SBInet - Cancellation
On 14 January 2011 the Department of Homeland Security canceled the SBI-Net project, which was intended to build a technology-based "virtual fence" across the US-Mexico border, on the grounds that it was ineffective and too costly. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said she had decided to end the five-year-old project, on which $1 billion has already been spent. Secretary Napolitano directed an end to SBInet as originally conceived and instead utilize existing, proven technology solutions tailored to the distinct terrain and population density of each border region. This is a significant departure from the original SBInet concept of a single, one size fits all integrated fixed tower-based solution across the entire border.
The technology component of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI), referred to as SBInet, is to put observing systems along the nation's borders and provide Border Patrol command centers with the imagery and related tools and information needed in deciding whether to deploy agents. SBInet is being acquired and deployed in incremental blocks of capability, with the first block to cost about $1.3 billion.
To enhance border security and reduce illegal immigration, DHS launched its multiyear, multibillion dollar Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program in November 2005. Through SBI, DHS intends to enhance surveillance technologies, raise staffing levels, increase domestic enforcement of immigration laws, and improve the physical infrastructure along the nation's borders.
Within SBI, Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is a multibillion dollar program that includes the acquisition, development, integration, deployment, and operation and maintenance of surveillance technologies to create a "virtual fence" along the border, as well as command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies to create a picture of the border in command centers and vehicles. Unattended ground sensors are to be used to detect heat and vibrations associated with foot traffic and metal associated with vehicles. Radar mounted on fixed and mobile towers is to detect movement, and cameras on fixed and mobile towers are to be used by operators to identify and classify items of interest detected and tracked by ground sensors and radar. Aerial assets are also to be used to provide video and infrared imaging to enhance tracking targets. These technologies are generally to be acquired through the purchase of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products.
In September 2006, CBP awarded a 3-year prime contract to the Boeing Company, with three additional 1-year options for designing, producing testing, deploying, and sustaining SBI. In 2009, CBP exercised the first option year. Under this contract, CBP has issued 10 task orders thato SBInet, covering for example, COP design and development, system deployment, and system maintenance and logistics support.
The initial deployment of SBInet capabilities is referred to as SBInet Block 1, which includes deployment of towers with a suite of integrated day and night cameras, radars, unattended ground sensors, and a communications relay. Block 1 also includes a COP, which links towers and sensors within an area of operations, and feeds information to a display in a Border Patrol command center, providing situational awareness of what is happening at the border. The Block 1 system completed Systems Qualification Testing in January 2009 at the Field Test Lab in Playas, N.M., the first of three testing milestones in the SBInet development process.
By early 2010 DHS had defined the scope of the first incremental block of SBInet capabilities; however, these capabilities have continued to shrink from what the department previously committed to deliver. For example, the geographical "footprint" of the initially deployed capability has been reduced from three border sectors spanning about 655 miles to two sectors spanning about 387 miles. Further, the stringency of the performance capabilities has been relaxed, to the point that, for example, system performance will be deemed acceptable if it identifies less than 50 percent of items of interest that cross the border. The result was a system that is unlikely to live up to expectations.
DHS has not developed a reliable integrated master schedule for delivering the first block of SBInet. Specifically, the schedule did not sufficiently comply with seven of nine key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not adequately capture all necessary activities, assign resources to them, and reflect schedule risks. As a result, it is unclear when the first block will be completed, and continued delays are likely.
DHS also had not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this first system block. In particular, it has not reliably estimated the costs of this block over its entire life cycle. To do so requires DHS to ensure that the estimate meets key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having an estimate that is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. However, DHS's cost estimate for the initial block does not sufficiently possess any of these characteristics. Further, DHS has yet to identify expected benefits from the initial block, whether quantitative or qualitative, and analyze them relative to costs. As a result, it does not know whether its planned investment will produce mission value commensurate with costs.
DHS has also not acquired the initial SBInet block in accordance with key life cycle management processes. While processes associated with, among other things, requirements development and management and risk management, have been adequately defined, they have not been adequately implemented. For example, key risks have not been captured in the risk management repository and thus have not been proactively mitigated. As a result, DHS is at increased risk of delivering a system that does not perform as intended.
SBInet's decreasing scope, uncertain timing, unclear value proposition, and limited life cycle management discipline and rigor are due to a range of factors, including limitations in both defined requirements and the capabilities of commercially available system components, as well as the need to address competing program priorities, such as meeting aggressive system deployment milestones. As a result, it remained unclear whether the department's pursuit of SBInet is a cost effective course of action, and if it is, that it will produce expected results on time and within budget.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
