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"Each [Guidestar] is thus an integrated goal for high-level out-year planning by the defense and intelligence space commu- nities ... " |
(NSSMP) In the three fiscal years from 1994 through 1996, Congress indicated its continuing concerns over our basic management processes governing military and intelligence space programs. Accordingly, one of DoD's first major initiatives has been to get a comprehensive central and multi-agency planning process underway to guide our defense space activity for the long term. This process is being sparked by an NSSMP Task Force, whose guiding vision:
The task force reports to a Senior Steering Group (SSG), which makes recommendations to the JSMB.
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In the year since March 1996, our task force has defined and achieved multi-agency coordination for
specific long-term planning objectives, also referred to Guidestars. These Guidestars derive from prior studies, vision
documents, and current policy and strategy. Each is thus an integrated goal for high-level out-year planning by the defense
and intelligence space communities; its multiple Attributes (qualities or characteristics) will be fully defined in the final Space
Master Plan. The draft Guidestars, as reported out of the SSG, are listed below; they will be presented for JSMB review
during the spring of 1997.
 Our Space Master Plan is important because it will lay out a consolidated roadmap by which the national security space community can meet its long-term objectives in a systematic way. The Master Plan is also a vehicle by which DUSD(S), in conjunction with the DoD Space Architect and the other space communities, can coordinate and implement the policies and operational concepts that will be pursued into the 21st century. We don't expect to have all the answers as the future remains uncertain, but, as a "living document," it will keep us on a sensible path.
Space Technology Planning. Guided by the NSSMP, emerging architectures and recent vision and technology documents, we will need to flesh out our investment planning with respect to key enabling technologies for space. For example, we will need to harmonize concepts emerging from the Air Force's New World Vistas forecast with those of other Services and agencies to ensure a coordinated approach to national security space priorities, from which specifically approved concepts may be implemented. Our approach will incorporate several factors in an effort to integrate and coordinate the technology efforts of the Services and Defense Agencies:
This two-phase activity is providing a road map for systems development and investment strategy. Phase I, Architecture Development, is now complete, and the work has transitioned to DUSD(S) for Phase II, Architecture Implementation. Phase I products are consistent with the Operational and Systems Architectures defined in the C4ISR Architecture Framework, and the technical features of prospective acquisitions (under Phase II) are expected to be consistent with the Framework's Technical Architectures.
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"Our Space Master Plan is important because it will lay out a consolidated roadmap by which the national security space community can meet its long- term objectives in a systematic way." |
Continuation of Acquisition Reform. We need to support
the Department's efforts to help the Services and other national security acquisition agencies integrate improvements to our
systems acquisition process. Many steps have already been taken and many techniques applied, such as acquisition streamlining,
reduced use of MILSPECs, and increased use of commercial procurement practices. However, defense space acquisition has
some unique features and needs that require special attention if we are to pursue best commercial practices in an optimal way.
For example, we need to ensure the right balance between commercial and military system features for operation in lethal as
well as exploitative threat environments. Competitors could seek to exploit our space capabilities for economic advantage,
while opponents — overt and covert — could seek lethal as well
as exploitative counters to our space operations.
Thus, functional specifications for security and survivability may need to be more stringent than for commercial environments — or failure risks must be considered in the systems' operational concepts. Our space capabilities are a national advantage for the U.S., but they are perishable and need to be protected and renewed accordingly.
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"Our space capabilities are a national advantage for the U.S., but they are perishable and need to be protected and renewed accordingly." |
Resource/Funding Stability. At least as important as
active threats is the threat posed by instability of funding during a given time frame. Here is where the Government as a whole
needs to agree on space's role in the nation's well-being, the general capabilities required over time, and on the commitment
needed to acquire these in a prudent way. "Surprises," especially in high-technology applications, can always beset the
best-constructed program. These need to be taken in stride and
alternatives planned. While such long-term funding stability —
in the sense of adequate funding profiles for agreed programs — may
require both commitment and patience, the penalties for
instability are well-known from other defense arenas: they typically involve major cost increases and/or program cancellations
or restructuring, with shortfalls in capabilities and collateral effects in other areas.
Sustaining an investment course may not be easy while the entire defense establishment continues to shrink, but keeping and improving our space capabilities is not a poker game, where money tossed into the pot is "lost" until somebody wins; rather, it is more like a mortgage — an investment on the installment plan — where "payments" need to be sustained until the desired item, whether house or satellite, has been procured and beneficially employed.
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Focuses on the warfighter;
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