Navy/ Marine Corps Ballistic Missile Defense: Roadblocks To Interoperability CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Navy/Marine Corps Ballistic Missile Defense: Roadblocks to Interoperability Author: Lieutenant Commander Brian A. Goulding, USN Thesis: Lack of focus on area defense systems at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Navy Department is unnecessarily delaying TBM defense in littoral warfare. Background: The Navy and Marine Corps cannot currently defend against TBMs. There is a growing threat of TBM delivered weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a littoral operating area. To counter this threat, the Navy and Marine Corps have stated that acquiring an area defense capability against TBMs is a critical near-term procurement goal. However, budgeting priorities to date have not focused on obtaining area defense systems quickly. The Navy is devoting considerable effort in long-term development of a theater defense system which can compete with the Army's theater program. There has been little emphasis placed on fielding an interoperable data link which can support coordinated TBM area defense between the Navy and Marine Corps. Prototype components required in area defense systems have been built and could be used in contingency operations. Accelerating the final testing, evaluation and installation of area TBM defense systems for timely protection of naval expeditionary forces is proving difficult. Recommendation: The Navy Department and BMDO must concentrate their money and effort on fielding interoperable Navy/Marine area TBM defense systems for the protection of littoral naval expeditionary forces. NAVY/MARINE CORPS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: ROADBLOCKS TO INTEROPERABILITY INTRODUCTION The Navy and Marine Corps have operated together since our nation's beginning. Amphibious warfare was a critical early 20th century addition to the joint fighting skills of the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF). Late 20th century technological developments demand that the Navy/Marine team design new ways to accomplish power projection from the sea. FORWARD . . . FROM THE SEA is the Navy Department's strategic vision for the future. It describes our vital interests as "lines of strategic approach that stretch from the United States to the farthest point on the globe." Those lines end in the ports around the world where U.S. naval expeditionary forces routinely deploy. "The striking power of sea-based forces" can influence these endpoints and adjacent land areas or "littoral regions." Our littoral strategy adapts military power to the national policy requirements. Peacetime presence, crisis action, or major regional response are the tools that forward deployed naval forces have to defend vital interests. Naval expeditionary forces provide "the protective cover essential to enabling the flow of follow-on forces that will be deployed, supported, and sustained from the continental United States"1 during a major regional conflict. Hostile regional powers occupying critical littoral areas can threaten U.S. interests. Enemy tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) could deter our employment of forces in response to a conflict. These weapons can strike military and civilian targets throughout a region, disrupting coalitions, troop movements, and logistic support. Will the NEF's "protective cover" defend against a multiple TBM launch into a friendly center of gravity? Can the Navy- Marine Corps team defend itself against this threat now or in the future? The Navy and Marine Corps cannot currently defend against TBMs. The Marines' HAWK air defense system will provide limited TBM coverage by late 1996. The Navy plans to field a littoral area system by 1998. Some time after the year 2000 there will be a Joint Navy/Marine TBM defense. The Navy Department and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) are not focusing on procuring interoperable systems as soon as possible. Service specific priorities are delaying the development of TBM defense systems. Consequently, we will be unable to protect our sailors and Marines from the TBM threat for an unacceptably long time. THE THREAT Historical Background Major General Dornberger and Professor Von Braun met with Adolph Hitler in the summer of 1943 to discuss the potential of the V-2 ballistic missile. The V-2's phenomenal capability astounded Hitler. He commented, "Europe and the world will be too small from now on to contain a war. With such weapons humanity will be unable to endure it."2 Hitler wanted to destroy his enemies with 10 ton missile payloads in massed rocket attacks. Dornberger had the unenviable task of bringing the Fuhrer back down to earth. The V-2 was designed to extend the range of heavy artillery without the use of enormous artillery tubes. The missile delivered a one ton payload 160 miles or more. The V-2's speed and trajectory made it impossible to detect. The missile could attack bomber serviced targets with comparable accuracy (1-2km) without risking bombers or crews. However, with the industrial resources available in Germany, Dornberger knew that limited missile production could not provide the "all annihilating effect" Hitler wanted. Eventual employment of the V-2 validated Dornberger's expectations. The rockets performed as designed, but fell in insufficient numbers to achieve the decisive strategic victory that Hitler was hoping for late in the war. "An estimated 1115 rockets fell on England, about half of which (518) hit London and its suburbs."3 The port cities of Antwerp and Liege, Belgium, endured over 1950 missile attacks. During the fall and winter of 1944, German missile crews, organized in mobile launcher battalions, threatened to destroy the Allies' largest port facility at Antwerp. From September 1944 to March 1945, V-2 missiles caused over 38,000 casualties (>8500 dead) throughout Europe. The V-2 Campaign forced the Allies to divert scarce war resources to improve civil defense. Fortunately, the Allies overran German launch areas by March 1945. The world's first ballistic missile employment ended, but the worldwide ballistic missile threat was just beginning. Technology transfer from Germany to the United States and the Soviet Union after the war supported further ballistic missile development. When Sputnik shot into orbit on a Soviet rocket in 1957, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology was born. TBM technology matured in the shadow of ICBM development. Descendants of the V-2, 70-280km range missiles appeared in the arsenals of several Third World countries during the 1970s and 80s. Soviet sale or transfer of TBM technology to client states has been the major factor TBM proliferation. "Nearly all the ballistic missiles in conflicts since 1945 have been Soviet manufactured missiles."4 Sensing the growing threat of TBM proliferation, the US and six other western countries agreed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987. The Soviet Union was not asked, and did not volunteer to participate in the accord. Five years later in 1992, Russia agreed to the principles of the accord. The Peoples Republic of China and other Third World weapons manufacturers never agreed to the MTCR and continue to flourish as TBM suppliers. Motivated by economic necessity and politico/military influence, missile suppliers are expanding the number, range and lethality of TBMs controlled by nation-states with little experience in missile diplomacy. Current Developments Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons development complements missile acquisition in those countries determined to improve their strategic security. Samuel P. Huntington characterized this new arms race as West versus non-West countries: "Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously, as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power."5 Table (1) summarizes global TBM and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. In addition to international recognition, TBM capable countries can employ a strategic threat in negotiations with their non-TBM neighbors. TBM delivered WMD are a powerful military force multiplier for a rising Third World power. Two conflicts during the past decade illustrate the increasing importance of TBMs in warfighting strategy. The Iran-Iraq War demonstrated Iraq's willingness and capability to conduct repeated TBM attacks against Iranian population centers. Western intelligence agencies were surprised at the number (at least 300) and ranges (>600km) of the modified Scud missiles. The Scuds' inaccurate guidance system (1-2km) limited the effectiveness of the 500 kilogram conventional warheads. If those TBMs had been fitted with chemical or biological warheads, targeted population centers would have been devastated by contamination. Potential Scud delivered chemical munitions were of prime concern to Coalition forces during the Gulf War. Iraq's strategic employment of Scuds against Israel was designed to drive a wedge between Arab and Western Coalition members. Intense diplomatic pressure and the TBM defense provided by the Army's Patriot missile system prevented Israeli retaliation; however, Scud employment caused a significant shift in Coalition air war strategy: "an unexpectedly large portion of allied air operations was directed toward the difficult task of finding and destroying Scud sites."6 Click here to view image NAVY/MARINE TBM DEFENSE How will a U.S. Navy/Marine expeditionary force operate against a potential tactical ballistic missile threat in the future? FORWARD . . . FROM THE SEA describes a vital naval/air port seizure and hold operation as the primary mission of amphibious forces. In this scenario, enemy TBMs could inflict significant damage on port facilities and debarking troops, especially with WMD. The NEF must protect the immediate area of operations. Anti-TBM weapons must intercept enemy missiles before they reach the target area. Area Defense Area Defense systems will intercept TBMs during the final or terminal phase of the enemy missile's flight. The range of the interceptor missile and its associated radar limit the protected area on the ground. In an ideal engagement, friendly space-based or airborne infrared sensors detect the heat from a TBM launch and pass a TBM launch warning to ground and sea based radars. The radars begin search patterns to acquire and track the incoming TBM. An interceptor missile is then launched with guidance commands from a ground station. Final in-flight corrections would steer the interceptor to an impact point with the TBM. Interceptor warhead detonation would fragment and incinerate the TBM housing and warhead. Ideally, the intercept engagement would occur a safe distance from the protected port or airfield area. Theater Defense Theater ballistic missile defense will expand the protected area on the ground. Intercepting the TBM shortly after takeoff during the "boost" phase or during the mid- flight phase would protect a much larger area from missile attack. This defense requires space-based sensors that provide precise missile trajectory data or "cueing" to long range ground and sea based radars. High altitude, high speed, long range interceptors would complete a successful engagement. Killing high speed TBMs further from vital areas requires these advanced technologies. Long range intercepts are critical against chemical, biological, and nuclear armed TBMs. Intercept debris could contaminate a large ground impact area. The closer the intercept point is to the friendly operating area, the greater-the chance of debris damage. Army Patriot missile intercepts against conventionally armed Scuds during Desert Storm illustrates the point. The Patriot, an area defense system, intercepted Scuds during terminal flight. The "successful" intercept diverted the TBM from its intended target, but missile debris fell on other friendly areas. The ultimate goal in theater ballistic missile defense is to kill the TBM while over enemy territory. Theater defense systems provide the best protection. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is spending most of its budget on theater defense research and development. Proposed systems like the Army's Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) or the Navy's Light Exo- Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) will not be operational until early in the next century. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, discussed later in this paper, has delayed the fielding of these advanced systems. The Treaty does not restrict area defense technology. Expeditionary forces need area defense systems as soon as possible to protect them while they move ashore in a lodgement operation. In a 5 July 1994 memo to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps stated, "The first priority of the Navy and Marine Corps in TMD is the rapid fielding of the Navy Area TBMD capability... There is a compelling national requirement for this capability and we need to move out to obtain it."7 Area Defense Interoperability Proposed Navy doctrine calls for Aegis cruisers and destroyers to provide area TBM defense during the initial phase of a port seizure. Once ashore, Marine HAWK batteries would join the area defense network established by the Aegis ships. With shared TBM track data, the missile system positioned for the best probability of kill (Pk) would intercept. A seamless, expanding area defense of littoral battlefields using fully interoperable Navy/Marine defense systems is the ultimate goal. At current funding levels, this objective will not be achieved by the Navy Department until after 2000. Why do naval expeditionary forces have to wait for a joint TBM defense system? Current Navy Implementation Issues The primary reasons for the delay in area defense interoperability are money, time, and focus. BMDO, a Defense Department organization, is the sole source for the funding of TBMD programs in each service. To support TBMD improvements, the Navy must upgrade related systems that are not funded by BMDO. For example, TBMD modifications to the Aegis computer system are funded by the Navy, not BMDO. Currently, the Navy is developing both an area and theater defense interceptor. BMDO budgeting policy is attempting to maintain both missile programs simultaneously instead of focusing on fielding one vital capability at a time. Upgrading the Aegis computer system is not as easy as adding a new word processing program to an open architecture home PC. Aegis uses a closed architecture system. A change to any portion of the system requires reprogramming the entire system. Shipboard testing demonstrated that a reconfigured Aegis radar can track TBMs but the modifications require extensive debugging. At present Navy and BMDO funding levels, the first TBMD test ship will be ready in 1998.8 Along with a TBM sensor, the Navy is developing an area defense interceptor missile. The Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IV-A will destroy TBMs during terminal flight. The Block IV-A evolved from an earlier slower missile. It has an improved guidance system and more powerful warhead that will disintegrate an enemy TBM. This improved missile will not be ready for at sea testing until 1997.9 Marrying the missile with the upgraded Aegis radar is planned for the 1998 TBMD test ship. Improved radar and missile systems by themselves do not increase interoperability between the Navy and Marine Corps. Data links allow different sensor/weapon systems to exchange track and engagement information. The Marine Corps has the most flexible tactical data information link (TADIL) capability today. A recent Naval Sea Systems Command review stated: "Marine Corps tactical air operations center (TAOC) units operating near the Gulf (during Desert Shield/Storm) provided a partial and intermediate data-forwarding capability between the land and sea data links."10 TADIL-J or the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) is the common tactical data language between all services. Over a decade in development, TADIL-J languished due to lack of inter-service interest. The Navy relied solely on TADIL-A and is only now installing experimental TADIL-J receivers in deploying battle groups. Installation will not be complete on most Aegis TBMD ships until after 2000. Some Aegis platforms will never receive the installation.11 TADIL-J's critical role in joint TBM defense was reinforced by the introduction of a TADIL-J TBM message set that transmits TBM track and engagement data. TADIL-J is the most reliable link for relaying this type of target data at the speeds necessary to successfully intercept an enemy TBM. Seconds are critical in the high speed world of TBMs. The Navy's older TADIL-A link has a slower data transmission rate than TADIL-J. The Navy is upgrading TADIL-A to provide all non-TADIL-J battle group ships with a threat warning capability. The first Aegis TBM area defense capable ship (with improved radar and Block IV-A missile) scheduled for testing and evaluation in 1998 will have the improved TADIL- A link, not TADIL-J. The test ship will be capable of participating in contingency operations with certain limitations such as slower data transmission rates. The first operational Aegis TBMD ship with the TADIL-J/TBM data capability will not enter the fleet until 2000.12 The Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC) is a new technology that will complement the TADIL-J link. CEC links all participating ships' radars, forming a true sensor fusion. This process is different from all other data links that compare and transmit computer generated track information. CEC takes the raw radar measurement data on a target sensed by any participating ships and forms an extremely accurate composite radar contact. This fire control quality radar data is transmitted almost instantaneously to all CEC units, whether or not they hold radar contact. CEC is currently only a sensor netting system and does not have TADIL-J's engagement coordination capability. The Navy is hoping that the other services will buy into the CEC concept. The Secretary of Defense wants the program accelerated and he is encouraging joint participation.13 TADIL-J will remain the engagement coordination net, but CEC will control joint sensor data. The Army and Air Force have made a significant investment in TADIL-J. Moving to a newer technology before the older one is fully implemented could impede the Navy's efforts at improving TBMD interoperability. BMDO is funding Navy research on a theater interceptor. Aegis ships could provide the NCA with a strategic theater defense capability that is highly maneuverable and self- sustaining. Although a late starter in the theater defense competition, the Navy is demanding a bigger piece of the BMDO theater defense budget. This program will compete directly with a very similar and mature Army THAAD development effort. Theater TBM defense has technical and legal challenges. The US is still negotiating ABM treaty limits with Russia. Treaty restrictions have hampered Army THAAD research and development for several years. The Navy program will encounter the same roadblocks. Current Marine Corps Implementation Issues In lodgement operations prior to 1998, the NEF will need to establish TBM area defense quickly with improved HAWK assets. Without the Navy Aegis umbrella, the NEF remains completely vulnerable to TBM threats until the HAWK battalions are on-line. HAWK system upgrades, fielded by late `96, include improvements to the Battery Command Post (BCP), missile and launchers, AN/TPS-59 radar, and the new Air Defense Communications Platform (ADCP).14 Another recent unfunded initiative which could be fielded in 1995 makes software modifications to launcher remote terminal units (RTUs). TADIL-A (TBM message set) Aegis ships could transmit target data directly to HAWK launchers. The ADCP is the key to TBMD interoperability in the Marine Corps. This self-contained, motorized shelter contains an open architecture computer system that can process non-TBM TADIL-A or TBM TADIL-J data. It will receive a direct feed from the TPS-59 radar on TBM profile targets. ADCP will exchange non-TBM track and engagement data with Aegis ships on TADIL-A or TBM data with Army and Air Force units on TADIL-J. The preferred data network is TADIL-J due to its higher transmission rate and TBM message set. If the Marine Corps buys the TBM capable TADIL-A, then they can configure the ADCP to either talk TBM with the Navy or talk TBM with the Army and Air Force. The ADCP cannot talk to all three simultaneously due to module space limitations. High probability TBM intercepts with HAWK require cued surveillance and accurate target illumination. The Navy cannot participate in a TBM surveillance net with HAWK without the TBM capable Aegis radar and TBM TADIL-A link. There is a need now for a waterborne TBM surveillance platform that provides HAWK the expanded coverage necessary to track an enemy TBM. The ADCP has the open computer architecture needed to support further configuration upgrades. Diagram (1) illustrates the interim 1996 configuration with the ADCP receiving TPS-59 radar and TADIL-J inputs directly for TBM tracks. The TAOC cannot process TBM tracks. The unfunded final configuration restores the TAOC as the central processing unit for air defense coordination. The ADCP will then become a HAWK fire control shelter. HAWK will improve the joint ground based surveillance net. The upgraded Army Patriot (PAC-3) system, to be fielded in early 1998, will have TBM capable TADIL-J. HAWK ADCP units fitted with TADIL-J will be able to conduct full track and TBM engagement coordination with the longer range Patriot system. The HAWK interceptor is the shortest range anti-TBM missile in the US arsenal. A recent enhancement improved missile mobility, guidance, and warhead lethality, but the rocket engine was not modified. HAWK intercepts are limited to the last few seconds of a TBM's terminal flight. Intercept debris or contamination will be a concern in the defended area. All area defense interceptors share that weakness to some degree, depending on interceptor range. HAWK protected areas will be the most vulnerable. Click here to view image Source: U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Theater Missile Defense," Joint Theater Missile Defense Warfighters Conference, 18 October 1994. ABM TREATY IMPLICATIONS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TBM defense technology continues to push the intercept point further and further from the protected area. Increasingly powerful radars look farther, and together in a joint data link they can watch entire regions. Space based infrared sensors can identify missile launch and boost, thus providing vital early warning to defensive systems. These capabilities make interception of a long range, high speed ICBM a possibility. "Given some external means of cueing the radars, the air defense system could offer some ABM defense capability."15 Cueing sensors pinpoint the location of a ballistic missile and predict its future position based on the missile's trajectory. An anti-TBM system could use this information to point its radar directly at a predicted trajectory point in space and acquire an inbound TBM. A cued long range interceptor could knock down either an ICBM or TBM. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 limits the development of ABM systems. The Soviet Union and the US realized that technological advances in ICBM defense could destabilize the arms race. Restrictions were placed on defensive system research, development, and employment. Neither side could have an effective defense against the other's offensive strategic nuclear weapons. The Treaty preserved the deterrence strategy of mutual assured destruction. Technological advancements in TBM defense are threatening Treaty limitations. The Treaty writers had not envisioned TBM proliferation. Third World TBM capabilities drive the requirement for cueing, linked radar nets, and long range interceptors, but the Treaty forbids any improvement that can be used in an "ABM mode." Russia has not been eager to modify the ABM Treaty. They cannot afford the expense of a vigorous research and development effort. Moscow has focused on reducing the total number of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive. Washington is anxious to modify the Treaty. With a TBM threat looming dangerously on every littoral horizon, the US wants to shift to defense dominant, anti- ballistic missile technology. "The Clinton administration has proposed to Russia that the Treaty be changed to allow development of interceptors that could block incoming missiles with ranges up to about 3,500 kilometers or 2,200 miles."16 The Russians acknowledge the Third World threats but want to limit US defensive capability in order to preserve the offensive strategic balance. Moscow would agree to "BMD deployments that would not disrupt each side's retaliatory capabilities."17 Defense of littoral operations is a completely legitimate use of technology. Constructing interceptor systems that could protect strategic areas in the continental US goes beyond what the Russians will currently accept. CONCLUSION BMDO is the Defense Department's primary programming and budgeting agent for ballistic missile defense. They choose the funding priorities. They provide the direction for the TBMD research and development effort. However, parochial service interests influence BMDO decisions. For example, the Navy's theater defense interceptor program attenuates the focus on area defense for the littoral enemy. The Navy and Marine Corps must concentrate on developing an interoperable TBM area defense system as soon as possible. The Navy's desire for a stand alone area defense system is delaying TBMD interoperability with the Marine Corps until 1998. Aegis radar modifications and TADIL-A or TADIL- J upgrades could be fielded sooner to provide expanded sensor coverage to HAWK sites ashore. Using Navy ships as sensor-only platforms has not been accepted doctrinally. The SM2 Block IV-A missile development could be accelerated with the money currently being spent on the Navy's theater defense interceptor. The Army has supported a long term development effort in theater defense with THAAD. The Navy should remain focused on acquiring an area defense capability. A Navy theater defense role could identified in the future after the technical problems and ABM Treaty restrictions are resolved. Marine Corps TBM defense developments could benefit by increased focus as well. Buying an interim TBM TADIL-A capability would allow the ADCP to talk with Aegis sensor platforms. Money could solve the HAWK missile range problem. An extended range interceptor could be modified for HAWK. If BMDO is committed to preserving HAWK as a TBMD asset, then modest improvements should be considered. The ballistic missile threat spans five decades. Germany used V-2 missiles for strategic and operational goals. The superpowers conducted a Cold War race for mutually assured destruction. Now, we live with Third World tactical ballistic missile proliferation. Dr. Henry Kissinger recently stated: Mutual destruction is not likely to work against religious fanatics: desperate leaders may blackmail with nuclear weapons; blackmail or accidents could run out of control. And when these dangers materialize, the refusal to have made timely provision will shake confidence in all institutions of government. At a minimum, the rudiments of a defense system capable of rapid expansion should be put into place.18 Area defense is that rudimentary system. The Navy and Marine Corps must ensure that they focus on the timely delivery of a littoral TBMD capability. Our nation's confidence may depend upon it. ENDNOTES 1. Department of the Navy, "FORWARD...FROM THE SEA," November 1994 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 2. 2. Walter Dornberger, V-2 trans. James Cleugh and Geoffrey Halliday (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 103. 3. Gregory P. Kennedy, Vengeance Weapon 2 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983), 40. 4. Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World" Adelphi Papers, no. 252 (Summer 1990): 20. 5. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 46. 6. MAJ Steve Zappalia, USA, Joint Theater Missile Defense: An Army Assessment, MMAS Thesis (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, June 1993), 40. 7. Department of the Navy, Navy Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense, Briefing, RemtTBMD 071494, July 1994, PP401.4 8. Syscon Corp. Aegis Program Support Office, Army/Navy TBMD Implementation Schedule, Briefing, Mike Sapp, January 1995, Schedule. 9. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Sea Based Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Briefing, CDR John E. Carey, August 1994, mj-41768. 10. Jeffrey McManus, "Develop a Joint Data Link." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 121, no. 1/1103 (January 1995): 65. 11. Syscon Corp. Aegis Program Support Office, Schedule. 12. Syscon Corp. Aegis Program Support Office, Schedule. 13. Naval Sea Systems Command, Theater Air Defense Program Executive Office, Cooperative Engagement Concept, Briefing, TADCEC, September 1994, Summary. 14. US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Theater Missile Defense, Briefing, October 1994, LAAM Improvements. 15. Richard Garwin and Theodore Jarvis, Jr., "Non-ABM Technologies with ABM Potential," in Defending Deterrence: Managing the AEM Treaty Regime into the 21st Century, ed. Antonia H. Chayes and Paul Doty (Washington, DC: Pergamon- Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989), 84. 16. Thomas W. Lippman, "Missile Treaty Changes Opposed, Committee Warns Administration that Senate Approval is Needed," Washington Post, 11 March 1994, Sec. A8. 17. Jeanette Voas, "Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty," Adelphi Papers 255, (Spring 1990): 57. 18. Henry Kissinger, "Ready for Revitalizing," Washington Post, 9 March 1995, Sec. A21. BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Briefing Papers Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Navy TMD Division Briefing. CDR John E. Carey, USN. Subject: "Sea Based Theater Ballistic Missile Defense." 10 August 1994. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Program briefing. 94U-0635. Subject: "Navy LEAP Theater-wide Technology Development." 21 October 1994. Department of the Navy. Program briefing. REMTBMD1040594. Subject: "Navy Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense." 14 July 1994. GEC-Marconi Electronic Systems Corporation. USMC Aviation Command & Control Systems Directorate Briefing. Subject: "JTIDS for TBMD; Application to Advanced Hawk Systems." 14 October 1992. Naval Sea Systems Command, Theater Air Defense (TAD) Program Executive Office. TAD Command & Control Briefing. Subject: "Command & Control." 9 December 1994. Naval Sea Systems Command, Theater Air Defense (TAD) Program Executive Office. TAD Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC) Briefing. Subject: "Cooperative Engagement Concept." 2 September 1994. Syscon Corp. Aegis Program Support Office. Planned TBMD Implementation Briefing. Subject: "Army/Navy TBMD Implementation Schedule." 16 January 1995. U.S. Marine Corps. Joint Theater Missile Defense Warfighters Conference Briefing. Subject: "Marine Corps Theater Missile Defense." 18 October 1994. U.S. Marine Corps. Roles & Missions Commission Office Briefing. Subject: "Theater Air/Missile Defense Status." 31 October 1994. U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command. Air Defense Communications Platform (ADCP) Program Briefing Subject: "Air Defense Communications Platform." 15 September 1994. Interviews Brant, Katrina. TBM Defense Assistant Program Manager at U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command. Interview by author, 16 November 1994. Fort, Thomas, CAPT, USMC. Air Defense Communications Platform Project Officer at U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command. Interview by author, 17 December 1994. Lepper, Steven J., LTCOL, USAF. Deputy Legal Counsel at Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interview by author, 3 February 1995. Oxendine, Ron. Senior Analyst at Techmatics, Inc. Telephone interview by author, 20 December 1994. Perez, Samuel, LCDR, USN. Acquisition Specialist at Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Navy TMD Division. Interview by author, 3 November 1994 and 3 February 1995. Peterson, Steve, CDR, USN. Command & Control Program Manager at NAVSEASYSCOM Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense. Interview by author, 9 December 1994 and 3 February 1995. Sapp, Mike. Analyst at SysCon Aegis Program Branch. Interview by author 3 February 1995. Wilkes, Keith, MAJ, USMC. Former Air Defense Communications Platform Project Officer at U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command. Interview by author throughout the academic school year 1994-95. Reports and Publications Department of the Navy. "Forward...From the Sea," Washington, DC, November 1994 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994) Institute for Defense Analysis. "Role of Ballistic Missiles in Third World Defense Strategies." Unpublished report funded by IDA. Contract no. MDA903-89-C-0003. June 1991 Martin Marietta Ocean, Radar & Sensor Systems, "Warfighting Capability of the AN/TPS-59 (Modified)," unpublished report funded by Martin Marietta Corp. October 1994. Joint Publication 3-01.5. Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. March 1994. U.S. Naval Doctrine Command Proposed Draft. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense: Concept of Operations. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, 27 September 1994. Secondary Sources Becker, LT Miriam D., USN. Strategic Culture and Ballistic Missile Defense: Russia and the United States. MANSA Thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1993. Desimone, LCDR David R., USN. Theater Missile Defense Beyond Patriot. Unpublished research paper. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 1994. Dornberger, Walter, V-2, trans. James Cleugh and Geoffrey Halliday. New York: Viking Press, 1954. Fallon, Willard G. "Combating the Ballistic Missile Threat" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 120/7/1097 (July 1994): 31-34. Garwin, Richard L., and Theodore Jarvis, Jr., "Non-ABM Technologies with ABM Potential," in Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the 21st Century. Ed. Antonia Handler Chayes and Paul Doty, 81-111. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989. Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 23-49. Kennedy, Gregory P. Vengeance Weapon 2. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983. Kissinger, Henry. "Ready for Revitalizing." Washington Post, 9 March 1995, Sec. A21. Lippman, Thomas W. "Missile Treaty Changes Opposed, Committee Warns Administration that Senate Approval is Needed." Washington Post, 11 March 1994, Sec. A8. McManus, Jeffrey. "Develop a Joint Data Link." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 121, no. 1/1103 (January 1995): 64-66. Navias, Martin. "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World." Adelphi Papers, no. 252 (Summer 1990): 3-73. Rempt, Rodney P., CAPT, USN. "Killing Scuds from the Sea." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 119, no. 6/1084 (June 1993): 52-58. U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) Pamphlet MCIA-1570-001-95, Threats in Transition: Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1995-2005. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, 18 October 1994. Voas, Jeanette. "Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty." Adelphi Papers, no. 255 (Spring 1990): 3-79. Zappalia, Maj Steve, USA. Joint Theater Missile Defense: An Army Assessment. MMAS Thesis. Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, June 1993.
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