AMENDMENT NO. 2078 TO AMENDMENT NO. 2077
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] proposes an amendment numbered 2078 to amendment No. 2077.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 5, beginning with `attack,' strike out all down through the end of the amendment and insert in lieu thereof the following: `attack. It is the further sense of the Senate that front-line troops of the United States armed forces should be protected from missile attacks.
`(c) Funding for Corps SAM and Boost-Phase Interceptor Programs:
`(1) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act, of the funds authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4), $35.0 million shall be available for the Corps SAM/MEADS program.
`(2) With a portion of the funds authorized in paragraph (1) for the Corps SAM/MEADS program, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study to determine whether a Theater Missile Defense system derived from Patriot technologies could fulfill the Corps SAM/MEADS requirements at a lower estimated life-cycle cost than is estimated for the cost of the U.S. portion of the Corps SAM/MEADS program.
`(3) The Secretary shall provide a report on the study required under paragraph (3) to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 1996.
`(4) Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4), not more than $3,403,413,000 shall be available for missile defense programs within the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
`(d) Section 234(c)(1) of this Act shall have no force or effect.'
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, very briefly, this adds back $35 million to what is the Corps SAM program. I know other people want to speak on the Kyl first-degree amendment. That is a good amendment. I support it.
This amendment does not in any way strike or in any way change the first-degree amendment, but is directly relevant because this gives strong emphasis to the Corps SAM program, which is at the heart of our forward theater missile defense.
I will explain this in more detail later. I know there are others who would like to speak, including the Senator from South Carolina.
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I again say I do not think that was the intent, but I am concerned about the way we got started on this.
Mr. President, I therefore ask unanimous consent that upon the disposition of the Kyl amendment that I be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I do not think I can add a lot to what the very eloquent Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl, said about this sense-of-the-Senate amendment.
I do support the amendment and offer this with Senator Kyl. One of the reasons I came to the Senate in the first place, and one of the reasons I sought to serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee, is a very deep concern over what has been happening to our Nation's ability to defend itself.
I have watched the cold war leave us and many people, when I was serving in the other body, would stand up and say, `There is no longer a necessity to have a very strong defense system. The cold war is over and the threat is not out there.' I honestly believe, in looking at this, through my service on the Intelligence Committee as well as on the Senate Armed Services Committee and formerly on the House Armed Services Committee, that there is a threat to our country out there that is even more severe, more serious today than there was during the cold war, because in the cold war we could identify who the enemy was. As Jim Woolsey said, there are 20 to 25 countries, not two or three, 20 to 25, that are working on or have weapons of mass destruction. That is not something that might happen in the future. That is something that is imminent and that is taking place today.
It is interesting that the administration downplays another conclusion by the intelligence analysts; namely, that there are numerous ways for hostile countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles far more quickly. We have watched this. We have watched the discussions take place. I think we can come to some conclusions, and those conclusions are that there is a multiple threat out there.
The Senator from Georgia mentioned briefly the ABM Treaty. I think it is worth at least discussing in context with our need for a national missile defense system. I think at the time that the ABM Treaty went into effect, perhaps there was justification for that. There were two superpowers in the world--this was 1972--and the feeling was at that time, if neither of the superpowers were in a position to defend themselves from a missile attack, then there would not be any threat out there for the rest of the world. Maybe there was justification for that.
I had a conversation with the architect of the ABM Treaty just the other day, Dr. Kissinger. He said, and I will quote him now, he said:
There is something nuts about making a virtue out of our vulnerability.
That is exactly what we are saying when we say, by policy and by treaty, that we can defend our troops who might be stationed overseas, that we can pursue a theater missile defense system, but we cannot defend our Nation against a missile attack. There is something nuts about that. So we are going to have to address this.
In the meantime, what can we do to put a national missile defense into effect in the next 5 years? We can do exactly what we are doing with this bill. I would like to move even quicker than we can move right now, but we feel what we are doing in this bill that we are looking at today is all we can do to prepare ourselves for what can happen in the next 5 years. So, when we are able to change this national policy, we will be in a position to not lose any time and do it in the next 5 years. I think the issue here is: Is it 10 years when the threat could be facing us or is it 5 years? I think it is incontrovertible it is closer to 5 years.
Even if we were certain there is no new threat that would materialize for 10 years, there are two compelling reasons to develop and deploy a national missile defense system. First, it will take more than 5 years to develop and deploy the limited system, even when the Missile Defense Act of 1995 is passed. By then, we will most certainly be facing new ballistic missile threats to the United States.
Second, deploying the national missile defense system would deter countries from seeking their own ICBM capabilities. A vulnerable United States invites proliferation, blackmail, and aggression.
We are going to hear, during the course of this debate, people who really are not concerned about the threats that face the United States of America talking about the missile defense system as star wars. They have always downgraded it by using that term. Star wars should not even be used. We are talking about an investment that we have in this country, through the THAAD system, through the Aegis system that we have--22 ships that are currently equipped--we have a $38 billion investment. That investment can be protected merely by putting approximately $5 billion over 5 years in, and being able to deploy a national missile defense system.
I implore my Senate colleagues in the strongest possible terms to wake up and see the world as it is and not the way arms control advocates in the Clinton administration would like it to be. The threat is clear. It is present. It is dangerous. That is why I strongly support this amendment.
Mr. President, I urge swift adoption of the Kyl-Inhofe amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Arizona for a fine amendment. This provision makes it absolutely clear that the world is becoming increasingly dangerous with regard to missile proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It also makes clear that the United States cannot wait around for a bunch of rogue states and possibly terrorists to acquire ballistic missiles capable of attacking American cities before we respond with a serious national missile defense system. Lest we want to invite another Oklahoma City bombing multiplied many times over, we must begin to take action to defend our country against this ever increasing threat.
In my view, the Kyl amendment simply states the obvious: that the United States should be defended against accidental, unauthorized, and limited ballistic missile attacks, whatever their source. We have attempted to establish a path toward this end in the bill now pending before the Senate, so I am pleased to support this amendment.
It has been argued that there is no threat to justify deployment of a national missile defense system to defend the United States. This view is strategically shortsighted and technically incorrect. Even if we get started today, by the time we develop and deploy an NMD system we will almost certainly face new ballistic missile threats to the United States. Unfortunately, it will take almost 10 years to develop and deploy even a limited system.
As Senator Kyl's amendment so clearly establishes, the intelligence community has confirmed that there are numerous ways for hostile countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in much less than 10 years by means other than indigenous development. Basically any country that can deliver a payload into orbit can deliver the same payload at intercontinental distances. Space launch technology is fundamentally ballistic missile technology, and it is becoming more and more available on the open market. Russia has all but put the SS-25 ICBM on sale for purposes of space launch. China has repeatedly demonstrated a
willingness to market missile technology, even technology limited by the missile technology control regime.
In his last appearance before Congress as Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey stated clearly that countries working on shorter range ballistic missiles could easily transition to developing longer range systems. Saddam Hussein demonstrated that even countries without a high technology base could get into the missile modification and nuclear weapons business.
North Korea has also demonstrated to the world that an ICBM capability can be developed with relatively little notice. The Taepo-Dong II missile, which could become operational within 5 years, is an ICBM. Each new development on this missile seems to catch the intelligence community by surprise. It certainly undermines the argument of those who downplay the threat and the intelligence community's own 10-year estimate.
Even if we knew with certainty that no new threat would materialize for 10 years there would still be a strong case for developing and deploying a national missile defense system. Deploying an NMD system would serve to deter countries that would otherwise seek to acquire an ICBM capability. A vulnerable United States merely invites proliferation, blackmail, and even aggression.
For this reason, I strongly and enthusiastically support Senator Kyl's amendment. It is a reasonable statement for the Senate to make. Only those who believe that the American people should not be protected against the one military threat that holds at risk their homes and country should oppose this amendment. I urge my colleagues to support it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the second-degree amendment?
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I would like to make a couple of comments about the Kyl-Inhofe amendment, and then also about an amendment that I intend to offer during the consideration of this legislation. I intend to offer an amendment that eliminates the $300 million that was added to national missile defense in the Armed Services Committee's deliberations.
There is, as I understand it, $371 billion for the national missile defense research and development in the budget that was submitted by the President and requested by the Pentagon. In other words, the Pentagon said, Here is what we think is necessary for that program. The Armed Services Committee added $300 million above that for national missile defense.
I listened to my friends from Arizona and Oklahoma, for whom I have great respect. We just disagree on this question. I intend to offer an amendment to strip the $300 million out of the bill because I do not think the national missile defense system described in this bill ought to be built or deployed, and I do not believe that the taxpayers should be asked to provide $300 million that the Pentagon says it does not need.
The Kyl-Inhofe amendment has four pages of findings. And on page 5, it says, `It is the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack.'
It is hard to find fault with the language unless one asks the question: What does one mean by this? Is someone who suggests this saying that we should spend over $40 billion on a ballistic missile defense system, or star wars? I know that we were admonished not to use that term because that does not apply, we are told. This is in my judgment a star wars national missile defense proposal. It is that simple.
The Congressional Budget Office in 1993 said the cost of building a national missile defense system at Grand Forks, ND and five other sites would be $34 billion. A March 1995 Congressional Budget Office review pegs the cost of that same site plus five others at $48 billion.
If with this simple sense of the Senate on page 5 the Senate is saying, Yes, let us develop a program that costs the American taxpayers $48 billion, I think people here in the Senate ought to think long and hard about this.
Sure everyone wants to be protected. Today, in the old Soviet Union, they are crushing and busting up missiles under a program that we are helping pay for. Missiles are being destroyed today as I speak in the old Soviet Union.
What is the threat? Well, the Soviet Union has now disappeared. But we are not told that the threat is that some terrorist Third World country, perhaps Iraq, or Iran, maybe some would suggest Qadhafi, could get ahold of an ICBM and some weapons grade plutonium, build a nuclear bomb, put it on the tip of a intercontinental missile and shoot it toward the West. Maybe that is the threat.
In my judgment, if the wrong people get ahold of enough weapons grade plutonium to build a nuclear bomb, it is far more likely that they will threaten this country by putting it in the trunk of a rusty Yugo parked on a dock of the New York City harbor. That is far more likely that the case in which they would acquire or be able to build an intercontinental ballistic missile with which to threaten the West.
Frankly, this bill is interesting to me. People are saying that we do not have enough money, that we are up to our neck in debt, and that we must reduce the Federal deficit--and I agree with that. Then this bill says the Pentagon does not know what it is talking about on ballistic missile defense--$371 million, humbug. We want to add $300 million. And more than that, we have not learned our lesson about advanced deployment and emergency deployment. We also want to not only add $300 million, we want to say to the folks who are building this star wars project that we want accelerated development for a limited deployment in 1999. And full deployment will follow in 2003. That is the scheme in this legislation.
I thought maybe we learned something about those enhanced research schedules and accelerated deployment schedules with the B-1 bomber, and some other weapons programs, but maybe not.
In any event, I think the question is not should we protect America. The question is why should we decide to spend $300 million more on national missile defense than the Defense Department says it needs? Why should we decide that we are going to dump in extra money beyond what the Secretary of Defense says he needs or wants?
We have direct testimony from the Secretary of Defense saying I do not want this. This is not money that I am asking for. I do not need this. You are proposing, he says, to defend against a threat that does not exist. And you are proposing giving the Pentagon money it does not want.
I just find it unusual that the same people who always tell us that the big spenders are on this side of the aisle are saying the Pentagon does not know what it is talking about; they want to provide the Pentagon $300 million more for this boondoggle, dollars they do not want. But that is not what I guess is so important today. The fact is that this extra $300 million is just lighting the fuse on a $40 to $50 billion spending program that once underway will not be controlled, and all of us know that.
I recognize that part of this deals with my State. My State was the site of the only antiballistic missile system in the free world. It was built in northeast North Dakota 25 years ago. I said at the time I did not think it should be built. It did not matter much what I said then; it was built. And after billions of dollars were spent and after the system was operational, within 30 days it was mothballed.
Now, some might say, well, it was useful to spend all of that because we were creating bargaining chips with which to negotiate with the Soviets on an ABM Treaty. I do not know the veracity of that. But I do know that we were the site of the only antiballistic missile system built in the free world, the only one that has ever been built by the West. And it was mothballed within 30 days after being declared operational.
Now we have a constituency to build a new ballistic missile defense system. This starts from President Reagan's announcement in the 1980's of a shield, sort of a national astrodome--I guess it was a national astrodome he was talking about, putting an astrodome over this country of ours so that no one could attack it. If an incoming intercontinental ballistic missile took aim on our country and took flight toward our country, we would have a system of defense, both ground based and space based, with which we would knock out those incoming missiles and protect our country forever.
The result was that an enormous amount of money has been spent all around this country on research, engaging academic institutions, engaging companies all over, virtually every State in the Union, and a constituency has developed for this idea. It does not matter that times have changed. It does not matter there is no longer a Soviet Union. It does not matter there is no Warsaw Pact, the Berlin Wall is gone, Eastern Germany does not exist. It does not matter the world is changed. The folks who want to build a star wars, ABM , national missile defense program have not had their appetites satisfied. So they want to continue with this program, but they are not satisfied by the Defense Department doing research in this area. They will only be satisfied if they require deployment--on an interim basis so that by 1999, less than 4 years from now, somehow, some way, someone will deploy the first contingent in any number of sites around the country of the national missile defense system.
Again, I certainly respect the views of those who have great ardor and support for this program. I respectfully disagree however. We have so many needs that we must prioritize them. Do we care about education? If we do, is not the need to build star schools more important than to build star wars? Do we care about hunger and nutrition? If we do, is it not more important to make sure that we fund those programs so that people in this country are not hungry instead of taking $300 million that the Pentagon does not want and building a system the Pentagon says should not be built at this point? It is a matter of priorities, and we must begin choosing.
I think those who push not only this but several other things in this legislation that go well beyond the funding request by the Pentagon are saying we do not have to make choices. We are not interested in prioritizing. Or at least if they are not saying that, they are making choices and prioritizing in kind of a burlesque way, saying, well, it is not important for a poor kid in school to have an entitlement to a hot lunch because we cannot afford it, and then changing suits, having a good sleep and coming back the next day saying it is important, however, to give the Secretary of Defense $300 million he does not need for a program he does not want to deploy at this point and for a program that he says is not going to be built to meet an existing threat.
I am just saying to you that I think those priorities are wrong. If I read Senator Kyl's sense-of-the-Senate: `It is the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from an accidental, intentional or limited ballistic missile attack,' I would say, oh, sure, it is a sense of the Senate all Americans ought to be protected. I understand that. That makes sense to me. If I change this and say it is the sense of the Senate that we begin embarking on a program that will eventually cost $40 billion to deploy in multiple sites around the country a ballistic missile defense system with a ground-based and a space-based component, have I changed the question? I think I have,
because if I am asking the Senators in this room whether that is the way we ought to spend $40 billion in the coming years, they have to evaluate whether $40 billion spent for this versus $40 billion allocated for other competing needs in this country is the right choice.
So, Mr. President, as I indicated when I began, I intend to offer an amendment to strip the $300 million in additional funding that has been put in the legislation before us for the national missile defense system. There will still remain $371 million, a substantial amount of money. But if my amendment is accepted, there will not remain $300 million which the Secretary of Defense says he does not want, does not need, and did not ask for. We will, I am sure, have a rather substantial debate about this when I offer my amendment. I shall not pursue it further at the moment. But I could not help but comment on this amendment, which is a sense of the Senate with language seemingly so innocent but consequences so substantial. The consequences of this are to say, yes, we believe that it is appropriate to embark on a $40 billion program with enhanced deployment to build a shield over the United States to protect us against incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Frankly, I think that is a misplaced priority. And I think we should have learned something in recent years that we must make very tough choices, all of us, very tough choices about what we spend money on. I think two questions ought to be asked on all of these proposals. Do we need it? And can we afford it? And with those two questions on the national missile defense system, nicknamed star wars--which is appropriate, because this talks about the potential of a space-based system--when we ask those two questions: Do we need it? And can we afford it? The first answer is answered by the folks that run the Pentagon. They have said, no, we do not need it. And they have not asked for it. The second answer ought to be answered by everybody who is in the U.S. Senate who is grappling with questions about can we feed our children through nutritional programs? Can we adequately educate our kids? And can we do all the things that are necessary? Can we adequately fund Medicare and Medicaid for the elderly and the poor?
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Mr. DORGAN. The answer to my question is no. We cannot afford something we do not need when priorities require us to make a better judgment than this.
I would be happy to yield.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
Mr. INHOFE. I am sure you heard several times----
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has yielded for a question.
Mr. INHOFE. We have quotes by Jim Woolsey and John Deutch and other experts in this field. And in terms of the quote that was attributed to Jim Woolsey, there are between 20 and 25 countries that have developed or are developing weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deploy those.
Do you not believe that statement by Jim Woolsey?
Mr. DORGAN. Well, I would say to the Senator from Oklahoma that the statements that are made by--let me give you a statement by the head of the DIA. `We see no interest in or capability of any new country reaching the continental United States with a long-range missile for at least the next decade,' so on, so forth.
But I would say this, that the Secretary of Defense, having evaluated all of these conditions, including the potential of other developments of ICBM's, has concluded that this is not in our interest. I mean, what the Secretary of Defense has said to you looking at all those things, `Don't do this. I don't want the money. I don't want the program as you constructed it. It doesn't make sense for this country's national security.'
I would be happy to yield further.
Mr. INHOFE. If the Senator will allow me to read a statement--two statements. One is by James Woolsey concerning what is out there today. `We can confirm that the North Koreans are developing two additional missiles with ranges greater than 1,000 kilometers that it flew last year. These new missiles could put at risk all of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific area. And if we export, the Middle East could threaten Europe as well.' Then further John Deutch says, `If the North Koreans field the Taepo Dong 2 missile, Guam, Alaska, and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk.'
So it is a two-part question. First of all, do you believe this? And, second, and most significantly, Mr. President, what if the Senator is wrong?
Mr. DORGAN. Well, will someday some countries that we now consider terrorist countries or renegade countries have the capability of developing or buying intercontinental missiles? Maybe. Maybe.
But I would say this. I ask if it is not the case, the single, strongest, best case that could ever have been made for a ballistic missile defense program, putting a shield over our country, will not be a case 5 years from now or 10 years from now or today. It would have been a case that you could have made 10 or 15 years previously when we had the proliferation of Soviet Union missiles, all of which were aimed at the United States, all of which the President said, at that point, required an umbrella around this country for protection.
But what did protect our country? No, it was not an umbrella. It was not a new ballistic missile program or a star wars program. What did protect our country? Well, it was a triad, of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with Mark-12A warheads that persuaded the Soviets--and I assume will now persuade any other country foolish enough to think about this sort of thing--that they will exist about a day or a two or three, beyond when they launch that kind of an attack.
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Mr. DORGAN. The point I make is this: We developed the triad, ground missiles, sea-based missiles and air-launched nuclear capability, which has for decades persuaded countries far better armed than the potential terrorists you suggest from not even thinking about attacking this country. And I am just saying this: When we start taking the potential of the North Koreans developing a missile and deciding the result is America ought to consign itself to a $40 billion new program, at the time we say to the American elderly that we have got to cut $270 billion in Medicare because we do not have the money, or at the time we say to American kids that we are sorry about student aid, we do not have quite enough money, and quite enough money for nutrition programs, I am saying the priorities are out of whack.
Am I saying defense does not matter? No. I am saying that the Secretary of Defense, the folks that know this program, the folks that have spent a long, long while concerned about and evaluating the need for a ballistic missile defense system are saying it is wrong. It is wrong what is being proposed. The extra money should not be spent. This program should not be deployed. And it is not in this country's national interest.
Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. DORGAN. They are the ones saying that, not me.
Mr. INHOFE. Is the Senator aware or do you deny that the Taepo Dong 2 is being developed today?
Mr. DORGAN. Let me say this again. Is the Senator aware that Yugoslavia produced Yugos and they are shipped to the United States and some terrorist could put a nuclear device in it and ship it to New York City and terrorize New York and this country? Would that require a sophisticated ICBM for delivery? Of course not. Would it accomplish the same result? Of course it would.
My point is, if you start taking a look at threats to this country, do not just look at the potential for developing an intercontinental ballistic missile. In fact, the Secretary of Defense and others are saying there is no realistic prospect within the next decade of that happening, No. 1. And No. 2, given all of the evaluations he and the folks in the intelligence community have made, he thinks what the Senator is proposing is not in this country's defense interests.
So that is the way I would answer the question of the Senator. I understand the case both Senators have made. I think they made it very well. It is just I do not agree with them. I think this is a case where you say, if you have unlimited funds that you can take from the taxpayer, you say, `Just keep giving us your money, because we have got plenty of opportunity and we have lots of needs.' If you have unlimited funds, then build everything. That is fine. The problem is we do not have unlimited funds. We are forced--literally forced--to start choosing among wrenching, awful, agonizing priorities. I think when the Senator proposes this, what he is saying is, we do not intend to choose, at least not in defense; we intend to build it all.
Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. DORGAN. Yes.
Mr. KYL. I know the Senator from Georgia is able to speak on his amendment. I can respond to each of the points that the Senator from North Dakota made in detail. But rather than doing that, I want to pose one quick question, because, frankly, it may not be necessary for us to do that.
Is the Senator prepared to tell us whether he is going to vote against or for my amendment? If the Senator is going to vote for the amendment, I will not bother to respond to some of the points.
Mr. DORGAN. I have not read the entire amendment. I read the sense of the Senate. It is hard to disagree with the sense of the Senate if you understand that the sense of the Senate says that `It is the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, limited ballistic attack.' Yes, they ought to be protected.
I ask you this question: Are you saying with this that it is your sense that we should spend $300 million extra next year and go to enhanced deployment of a ballistic missile defense system; that it is your intention with this amendment to put the Senate on record to go for early deployment and $300 million extra and the tens of billions of dollars that will be required in the years ahead to fully deploy this system; is that your intention?
(Mr. CAMPBELL assumed the chair.)
Mr. KYL. In response to the Senator's question, it is as you have noted. You are going to propose an amendment to strike $300 million that is already in the bill. My amendment does not add any money to the bill. My amendment simply expresses the sense of the Senate that all Americans deserve to be protected from missile attack. So when the Senator makes the argument about the $300 million, he is really making the argument in support of his amendment that is going to be offered later to the bill. That is why I said I could easily respond to some of the things you said, but I do not want to take the time if the Senator is going to end up supporting my amendment. I think we can move on----
Mr. DORGAN. Let me just say this. The committee brought us $671 million, as I understand it, in ballistic missile defense, $300 million of which the Pentagon said it does not want, does not need and did not ask for.
My feeling is this country protects itself against nuclear threat, accidental, intentional, or ballistic missile attack by having intercontinental ballistic missiles in the ground, by having Trident submarines in the sea, and by having our bombers with nuclear capability in the air. In my judgment, the current triad, as I have indicated to you, has done that for 20 or 30 years.
I have not read the rest of your findings. As soon as I read the findings, I will determine whether it comports with what I think we ought to go on record with in the Senate.
Again, I ask the Senator from Arizona whether his intention with this is to provide support and comfort for and to assist in the accelerated deployment of a national missile defense system?
Mr. KYL. And I say to the Senator, absolutely, bingo.
Mr. DORGAN. If that is the Senator's intention, I will not want to be supportive of that, because I do not think that happens to make sense for this country.
Mr. KYL. The Senator, obviously, has the right to vote for or against my amendment. I was curious. There is a lot that can be said. Perhaps the Senator could be thinking--I would like to hear from some of the other Senators--perhaps the Senator could be thinking how he will substantiate the claim he made repeatedly now that the Secretary of Defense does not want this, did not ask for it, and so on. If the Senator can find those statements, I would be curious because, of course, General O'Neill testified to the Armed Services Committee that he could spend $450 million and he does not do that without getting the concurrence of the administration.
The administration's initial budget request did not ask for the money, I agree, but in last year's budget, the Clinton administration, in the 5-year defense plan, called for more than what is being requested----
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, reclaiming my time, I say it is good news for the Senator from Arizona. In a body where there are so few answers and so much debate, he is about 50 paces from the answer. I will give him the telephone number. He can call the Secretary of Defense and ask the Secretary of Defense in the next 4 minutes, `Do you want this $300 million, did you ask for it, and do you think that it is necessary for this country's security?'
His answer will be, `No, I didn't ask for it; no, I don't want it; and I think it is a mistake.'
So the Senator is very close to an answer, physically and also with respect to time. Maybe by the next time we have this spirited discussion, when I offer the amendment to strike the money, maybe the Senator will have spoken to the Secretary of Defense and will have that answer.
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Mr. DORGAN. I will be a happy to yield.
Mr. COATS. The Senator from North Dakota, in answer to the Senator from Arizona as to what he would prefer, in response to what the Senator from Arizona has announced in terms of deterrence, he would prefer the deterrent that was used successfully for a long, long time, namely, we use the term `mutually assured destruction.' He said that our deterrence from submarines under the sea, missiles in the ground, and bombers in the air would be his proposed solution to a ballistic missile attack on the United States.
My question to the Senator is, do you believe that mutually assured destruction is the preferred solution to, say, an accidental launch?
Mr. DORGAN. Well----
Mr. COATS. And do you believe that would be any kind of a deterrent or appropriate response to an accidental launch of a missile?
Mr. DORGAN. The Senator understands, I would judge successful the strategy that has been employed with the nuclear triad in order to avoid nuclear war over some 25 or 30 years. Would the Senator agree with that?
Mr. COATS. I do, but the world has changed significantly since then. We are trying to deter something entirely different.
Mr. DORGAN. If I may respond to that--I did not respond to the Senator's question about North Korea. I would like to add for the record something I will not read, a rather lengthy paragraph, about the capabilities of North Korea written by two Nobel laureates, two veterans of the Manhattan project, a total of seven eminent physicists, who are completely at odds with the Senator's representations about the capabilities of the North Koreans at this point.
I guess the Senator from Indiana is standing up saying we need this system because it is the only way we can provide for an impregnable defense against the renegades, against terrorist countries; is that what the Senator is saying?
Mr. COATS. I am saying the world has changed significantly since we employed the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, and the deterrent effect the Senator alluded to that would satisfy the concerns of the Senator from Arizona simply may not be applicable in today's world.
Mr. DORGAN. It is interesting, what has changed it is quite remarkable--it is almost breathtaking in its scope--is that the Soviet Union does not exist any longer, and today we are cutting the tails off bombers, they are crushing their missiles, and we are taking warheads apart. What has changed dramatically is that we have stepped back from the brink, we have largely seen the cold war dissolve, we have a circumstance in this world today for which all of us should rejoice.
The arms race is largely over, and the Senator raises the question, are there still not some other threats? Yes, there are. But you know what has not changed is the appetite for those who are parents of weapons programs, because those who have parentage of new weapons programs just cannot give up. It does not matter what the world is like, it does not matter what the need is; they have a weapons program, and they are going to build it.
Mr. COATS. That may or may not----
Mr. DORGAN. Will the Senator at least acknowledge that the genesis of this kind of program came from Ronald Reagan, I believe, in 1982 or 1983, in which he described the holocaust from a devastating full-bore Soviet Union ICBM attack on the United States? That is the genesis of the description of the umbrella with which to protect our country.
Mr. COATS. That is true----
Mr. DORGAN. Things have changed. The Senator makes a correct point. Things have changed. What has changed is that that threat has changed dramatically because it has lessened, a much lesser threat than existed before. In fact, we have Yeltsin over here, we are working with Yeltsin on all these things, we have Russians and Americans cavorting in space in a spacelab. Adversaries? No, hardly. We are working together. We are doing a lot of things together, including reducing the risk of an accidental nuclear attack.
What has changed? Has the change occurred among those who said we need an umbrella for $40, $50 billion to protect America against a full-scale nuclear attack from the Soviet Union? No, the Soviet Union is gone, but it has not deterred by one step those who want to spend money on this program. They simply find another threat--North Korea, and the Nobel laureates and others tell us about North Korea.
It is at odds, and I will put it in the Record because I do not want to read the whole thing.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this portion of the physicists' letter be inserted in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I would say that if you do not want to use North Korea, then somebody else will come waltzing over here and say, `Well, maybe it's not Korea, maybe its Qadhafi.' And the next person comes over and says, `Maybe it's not Qadhafi, maybe it's Iran.'
Do all of those prospects concern me? Sure; sure. Is the likelihood of nuclear attack or the nuclear threat from those kind of renegade countries the likelihood of an ICBM pointed at Gary, IN? Of course not.
The likelihood is a terrorist act that----
Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator yield a minute to get somebody on the floor?
Mr. DORGAN. I will be happy to yield, without losing my right to the floor.
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Michael Matthes and Peter Simoncini, military fellows in Senator Warner's office, be granted floor privileges for the duration of Senate debate on S. 1026, the Defense Authorization Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I will be brief. I say that the likelihood of the nuclear threat coming from a renegade country is not them getting hold of some sophisticated targeted intercontinental ballistic missile; it is that they would get hold of some weapons grade plutonium and the know-how, which pretty readily exists, to turn that into a nuclear device, and then in some ingenious way to hold some country hostage with that device. It is unlikely that it is going to be on the tip of an ICBM in flight. It is much more likely that it is going to be different circumstances, in which the $40 billion and the best star wars program ever conceived by man or woman will be irrelevant.
I will make one other point to the Senator. On page 52 of the bill brought to us, on the bottom of the page, you are talking about deploying a system--deploy as soon as possible a highly effective system, and so on. Then it says, `That will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger, more sophisticated ballistic missile threats.'
When you stand and say we are trying to respond to North Korea--which I think gives them far more credit than they deserve--your bill would do much more than that. The legislation suggests that if you want to fund a program that will provide a layered defense against larger ballistic missile defense threats over time. That goes back to the Reagan star wars concept in the eighties.
My point is that nothing has changed with those that propose the program. They pull the wagon through here no matter what the climate is, whether the wind blows, or whether it rains, it is the same wagon. They just change the debate a bit. In my judgment, the taxpayers ought not to fund something that the Secretary of Defense says he does not want, the country does not need, and he says putting in this bill--I have not even talked about the things we will talk about later, about abrogating the ABM Treaty and other things; I have not even discussed that. But I think you ought to listen to the Secretary of Defense on this issue. You ought to listen to the taxpayers. I think they understand.
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The Senator from Arizona is more than capable of answering--and I believe he probably has already done it--the reasons why this program is significantly different from what Reagan or anybody else proposed in the early eighties. It is not the so-called umbrella defense star wars system that has been debated on the floor here for a decade and a half. It is much, much different from that. The threat is different from that. I do not disagree with the Senator that the threat we face includes options other than----
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, if the Senator would like to ask a question, I will be happy to answer a question. If not, I would like to regain the floor.
Mr. COATS. How does the Senator propose to deal with an accidental ballistic missile launch in the United States? The Senator suggested that mutually assured destruction was the deterrent to that and the way to respond. I do not agree with the Senator. I wonder what his solution was to that question.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the query. The Senator from Indiana is now suggesting that the principal reason for spending $40 billion is to protect against an accident. It occurred to me that the Koreans would not likely be involved in an accident, according to the Senator from Arizona. He is proposing that the Koreans might pose a threat. I assume when we hear discussions about other countries--Libya, Iran, or others --we are talking about a threat rather than an accident.
The question of an accidental nuclear launch, I suppose, is a question others could ask of us and we could ask of many in the world. We have, it seems to me, very carefully, over many, many years, decades, in fact, worked to prevent that sort of circumstance from occurring on any side, with respect to the nuclear powers. I again say that I urge all of us to evaluate. When we start talking about the need now, when the Soviet Union is gone, to build a star wars program to react to North Korea and spend $40 billion we do not have, I urge everyone to understand that at the same time we are going to consign ourselves to spend $40 billion, we are going to say we cannot really afford Medicare and Medicaid, and that the old folks should pay more and get less, and we will cut $270 billion out of Medicare.
We supposedly cannot afford all the other things we are talking about because we have to tighten our belts. It occurs to me that those that push this, especially in the year 1995, when the world has changed, but changed in a way that would augur for less incentive to need this kind of a program, those who push this are making an illogical argument. It seems illogical to me to be saying we have to tighten our belts here at home and have to worry about priorities, we have to make tough choices, and then pull a project like this to the floor and say, by the way, this is true for everything else, but we have $300 million here that that does not apply because this $300 million we will substitute our judgment for the judgment of the Secretary of Defense, and others, and say that we must now embark on an accelerated deployment of a national missile defense program, including star wars.
I am just telling you that we will probably have a long discussion on the question of that $300 million. If I see the glint in the eye of the Senator from Arizona from across the room, I suspect he will have a spirited defense of spending that money. I will be here, as soon as it works into the schedule, to see where we all stand on spending money we do not have on something we do not need.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that portions of a July 7, 1995 letter from seven eminent physicists, including two Nobel Prize winners and two veterans of the Manhattan project, who discuss accidental launch by Russia or China and the likelihood of a threat from a third country, particularly North Korea, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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I am sure there will be other views as we go along. I would like to explain, in just a few minutes, the amendment I have offered, which is now the pending second-degree amendment to the Kyl first-degree amendment.
This amendment is intended to restore funds for the program known as the Corps SAM program, which is also a cooperative program called MEADS. They are one and the same program, but the MEADS program is the name given for SAM that is designated as a cooperative program and supported by the Governments of Germany, France, and Italy, where they will be paying approximately 50 percent of the cost of the program, which is what we have been encouraging for the last several years in terms of allied participation.
Corps SAM is a highly mobile theater missile defense system which is designed to defend our most vulnerable military forces, that is, our Marine and Army troops amassed at the very edge of the battle area. It is the only system under development that can meet this requirement. In addition to defending our forward troops from attack by short-range ballistic missiles, the Corps SAM/MEADS system will also replace the aging and outmoded and, in many cases, HAWK batteries that are now the Marines only defense against ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as enemy aircraft.
Notwithstanding the importance of the requirement to defend these forward deployed troops, the committee bill before us, unless it is changed, will cancel the Corps SAM/MEADS program that was done during the committee markup. That is the provision of the bill now. The bill does not just zero funding in the report; it directs the Secretary of Defense, in permanent bill language, to terminate this international program.
Mr. President, in my view, this is a shortsighted action and defies rational explanation. The Senate Armed Services Committee majority argued in their report accompanying our bill that 80 percent of the total ballistic missile defense funding goes to theater missile defense systems. And the majority of the report complains about both the number of the theater missile defense systems under development and their cost.
This bill has shifted more funds to the national missile defense, which is the overall, rather than the theater defense. But what the majority report does not set forth, Mr. President, is the following set of important facts:
First, the bill as it now exists, enshrines as the core theater missile defense program four programs to the exclusion of all the other programs.
Second, the bill does not recognize that these four core theater missile defense programs provide overlapping coverage of the rear area in the theater but often no coverage for our front line troops.
That is graphically shown on this chart, Mr. President. This is the forward battle area. These are various forms of attack coming from the enemy on a theoretical battlefield.
This unprotected zone, this area right here in red, is the area where our forward troops are, usually Marine forces or Army forces. The white zone is the theater zone that is the support area, not on the forward area.
The only system that is being designed now to protect these forces in the forward battle area is the Corps SAM system, which has been canceled in this bill and which I am seeking to add back in this amendment.
The programs that are left in the bill are all designed to protect in this zone. We have the Patriot intercept zone in white. The Patriot system is designed to protect in that area. We have the Navy upper tier--very difficult to read here--but it is the outlined pink area in the outline here.
That is the upper tier engagement. We have the THAAD intercept zone, the light green zone here. Then we have the Navy lower tier, which is a possible program, which is below here.
These are overlapping programs. We want some overlap. We did not know which programs will end up being the best programs. I am not complaining about the overlap. What I am complaining about is leaving this area completely--not only unprotected except for HAWK batteries, which are limited in their effectiveness--but we do not have any program, even with all this money that is being complained about that is being added, to protect the troops on the forward battle area.
There is a reference in the majority report to making the PAC-3 mobile. There is no money to do that. We do not know whether that can be done. In my amendment, what I provide is $4.6 million to test that view. Can we make the PAC-3 program apply to this area?
Right now the incoming missiles for this zone are only not protected now, if we have this bill without being changed, as it now exists, we will have no program being designed for that. We will cut out the only program that our international allies--at least three of them--have signed up for: Germany, France, and Italy.
That is what our Congress has asked, for our allies to get involved in this. They finally get involved, it is the very beginning of the program, and what did we do? We cancel the program. I do not understand it. Perhaps someone can explain it.
The third point I make is that the bill now makes the theater missile defense funding problem that is being complained about--that is, the majority report complains we are spending 80 percent of our money on overall defenses in the theater, but in this bill we add $215 million to the theater programs in this area while we cut out $30 million from the Corps SAM/MEADS program, which I seek to add back.
If there is a problem--and I am happen to be one that believes theater missile defense should be the priority because that is where the immediate threat is and where we have a chance to get programs in the field in the next few years that can be effective--if there is a problem with 80 percent of the overall funding going to theater, what is done in this bill as it now stands, those programs are being added to what the program that goes to the heart of the forward battle area is cut out.
The fourth point is that the bill argues that instead of pursuing Corps SAM, the ballistic missile defense office should begin development of a system based on making the Patriot PAC-3 technologies highly mobile to meet the Corps SAM requirement.
I do not have a quarrel with that. Perhaps PAC-3 would be better than Corps SAM. We do not have money in the bill to test that. Right now it cannot protect in this area. It is not being worked on. I do not mind seeking an answer to that question, but no one knows the answer now.
Why should we cancel the only program that is designed to protect this, and try the PAC-3, give them no money to try PAC-3, and in the meantime cancel the only program we have designed in that direction. I do not understand any logic in that.
The fifth point, the bill right now, unless it is changed, rejects the cooperation with our allies on the MEADS program. That is the program that three of our allies have signed up for, saying they are willing to put some of their money into it. For the first time we have some of our allies willing to put money into these programs. They will pay 50 percent of the MEADS program.
Now, that is puzzling to me, because every Congress--and I do not know of any objection we have ever had from this on either side of the aisle--has requested that the administration, the Bush administration and the Clinton administration, and even the Reagan administration in the early 1980's, push hard for greater involvement of our allies in missile defenses.
The allies finally, after a lot of urging, have voluntarily--we did not tell them which program to get involved in; they voluntarily chose this program. What do we do? The first thing we do after years of urging, we say, OK, you have signed up for this program, we will cancel it. We want you to now look at other programs, I assume. I do not think that makes any sense.
Mr. President, the bill's decision to terminate the Corps SAM/MEADS program leaves our forward-deployed Marine and Army troops virtually unprotected for the foreseeable future from attacks by short-range ballistic missiles.
I want no one to misunderstand. We are not talking about what the dialog was a little while ago, when we have a threat in 10 years against the Holy Land, the United States, or whether we have a threat in 12 years or 8 years, or a present threat. This is a present threat. It is today's threat. It is one in which the next time we have a conflict, we may well have a chemical weapon dropped on our forward battle troops by a delivery system, that the Corps SAM--which has been canceled under this bill--is designed to protect against.
I emphasize the point about today's threat. This is a Defense Daily report dated July 6, and it is reporting on the Roving Sands exercise, which the caption says `Roving Sands Exercise Reinforced Need for Corps SAM, the Army Says.'
From the report, `In a June paper, officials of the Army's Air Defense Artillery Center say that recently completed Roving Sands air defense exercise `reinforced the Army's need to field the Corps SAM [surface-to-air missile]'--that is what SAM stands for, surface-to-air missile--`1A`to fill a void that exists as a result of emerging threats' from tactical ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.'
`During the Army's live Theater Missile Defense Advance Warfighting Experiment, which was conducted as a part of Roving Sands, SS-21 short-range missiles employed by enemy red forces presented a particular problem for the friendly blue forces.'
Mr. President, getting away from the quote, this is an exercise. We have enemy forces, we have friendly forces. They test the various enemy systems against our present capability. SS-21 has been produced by the Soviet Union for years and have been sold to numerous countries around the world. These are widely distributed missile systems that exist in many countries.
`The largest problem for the blue forces,' that is, the friendly forces, `came from the red Alpha Battery 1st Battalion, 914 SSM Brigade, which `successfully fired all missiles, many with chemical warheads, against some 20 Corps and Division targets.' The battery was not detected during a single mission, and they were not engaged by fixed wing aircraft, rotary aircraft,' or the Army Tactical Missile System.
In other words, they had 100 percent success rate in the shots that were postulated with existing technology against forward battle troops. Any one of those in a real battlefield would have contained chemical weapons.
Continuing the quotation from this report:
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Surrogates for cruise missiles formed during Roving Sands `also attacked Corps targets at will' despite the deployment of blue forces of an advanced technology sensor to detect them.
This inability to deal with the major elements of the emerging threat during Roving Sands highlights a deficiency in corps missile defense capabilities, air defense officials conclude in the paper. The Army must field the Corps SAM system to ensure protection of friendly forces and allow the corps commander to accomplish his mission.
Mr. President, there is much more that can be said about those testings, but I think those paragraphs pretty much capture the essence of what we are faced with.
I am not going to get into a detailed comparison of the programs which are funded versus this program which is not funded. Suffice it to say, though, in my opinion we are pouring money into programs that are going to take a long time to develop, that are speculative in terms of whether they will work or not. I think some of them are worth some money. Some of them are worth putting money in, to see whether they will work or not. I do not disagree with that. But we are pouring in large sums of money, above the requests in those areas, and we are canceling the very program that our allies are working on with us, finally, that is designed to protect the frontline troops against today's threat. That does not make sense.
Finally, the termination of the Corps SAM program in this bill is bound to have a chilling effect on further cooperation with our NATO allies on all defense programs, not just missile defenses. The actions in this bill are a complete reversal of the previous policy of cooperation. The Congress has been urging cooperation by the allies. Frankly, we want them to put some of their money into these programs, too. We do not want to be the only ones who ever put any money up. We want them to put some money up, because we are going to be fighting, in most conflicts, certainly in the European theater, side by side with our allies.
Quoting from the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994, and I give this as the exact quote from that bill--I know of no Senator or Congressman who opposed this provision in any way:
Congress encourages Allies of the United States, and particularly those Allies that would benefit most from deployment of Theater Missile Defense systems, to participate in, or to increase participation in, cooperative Theater Missile Defense programs of the United States.
We have urged them to get involved. They have finally gotten involved and we are canceling the program. We are talking about $35 million in this amendment and we are talking about, not an add-on to this bill, this amendment would shift the money from the big pot of money, over $3 billion that is provided in the overall missile defense area, and we leave it up to the Secretary of Defense, in this amendment, to determine how to shift those funds. But there is in my opinion sufficient funds for this purpose.
Let me briefly summarize. My amendment restores the $30.4 million requested by the ballistic missile defense office for the Corps SAM/MEADS program. We add another $4.6 million for the ballistic missile defense office to study the view of the majority that the PAC-3 system can also be made applicable to this. We say, `OK, good idea. Take a look-see. But do not cancel this program while you are doing it because we do not know the answer.' Thus, my amendment adds back a total of $35 million. Since the grand total of $770 million the majority has already added to the request for ballistic missile defense in my opinion is adequate, my amendment thus offsets the $35 million increase by an undistributed reduction of $35 million to the total BMD funding of $3.4 billion.
We have $3.4 billion in this bill. Of that $3.4 billion, we would shift $35 million to restructure, repay, and reinsert this program.
Mr. President, I should close by quoting from a number of letters of support for the restoration of the Corps SAM funding which I received both from the Pentagon and from our commanders in the field.
The first letter is a letter from Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. I will just quote selectively from that. It is a 2 1/2 page letter addressed to Senator Thurmond.
Dear Mr. Chairman: As you continue your consideration of the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Bill, I strongly urge you and your colleagues to reconsider the termination of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program. The MEADS is a high priority advanced capability tactical ballistic missile defense system that merits your full support.
Continuing to quote:
The MEADS [program] represents an appropriate form of allied cooperation in the development of a missile defense system for which the United States and our allies share a valid military requirement.
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The outcome of the internationally structured MEADS program will be viewed on both sides of the Atlantic as one of the most important tests of future trans-Atlantic defense cooperation. At a time when both sides of the Atlantic are experiencing declining defense budgets and smaller procurements, we should welcome collaborative ventures where there are compatible requirements. Failure to follow through with this collaborative effort could significantly impact prospects for future defense cooperation within the alliance, jeopardize U.S. efforts to forge an alliance policy on theater missile defense, and may hamper the ability of U.S. defense industry to solicit joint programs with the allies in other areas.
The Senate report language specifies the United States would be best served to work with the allies on theater missile defense systems that would provide wide areas of coverage, such as the Navy wide area or Army THAAD systems. While future cooperative efforts in those programs may have merit, I firmly believe that MEADS uniquely offers the best opportunity for allied cooperation at this time. In a future conflict, as in Operation Desert Storm, the United States and our allies will likely be operating together in a theater of operations as a coalition force. In this manner, our maneuver forces will be vulnerable to attack by tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other air-breathing threat. The MEADS would allow the United States, French, German and Italian forces operating the system to provide protection for all coalition partners.
Mr. President, next I will read from a letter from Gen. George Joulwan who heads up our European command. Quoting from General Joulwan:
The recent Senate Armed Services Committee mark-up concerning the MEADS/Corps SAM program directly impacts USEUCOM and NATO's ability to fight and win on the future battlefield. USEUCOM and NATO have a critical need for MEADS.
Missile defense is one of my very top priorities. While the `Core' US Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems (PAC-III, Navy lower-tier and THAAD) play a central role in defending US interests and forces, they do not provide the mobility and force protection required to defend against emerging air and cruise missile threats. These limitations provide our potential enemies a window of opportunity to attack perceived vulnerabilities in protection of our forces and/or national interests. Core TMD programs alone simply do not provide sufficient operational capability to meet our security requirements.
The MEADS/Corps SAM program will enable the US to protect its regional interests against a wide spectrum of threats. Excepting long range strategic missiles currently deployed by only a few countries, there is no direct missile threat to the continental United States today. Conversely, this theater faces a range of systems that could directly threaten US interests and US/Allied forces. Many nations in and around the European Theater (especially in our Southern Region) are developing and employing short range Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM), cruise missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to exploit perceived US and Allied vulnerabilities.
In the European Theater, interoperability is absolutely vital. Further, NATO is the enabler for coalition operations elsewhere. The MEADS program improves both US and NATO operational capability through total interoperability. Having MEADS deployed with our allies would mean less reliance on strictly US assets to defend US and Allied forces and interests.
Mr. President, next I would like to read a letter from General Luck, commander in chief, U.S. Army in Korea.
This situation, especially on the Korean peninsula, requires that we develop and field TMD systems that are highly flexible, extremely mobile, capable of 360 degree coverage and able to counter the full threat spectrum. Though there is no system that can currently do this job for us, I strongly believe the US Army has clearly articulated the need for such a system through the Corps SAM program.
I understand that recent action by the HNSC and the SASC have essentially terminated the Corps SAM program. I would think that the demise of that program should not be mistakenly linked to the vital Corps SAM requirement. The capability provided by Corps SAM represents one of our more important needs in protecting the force on the peninsula today and in the future.
Mr. President, he goes on to say:
While we do have Patriot PAC-2 assets in theater, we remain at risk given the growing and rapidly improving nature of the threat. The termination of Corps SAM continues and increases that risk. I would strongly recommend that Congress reconsider the Corps SAM requirement and restore appropriate funding to protect our forces.
Mr. President, I also would like to read a letter from Gen. Dennis Reimer, head of the U.S. Army:
The predominant threats to Army and Marine Corps maneuver forces are very short/short range tactical ballistic missiles (VS/SRTBMs), cruise missiles (CMs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Defense against these threats well forward of our forces is clearly one of the greatest concerns facing our Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). The Corps SAM Operational Requirements Document (ORD) specifies countering these threats with a strategically deployable, tactically mobile system providing 360 degree coverage. Existing/proposed system configurations (PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Upper/Lower tier) fail to provide the required protection due to deployability and mobility limitations, lack of 360 degree coverage, and lack of growth potential to meet these essential requirements.
This is a compelling requirement. Army and Marine Corps forces are currently at risk, and will remain at risk with no defense against VS/SRTBMs and only limited capability against CM attacks.
Mr. President, finally a letter from Robin Beard. Many of you know Robin Beard. He was a Congressman from Tennessee, a Republican Congressman, and now is the Assistant Secretary General, NATO. He writes the following letter. This letter is addressed to Senator Ted Stevens:
Dear Senator Stevens:
I am writing to express extreme concern with the Senate Armed Services Committee's decision to terminate the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program and to urge you and your colleagues to support the President's budget request of $30.4 million for MEADS in the FY 1996 Defense Appropriations Bill.
While others have spoken to the U.S. military requirements for MEADS/Corps SAM, I would like to offer a broader NATO perspective on the matter. Canceling MEADS would send a horrible message to the Allies. It would confirm their worst fears regarding the lack of U.S. interest in cooperative armaments projects and would seriously jeopardize on-going efforts to develop a cooperative approach for meeting the challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
Mr. President, continuing to quote from Robin Beard who is now the Assistant Secretary General, NATO:
In addition to the political track, NATO Military Authorities have prepared a draft Military Operational Requirement for Theater Missile Defense that calls for the protection of NATO territory, forces and populations against ballistic missiles. And efforts are also underway under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Director (CNAD)--where NATO's material development is focused--to define future opportunities and mentors of collaboration in the area of TMD.
All of these efforts will lead, in the next couple of years, to the development of an Alliance policy framework on TMD cooperation endorsed by the North Atlantic Council. The termination of MEADS, the first significant TMD collaborative efforts, would be a serious setback for U.S. leadership in this area.
Mr. President, I also have a letter from General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But I think I have probably given enough so that my colleagues have gotten the drift of the priorities for this program.
I hope that the Senate will consider this carefully. I hope that this amendment could possibly be accepted. But, if it is not accepted, I urge my colleagues to vote for it.
I think this is a very important program. A lot is at stake here. The lives of the battlefield troops at the front line are at stake, and the future of cooperative efforts in our alliance in terms of theater missile defense I think also will be very significantly affected by how we handle this matter.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all of the complete letters that I have read excerpts from be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I rise in support of this very important Department of Defense authorization bill. I think outstanding work has been done on this bill, and I commend the very distinguished chairman of the full committee, the Senator from South Carolina, Senator Thurmond, who really provided true leadership on this bill. He allowed the subcommittees to do their work. We had a lot of very good hearings. All of the Members were engaged and involved. And I think we have produced a good bill. Obviously, there are some points we disagree on. But I think we can work out some of those disagreements, and we will have votes on others and move forward.
I want to thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia, who has always done good work on the important defense of our country, and I look forward to working with him on a number of issues that are still outstanding that I think we can resolve.
I want to make the point at the beginning that we have already had a lot of negotiations and addressed a number of concerns in the Department of Defense authorization bill. I believe we are going to be able to make a number of changes in the Department of Energy portion of the DOD authorization bill that will address concerns of Senators on both sides of the aisle, and from States as divergent at South Carolina, Idaho, New Mexico, and Tennessee.
We have tried to list all of the various concerns. We have resolved all of these issues except maybe one or two where we just need to have a good debate and have a vote and see how it turns out.
So I am pleased with the bill that we have produced. I think we should not lose sight of the fact that we need to move it on through in a reasonable time, get it into conference where we will continue to work out differences, and produce a bill that I feel confident that hopefully the President will be able to sign.
Also I would like to urge my colleagues to try to limit the number of amendments. Let us get right down to the basic issues and vote so we can finish up the authorization bill in the next 3 days and move on to the appropriations bill.
From an authorization standpoint, I think we need to remember that we are right on top of the appropriations process now. If we dally along very much, we will wind up on a side track, and the appropriators move forward. So let us work together and resolve these issues the best way we can.
But I would like to address the issue that has been discussed a lot here today--a couple of the issues that will be debated later on, and we will have amendments on it. That is the Missile Defense Act of 1995. Since there have been a number of assertions that I think are not true--I think they are false--concerning the content and the intent of this legislation, I would like to explain actually what it does and does not do in my opinion,
The Missile Defense Act of 1995 would replace the Missile Defense Act of 1991 which was a bipartisan effort that was developed in 1991 with more up-to-date legislation intended to respond more completely to the challenges and opportunities of the post-cold-war era--times have changed--and establish a more focused course for theater and national missile defenses.
The new legislation also addresses the growing cruise missile threat that we have around the world, for the first time establishing an integrated approach to ballistic and cruise missile defense.
Programmatically, the Missile Defense Act of 1995 has three pieces: One that focuses our efforts in the area of theater missile defense; one that establishes a clear policy to develop and deploy a limited national missile defense system; and, one that establishes the cruise missile defense initiative.
With regard to TMD, the legislation establishes a top priority corps program consisting of the Patriot PAC-3 system, the theater high altitude area defense system, or THAAD, the Navy lower tier system, and the Navy upper tier system. To allow us to maintain this high priority program and to make room for programs to defend American territory, the legislation also proposes to terminate two unfocused and relatively low priority programs--although its value or priority has already been discussed, and we will talk more about it in a moment--that is, the airborne boost-phase interceptor, and the Corps SAM system.
Each year, several of our colleagues say that, well, you never cancel any defense programs even when they have had problems or when their future is not clear, or regardless of what the cost is. Well here is a case where we are trying to terminate one that has been unfocused and has some problems.
We want to work with Senator Nunn on the Corps SAM issue and I think maybe we can find a way to work through this. But keep in mind, this is not some $30 million program or $35 million program. This is a program that leads us to over $10 billion now. If it is an international program that involves some of our allies in Europe, presumably they would take up some half of the costs of that Corps SAM program. But this is potentially a big dollar program.
So what I would like to see us do is let us look at the problems it has had, let us ask some questions about why it has moved on into the international arena without us I think directly acting on that, and see if we can understand where we want to go before we get started toward a program that could cost a lot.
I am impressed, we are all impressed, when the frontline commanders say we need this. We listen to that. But here is a case where we said we just do not feel we can afford this one in view of the way it has been developed and some of the problems it has had.
With regard to the national defense, I am amazed at what I hear on this. Listen to what I said: `National defense.' The Missile Defense Act would establish a policy to deploy a multiple-site ground-based system by the year 2003. This is not star wars but a modest and responsible answer to a growing threat.
After considering all the alternatives, the Armed Services Committee felt that the United States should move directly to a multiple-site system, since a single-site system would just not be capable of defending all Americans. We are thinking about a system that is going to allow some Americans to be defended and not others? Somebody want to defend that?
We felt it was inappropriate morally and strategically to select a subset of the American population for defensive coverage while leaving some undefended. You better check and see if you would be undefended or not. We are talking about national defense of our country and by one that could have more than one site so that everybody could be covered. This decision seems even more correct given that the most unpredictable and dangerous new ballistic missile threats will be capable of reaching States like Alaska and Hawaii before the continent itself becomes vulnerable. I am referring to the North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile program which the intelligence community believes could become operational within the next 5 years.
This is not some far-off potential threat. This is very close. An NMD system consisting of the only site in the middle of the United States simply cannot defend Alaska and Hawaii and would not do a very good job of protecting the coastal regions where most Americans live, including this Senator. I live on the Gulf of Mexico. I look at the areas covered. We probably would not be covered. I am uncomfortable with that.
In the area of cruise missile defense, the legislation would require the Secretary of Defense to focus U.S. activities and coordinate the various efforts within the Department of Defense. It would require the Secretary to integrate U.S. programs for ballistic missile defense with cruise missile defense to ensure that we leverage our efforts and do not waste resources through unnecessary duplication. It also requires the Secretary to study the current organization for managing cruise missile defense and recommend changes that would strengthen and coordinate these efforts.
There have been a number of other statements I just do not agree with raised against this legislation, most of them having to do with the ABM Treaty. Let me set the record straight. Nothing in this bill advocates or would require violation of the ABM Treaty. Every policy and goal established in this bill can be achieved through means contained in the ABM Treaty itself. The argument this bill would force us to violate the ABM Treaty is like arguing that one must drive off a cliff just because there is a bend in the road where the cliff is.
This bill recommends that we gradually and responsibly turn the wheel. Can we improve on it? Let us work at it. Maybe we can. I think we have got some scare tactics here with regard to what we are trying to do, and that is not what we want to do.
Let me also say that it is not this bill first and foremost that forces us to reconsider the ABM Treaty. Such a reexamination is warranted, indeed required, as a result of the end of the cold war and the growing multifaceted ballistic missile threat characterizations of this new era. The ABM Treaty with its underlying philosophy of mutually assured destruction, MAD, practically defined the cold war confrontation. Why would anybody argue that we should now reexamine that agreement? Times are different.
Let us be clear about what this bill in fact calls for. It recommends that the Senate undertake a comprehensive review of the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty. It suggests that the Senate consider creating a select committee to undertake a 1-year assessment. Let us not run up to the point where in the year 2002 or 2003 we may actually want to move toward deployment.
Let us think about it. Let us have a group, and if this is not the way to set it up, set it up somewhere else. Get the various committees that would have jurisdiction involved. Let us start thinking about and talking about what we want to do with the ABM Treaty. So what we are recommending is a careful examination of all issues before making a specific recommendation to the President on how to modify our current ABM Treaty obligations.
By establishing a policy to deploy a multiple-site NMD, national missile defense system, this bill does assume that eventually we will need to amend or otherwise modify the ABM Treaty, but let me repeat that the means to achieve this are contained in the ABM Treaty itself. The treaty in no way limits the establishment of policies. It limits the deployment of ABM systems.
In the case of ground-based systems, the treaty in no way limits deployment or development or testing. Therefore, we can proceed simultaneously to develop the system called for in this bill while we figure out the best approach dealing in the future with the treaty.
We should remember that the ABM Treaty was meant to be a living document that can be changed as circumstances change. Anyone who argues that the strategic and political circumstances have not changed since 1972 is living on another planet.
Article XIII of the treaty envisioned possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty. So I wish to just emphasize again as I move forward that there are various treaty compliant ways to modify our current obligations under the treaty and we would like to work toward.
For those who are upset by the fact that this bill would establish a policy to deploy a multiple-site NMD system, I would point out that the ABM Treaty signed and ratified in 1972 did permit development and deployment of multiple sites. I would also remind my colleagues who seem to fear the prospect of amending the treaty that in 1974 the Senate approved a major amendment to the treaty. So we are not suggesting something happened that has not already happened before and we would not suggest doing it for quite some time.
Let me also briefly address another provision in the Missile Defense Act of 1995 which relates to the ABM Treaty. Section 238, which is based on legislation introduced earlier this year by Senator Warner, would establish a clear demarcation line between TMD systems which are not covered by the treaty and the ABM systems which are explicitly limited. This provision is also consistent with the letter and the spirit of the treaty, and I know we will talk more about that later on.
Now, with regard to this specific amendment that is pending, I wish to commend Senator Kyl for his amendment. How could anybody disagree with it? It says the purpose of this amendment is to state the sense of the Senate on protecting the United States from ballistic missile attack. That seemed like a very worthwhile proposal to me. The Senator from Arizona has clearly demonstrated that there is a real and growing threat to the security of the United States posed by ballistic missiles of all ranges. I fully conquer with his sense-of-the-Senate language that all Americans should be defended against this potential limited ballistic missile attack.
This week we will have a lot of debate on this subject and others related to it. One argument that will surface over and over is that there is no threat to justify the deployment decision of the national missile defense program. The Kyl amendment clearly establishes that this is an erroneous assumption. The United States currently faces ballistic missile threats from Russia and China, if only the threat of accidental or unauthorized attack.
Just as important, the missile technologies that these two countries possess have ended up or are likely to end up in the hands of countries that would like nothing more than to blackmail, if not attack, the United States. North Korea has also demonstrated that any country that has a basic technology infrastructure can develop long-range ballistic missiles without providing significant warning.
Saddam Hussein, I heard earlier today some Senators kind of seeming to brush off Saddam Hussein or what he might do. But he proved to the world that modifying existing missiles is not, you know, something we should take lightly. It can happen. High technology is not needed if the intent is to terrorize, if not directly act.
Since we will debate this issue at length, I will limit my remarks at this point. But I do think that the Kyl amendment is a good amendment to sort of lay out the parameters of this debate. I hope it will pass. I understand there has been a second-degree amendment by the Senator from Georgia that would put back in the Corps SAM funding at the $35 million level, as I understand it, which is $5 million more than what the administration asked for. Now, I understand that extra $5 million is so we can have a study of the potential problems and where we are headed.
My only suggestion would be here that maybe we are kind of getting the cart before the horse. Let us take a look at it and see where the problems are. Let us see how it is developing internationally.
Again, I sympathize with what the Senator from Georgia says on the front-line need for this. But I just have to ask if there is not a better way we can do it. Have we looked at the problems it has? And have we evaluated the fact that this could wind up costing $10 billion? I think we will talk about that some more. But again, my disposition on that is let us try to find a way to work it out, if we can. Let us go ahead and agree to the Kyl basic language and then get to some of the specifics. I think that, generally speaking, Senators on both sides of the aisle in the committee are comfortable with the dollar amounts, but we are still--and I know there will be some amendments to change the dollar amounts, but the big question is the policy we are establishing here. We could work on the language. That will allow us to move forward with the agreed-to policy.
Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the Kyl amendment. The Senator from Arizona has clearly demonstrated that there is a real and growing threat to the security of the United States posed by ballistic missiles of all ranges. I fully concur with his Sense of the Senate language which states that all Americans should be defended against limited ballistic attack, whatever its origin and whatever its cause.
This week we will have extensive debate on this subject and a variety of related matters. One argument that will surface over and over is that there is no threat to justify a deployment decision on national missile defense. The Kyle amendment clearly establishes that this is an erroneous assumption. The United States currently faces ballistic missile threats from Russia and China, if only the threat of accidental or unauthorized attack. Just as important, the missile technologies that these two countries possess have ended up or are likely to end up in the hands of countries who would like nothing more than to blackmail, if not attack, the United States.
North Korea has also demonstrated that any country that has a basic technology infrastructure can develop long-range ballistic missiles without providing significant warning. Saddam Hussein proved to the world that modifying existing missiles is not a serious challenge. High technology is not needed if the intent is to terrorize.
Since we will debate this issue at length, I will limit my remarks at this point. Later in the debate I will present a detailed rational for the missile defense provisions in the Defense authorization bill and respond to the many red herring arguments that have been made in opposition. Let me close by saying that the Kyl amendment is warranted and long overdue. I strongly urge my colleagues to support it.
This is not star wars but a modest and responsible answer to a growing threat. After considering all alternatives, the Armed Services Committee felt that the United States should move directly to a multiple-site system, since a single site system would just not be capable of defending all Americans. We felt that it would be inappropriate morally and strategically, to select a subset of the American population for defensive coverage while leaving some undefended.
This decision seems even more correct given that the most unpredictable and dangerous new ballistic missile threats will be capable of reaching States like Alaska and Hawaii before the continent itself becomes vulnerable. I am referring to the North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile program, the so-called Taepo-Dong, which the intelligence community believes could become operational within the next 5 years. An NMD system consisting of only one site in the middle of the United States simply cannot defend Alaska and Hawaii, and would not do a very good job of protecting the coastal regions where most Americans live.
In the area of cruise missile defense, the legislation would require the Secretary of Defense to focus U.S. activities and to coordinate the various efforts within the Department of Defense. It would require the Secretary to integrate U.S. programs for ballistic missile defense with cruise missile defense to ensure that we leverage our efforts and do not waste resources through unnecessary duplication. It also requires the Secretary to study the current organization for managing cruise missile defense and recommend any changes that would strengthen and coordinate these efforts.
There have been a number of other false arguments raised against this legislation, most having to do with the ABM Treaty. Let me set the record straight: nothing in this bill advocates or would require a violation of the ABM Treaty. Every policy and goal established in this bill can be achieved through means contained in the ABM Treaty itself. The argument that this bill will force us to violate the ABM Treaty is like arguing that one must drive off a cliff just because there is a bend in the road. This bill recommends that we gradually, and responsibly, turn the wheel.
Let me also say that it is not this bill, first and foremost, that forces us to reconsider the ABM Treaty. Such a reexamination is warranted, indeed required, as a result of the end of the cold war, and the growing multifaceted ballistic missile threat characterizes this new era. The ABM Treaty, with its underlying philosophy of mutual assured destruction, practically defined the cold war confrontation. Why would anybody argue that we should not reexamine such an agreement.
Let us be clear about what this bill in fact calls for. It recommends that the Senate undertake a comprehensive review of the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty. It suggests that the Senate consider creating a select committee to undertake a 1-year assessment. What we are recommending is a careful examination of all issues before making a specific recommendation to the President on how to modify our current ABM Treaty obligations.
By establishing a policy to deploy a multiple-site NMD system, this bill does assume that eventually we will need to amend or otherwise modify the ABM Treaty. But let me repeat, the means to achieve this are contained in the ABM Treaty itself. The treaty in no way limits the establishment of policies, it limits the deployment of ABM systems. In the case of ground-based systems, the treaty in no way limits development or testing. Therefore, we can proceed simultaneously to develop the system called for in this bill while we figure out the best approach to dealing with the treaty.
We should remember that the ABM Treaty was meant to be a living document that could be changed as circumstances changed. Anyone who argues that the strategic and political circumstances have not changed since 1972 is living on another planet. Article XIII of the treaty envisioned `possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty.' Article XVI specifies procedures for amending the treaty. Article XV specifies procedures for withdrawal from the treaty. As we debate the Missile Defense Act of 1995, therefore, we must bear in mind that there are various treaty-compliant ways to modify our current obligations under the treaty, including withdrawal if we are unable to achieve satisfactory amendments. Talk of violation or abrogation at this time is nothing more than hyperbole.
For those who are upset by the fact that this bill would establish a policy to deploy a multiple-site NMD system, I would point out that the ABM Treaty, as signed and ratified in 1972, did permit deployment of multiple sites. I would also remind my colleagues who seem to fear the prospect of amending the treaty that in 1974, the Senate approved a major amendment of the treaty.
Let me also briefly address another provision in the Missile Defense Act of 1995, which relates to the ABM Treaty. Section 238, which is based on legislation introduced earlier this year by Senator Warner, would establish a clear demarcation line between TMD systems, which are not covered by the treaty, and ABM systems which are explicitly limited. This provision is also consistent with the letter and spirit of the treaty. It simply codifies what the administration itself has identified as the appropriate standard. This provision is required to ensure that the ABM Treaty is not inappropriately expanded or applied in ways and in areas outside the scope of the treaty. In essence, it would prevent the ABM Treaty from being transformed, without Senate concurrence, into a TMD treaty.
Mr. President, before yielding let me briefly address one particularly flawed argument that is commonly used against this bill and missile defense programs in general. It has been asserted that this bill would undermine START II and perhaps even damage broader United States-Russian relations. There is no substantive basis to this argument. It is a red herring that has been used by some Russians and repeated by more than a few Americans including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Fundamentally, this argument is rooted in the cold war. It assumes an adversarial and bipolar relationship between the United States and Russia. Rather than repeat stale arguments, the Russians and the Clinton administration, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be seeking to change the basis of our strategic relationship to one based on mutual security rather than mutual assured destruction. I would agree with Defense Secretary Perry's recent statement that `the bad news is that in this era, deterrence may not provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold war.'
If we look closely at the argument that this bill undermines START II, we see no substantive content. The type of defense envisioned in the Missile Defense Act of 1995 should in no way undermine Russian confidence in strategic deterrence. We must remember that President Yeltsin himself proposed a Global Defense System and that, in the early 1990's, the United States and Russia had tentatively agreed to amendments to the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of five or six ground-based sites. According to testimony the Armed Services Committee received earlier this year from Mr. Sidney Graybeal, who was a senior United States ABM Treaty negotiator, the Russians were not opposed to permitting five or six sites in the original ABM Treaty. How is it, then, that today such deployments will upset stability and arms control? It simply will not.
Of course, we should seek to cooperate with Russia and take into account legitimate security concerns. But this is what START II is all about. That agreement is manifestly in both countries' interest and should not be held hostage to any other issue. Unfortunately, the Russians have linked it to a variety of issues including expansion of NATO. We must reject this linkage, lest we encourage the Russians to believe that they possess a veto over a wide range of United States national security policies.
Admittedly, START II is in trouble in the Russian Duma, but this has nothing substantively to do with the United States missile defense program. Stated simply, Russian hard-liners are intent on undoing START II so they can retain some or all of their multiple-warhead ICBM force. The United States should strongly oppose this effort to undo START II. But legitimizing the false argument about ABM Treaty linkage only obfuscates the issue. The United States should not participate in a clouding of the issue by repeating Russian arguments about ABM Treaty linkage. This is simply a distraction from the central problem.
As we proceed to debate the various aspects of the Missile Defense Act of 1995 and consider implications for START II, we should bear in mind that today the United States has no defense against ballistic missiles. Russia, on the other hand, has an operational ABM system deployed around Moscow, which has been modernized and upgraded over the years. We should not feel threatened by the existence of this system. Indeed, we should encourage the Russians to invest in this system instead of their destabilizing strategic offensive forces. Likewise, the United States should develop and deploy a national missile defense system. Such a system would provide greater security for all Americans than an outdated theory of deterrence that does not even apply other countries. The Missile Defense Act of 1995 clears the way for a world that is safer and more stable for the United States and Russia.
I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Georgia if he would like to respond.
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We have the Navy upper tier program, which is in this envelope. We have the THAAD intercept program, which is in this green envelope. We have the PAC-3 right in this envelope, and then a possibility of maybe a Navy lower tier in this envelope.
So my point is, this system should not be canceled unless we can find one of these systems that could also cover this. Now, I believe the majority report indicated that perhaps the PAC-3 system could. I am perfectly willing to have that study. That is what the extra $5 million is for, is to see if that idea really will be proven to be workable. I would also be willing to have this study take place and hold back some of this money. I think that has been suggested by the staff of the Senator from Mississippi. We could work on some fencing amendment so we make sure we are getting the best program. I certainly share that, but I do not think we should cancel this program when it is the only one, until we get some affirmative answer, which we do not have now, on something that could take its place.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I may respond to the Senator's comments there, I do think there is a possibility that we could do that PAC-3 modification. But we do not know yet that it could provide that additional coverage. We should look into that to see if it can be done. Perhaps we can work out a way not to completely cancel the Corps SAM while we take a look at that. But again, my argument is before we start down this trail that could lead to $10 billion, I think we need to look and see if there are other options.
I would like some clarification of how we got into this international agreement. What is that international agreement? What extent of commitments do we have from our allies about being willing to pay up to $5 billion of the cost of this program? There are just a number of questions in that area that I think we need to get clarified.
But we will work with the Senator from Georgia as the day progresses, and hopefully we can work something out.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Mississippi, each of these other programs is going to involve billions and billions of dollars, also. We know we will not be able to afford them all. We know that.
Mr. LOTT. Which one do we not want to afford?
Mr. NUNN. Well, right now we have four programs that cover the same area, and they are fully beefed up and funded, while the only program that covers the forward battlefield is being canceled. So we have tremendous redundancy here. I do not mind some redundancy, because we do not know which of these programs is going to work and be the most cost-effective program.
But we do not have any redundancy here and no coverage here. The problem is the majority suggestion about PAC-3 possibly covering this area. We need to get some funding into a study for that, if that is going to be done. Perhaps we can work on something while we are continuing the debate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor at this time.
Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, before we went to a vote on any of the amendments, I just wanted to ask the Senator from Georgia a few questions about his understanding primarily of the Kyl amendment. I certainly support his perfecting amendment as I understand it, and believe it is well considered. But I have some concerns about the Kyl amendment, which it is an amendment to. And I wanted to just clarify the thinking of the ranking manager on this bill as to what his thoughts were on the import of the Kyl amendment.
It seems harmless enough in some respects. When you read it, it says it is a sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, limited ballistic attack. I agree with that. But I add to that that we also ought to protect all Americans from cruise missile attack, terrorism, and from a variety of other potential hazards.
I guess my concern is that, as the Senator from Georgia knows very well, and all of us on the Armed Services Committee know, there is considerable controversy about the provisions in the bill that we are now beginning to debate regarding ballistic missile defense.
We have a letter from Secretary Perry to Senator Nunn, and I am sure to the chairman of the committee as well, dated the 28th of July, where Secretary Perry makes a variety of points or a series of points about this. He says he wants to register strong opposition to the missile defense provisions of the Senate Armed Services Committee defense authorization bill. In his view, they would institute congressional micromanagement of the administration's missile defense program and put us on a pathway to abrogating the ABM treaty.
I am concerned that I do not want to support the Kyl amendment if it puts us on a pathway to abrogating the ABM Treaty. I would be interested in the Senator from Georgia giving me his perspective on that as to whether I could vote for the Kyl amendment with confidence that it was not an endorsement of the various ballistic missile provisions in this bill, many of which I intend to join with Senator Exon and others to strike here when the opportunity arises.
Mr. EXON. Will the Senator yield for an additional question before the----
Mr. BINGAMAN. I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I would say to my friend from the State of Georgia, I have the same concern about this, basically, as posed in the question by the Senator from New Mexico. I am for and wish to make a short statement in support of the Nunn underlying amendment.
But if I understand the procedures, the Kyl amendment is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution that I would strongly oppose because of its implications, even though it is only a sense-of-the-Senate amendment.
What would be the situation if the Nunn amendment in the second degree to the Kyl amendment passes, and then the Kyl amendment itself falls? Obviously, it would take the amendment that I support, offered by the Senator from Georgia, along with it, would it not?
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I guess we have six or eight questions posed to the Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. I am sorry. I must ask the Senator from Nebraska, and I apologize, if he will repeat that question. He has gotten to be such a good--almost like a lawyer since he has been here. I am sure he can reframe that question.
Mr. EXON. I resent that statement.
Mr. NUNN. I knew the Senator would resent that statement. I said `almost,' not quite. Does the Senator mind repeating that, if he would?
Mr. EXON. I was simply saying to the Senator from Georgia, I was asking the same basic question just a little differently than the Senator from New Mexico. I am strongly in support of the amendment by the Senator from Georgia, and would like to make a statement in support of that amendment.
As I understand the procedure, though, it is attached as a second-degree amendment to a sense-of-the-Senate amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona. I am questioning what the situation would be if we vote on the second-degree amendment, which I support, then vote on the Kyl amendment, which is a sense of the Senate. If the Kyl amendment fails, that would take along with it the amendment that I support offered by the Senator from Georgia. I am wondering if I properly understand the procedure.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from New Mexico yield the floor?
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Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will say first to my friend from New Mexico, his question was, does the amendment breach the ABM Treaty. We are talking about the Kyl amendment now.
As I outlined in my opening statement, I feel that the provisions of the underlying bill create what I would call a very high risk that it would be perceived as an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. That is the underlying bill. I do not think there is anything in the Kyl amendment, and the Senator from Arizona is not on the floor now, but I do not read anything in the Kyl amendment that would either breach the ABM Treaty or suggest breaching the ABM Treaty.
The operative paragraph in the Kyl amendment is the one at the end that says:
It is the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack.
Like the Senator from New Mexico, if I were drafting this, I would certainly add cruise missile in there, perhaps some other threats. I see nothing wrong with the way it is worded in terms of in any way creating the impression that the ABM Treaty would be breached by this amendment.
I also note the paragraph just before the sense-of-the-Senate operative paragraph, paragraph 12, page 5 of this amendment says, explicitly:
The United States and Russia have the opportunity to create a relationship based on trust rather than fear.
So it seems to me there is nothing in this amendment that would in any way breach the ABM Treaty or that would in any way violate the conditions that the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Perry, has laid down in his letter.
I made a lengthy statement about what my fears were about the course this bill takes, and we will have amendments dealing with that on the ABM Treaty. So I do have very similar concerns as the Senator from New Mexico on the underlying bill, but I do not have such concerns on this amendment.
I will also say, if you look at the findings in paragraphs 1 through 12, I think the findings I generally agree with. Everyone will have to read them to see if they agree with them. But the findings I personally agree with.
I say to my friend from Nebraska, he is correct. If my amendment, the second-degree amendment, were adopted and became part of this Kyl amendment, then if the Kyl amendment were defeated, it would take down the second-degree amendment. In that case, what I would do is propose it again, and I hope that will not happen. I really believe careful reading of the Kyl amendment will not have many people taking exception to it. Everyone will have to judge some of the findings.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, can I pose one additional question to the Senator from Georgia? Senator Exon, Senator Glenn, Senator Levin, and myself intend to offer an amendment at some stage to strike various of the provisions that are contained in this bill at the present time, particularly the ones under subtitle C on missile defense. I think that striking those is totally consistent with the letter we have received from Secretary Perry.
As the Senator from Georgia sees this Kyl amendment, it would not be inconsistent for a person to support the Kyl amendment and still vote to strike those provisions relative to missile defense when that amendment comes up?
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from New Mexico, I do not see any inconsistency there. As long as the Senator from New Mexico really agrees with the bottom paragraph, that it is the sense of the Senate that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack, this Kyl amendment does not say how that should be done. It does not refer to the ABM Treaty. It does not set up any kind of anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. It does not say anything should be done in terms of deployment or testing that would violate the ABM Treaty. It simply states that we would like to protect Americans. So I do not see any inconsistency.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me clarify one more time. My own position is that I do support the existing law with regard to the ABM Treaty, which I gather was adopted by us in 1991. And as the Senator from Georgia reads the Kyl amendment, the adoption of that amendment would be consistent with existing law and with the 1991 language which we put on the books; is that correct?
Mr. NUNN. As I read it--I will not pretend to the Senator from New Mexico that I have made a detailed sentence-by-sentence analysis of this amendment--I read it hastily, I read it again, my staff has read it. I see nothing in here that would contravene--in fact, the basic premise of this amendment is also the basic premise on which the 1991 Missile Defense Act passed, which I coauthored.
I see nothing inconsistent in that. Most of the findings in the Kyl amendment reference various statements Secretary Perry has made or that various military witnesses have made or simply statements that, for instance, the head of CIA has made and the statements that have been adopted, some in conference between the President of the United States and the President of Russia. I do not see that it contradicts.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate those responses, and I yield the floor.
Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Nunn amendment, that I just referenced, to make $35 million available to continue the funding on the Corps SAM Program, also known as the MEADS or Medium Extended Air Defense System.
This program will provide a rapidly deployable, highly mobile 360-degree coverage defense system to protect our maneuver forces against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles.
Corps SAM will also defend against a full spectrum of air breathing threats against our troops, including advanced cruise missiles. The committee decision to terminate this joint NATO program is a mistake. Corps SAM will provide missile defense for our troops that other systems, such as the Patriot or the THAAD will not. Corps SAM will have the mobility necessary to advance with U.S. and allied ground forces in the field of battle. Sometimes Patriot's protective umbrella cannot provide this, and certainly not against short-range missiles that would otherwise underfly the THAAD Missile Defense System, as important as that system might be.
Corps SAM is what the Congress has been pushing for for many years, a cooperative trans-Atlantic defense program. Pulling out the program now will harm ongoing, as well as future, cooperative ventures with our allies. More important, it will deny--I emphasize, Mr. President--it will deny our forces in the field of battle an important layer of defense against missile attack that does not otherwise exist.
Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support this modest addition. At a time when we are unwisely throwing billions of dollars, in my opinion, on unnecessary full-blown national missile defense systems, I believe we can afford this small investment in the protection of our troops overseas in battle conditions.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LOtt addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I wonder if we are perhaps ready to go with a modification and perhaps a couple of votes on the pending amendments?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have asked the staff to check with the leadership. I recommend that we go ahead with the modification and have a rollcall vote on the second-degree and on the first-degree amendment.
I have talked to the Senators from Mississippi and South Carolina about modifying the pending second-degree amendment which is related to Corps SAM.
I will soon send a modification of the amendment to the desk. It basically says that we will defer $10 million of the $35 million until such time as we have the report referred to in subsection (c)(2). That is the report, as I explained in my remarks, to determine whether the PAC-3 system could basically also cover that unprotected forward area that the Corps SAM system is designed to. This is acceptable to me.
[Page: S11153]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
The amendment is so modified.
The amendment (No. 2078), as modified, is as follows:
On page 5, beginning with `attack,' strike out all down through the end of the amendment and insert in lieu thereof the following: `attack. It is the further Sense of the Senate that front-line troops of the United States armed forces should be protected from missile attacks.
`(c) Funding for Corps SAM and Boost-Phase Interceptor Programs--
`(1) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act, of the funds authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4), $35.0 million shall be available for the Corps SAM/MEADS program.
`(2) With a portion of the funds authorized in paragraph (1) for the Corps SAM/MEADS program, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study to determine whether a Theater Missile Defense system derived from Patriot technologies could fulfill the Corps SAM/MEADS requirements at a lower estimated life-cycle cost than is estimated for the cost of the US portion of the Corps SAM/MEADS program.
`(3) The Secretary shall provide a report on the study required under paragraph (2) to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 1996.
`(4) Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4), not more than $3,403,413,000 shall be available for missile defense programs within the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
`(d) Section 234(c)(1) of this Act shall have no force or effect.
`(e) Of the amounts referred to in section (c)(1), $10 million may not be obligated until the report referred to in subsection (c)(2) is submitted to the Congressional defense committees.'
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I could comment briefly, our staffs--Senator Thurmond's, mine, and Senator Nunn's--have discussed this, and I think this is acceptable, from my viewpoint. If the chairman is comfortable with that, it makes the amendment acceptable.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after we take the vote on Senator Nunn's amendment that we take the vote on Senator Kyl's amendment, back to back, to save time.
Mr. NUNN. Reserving the right to object, I will ask the leadership to respond. I propose that we vote on both of those. I would like to accommodate the Senator.
I have received word, so I will not object.
I ask for the yeas and nays on the second degree amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. LOTT. On behalf of the Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], I ask for the yeas and nays on his amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
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