According to US intelligence officials, an accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia or Chinais extremely unlikely. Moreover, it is in the interests of Russia and China to ensure that suchlaunches do not occur. Indeed, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Gen. James Clapper testifiedin 1994 that `Russian strategic missile systems are currently considered to have very good controlmechanisms' to prevent such launches, and the United States is currently discussing sharing similarsystems with China. National missile defenses are the wrong solution to this problem in any eventsince cooperative measures could be implemented more quickly and cheaply, and would be moreeffective than NMD. These include installing destruct-after-launch mechanisms on all missiles toabort an unauthorized launch and separating nuclear warheads from delivery systems.
* * * * *
(3) Deliberate missile attack by other country in the future:
Ballistic missiles are the least likely method a developing country would use to deliver an attack.Long-range missiles are more expensive and technically difficult to build and deploy than othermeans of delivery, and are less accurate. Since launches are readily detected by satellites, theUnited States would pinpoint the origin of a missile attack and could retaliate quickly withdevastating force. Such retaliation would have to be considered as certain by any leader, and willalways be a powerful deterrent to missile attacks.
Currently, no country hostile to the United States possesses ballistic missiles that can reach USterritory. Even if such threats begin to emerge in the future, the United States will haveconsiderable warning since missile development requires flight testing that can be monitored bysatellite. Although some 20 countries in the developing world possess some type of short-rangemissile or space-launch vehicle, only countries friendly to the United States--Israel, India, andSaudi Arabia--have deployable systems with a range greater than 600 kilometers.
North Korea, perhaps the most discussed threat, has conducted one partial-range test of the 1000kilometer range Nodong missile, but does not have an operational version after six to seven yearsof development. North Korea is reported to be working on new missiles with ranges up to 3,500kilometers, but such missiles would require new technologies, such as staging and more powerfulengines. Judging from the long development time of past North Korean missiles, deployment ofsuch an intermediate-range missile is many years off at least, and progress can be monitoredclosely by satellite. In any event, none of these missiles would have the range to strike the UShomeland.
CONCLUSION
Rather than devoting resources to national missile defenses, the United States should insteadfocus on programs to combat existing, more pressing threats. For example, a higher priorityshould be placed on bringing military and civil weapon-usable fissile material in the former Sovietrepublics under better control and accelerating safe, verified dismantlement of Russian nuclearwarheads and delivery vehicles.
In sum, proposals to deploy NMD are misguided and irresponsible. National missile defenses donot address the existing and most likely future threats to the U.S. homeland and are divertingvaluable resources. Instead, NMD will destroy much of one of the United States' primary tools formaintaining and increasing national security: arms control. We urge you to weigh carefully thenegligible benefits and substantial costs of deploying NMD. Thank you for your attention to ourviews and please call on us if we can be of assistance as you deliberate on this matter.
Sincerely,
Hans Bethe,
Professor of Physics Emeritus, Cornell University.
Richard Garwin,
Adjunct Professor of Physics, Columbia University and IBM Fellow Emeritus, IBM ResearchDivision.
Kurt Gottfried,
Professor of Physics, Cornell University.
Frank von Hippel,
Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.
Henry W. Kendall,
Chairman, Union of Concerned Scientists and Stratton Professor of Physics, MassachusettsInstitute of Technology.
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky,
Professor and Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University.
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