DSP) missile warning satellites))
-
Operating ballistic missile warning radars
-
Operating the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS)
operations)
-
Operating an operational anti-satellite (ASAT) program (Program
437)
-
Conducting limited launch operations (Thor).
To support each of these missions, SAC and ADCOM needed a cadre of space
personnel.
The Birth of the Space Operations Career Field
In 1970-71,
the Air Force created a new space operations career field in the Air
Force, designated by the officer Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 20XX.
Primarily residing within SAC and ADCOM, this new career field was initially
very small and consisted of a combination of some new accessions (i.e.
newly commissioned lieutenants) and numerous crossovers from other Air
Force career fields. Many of the cross flows came from the Air Defense
Control field, but other career fields, such as engineering and intelligence,
also contributed. As SAC and ADCOM matured their space missions, a new
space culture began to develop separate and distinct from the research,
development, and acquisition culture in Los Angeles.
The Ascendancy of the Space Operations Career Field
The 1980s
saw the establishment of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) in 1982 and
United States Space Command in 1985.
AFSPC assumed control of the 20XX space career field and eventually
assumed responsibility for all of the space operations in ADCOM and
SAC. From a personnel and cultural perspective, this was a straightforward
process, because AFSPC adopted many ADCOM and SAC personnel policies.
However, there were two events in latter half of the decade that impacted
the Air Force space community. First was the transfer the Air Force
Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) and all of its Remote Tracking Stations
from Space Division to AFSPC in 1987.
Second was the transfer of the launch mission from Space Division to
AFSPC in 1990.
The impacts caused by these changes continue to be felt within the Air
Force. Space Division, whose heritage went back to the beginning of
our nation's space program, felt the AFSCF and launch missions were
core to their research, development, and acquisition missions. AFSPC
took a different view and categorized their new missions at Sunnyvale,
Vandenberg AFB, and Cape Canaveral as "operations." These
decisions had numerous impacts.
-
Because
of the new missions, the 20XX space career field grew much larger
and gained new flexibility in how it managed its personnel.
-
AFSPC
personnel viewed the mission transfers as strong steps toward operationalizing
and normalizing space activities with those in the rest of the Air
Force. They forged ahead with efforts to bring a new operational
discipline to the space business.
-
Space
acquisition personnel found themselves on the outside looking in
as the decade of the 1980s progressed. As more Air Force space missions
migrated to AFSPC, senior leadership decided that AFSPC would not
develop a career track for the space engineering personnel within
the operational command. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) retained
responsibility for the career tracks of all space engineering and
acquisition personnel. This had a negative impact on the morale
and space career paths of space engineering and acquisition professionals
and reduced overall program continuity and expertise. It also limited
the ability of AFSPC to perform legacy system operations not designed
to be fully operational or sustainable.
-
Cross
flow of personnel between the launch bases, the Air Force Satellite
Control Facility, and Space Division program offices slowed to a
trickle. To a lesser degree, this also reduced the cross flow of
space experts between Space Division and the NRO.
-
New
acquisition policies and legal requirements levied upon acquisition
officers meant they were no longer able to pursue a space acquisition
career. Instead, their new acquisition career paths consisted of
jobs in space and non-space programs.
-
Some
level of tension grew between the NRO and AFSPC. AFSPC did not share
Space Division's long history of close support and common bonds
with the NRO. The NRO depended on the Air Force satellite Control
Network (AFSCN) and the launch bases, but were used to playing a
dominant role in the operation of these functions.
AFSPC felt they were the operational command and should be "in
charge" rather than accepting the role of supporting the NRO
as a customer like Space Division had done.
-
Over
time, some organizations perceived a reduction in overall technical
competency of Air Force space operations especially in the launch
arena. This was viewed as an overall increase in operational risk
by the NRO who responded in many cases by creating its own key processes
to keep mission risk at levels they considered to be acceptable.
Continued Turbulence
The
decade of the 1990s continued the pace of change within the Air Force
space community. Below are the key changes and their impact.
-
The
re-organization of the NRO in 1992 disestablished Program A and
moved most of the NRO's California-based functions to Washington
DC. Senior government leaders thought disestablishing Program A,
Program B (CIA), and Program C (Navy) were important steps to ending
destructive competition between the Air Force, CIA, and the Navy
elements of the NRO. However, this action had numerous unintended
consequences for the Air Force space cultures within Space and Missiles
Systems Center (SMC) (the successor to the Space Division) and the
NRO.
-
Ending over 30 years of physical collocation between SMC and
Program A caused the most obvious change. Physical collocation
creates its own dynamic in the way that organizations relate
to one another. The departure of the Air Force component of
the NRO changed the relationship between the Air Force and the
NRO.
-
The NRO re-organization also ended the dual hatting of the Director
of Program A as the Deputy Commander of SMC. This change, combined
with those described above, effectively ended the natural and
regular cross flow of space personnel between SMC and the NRO.
Certain levels of cross flow between the Air Force and the NRO
continued to exist, but to a much smaller degree and in more
limited areas than in the past.
-
A less obvious change was caused by the nature of the new NRO.
The 1992 reorganization created a new NRO organized according
to functions (Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT), Communications, etc). NRO personnel from the Air Force,
Navy, CIA, and other government agencies were dispersed throughout
the new organization without regard to parent agency affiliation.
The long standing Air Force, CIA, Navy identities within the
NRO began to dissipate.
-
The
Persian Gulf War in 1991 was a watershed event for the recognition
of the potential use of space at the operational and tactical levels
of war. The war also shone a bright light on the lack of space integration
into operational and tactical warfighting. The Air Force recognized
the need to make changes to remedy the weaknesses and many of the
changes involved the makeup, training, and focus of space personnel.
-
Gen Charles Horner, the commander of the Persian Gulf air war,
was assigned as CINCSPACE in June 1992. Gen. Horner embarked
on an effort to develop a new mentality within AFSPC and to
break down the barriers between space and the rest of the Air
Force. He challenged the status quo in every area where he felt
change was needed. He spoke out against the overwhelming "national"
focus of the Air Force and NRO space missions in favor of giving
military commanders much greater say in the priority and use
of national security space systems.
-
The
Air Force began assigning greater numbers of combat pilots into
key space positions to bring a warfighting perspective to AFSPC.
This further diminished leadership opportunities for career space
professionals, but rated Air Force leaders gained some level of
space experience that they were able to utilize in later assignments.
The Air Force recognized that Air Force warriors needed space expertise
and that space was crucial to the success of future air campaigns.
Recent major air campaigns such as DESERT FOX in 1998 and ALLIED
FORCE in 1999 demonstrated that the efforts started by Gen Horner
in 1992 paid handsome dividends years later. AFSPC's focus was firmly
on the operational and tactical warfighter.
-
AFSPC stood up new organizations such as the Space Warfare Center,
Space Support Teams, and the Space Division of the Air Force
Weapons School to assist in these efforts.
The major focus of these offices was to rapidly integrate space
support capabilities into air operations.
-
AFSPC
also created 14th Air Force at Vandenberg AFB.
The 14th Air Force commander was also the Commander of Space
Forces (COMSPACEAF) and functioned as the Air Force warfighting
space component to USSPACECOM. COMSPACEAF continued to mature
the Air Force warfighting focus of AFSPC and its people. New
concepts for the command and control of space forces and their
integration into the air campaign were developed and implemented.
COMSPACEAF's primary tool in these efforts was the creation
of the Aerospace Operations Center (AOC) at Vandenberg to interface
with CINCSPACE and Joint Force Air Component Commanders (JFACC)
around the world and to direct the operational Air Force space
units supporting worldwide military operations.
The changes described above created undeniable benefits for the Air
Force. They drastically improved the integration of space into the operational
Air Force. However, the changes further exacerbated the growing trend
towards less experienced and less technically trained personnel in key
space positions.
The Space Operations and Missile Cultures Combine
The disestablishment
of SAC in the early 1990s initially caused Air Force ICBM forces to
be assigned to Air Combat Command. This move was short lived and ICBM
forces were reassigned to AFSPC in 1994. Soon the decision was made
to merge the space and ICBM career fields into a new career field known
by the Air Force Specialty Code 13SXX. After nearly 25 years, the 20XX
career field faded from sight. This decision had numerous impacts on
the Air Force space culture.
-
The
first impact was the large increase in the number of personnel assigned
to the command. The ICBM career field was twice as large as the
space career field and AFSPC's new mass made it a much larger command.
-
Second,
the longstanding SAC heritage of the ICBM personnel was a tremendous
benefit to the strength of their personnel records. They had developed
finely honed processes to develop personnel and their records typically
outshone those of their space counterparts. ICBM personnel competed
better for key jobs and promotion and within a short period had
assumed the majority of the leadership positions within AFSPC not
occupied by rated officers.
-
Last,
the integration of the ICBM force into AFSPC infused the command
with a culture that placed a premium on the types of skills that
were necessary to command and control nuclear weapons. ICBM personnel
operated in a system with rigid operational and weapons systems
safety controls and mature logistics, depot systems, and operational
procedures. These aspects of the ICBM culture had positive and negative
impacts on the space culture.
-
The operational discipline brought into AFSPC by the ICBM personnel
was applied to many Air Force space missions that sprung from
the research, development, and acquisition culture within SMC.
Sometimes these changes were beneficial, but in some instances,
the changes were not made with a full understanding of their
impacts.
-
Accompanying this new perspective was the accelerated move to
reduce the AFSPC reliance on Air Force space engineers assigned
to operational space units. Though this movement started in
the early 1980s, it became more focused by the mid 1990s. The
rationale being that mature operations could rely on good training,
sound procedures, and strong logistics. By the mid-1990's reduced
reliance on Air Force engineers in Air Force space operations
was seen as an indication that efforts to operationalize space
were successful. As a result, the number of engineers began
to be reduced and they were forced to build their careers in
AFMC, especially as the senior leadership had decided not to
create career paths for them in AFSPC.
-
When the infusion of ICBM personnel occurred throughout AFSPC,
personnel policy began to reflect their culture. Highly developed
and mature processes allowed the ICBM professionals to accomplish
the ICBM mission with little requirement for technical education
in science and engineering. Instead, they were able to accomplish
their mission because of strenuous weapon system training and
exercises, stable operational environments, and mature logistics
and maintenance systems. As a result, very few ICBM professionals
possessed the technical backgrounds that were needed in several
20XX mission areas. To give ICBM personnel the broadest possible
opportunities in space units, AFSPC policy was changed to eliminate
any requirement for space operators to have technical backgrounds
as a prerequisite for entering the career field.
History's Impact on Space Culture
Each of
the changes discussed above brought a new emphasis on what skills were
required, what functions would be performed, what the priorities would
be, which organizations within the Air Force were responsible, what
the career progressions would be, and what senior leader experience
was required. Each of the changes may have made sense at the time, but
snapshots of the current military space community indicate that the
career field is not where it must be to support space operations in
the future. The unintended consequences of the changes that have occurred
over the past 40 years within the Air Force space community have increased
instability, caused serious reductions in depth of experience, fostered
inadequate technical education and training, and increased isolation
between various aspects of the space community. These shortfalls must
be remedied through aggressive pursuit of improvements across all aspects
of the space career field.
Existing
space career paths within the Air Force today do not provide the depth
and breadth of experience necessary to support space operations in
the future. The primary cause of this shortfall stems from how the
Air Force defines the space operations career field. Today the 13SXX
career field is called the "Space and Missile Operations"
career field. The career field is broken down into the following five
mission areas: (1) Satellite Command and Control, (2) Spacelift Operations,
(3) Missile Operations, (4) Space Surveillance, and (5) Space Warning.
However, there are several weaknesses in the current policies that
govern how the career field is defined and managed.
Lack of Depth Within Mission Areas
First the
current career path does a poor job of developing technical or operational
"depth" within any of the four space mission areas. The Commission's
research into the career backgrounds of space leaders and current career
path policy indicates officers rarely have more than one or two assignments
in a particular mission area over the course of a career. The career
path pyramid from the Air Force Personnel Center Officer Career Path
Guide for Space and Missile Operators illustrates the point (Figure
3). The primary weakness in the pyramid is that it is a one-size
fits all approach that builds space and missile generalists, but inhibits
the development of experts within specific mission areas or weapon systems.
Insufficient Breadth
The second
weakness stems from the manner in which Air Force space operations personnel
policies define breadth of experience. The basic problem is caused by
the one-size fits all approach described above. Currently, achieving
breadth for space operators in Air Force Space Command has several components.
-
The
first component is common to most career fields. Personnel are encouraged
to gain experience in a variety of operational and staff positions
such as crew member, crew commander, instructor, evaluator, flight
commander, operations officer, and headquarters staff officer. This
is an excellent approach to providing a long-term build-up of experience
in a variety of positions that increase in scope and responsibility
over time.
-
The
second component of AFSPC's formula for building breadth is where
the major flaw occurs. Personnel do not gain breadth within a particular
space mission area. Instead, they are encouraged to gain experience
in as many of the five space mission areas as possible. While a
broad space background in multiple space mission areas can be useful,
it cannot come at the expense of building depth for leaders who
must command units or organizations with specific space missions.
Today's approach does not strike the proper balance between depth
and breadth.
Segregated Space Communities
The third
weakness involves the segregation between the space operations, research
and development, and acquisition communities. Perhaps more than any
other area, space benefits from a unique and close relationship among
research, development, acquisition, and operations as spacecraft are
usually procured in far fewer numbers, sometimes as few as one or two,
than are tanks, airplanes or missiles. Cross flow across space communities--between
the operational commands, space acquisition commands and the National
Reconnaissance Office--is clearly desirable. Today, numerous barriers
restrict the cross flow of personnel between the space operations commands,
space acquisition commands, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
Current policies and laws foster space personnel systems that are increasingly
independent and insulated from one another. Space engineers, having
no career path in AFSPC and needing to meet acquisition career field
legal requirements, literally have abandoned AFSPC. The result prohibits
the free exchange of space expertise among the various organizations
that is desirable. Current management and organization practices, especially
within the Air Force, do not leverage space research, development, or
acquisition knowledge or expertise to benefit space operations, nor
do space operations personnel routinely infuse the space research and
development communities with their operational expertise and knowledge.
Unintended
Consequences of Space and ICBM Integration
The final weakness stems from the manner in which space and ICBM personnel
were combined when their career fields merged in 1994. Then and today,
the ICBM mission area is larger than all four of the space mission areas
combined and more than three times larger than the largest space mission
area, satellite command and control (Figure
4). Despite the disparity in size between ICBM and the four space
mission areas, the Air Force decided to fully integrate space and missile
personnel in an effort to broaden career opportunities for the ICBM
community and to bring more operational discipline to space operations.
While the merger had some benefits, there were a number of serious unintended
consequences on the ability for AFSPC to grow leaders with the levels
of space experience required for the future.
-
This
approach complicated the career field manager's ability to build
the proper depth and breadth into its officers because two of every
three operational positions in Air Force space command are ICBM
positions. When combined with the policy of maximizing the opportunity
for career ICBM personnel to serve in space positions, regardless
of their rank, a dynamic was created within the career field that
made it almost impossible to create officers with sufficient experience
in specific space mission areas.
-
As
already mentioned, one unintended consequence was the drastic reduction
of space experience among many general officers in AFSPC and among
the majority of space squadron, group, and wing commanders. Conversely,
career space personnel were leading some ICBM units despite having
no experience in ICBM-related matters.
-
Another unintended consequence was in unhealthy expectations and pressures
created on the ICBM personnel within AFSPC. During the early days
of the merger, young ICBM personnel were told that the future was
"in space," and they had to get space experience in order
to be competitive for future leadership positions. This denigrated
the ICBM career field that had a proud heritage and a critical national
mission. Soon there was a crush of ICBM personnel wanting to leave
ICBM units for space jobs in an effort to stay competitive for future
promotion. Personnel policies were adjusted to maximize the opportunities
for ICBM personnel to obtain space jobs.
As shown by the preceding historical perspective, the Air Force has
a significant and proud heritage in the space arena. However, the
challenges of tomorrow require additional changes. To improve the
manner in which future space leaders acquire the proper balance of
depth and breadth of experience, new career paths must be developed.
Future space leaders and commanders at all levels must have the right
expertise within specific space mission areas. They must also develop
sufficient breadth to allow them to successfully compete for and hold
the most senior military positions in the DoD. To accomplish this,
several steps should be taken.
Build Mission Area Depth
Changes
are required to ensure leaders acquire sufficient depth of experience
in specific space mission areas. Criteria should be developed for the
selection, training, qualification and assignment of all personnel who
lead, operate, design, develop and acquire each of the nation's national
security space systems. The criteria should encompass experience, education,
and training milestones.
It is important to note that the criteria may not be identical for all
space mission areas. Some areas may be less technically demanding than
others. Some mission areas may be similar enough to one another that
significant cross flow opportunities could exist between each of them
without impacting the ability to gain depth in one or the other. The
Air Force should carefully balance the need to build depth with the
desirability to build breadth.
Build Breadth Within a New Integrated Space Career Field
Changes
are needed to ensure future space leaders acquire sufficient breadth
of experience both inside and outside the space career field. A major
element of this change would be the establishment of a new space career
field created by combining the existing 13SXX Space and Missile Career
Field and those portions of the space research, development, and acquisition
career fields devoted to space related missions.
Breadth within the space career field should include experience across
space research, development, acquisition, launch, and operations. This
approach leverages the unique and close relationship between the various
space functions by encouraging the free exchange of space personnel
between each of them. Personnel leading operations units would benefit
immensely from the experience gained in other areas. Space research
and development communities would also benefit from officers with expertise
and knowledge in operational areas. This approach has numerous other
advantages. It enlarges the space manpower base and provides new degrees
of flexibility to career field managers. It begins to align Air Force
and NRO personnel practices in support of possible future mergers. It
could also serve to reverse the retention problem among space acquisition
officers by opening up new career paths and leadership opportunities
for them within the Air Force. The same benefits might also apply to
enhancing retention of space operations officers.
Space officers should also acquire breadth outside the space career
field especially as they rise in rank. At more senior levels, space
officers should gain experience at Headquarters Air Force, the Joint
Staff, or within a Unified Command. A higher percentage of promotable
jobs should be opened to space professionals to ensure they gain the
experience necessary to lead at the highest levels.
Separate Space Career Path Pyramids
AFSPC should
build separate career path pyramids for each space mission area to ensure
leaders gain the proper balance of depth and breadth over the course
of a career. The Air Force should consider adding new or redefining
current space mission areas to better match future missions such as
"space control" or "space force application." It
is also desirable to create acquisition and operations tracks within
each mission area to allow some personnel to specialize in one or the
other.
For example, a career path could be created for satellite command and
control officers. Air Force Space Command would need to determine what
assignments an officer would need to be qualified to be a satellite
command and control squadron commander or system program office (SPO)
director. It would be desirable for the officer to have several satellite
command and control assignments to gain sufficient depth and breadth
in the mission area. Below are some of the types of jobs that should
be considered to gain the right balance between depth and breadth for
a squadron commander or SPO director.
-
In
the operations area, the officer might perform duties such as crewmember,
crew commander, instructor, evaluator, flight commander, and/or
operations officer.
-
The
individual might serve in a variety of positions within a satellite
command and control SPO developing and acquiring satellites.
-
Satellite
command and control staff experience at the group, wing, numbered
Air Force, major command headquarters, or Headquarters Air Force
would also be desirable to provide additional breadth.
-
The
officer could be broadened in positions outside satellite command
and control. Assignment in other space mission areas should occur
early in the officer's career unless the other mission area is closely
related to satellite command and control.
Leadership Emphasis on Importance of All Mission Areas
The Air
Force must emphasize that all AFSPC mission areas are important to the
defense of the nation and to the United States Air Force. There should
be no actual or perceived distinction as to the importance of Satellite
Command and Control, Spacelift Operations, Missile Operations, Space
Surveillance, and Space Warning. Personnel must understand the needs
of the Air Force dictate the requirement to create the career paths
described above. Commanders at all levels must explain why each mission
area is important and that leaders will be required in each of them.
This step is needed to establish a vision within the command that values
the right mix of experience, technical skill, and leadership in all
of AFSPC's missions. Without this leadership emphasis, efforts to develop
the space culture the nation requires will be difficult.
New Emphasis on Recruiting Space Professionals
The Air
Force must emphasize the need for recruiting science and engineering
graduates from all commissioning sources to meet Air Force needs in
the space arena. Space is not the only career field with these requirements,
but an aggressive recruiting and advertising campaign aimed at building
careers in the space arena could attract more young people into the
field. Other incentives, such as bonuses and additional educational
benefits, should also be considered.
The Commission investigated other military career fields in an attempt
to find models that could prove useful to the space career field.
The Navy has an excellent model for developing highly experienced
and technically qualified officers to command submarines and submarine
units. Understanding this process is important to see potential application
to the space arena.
The career path for nuclear submariners has very strict job experience
and professional education criteria. For example, it is helpful to
look at the career path of nuclear submarine captains, the first level
of command for a Navy line officer. Captains of nuclear submarines
typically hold the rank of Commander, and this level of command is
roughly equivalent to command of an Air Force squadron. Before a Navy
officer takes command of a nuclear submarine, he has had at least
three substantial operational tours in a submarine and has qualified
as a division chief; engineering, navigation, or weapons department
head; and the submarine Executive Officer, which is the submarine's
second in command. He has also completed intensive schooling prior
to the assumption of each of those levels of leadership. By the time
a nuclear submariner reaches the level of a submarine captain, he
has acquired the equivalency of a master's degree in nuclear engineering
(Figure 5).
Obviously, part of this career path is predicated on the need for
nuclear submariners to safely operate the nuclear reactor on their
submarine and to ensure the safety of the submarine's crew under demanding
conditions. However, their career path has other operational and tactical
objectives. The Navy's philosophy is that the nuclear submarine captain
should be the most experienced and most knowledgeable individual on
the submarine. A submarine captain understands the design and engineering
limits of his vessel. He has performed and understands the roles of
all of the officers below him. He is an expert on tactics and the
employment of his submarine as an instrument of war. All of these
factors contribute to the overall effectiveness of the submarine,
especially during combat operations.
After nuclear submariners complete their initial submarine commander
assignment, they are more likely to be assigned to jobs that provide
depth outside of the nuclear submarine field. These assignments could
be at Headquarters Navy, the Joint Staff, or on the staffs of Unified
Commands. The Navy career path for nuclear submariners is broad enough
that they can attain the most senior ranks in the Navy.
The Air Force should consider this model as the core career path concept
for future space operations officers. It contains many of the elements
necessary to ensure future space leaders are the most experienced
and most highly trained people in the world.
The Space Commission recommends that responsibility for space career
field management be moved from the Air Staff to the Commander of Air
Force Space Command. This recommendation was made in conjunction with
two additional Commission recommendations--the organizational change
to place the Space and Missiles Systems Center (SMC) under AFSPC and
the management change to have the SMC Commander control all space
research and development priority and funding. The changes give the
Commander of Air Force Space Command responsibility for all Air Force
space operations, as well the organize, train, and equip functions
for Air Force space research, development, and acquisition programs.
To effectively oversee the development of the nation's new space culture,
the AFSPC commander must have authority to create a new set of space
career paths without the burden of meeting broader non-space Air Force
personnel goals. The AFSPC commander requires full management control
and authority over the existing 13SXX Space and Missile Career Field
and the portion of the current Air Force Materiel Command research,
development, and acquisition career field devoted to space related
missions. Without centralized management authority, it will be almost
impossible for the Commander of Air Force Space Command to create
the space cadre our nation needs.
In addition to the Air Force, the Army and the Navy also have highly
capable and long-standing space programs and space cultures. Army
and Navy space programs are relatively small as a percentage of the
overall DoD space program, but they are vital to their Service's missions
and the overall national security space program. Each has deep roots
in space research, development, acquisition, and operation of space
hardware. However, the focus of the Army and the Navy is to build
space cadres that contribute to using space in support of their missions.
Naval Space Command serves as the naval component of U.S. Space
Command. Its responsibilities include: operating assigned space
systems for surveillance and warning; providing spacecraft telemetry
and on-orbit engineering; developing space plans, programs, concepts,
and doctrine; and advocating naval warfighting requirements in the
joint arena. The Naval Research Laboratory conducts space research
and development in the Navy. Naval Space Command develops space
requirements for the Navy and Marine Corps, and the Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command acquires space systems. The Navy also maintains
a small Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP)
office to enhance warfighter use of national security space information.
Naval Space Command serves as U.S. Space Command's Alternate Space
Command Center. It is also responsible for operating the Navy Radar
Fence which contributes to space surveillance. The Navy operates
the UHF Follow-On constellation of communication satellites, is
responsible for the development and acquisition of its replacement
system, the Multi User Objective System, and acquires Navy ground
terminals. The primary mission of Naval Space Command is to provide
direct space support to Fleet and Fleet Marine Force operational
units around the world whether for routine deployments, exercises
or crisis response.
To perform their space missions, the Navy maintains a cadre of space
professionals. Unlike the Air Force, the Navy space cadre does not
comprise its own career field. Instead, the Navy creates space expertise
by educating personnel, primarily from the operational warfighting
community, through special education or experience. The primary
source of Naval officer space education is provided at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterrey, CA. The curriculum includes degrees
in Space Systems Operations and Space Systems Engineering. Once
officers complete their degrees, they are assigned to one of 253
space-coded billets throughout the Navy, the Joint Staff, and certain
Unified Commands.
Today, the primary focus of the Navy's space career field is to
further enhance the combat effectiveness of the Fleet by conducting
Navy space operations, integrating space into Naval operations,
and generating Naval space requirements. It is not clear if the
Navy has plans to develop a space culture beyond the one already
in place. Nonetheless, some of the suggestions stated in the Commission
report and in this staff paper may have application for the Navy.
Army Space Command, the Army component to U.S. Space Command, and
a subordinate element of the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command
(SMDC), conducts space operations assigned to the Army. Army Space
Command is assigned payload control responsibility for the Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and operates Ground Mobile
Forces terminals providing DSCS communications to DoD forces forward
deployed worldwide. The Army conducts space surveillance operations
from Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Satellite
terminal and receiver operations are spread throughout the Army
which are functionally based in units responsible for a particular
function. Joint Tactical Ground Stations are co-operated by the
Army Space Command and Naval Space Forces in Europe, Korea, and
the Middle East. Army intelligence units assigned worldwide operate
a variety of terminals and receivers that collect and receive space,
air, and ground intelligence.
The Department of the Army Headquarters approves Army space requirements
developed by SMDC's Force Development Integration Center. However,
Army Space Command and the Army Training and Doctrine Command also
influence the development of Army space requirements. Research,
development and acquisition of space-related equipment are generally
conducted within the SMDC, the Intelligence and Security Command
or the Communications Electronic Command. The Army Space Program
Office has responsibility for the operation of systems acquired
through the Army's TENCAP program.
To perform their space missions, the Army maintains a cadre of space
professionals. Recently the Army created a new space functional
area called Functional Area 40 (FA 40) within the Information Operations
Career Field. FA 40 officers are trained to assist in the managing,
planning, and integrating of space systems capabilities to benefit
the Army warfighter. To become an FA 40, the officer must attend
several training programs. First, they attend the Army Command and
General Staff College's (CGSC) 81-hour space elective. Next they
attend the Interservice Space Fundamentals Course. The Army is working
to further mature FA 40 training by developing a separate FA 40
qualification course to augment the CGSC course and replace the
Interservice Space Fundamentals Course. The Army is also supportive
of sending FA 40 officers to other Service space schools and space-related
degrees at civilian institutions.
The creation of the FA 40 career field reflects the Army's understanding
that space plays a key role in supporting Army operations. However,
there are two known shortfalls in the current implementation of
the functional area. First, there are few space opportunities for
Army officers below the rank of major. This makes it difficult to
build technical depth of an Army space officer over the course of
a career. Second, the FA 40 pool is very small. There are only 146
officer slots between the ranks of major and colonel and the Army's
officer distribution plan only allocates personnel to fill 80 percent
of the 146 slots. Despite these shortfalls, the Army is making good
progress towards the development of an Army space culture. Like
the Navy, the primary focus of the Army's space program is to enhance
the Army's combat effectiveness by conducting Army space operations,
integrating space into Army operations, and generating Army space
requirements. There are no indications that the Army has plans to
expand their core missions into space or to develop a space culture
beyond the one already in place. Nonetheless, some of the suggestions
stated in the Commission report and in this staff paper may have
application for the Army.
To ensure the creation of a highly skilled workforce, technical education
programs will have to be enhanced. Space systems under development,
such as the Space-Based Infrared System High and Low and the Global
Positioning System III, and future systems envisioned, such as a space-based
radar and a space-based laser, will be far more complex than today's
systems. Other career fields, such as the Navy's nuclear submarine
program, place strong emphasis on career-long technical education.
This approach produces officers with a depth of understanding of the
functions and underlying technologies of their systems that enables
them to use the systems more efficiently in combat. The military's
space force should follow this model.
Like the nuclear Navy, career field entry criteria should emphasize
the need for technically oriented personnel whether they are new lieutenants
or personnel who cross train from other career fields. This will require
new entrants to meet minimum educational requirements prior to entry
into the space career field. In some cases, this may not require an
undergraduate degree in a technical field, as long as the individual
possesses a technical background or aptitude that will allow successful
completion of training.
In-depth space-related science, engineering, application, theory and
doctrine curricula should be developed, and its study required for
all military and government civilian space personnel as is done in
the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and the Naval Submarine School.
This will require a significant investment by the Air Force to develop
the necessary schools and curricula. However, the investment is needed
to provide a career long path of education and training for tomorrow's
space leaders.
Below is a notional example of the levels of training a space professional
might need to attend over the course of a career. This example is
only provided to illustrate the principle of career long training
and education. Exact course content and course timing would depend
on the results of careful study by AFSPC.
Initial
Space Training
Initial
training would first focus on building a strong science and technical
foundation to provide theoretical background knowledge on space systems
design and operation. Subjects might include advanced mathematics, physics,
chemistry, thermodynamics, electrical engineering, materials, propulsion
and power systems, space communications, microprocessor and computer
operations, software, space environment, and orbital mechanics. Fundamentals
of spacecraft, launch vehicle, and ground system design would also be
part of the curriculum. This is only a representative sample of the
training that might comprise initial space training. The Air Force should
leverage curriculum from the Air Force Institute of Technology Space
Operations Master of Science program or the Naval Postgraduate School
Space Systems Engineering or Space Systems Operations program to support
this new training.
Initial Space System Training
Immediately
following Initial Space Training, the individual would be trained in
duties directly related to their first space assignment. This training
would certify an individual to perform crew member duties in a specific
space system.
Space System Acquisition Training
Space personnel
might need to attend some or all of the current Air Force training for
acquisition professionals. The content and timing of these courses would
need to be coordinated with other education milestones in the space
career path.
Squadron Operations Officer Course
Prior to
becoming a squadron operations officer, the individual would go back
to school to strengthen their technical foundation, refine skills learned
in previous assignments, gain a broader understanding of operations
and maintenance of their assigned space system, and study the employment
of their space system in support of joint operations. Specific aspects
of the curriculum would focus on science and technical refresher courses,
operations and maintenance practices, configuration control principles,
and anomaly resolution disciplines. Initial courses on joint forces
employment of the space system should also be taught. The goal is to
prepare prospective Operations Officers by providing them an in-depth
understanding of all squadron processes and functions involved in the
operation of a space system.
Squadron Commander Course
The last
significant element of the career long education would occur prior to
assuming squadron command. The individual would now receive the final
portion of their technical, operational, and tactical training in their
space system. The curriculum would consist of science and technical
refresher courses, advanced space system application courses, and other
concepts related the employment of their weapon system at the operational
level of war. At this point, the officer should be expert in the design,
engineering, and operation of their space system including hardware
and software elements. The officer would also be highly expert in the
employment of the space system in peacetime and at the tactical and
operational levels of war. The squadron commander would be among the
most knowledgeable and experienced of all personnel in the squadron.
As they
rise in rank, military officers typically remain in their assignments
for only a year or two. This creates fewer problems if the they have
experience and training in their specialties. But for senior officers
new to a specialty area, they barely have time to learn about their
job and system before they are reassigned.
Personnel in the space field suffer from:
This keeps space organizations from reaching their potential. Today,
many leaders of space organizations spend most of their assignments
learning about space rather than leading. This can weaken their effectiveness
as military leaders by placing too heavy a reliance on staff support.
Until space leaders have extensive experience and technical training
in space activities, longer and more stable tour lengths are desirable.
Space capabilities are already integral to all traditional air, land,
and sea military operations. They have contributed to U.S. successes
in conflicts during the past decade from DESERT STORM in 1991 to the
air campaign against Serbia in 1999. Soldiers, sailors, marines, and
airmen need an understanding of how space systems are integrated into
nearly all military operations particularly as new systems and applications
emerge.
Programs in the four Service's professional military education institutions
are key sources of space education programs. In all the military schools,
space education is gaining in prominence. Within the Air Force, space
education is now integrated into all phases of professional military
education. New Air Force lieutenants who attend the Aerospace Basic
Course are taught space fundamentals and space systems integration into
the tactical and operational levels of war. Other Service schools offer
space electives as well as optional space focus areas. The Naval War
College offers several elective courses allowing students at both its
intermediate and senior service schools to focus on space. The Army
Command and General Staff College offers a focused study program requiring
81 hours of space-related instruction. Students completing this program
are awarded a special skill identifier qualifying them to serve in space-related
positions in Army and Joint commands.
Despite the increased attention given to space within the military education
system, the core curriculum does not stress at the appropriate levels
the operational or strategic application of space systems to combat
operations. Military commanders and their staffs continue to rely on
"space support teams" assigned to them in time of crisis to
advise on the use of space capabilities. Commanders would be better
able to exploit the full range of combat capability at their disposal
if they were educated from the beginning of their careers in the application
of space systems.
The U.S. has been the world leader in space since the early 1960s. However,
the nation cannot rest upon the successes of the past 40 years to ensure
success in the future. A forward leaning vision for space and national
leadership will be an important element of our success in the coming
decades and will set the stage to ensure we develop space capabilities
to deter threats against and defend U.S. national interests. Without
a cadre of capable and dedicated space professionals, progress will
remain slow. However, the Department of Defense in general and the U.S.
Air Force in particular will play the most significant role. They must
aggressively develop a space culture to ensure leaders at all levels
are developed to lead our space organizations. Only with these actions
will the success of the U.S. national security space program be ensured
in the coming decades.
Acknowledgements
The
author would first like to thank his family for their love and support
during the many long days and nights working in support of the Space
Commission. In addition, he would like to thank his wife Victoria for
her final editing and for performing "comma control" on this
paper.
The author would also like to acknowledge the valuable contribution
of the following individuals to this paper: Mr. Stanley Chan, a senior
analyst for System Planning Corporation in Arlington, Virginia, for
his in-depth analysis of the career backgrounds of several hundred Air
Force and Naval personnel that formed the foundation of Commission's
and this paper's findings in the area of space culture; Maj Gen (ret)
Jimmey R. Morrell for his historical insights, substantial editorial
input and advice; Maj Gen H.J. "Mitch" Mitchell, Col (ret)
William E. Savage, Member, Col (ret) Eric Anderson, Col Thomas Cullen,
Lt Col Stephen Mitchell, Lt Col Martin Whelan, Lt Col Pat Almazar, Lt
Col Dan Jordan, Lt Col (ret) John Williams who each provided extensive
verbal history of United States Space Management and Organization since
the 1950s, as well as editorial input; Mr. Craig Baker and Mr. John
Luddy, NSSMO Staff, for their excellent editorial inputs; Lt Col Bill
Harding and Maj Jodi Jordan for their extensive efforts to gather career
background data on Air Force personnel in support of Commission analysis;
CDR Bob Burke and his staff, DCNO/N133C, for their time and patience
spent teaching us about the Nuclear Navy Career Field; Dr. Stephen A.
Cambone for his confidence and support on this paper; and last, to the
vision and efforts or our thirteen distinguished Commissioners, who
motivated and guided the author throughout the life of the Commission.