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3-1. The AAMDC not only performs a traditional C² mission for Army theater air defense forces but also integrates the operational elements of TMD for the Army forces. When the AAMDC deploys into a theater, the TOC plans, integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes Army TAMD operations. The TOC consists of five functional areas or "cells" that operate under the direction of a battle captain. These cells are derived from the AAMDC staff sections as shown in Figure 3-1. Three of these cells, the active defense (AD), passive defense (PD), and attack operations (AO) cells, perform current TAMD operations.

3-2. The other two cells-the plans/communications and administrative/logistics cells-are composite support cells formed from the AAMDC staff. The plans/communications cell performs operations and communications planning to support the three current operations cells. The administrative/logistics cell provides support for all current and future operations.

3-3. The TOC, shown in Figure 3-2, is 100 percent mobile with its own organic C4I systems and shelters. The TOC contains an integrated system of hardware and software known as the air and missile defense planning and control system (AMDPCS), which is used to conduct TAMD operations and execute the AAMDC mission. The configuration of the TOC can be changed if necessary to satisfy the requirements of the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC).

3-4. TOC operations are summarized below by functional cell and described in more detail later in the chapter under each TMD operational element:

• The Battle Captain is the focal point of TOC operations. He ensures that the TOC is properly configured and that all systems are operable. He synchronizes the planning and execution of operations and ensures that intelligence, active defense, passive defense, attack operations, logistics and administrative support operations are fully coordinated. During operations, he assesses enemy TM launch information, verifies alerts, characterizes missile launches, determines launch and impact points, maintains air situational awareness, and confirms that warnings are passed to affected friendly units. Throughout the battle, he maintains contact with external LNOs to exchange information on the status of operations and TM events.
• The Active Defense cell coordinates Army active air defense operations throughout the joint operations area. The cell displays air and missile track information from ADA and joint sensors and the locations and coverages of AMD units. During operations, it monitors the friendly and enemy air and missile situations. When enemy missiles are launched, the cell passes the TM launch information to the attack operations and passive defense cells.
• The Passive Defense cell develops and provides an early warning architecture and disseminates early warning to affected ARFOR units and, if required, the local populace. Through the use of IPB, imagery and displays, it determines which friendly areas are fully protected, partially protected and unprotected, and provides this information to battle planners. The cell also displays and monitors the friendly ground situation, warns friendly forces of enemy activity, and conducts TM vulnerability assessments for the ARFOR or JFLCC.
• The Attack Operations cell supports ARFOR deep operations and joint force offensive counterair (OCA) attack operations through analysis and targeting focused specifically against the TM threat. Analysis includes such actions as developing TM information requirements (IRs), building operational patterns and profiles, identifying trigger events, analyzing launch events, conducting countermobility analysis, and identifying information operations (IO) warfare vulnerabilities. Targeting actions include nominating attack strategies and submitting target nominations and mission requests. These validated TM nominations are normally forwarded electronically to the DOCC for immediate or preplanned execution.
• The G3 Plans/Communications cell performs a variety of planning and communications support activities. These activities include assisting in developing OPLANs and OPORDs, determining communications and data link requirements, and maintaining the communications equipment, including the TOC LAN.
• The Administration/Logistics (Admin/Log) cell monitors and advises the commander on the status of logistics functions.

3-5. Active air defense functions are performed primarily in the active defense and G3 plans cells, with support from the G2 staff. These functions include:

• Developing the TAMD intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB).
• Planning AMD operations.
• Monitoring and coordinating AMD operations.

These functions focus on force operations-the AAMDC does not directly execute engagement operations, which are the responsibility of the ADA brigades, battalions and batteries.

3-6. IPB is accomplished by the G2 staff. It is a systematic and continuous process of analyzing enemy air and missile forces as well as the battlefield environment to determine the most probable enemy courses of action (COAs). IPB allows the AAMDC commander and intelligence staff to assess enemy capabilities and intentions and predict when and where the enemy will strike and what assets he will use.

3-7. The IPB process is comprised of four steps: (1) defining the battlefield environment, (2) describing the battlefield's effects, (3) evaluating the threat, and (4) determining threat COAs. The active air defense portion of the IPB process is described below.

3-8. To focus the command's initial intelligence collection efforts and determine intelligence deficiencies, the staff must define the battlefield environment. This involves identifying characteristics of the battlefield that will influence enemy and friendly operations. The staff must develop a broad understanding of battlefield terrain and climatology, the geopolitical environment, and a basic understanding of the enemy's air and missile capabilities. Of particular interest to active air defense planners are:

• The location and type of assets to be defended.
• The location, size, and capabilities of enemy air and missile forces.
• The disposition and capabilities of friendly AMD forces.
• Geopolitical/other constraints that affect active air defense operations.

The staff obtains this and other pertinent information from intelligence reports (for example, the theater intelligence estimate, intelligence summaries, and spot intelligence reports) available via digital sources.

3-9. The staff conducts terrain and weather analyses to understand how these factors will affect friendly and enemy operations:

• By analyzing terrain characteristics (for example, elevation, ground slope, road accessibility, vegetation, overhead cover, and soil trafficability), the staff can determine the most likely locations of enemy TM activity and the avenues of approach for enemy air and cruise missile (CM) threats. Automated workstations within the TOC contain terrain databases that can be used in these analyses.
• By analyzing regional climatological factors and current weather reports, the staff gains insights into how the region's weather will affect operations and how seasonal variations in weather patterns may change potential launch areas and tactics. Of particular interest to active defense cell planners are the effects of weather on the enemy's employment of TMs and aircraft and the impacts on active air defense sensors and systems.

3-10. In evaluating the threat, the staff examines the enemy's air and missile capabilities, doctrinal organization, and tactics, techniques and procedures likely to be employed in combat operations. Using threat models and doctrinal templates, the staff systematically analyzes the threat, including the enemy's order of battle, and develops a set of general COAs that the enemy is likely to pursue.

3-11. Each COA is then evaluated and prioritized based on the staff's understanding of enemy doctrine, the battlefield environment, and the enemy's likely objectives. The intent is to replicate the set of specific COAs the enemy is considering and determine which COA he is most likely to pursue.

3-12. Planning for active air defense operations involves analyzing the mission, performing a defense laydown, assigning missions to subordinate brigades, and performing follow up coordination to ensure that forces and selected geopolitical assets remain adequately protected.

3-13. Planners first review the assigned mission and identify the critical assets to be protected. The assets are identified in the JFC-approved defended asset list (DAL). The DAL is a prioritized listing of assets by phase and is included in the OPLAN and air defense plan. The enemy situation is appraised by reviewing the IPB and recent intelligence information to confirm COAs and determine the types and numbers of missiles and aircraft the enemy is likely to employ, the locations of launch sites, and the ranges of these sites from the assets to be defended. Planners must also review the composition and disposition of the AMD resources available to protect critical assets.

3-14. After analyzing the mission, a defense laydown is performed to determine if available AMD resources can adequately protect critical assets. This is accomplished through the use of automated planning tools. The locations of enemy launch sites, protected assets, and AMD unit locations are plotted and the automated tools used to determine if the required surveillance and engagement coverages and levels of protection can be achieved. If required coverages or levels of protection cannot be achieved with available AMD resources, additional resources must be requested from the ARFOR commander or he must be advised of the risk to forces or assets.

3-15. Planners task-organize the EAC ADA brigades and then assign specific assets to the brigades for protection. The brigades then perform more detailed planning to determine which subordinate battalions and task forces will cover the assets. Throughout operations, active air defense planners coordinate with the brigades to ensure AMD resources are sufficient to accomplish the mission and coverages are weighted in accordance with the JFC's priorities.

3-16. As required (by METT-TC) the AAMDC may establish or participate in re-prioritization boards to recommend changes to AMD priorities on the DAL and adjustments to the defense design during the course of operations. The board uses an objective process that quantifies the level of importance of each asset based on selected criteria. Criteria are weighted based on consideration of the JFC's guidance and intent and his center-of-gravity concerns. Board recommendations are forwarded to the respective component commanders and the AADC, and are ultimately approved by the JFC. The AADC may designate the AAMDC commander (in his capacity as the DAADC) to chair the joint re-prioritization board.

3-17. The monitoring effort involves several functions:

• Monitoring enemy air and missile activities.
• Monitoring friendly air and missile operations including the status and defensive posture of AMD units.
• Providing critical active air defense information to the battle captain, LNOs, subordinate units, and other cells within the AAMDC.

3-18. Active defense cell personnel monitor enemy air and missile activity by observing situation displays and processing reports of air and missile events. The AMD displays provide a comprehensive, near-real-time picture of the air situation, displaying tracks from a variety of joint and Army sources. The reports provide information on track locations, identification, classification, the number of missiles launched, launch and predicted impact areas, and estimated impact times.

3-19. Active defense cell personnel monitor friendly air and missile operations by observing situation displays and processing tactical orders, reports, and information from higher headquarters, adjacent and subordinate units, and LNOs. The active defense cell AMD displays show the operational control measures currently in effect, unit positions, coverages, and primary target lines (PTLs). The reports from subordinate units (normally received digitally) include the commander's narrative summary, situation reports, and engagement reports. Collectively, these reports provide an updated, comprehensive picture of TAMD operations that includes:

• Unit locations.
• Unit state of readiness.
• Number and type of missiles available.
• Summary of recent activities/operations.
• Summary of anticipated activities/plans.
• Number of air and missile threats engaged, destroyed, and types.
• Number and type of missiles fired.
• Number of targets unsuccessfully engaged.

3-20. All of this information is continuously reviewed and assessed by active defense cell personnel. TM launch events and significant red air movements are immediately reported digitally to the battle captain and other cells in the AAMDC. Active defense cell personnel also coordinate with subordinate unit LNOs as required to adjust AMD coverages in accordance with the AMD plan or guidance from the battle captain.

3-21. The AAMDC supports TM attack operations through the critical planning, analysis, tracking, and development of TM targets by its G2 analysis section and through its attack operations cell and by nominating attack strategies and submitting TM attack mission requests. LNOs at key TMD nodes (DOCC, ACE, BCD/JAOC, and JFSOCC) also provide additional TMD attack operations expertise. TM attack operations functions are performed primarily in the attack operations and G2/G3 Plans cells. These functions are:

• Conducting IPB.
• Planning TM attack operations.
• Nominating TM targets and requesting TM attack missions for immediate or preplanned execution.

3-22. The IPB process described in the previous section applies also to attack operations; however, the focus is on the TM threat and infrastructure. This process must support early detection and tracking of air and missile elements including infrastructure. Early tracking supports preemptive attack operations and facilitates locating hide-and logistical support sites.

3-23. In evaluating the battle area, the staff must consider:

• The disposition, composition, and capabilities of the enemy's air and TM force.
• The areas the enemy may use to support launch-, hide-, and transload-site operations and forward operating base (FOB) operations.
• The locations of fixed air and theater ballistic missile (TBM) sites, and possible mobile TBM sites.
• The types of missiles and warheads used by the enemy.
• The disposition and capabilities of joint and Army attack operations forces.

3-24. In assessing effects of the battlefield, the staff considers how terrain factors and existing road networks might affect the movement of launcher and support vehicles or impact resupply and transload activities. They assess how changes in the weather may change potential operating areas or otherwise affect the conduct of enemy air and TM operations. They also assess the impact of terrain and weather on joint and Army attack operations and capabilities.

3-25. In evaluating the threat, the staff analyzes the enemy order of battle (EOB), performs mobility and temporal analyses, and examines TM doctrine and tactics with the goal of developing doctrinal templates and identifying high value targets.

• In analyzing the EOB, the staff looks at the organizational structure of air and missile units including such data as the number of transporter-erector launchers (TELs) or mobile erector launchers (MELs); transloading assets and capabilities; transportation assets and capabilities; the types (and numbers) of missiles and warheads; and the accuracy of the missiles. They also examine the command structure, equipment condition and status, and the level of experience and training of enemy troops.
• In assessing mobility, the staff looks at terrain and other mobility limitations that affect deployment and launch of aircraft and TMs. They also examine the operational ranges of launch units and support vehicles and the doctrinal distances between firing sites, hide sites, transload sites, FOBs, battalion-size support bases, and missile support bases.
• With respect to temporal analyses, the staff examines how the battlefield environment and other factors affect the tempo and sustainability of air and TM operations. They also determine typical transload times, missile checkout times, launch countdown timelines, and rates of fire.
• With respect to doctrine and tactics, the staff assesses how the enemy is likely to conduct air and TM launch operations, how the C⁴I and logistic infrastructures are used to support these operations, and how they may be exploited to disrupt air and TM operations.

3-26. In this phase, the staff compiles and integrates the information gathered in the previous phases to determine the most likely enemy COA, identify high priority targets, and lay the groundwork for intelligence collection requirements. After considering the previous analyses of weather, terrain, enemy capabilities, doctrine, tactics and infrastructure, the staff identifies the most likely COAs. They also examine air and TM vulnerabilities and decisive points and determine which high value targets (HVTs) are likely to become high payoff targets (HPTs). Using doctrinal templates, they assess where the various elements of the air and TM infrastructure (airbases, FOBs, transload sites, hide sites, and launch sites) are likely to be located. These become named areas of interest and drive intelligence collection requirements.

3-27. The AAMDC has a strong supporting role in TAMD IPB attack strategy development, and the target development process. The attack operations cell in coordination with AAMDC intelligence personnel and the ACE provide detailed target intelligence to the DOCC and recommend TM attack strategy and plans. AAMDC intelligence personnel assist the ACE in the TM portion of the IPB effort by providing dedicated analysts and subject matter experts.

3-28. The AAMDC G2 may deploy to the ACE a liaison team equipped with the necessary equipment to establish connectivity to intelligence resources. If deployed, the LNO team collects information for the AAMDC and passes information requirements to the ACE collection manager. Recommendations for collection support for TAMD IPB are made to the ACE for incorporation in the joint force collection strategy.

3-29. The G2 analysis section supports the attack operations cell by analyzing launch events, conducting countermobility analyses, refining and validating the IPB, nominating deliberate targets 72-96 hours out, analyzing post-launch events, building tracking profiles, and disseminating intelligence products and reports for the ARFOR commander or JFLCC.

3-30. The AAMDC G2 leverages all intelligence sources to develop a comprehensive TM intelligence picture. AAMDC G2 personnel may establish intelligence collaboration efforts with their intelligence counterparts at the JAOC through digital and voice means or the AAMDC LNO team deployed to support the DAADC and AADC. TM analysts in the AAMDC G2 section and the JAOC may collaborate in AMD IPB development and share near-real-time target intelligence. Intelligence collaboration between component TMD nodes ensures that all available TM information is fused, limited collection resources are efficiently used, and operational level decision-makers have the best analysis available.

3-31. At the Joint Task Force (JTF) level, the JFC issues targeting guidance and priorities to establish how air- and surface-delivered fires will be used to accomplish his objectives. When established, the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) assists the JFC in providing targeting guidance and priorities for the campaign. The AAMDC commander should be a member of the JTCB to provide a TM focus to the process. The JFACC Staff at the JAOC is heavily involved in the JFC's campaign through the production and execution of the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO ultimately assigns aircraft and weapons against targets and runs for a theater-specific time period, usually 24 hours. The length of the ATO development cycle is also theater-specific, but usually ranges between 48- and 96-hours. The ARFOR DOCC is responsible for coordinating ARFOR deep operations and targeting outside the ARFOR AO with the ATO planners at the JAOC. Targets identified for attack by the AAMDC G2 and attack operations section are nominated to the DOCC for prosecution, either as preplanned targets or immediate targets.

3-32. Preplanned targets are targets with lengthy dwell times that can be engaged via assets on the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Preplanned targets include TBM production and storage facilities, SSM garrisons, stationary FOBs, communications nodes, and countermobility targets such as bridges and mining chokepoints. These verified nominations are submitted to the DOCC for inclusion in the ARFOR candidate target list (CTL). The CTL represents targets recommended for attack which support the ARFOR plan within the JFC's overall campaign plan. The CTL is passed to the Army BCD for coordination and deconfliction and then submitted to the JAOC. The master air attack planning (MAAP) team in the combat plans division of the JAOC takes the ARFOR CTL and combines and prioritizes it with the nominations on the other components' CTLs to produce the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). The JIPTL is the basis for the ATO.

3-33. Early and continuous IPB collaboration may expedite the JIPTL process by establishing a common TM intelligence picture to support and justify target nominations. Collaborating before actual target nominations are submitted improves the quality of analysis, prevents unnecessary target duplication, provides the opportunity to discuss priorities in support of strategy, coordinates surveillance area requests, minimizes redundancies, and creates a synergy in TM target development.

3-34. Potential TSTs should be determined during the planning process. This enables target nomination and early selection of primary attack means, which will significantly reduce the time from detection to attack. Ideally attack means are given ROE for attack of targets in their area, which allows them to engage immediately on detection and identification of the TST.

3-35. While preplanned targets are an integral part of an overall TM attack strategy, immediate targeting is also essential to the successful conduct of TM attack operations. TM IPB does not stop after planning. It is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment. Through this analysis, target areas are refined and collections are focused so that ultimately, short dwell or immediate targets become identifiable and engageable. Immediate targets-those that must be attacked inside the normal ATO planning cycle-are also submitted to the DOCC via a request and nominations process similar to that used for preplanned targets. Examples of immediate targets are mobile FOBs, missile transload sites, TEL hide sites, and launch sites. When identified by the AAMDC, these targets are forwarded to the DOCC fire support element (FSE), which processes the request. If the request is approved and the target is serviceable with Army assets, it is forwarded to the BCD for airspace clearance and to the executing unit for attack. If not serviceable by Army assets, the request is forwarded to the BCD, which then passes it to the execution cell in the combat operations division of the JAOC for tasking to available aircraft.

3-36. The AAMDC may have attack operations LNOs deployed at the DOCC and the BCD/JAOC to facilitate TMD attack operations and keep the attack operations cell informed of the status of target nominations and all available attack assets. See Figure 3-3 for TM attack operations connectivity.

3-37. Passive air defense functions are performed primarily in the passive defense cell. These functions are planning and executing passive air defense operations.

3-38. The passive defense cell plans, coordinates, and executes passive air defense warning operations for the ARFOR to minimize the effectiveness of attacking aircraft, missiles, and threat surveillance . The passive defense cell normally plans and coordinates operations 72 hours in advance. Passive defense cell plans are created with a firm understanding of the TAMD IPB, while passive defense cell planners assist the AAMDC G2 with developing nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) intelligence. The passive defense cell contributes to the development of the AMD plan and plans for a warning architecture that can disseminate both general and specific warnings to the force. General warnings indicate that attacks are imminent or have occurred, while specific warnings signify that only certain units or areas are in danger of attack.

3-39. The passive defense cell must develop and maintain an accurate, coherent, tactical picture of friendly land forces to ensure that these forces can be quickly warned if a TM or air threat is launched or an NBC event occurs. Information technology displays and supporting databases provide the exact locations and the identity of friendly forces. These databases are updated at frequent intervals from various joint sources. Using these databases, the passive defense cell can maintain an accurate friendly picture that includes virtually all of the Army, joint, and multinational forces that the AAMDC must warn.

3-40. Concurrently with developing the friendly picture, passive defense cell planners must decide how air, missile, and NBC warnings will be disseminated. Communications means and procedures will vary with the theater of operations. Warning will normally be transmitted by data and voice for redundancy. Planners may elect to use existing communications capabilities in the theater to facilitate warning of attack-specifically, the air defense early warning architecture-or use an alternative means such as a pager alert warning system.

3-41. A pager alert warning system may expand the existing data warning architecture, distribute warning directly to the lowest levels of the force, and allow flexibility in warning only affected units. If a pager alert warning system is used, the passive defense cell, after a thorough analysis based on METT-TC, recommends which units will receive the pagers in a pager distribution plan. If the number of available pagers is insufficient to equip all units, the passive defense cell planners will recommend alternate methods of warning the units without pagers.

3-42. The passive defense cell must also conduct vulnerability analyses within the ARFOR/JFLCC area of responsibility to ensure personnel and equipment will survive an air, missile or NBC attack with minimum casualties and damage. Analyses will focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In conducting vulnerability analyses, planners must consider a number of factors including hardening, redundancy, dispersal, civil authority training, and NBC defense. Passive defense planners will ensure that AMD forces are aware of the locations of engineer support units, chemical decontamination units, medical facilities, and host nation and other support facilities to assist recovery and reconstitution efforts. In order to advise the commander in a timely manner, passive defense cell planners will have information systems to quickly produce vulnerability analyses against various threat courses of action or scenarios.

3-43. Passive defense cell planners will ensure their passive air defense procedures and plans are current and relevant to the theater in which the AAMDC is deployed. They will also assist in developing theater procedures and plans and share information and expertise with other component passive defense cells. Planners may also be called upon to assist in development of theater deception plans.

3-44. The passive defense cell tracks friendly forces and monitors ARFOR or JFLCC ground and TAMD operations to assist it in performing its primary function of disseminating warnings to the force. The cell also monitors the DAL and active air defense operations conducted to protect priority assets. Reports of enemy air activity and TM launches are provided digitally by several joint sources in near real time to information workstations within the cell. The workstations display the air and missile activity including the number of missiles launched, launch locations, and predicted impact areas and times.

3-45. Other workstations receive reports of NBC events and display the type of event, type of burst or agent, area of contamination, downwind hazard, and the units affected. The cell has the ability to predict ground effects of WMD from identified incoming TMs and pass that information immediately to affected units. Passive defense cell personnel also can receive joint force information, intelligence information, and weather data to aid in current operational decisions.

3-46. The passive defense cell disseminates general and specific warnings based on receipt of the above information. This is shown in Figure 3-4.

3-47. Liaison teams, commonly referred to as coordination teams, are essential in joint and multinational TAMD operations. They facilitate understanding, coordination, synchronization, and mission accomplishment. Liaison personnel must be familiar with the staff and operational organizations, doctrine, and procedures of the headquarters or element with which they will work as well as being subject matter experts on ARFOR and AAMDC air and missile defense capabilities. AAMDC liaison requirements are fulfilled through dedicated liaison personnel and information technology systems.

3-48. AAMDC liaison teams may deploy to all major theater C² headquarters including the JFLCC, JFACC/AADC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC, and to the ARFOR elements of the DOCC, BCD, and ACE. In particular, the AAMDC normally deploys a robust liaison team to the AADC location to support the DAADC and the AADC and to integrate with the JAOC and BCD. The liaison team is led by a senior ADA officer when the DAADC is not present and may consist of active air defense, attack operations, and IPB experienced personnel to execute 24-hour TAMD operations. Liaison team equipment and support requirements are listed in Figure A-9.

3-49. Force projection operations usually begin as a rapid response to a crisis somewhere in the world. Deployed forces, communication facilities, and geopolitical assets will need protection from air surveillance and from air and missile attack. AMD forces must be lethal, modular, versatile, and tactically and strategically mobile to accomplish the mission.

3-50. Military forces are mobilized in response to a situation requiring military intervention. Rapid mobilization of the reserve component piece of the AAMDC is critical during this stage and must be planned and rehearsed in advance. During mobilization and predeployment, the ARFOR (or JFLCC) uses the AAMDC to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and execute TAMD within the assigned AO. The AAMDC establishes communications with and sends liaisons to the ARFOR or JFLCC staff and other units, organizations, and agencies as required. Normally, the AAMDC sends an initial coordination element (ICE) of planners and logistics personnel into theater to start planning and coordination. The ICE is followed by a larger advance party to continue planning and lay the groundwork for the deployment and reception of the main body and the TOC equipment.

3-51. Although planning is an ongoing process, the AAMDC works in coordination with the ARFOR or JFLCC commander and his staff to convert the command's contingency plan (CONPLAN) to an OPLAN. The AAMDC conducts analysis and assessment activities, participates in the decision-making process, and assists in the development of the operations order. The AAMDC uses automated planning capabilities to develop the air and missile defense annex to the ARFOR's/JFLCC's plan and synchronizes it with the joint force and other component OPLAN(s). Planning cells within the AAMDC will conduct detailed planning and assessment activities for entry and follow-on operations.

3-52. During the mobilization and predeployment stage, numerous concurrent activities for planning and execution will continue. The ARFOR or JFLCC uses the AAMDC to validate possible air and missile threat scenarios and COAs. The IPB serves as the basis for determining the most effective deployment strategy, development of the ARFOR's/JFLCC's intelligence plan, and the appropriate mix of weapons, sensors, and capabilities to counter the anticipated TM and air threat for each phase of the operation. During this stage, the AAMDC:

• Conducts air and missile IPB.
• Participates in TAMD planning.
• Plans ARFOR/JFLCC TAMD operations.
• Assesses AMD architecture and recommends changes as needed.
• Develops force packages for subsequent force projection stages.
• Assesses unit readiness status.
• Plans deployment of LNO teams as required.
• Plans communications and multi-tactical digital information link (TADIL) network architecture.
• Assesses passive defense capabilities.
• Plans for follow-on TAMD operations.
• Plans for logistic support operations (sustainment requirements).
• Plans for movement.

3-53. Deployment and entry operations are characterized by rapid deployment of forces into the theater of operations. As part of the Army's initial force projection capability, the AAMDC is deployed to the theater under the command of the ARFOR or the operational control of the JFLCC. This force will include the TOC, command group, LNO teams, and essential staff sections. Upon arrival in theater, the AAMDC establishes connectivity through the Army's C4I architecture and joint interfaces as required and establish linkages to joint, multinational, and national C⁴I systems.

3-54. The AAMDC represents the ARFOR or JFLCC during joint planning on TAMD issues. The AAMDC monitors enemy activities using intelligence provided by available national and theater intelligence sources. The AAMDC continuously processes and reviews intelligence information, collects battle damage assessment (BDA), and assesses the enemy situation. LNO teams continue to deploy as required. During this stage, the AAMDC:

• Participates in the JFLCC J3/J5 or ARFOR G3 planning cell by providing TAMD input to plans.
• Integrates intelligence from deployed sensors to provide the ARFOR or JFLCC situational awareness.
• Refines the air and missile IPB picture and requirements.
• Conducts criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and threat (CVRT) analysis.
• Recommends changes to improve passive defense.
• Monitors operations security (OPSEC).
• Monitors friendly and enemy air operations.
• Recommends AMD architecture designs.
• Recommends AMD priorities in coordination with operational maneuver plans.
• Executes logistic support functions.
• Coordinates with the JFACC/AADC/ACA and other components as required.
• Coordinates and implements AMD early warning procedures.
• Assists in coordination of TM targets and targeting priorities.
• Provides theater AMD expertise.
• Monitors ADA unit locations and status.
• Task organizes and assigns missions to EAC ADA brigades as required.

3-55. The AAMDC supports the ARFOR or JFLCC by providing effective land-based active air defense to protect maneuver forces and the JFC's priority assets. The AAMDC assists in implementing passive air defense measures throughout the AO and provides attack strategy recommendations to the ARFOR and JFACC staffs for planning and coordinating of preplanned and immediate missions. The AAMDC plans, coordinates, monitors, integrates, and sustains Army TAMD operations and recommends adjustments to the DAL. During this stage, the AAMDC:

• Provides the TAAMDCOORD to the ARFOR or JFLCC.
• Integrates Army TAMD operations.
• Provides the Deputy AADC when designated by the JFC or AADC.
• Provides an LNO team to support the DAADC and AADC and other LNO teams to support other theater C2 nodes and ARFOR elements.
• Monitors theater-wide combat service support (CSS) for ADA units including allocation of missile and repair parts to EAC and corps ADA brigades according to the ARFOR or JFLCC, and JFC priorities.
• Provides early warning according to warning release criteria.
• Supports the ARFOR or JFLCC by processing and disseminating TAMD information to EAC, corps, and division C² nodes.
• Establishes or assists in establishing a re-prioritization board to recommend changes to the DAL and the defense design to the COMARFOR and/or the AADC.

3-56. Postconflict and redeployment operations generally take place after cessation of hostilities and accomplishment of the primary mission by the deployed force. Reconstitution activities support the redeployment. The AAMDC task organizes active air defense forces based on reassessed JFC and ARFOR priorities and the DAL. AMD forces may maintain an alert or ready status during this stage to protect the force. Additionally, AAMDC may make recommendations on AMD elements to remain behind for stability and support operations. During this stage, the AAMDC:

• Consolidates forces for redeployment and reconstitutes remaining air and missile defense forces to a full readiness capability.
• Requests theater sensors and intelligence resources in sufficient quantities to provide continuous (though possibly reduced) early warning and intelligence coverage during postconflict operations.
• Recommends the size, composition, and mission guidelines for stay behind forces to the ARFOR or JFLCC commander.

3-57. Because of the AAMDC's unique composition of active component and reserve component personnel, demobilization for reserve component personnel must be planned in advance. The AAMDC establishes procedures, actions, and responsibilities to meet demobilization requirements. Lessons learned must be captured before demobilization is completed.