According to Hadi’s decision, every member of the Presidential Command Council will have the rank of deputy chairman of the Leadership Council. However, what is noteworthy is that all the appointed figures come from different backgrounds and had an active role during the war years. Leading these figures is the governor of Ma'rib, the last stronghold of the government in northern Yemen, Major General Sultan Al-Arada, who has been leading the ongoing fight against the Houthi group since 2015, and enjoys great agreement among the anti-Houthi parties and military leaders. Al-Arada runs the governorate, which is rich in oil and gas, and during the years of the war he was able to make the small city of Ma’rib - which contained approximately 300,000 Yemenis before the war - a destination for Yemenis and displaced people, as its population now amounts to more than 3 million Yemenis, according to local authorities. The council also includes the governor of Hadramaut (southeast of the country), Major General Faraj al-Bahsani, a former soldier in the army of the state of South Yemen. President Hadi brought him back from Saudi Arabia and appointed him commander of the second military region in 2015, before adding to him the position of governor of the governorate in 2017. Al-Bahsani is accused of the failure of the administration, and the governorate is constantly witnessing angry protests denouncing the deterioration of basic services, but he is credited with sparing the governorate the vortex of conflict that struck the southern governorates. Othman Majli, a member of Parliament from the Congress Party and former Minister of State and Agriculture, was included in the council. The man from Saada Governorate (northern Yemen) is known for his closeness to Saudi Arabia, and he is also one of the most prominent figures who have waged confrontations against the Houthi group since the first war in 2004. The fourth member of the council is Abdullah Al-Alimi. He comes from Shabwa Governorate (southeast), and his star has shone since the start of the war after his appointment as director of President Hadi’s office. The remaining three members of the Council are united by loyalty to the UAE, despite their recent conflict of goals and interests. They are the President of the Southern Transitional Council, who calls for the separation of southern Yemen from its north, Aidaroos Al-Zubaidi, the leader of the National Resistance, Tariq Saleh, and the leader of the Salafist-oriented Giants Brigades, Abdul Rahman Abu Zara’a Al-Muharami. Al-Zubaidi was one of the military leaders in the South Yemen Army, before he became persecuted by President Saleh’s regime after the 1994 Unification War. His name rose to prominence during the Houthi invasion of Aden and the south of the country, as he led resistance forces that forced the Houthis to withdraw. Hadi appointed him governor of the temporary capital, Aden, before dismissing him, so he went with others to establish the Southern Transitional Council with support and funding from the UAE. He also led large military formations established by Abu Dhabi, such as the Security Belt and the Support and Assistance Brigades, which fought confrontations against government forces to eventually take control of Aden and a number of governorates. As for Tariq Saleh, the nephew of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, he assumed command of the Special Guard and the Third Brigade of the Republican Guard during his uncle’s rule until his dismissal in April 2012. With the outbreak of war, he sided with the Houthis and fought fiercely against the Saudi-led coalition forces and government forces. But after his uncle's alliance with the Houthis was broken and he was killed at their hands at the end of 2017, Tariq Saleh was forced to flee, and after a while he appeared again, then returned to Aden under Emirati protection, moving to the west coast, and there, with Emirati support, he formed the National Resistance Forces. During the past three years, Tariq Saleh established a political office and appointed himself president. He refused to recognize President Hadi’s authority until the last days, when he began to implicitly refer to Hadi’s legitimacy. The last member of the Council was a surprise, as Abu Zaraa Al-Muharrami is the leader of a military faction who has always presented himself as not seeking a political position, and the man - who appears for the first time in the media - was appointed commander of the Giants forces by the UAE despite the opposition of a number of military leaders. . According to the announced decision, the presidential decision has the authority to command the supreme command of the armed forces, represent the country, appoint governors of the provinces, security directors, judges of the Supreme Court, and the governor of the Central Bank, ratify agreements, and declare a state of emergency. The decisions of the Presidential Leadership Council are issued by consensus. In the event of disagreement, decisions are taken when voted on by a simple majority. When the votes are equal, the side for which the President of the Presidential Leadership Council voted prevails. If a simple majority is not possible, the issue is referred to a joint meeting with the presidency of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission. Houthi leader Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti said 30 March 2022, “The siege imposed on Yemen is considered a military act because it is imposed by force of arms, and if the siege is not lifted, the aggression coalition’s announcement to stop its military operations will have no meaning.” The Houthi leader added that this "means the continuation of our military operations aimed at breaking the siege." Major General Dr. Rashad Muhammad Al-Alimi Rashad Muhammad Al-Alimi (born January 1 , 1954 , Taiz ) is a Yemeni politician and academic. He served as Deputy Prime Minister of Yemen and Minister of the Interior ( 2001 - 2007 ). On April 7 , 2022 , he assumed the position of Chairman of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council after Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi abandoned his position. Council President Rashad Al-Alimi, born in Taiz Governorate (central Yemen) in 1954, was the third president of Yemen since its unification in 1990, having been preceded by Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. Al-Alimi is a major-general officer who comes from an academic security background. He worked as a professor at Sana’a University, and served in several security positions in the Ministry of Interior. During Saleh’s rule, he was appointed Minister of Interior, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs, and Minister of Local Administration. Al-Alimi - who was close to Saleh, before he defected from him at the beginning of the coalition operations in Yemen - was also appointed as an advisor to Hadi, and during the years of the war he remained residing between the Saudi capitals, Riyadh, and the Egyptian capital, Cairo. His name was frequently mentioned during the crises that struck the Yemeni presidency and the government, and he was also appreciated in the security community when he assumed leadership of the Interior Ministry. In 1954, Al-Alimi was born in the “Al-Aloom” isolation in Al-Mawaset District in Taiz Governorate. He received his first education in Katateeb, in parallel with his religious education in the Holy Qur’an and jurisprudence, at the hands of his father, Judge Muhammad bin Ali Al-Alimi. He then moved to the capital, Sanaa, to complete his education until he graduated from Gamal Abdel Nasser Secondary School in 1969. In 1975: He graduated from the Police College in Kuwait, then returned to his country to work at the Police College in Sana’a. In 1978: He obtained a bachelor’s degree in literature from the Faculty of Arts at Sana’a University. He moved to the Criminal Investigation Department in Sanaa, before deciding to go to Egypt and obtain a master’s degree in the Department of Sociology from Ain Shams University. He later obtained a doctorate from the same university, before returning to work as an associate professor at the Faculty of Arts at Sana’a University in 1989, then he worked as a professor at Taiz University. The man began his career holding positions as Director General of Legal Affairs in the Yemeni Ministry of Interior, then he rose through the ranks. In 1994 he became head of the Immigration, Passports and Nationality Department. In 2000, Al-Alimi was appointed Director of the Security Department of Taiz Governorate, and not a year passed until he became Minister of the Yemeni Interior. In 2008, he assumed the position of Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs and Minister of Interior, before being assigned the portfolio of Ministry of Local Administration in the same year. And in 2008 Al-Alimi was also appointed a member of the Permanent Committee of the General People’s Congress Party, which was founded under the leadership of Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 24, 1982, and remained officially in control of the Yemeni political scene until 2011. On June 3, 2011, Dr. Rashad Muhammad Al-Alimi was injured in the explosion of the Al-Nahdain Mosque in the Presidential House during Friday prayers, which targeted former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and leaders in the state. Al-Alimi was able to walk on his feet again after an arduous journey to receive treatment, which he spent between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Germany. He returned to the capital, Sana’a, on June 13, 2012, a year after. Since 2014: He has become an advisor to Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. Following the launch of the “Decisive Storm” military operation launched by the Arab coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia against the Houthi group controlling Sana’a and allied with the forces of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the coup against the legitimate Yemeni government in 2015, Al-Alimi left his political companion, Saleh, and preferred to leave the country for Saudi Arabia. Months after his departure for Riyadh, Saleh accused him of being the one who provided the Arab coalition forces with “coordinates of the camps and state headquarters” that were controlled by the Houthi group in Yemen, so that air fighters could target them. Yemen seeks to restore stability to its situation and enter into a new phase of rapprochements between the political forces within the country, reconcile the situation and settle differences. In this context, Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi relinquished power today, Thursday, ten years after he ascended to the throne as the country’s consensual president. Under the Gulf initiative, before the Houthi militia overthrew his authority in late 2014. According to a decision issued at dawn yesterday, Thursday, April 7, 2022, by the President of the Republic of Yemen, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, a member of the Permanent Committee of the General People’s Congress Party, became Chairman of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council. Hadi's declaration stipulated that the Presidential Leadership Council, headed by Al-Alimi and with seven others, would assume power in the country "to complete the implementation of the tasks of the transitional phase." According to the presidential decree, the Presidential Command Council includes eight members, and will complete the implementation of the tasks of the transitional phase, and delegate all the powers of President Hadi in accordance with the Constitution and the Gulf Initiative and its implementation mechanism. The Yemeni President also authorized the Presidential Command Council to negotiate with the Ansar Allah Al-Houthi group, for a permanent ceasefire in Throughout the country, according to a transitional phase that ends with the election of a new president for the Republic of Yemen.
Personal Overview
- Name : Rashad Mohammed Al-Alimi.
- Place of Birth : Taiz City , Yemen
- Date of Birth :15 January 1954 .
- Nationality : Yemeni
- Mother tongue : Arabic .
- Religion : Muslim .
- Highest Academic Qualification : PhD in Sociology .
- Occupation : Politician , Academic , and Major General in the Ministry of Interior .
- Current Position : Chairman of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council .
- Social Status : Married .
- Children : sons and three daughters .
Academic Qualifications
- – Bachelor’s degree in Military Sciences from Police Academy – State of Kuwait 1975 , ranking as 3rd highest graduate of his class.
- – Bachelor of Artist from the faculty of Arts, Sana’a University 1977.
- – Master’s degree in Sociology from Ain Shams University, with distinctions – Egypt 1984 .
- – PhD in Sociology from Ain Shams University, first class honors – Egypt 1988.
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Work and Employment History:
- Lecture at Police Academy in Sana’a, Yemen 1975-1977 .
- Officer at the Criminal Investigation Department 1978-1981 .
- Professor at Sana’a University since 1989.
- Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Interior (1989-1994).
- Director of the Immigration and Passports Authority (1994-1996).
- Chief of Security in Taiz Governorate (1996-2001).
- Minister of Interior (2001-2006).
- Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior(2006-2008)
- Deputy Prime Minister for Defence and Security Affairs (2008-2011).
- Deputy Prime Minister for Defence and Security Affairs and Minister of Local Administration (2008-2011).
- Member of the General Committee of the General People’s Congress Party since 2011.
- Member of the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference in 2013 .
- Adviser to the President of the Republic (2014-2018 ).
- Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council since April 2022.
Yemen Politics - President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi - 2012-2022
Yemen is a republic with a constitution that provides for a president, a parliament, and an independent judiciary. The internationally recognized government’s control was limited in large portions of the country’s territory due to influence exerted by the Iran-backed Ansar Allah movement (known colloquially as the Houthis) and other nonstate actors. The most recent presidential election occurred in 2012, when Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi won a two-year mandate as president. On 07 April 2022, in a surprising move, Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi transferred all his powers to an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council, thus ending 10 years of rule of the country, which during his reign entered into an ongoing war for the eighth year. At dawn, Yemeni television broadcast the speech of President Hadi, who also relieved his deputy, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, from his position. He said, “I hereby grant the Presidential Leadership Council an irrevocable mandate with all my powers in accordance with the constitution, the Gulf initiative, and its executive mechanism.” Hadi said that the Presidential Leadership Council would complete the tasks of the transitional phase that followed the popular uprising that he had begun when he assumed power as interim president in February 2012 following elections in which he was the only candidate. Hadi's declaration stipulated that the Presidential Leadership Council would be headed by Rashad Muhammad Al-Alimi, with 7 members: Sultan Al-Arada, Tariq Saleh, Abdul Rahman Abu Zaraa, Abdullah Al-Alimi, Othman Majli, Aidaroos Al-Zubaidi, and Faraj Al-Bahsani. Yemen's internationally recognized government and southern separatist fighters signed a power-sharing agreement to end infighting between the groups. The deal would see the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) handed a number of ministries, and the government return to the southern city of Aden, according to officials and reports in Saudi media. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced the deal on state television on 05 November 2019, saying it was a crucial step to ending Yemen's four-year war. "This agreement will open, God willing, broader talks between Yemeni parties to reach a political solution and end the war" said the Saudi crown prince at a signing ceremony aired live on Riyadh TV. Troops from Yemen's Hadi-led government's military and the STC will have to pull out of Aden within 30 days. Saudi Arabia's military will then take over control of security within the city.
Yemen’s President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi met the head of the Southern Transitional Council on 07 November 2019, in their first meeting since his government and the separatists signed an agreement to end a power struggle in the south. In the meeting with Aidarus al-Zubaidi in Saudi Arabia, Hadi praised the efforts to reach the deal. The stand-off had opened a new front in the more than four-year-old war and fractured a Saudi-led coalition battling the Iran-backed Houthi militia that ousted the government of Hadi from the capital, Sanaa, in the north in late 2014.
The officials said the separatists had agreed to disband their militias, which would be integrated into President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi's forces. After Houthi rebels seized the capital, Saana, in 2014, Hadi first fled to Aden, and later to Saudi Arabia. Hadi's forces and the separatists have clashed since August, though they're allies in the Saudi-led war against the Houthis. "We signed the final draft of the agreement and are waiting for the joint signature within days," an STC official currently in Riyadh told AFP. A Yemeni government official, declining to be named, confirmed the deal had been agreed and was expected to be signed.
It sets out "the reformation of the government, with the STC included in a number of ministries, and the return of the government to Aden within seven days after the agreement being signed", he said. Saudi Arabia's Al-Ekhbariya state television said a government of 24 ministers would be formed, "divided equally between the southern and northern governorates of Yemen".
Violence continued, in part because the crisis had reinvigorated various factions, including Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The GCC initiative signed by former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, his party the General Peoples Congress (GPC), and a coalition of six opposition parties, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) provided for a political settlement and transfer of power on November 23, 2011. A government of national accord was formed in December 2011 on the basis of a (50-50) power-sharing agreement between the GPC and the JMP. According to the initiative and its implementation mechanism, formation of a government launched a two-stage transitional period: the first stage from formation of the government until the election of a new president; the second two-year stage from when the new president took office.
In December 2011 a new parliament was sworn in and in February 2012, a presidential election was held with only one candidate on the ballot, former Vice-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The February 21 presidential election was deemed free and relatively fair. Voter turnout was high, including among youth and women. There were some concerns that the election served as a referendum on one party and one candidate rather than a fair democratic election among multiple candidates.
President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was sworn in on 25 February 2012 and on 27 February 2012 former President Saleh officially resigned from his post. Unlike Egypt, Yemen’s military lacked the capability and legitimacy to act as a viable transitional power. The Yemeni political and social landscape is teeming with tribal leaders and Islamist groups that had the arms and the power to turn the situation into an all-out civil war.
President Hadi continued to face protests and violence. Protesters demanded that President Hadi work to remove Saleh family and loyalists from positions or power, and there was anger over the immunity granted to Saleh by the new parlaiment as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council deal. President Hadi's new government did remove some Saleh family and loyalists in early 2012 from positions of leadership in the military. In addition, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its new affiliate, Ansar Al-Sharia, continued to attempt to unseat the established government, taking advantage of the continued instability in the country.
The transitional president of Yemen, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, worked to bring together the various factions in Yemen for the Conference of National Dialogue starting in mid-November 2012. The dialogue, expected to last six months, was intended to address the range of issues relating to the transition to a "civil state". The dialogue was supposed to include drafting a new constitution for the country, and to prepare the way for Presidential and Parliamentary elections in February 2014. If the dialogue failed, civil war was a probable outcome.
In Yemen, like in many Arab Spring countries, the revolution’s center of gravity shifted from the popular revolts in Sana'a’s Change Square to quiet boardrooms across the capital, where nominally-elected political elites are guiding the beleaguered country through the democratic reform process. However, in contrast to other revolutionary struggles around the Middle East and North Africa, Yemen's political transition is being driven by an experimental regional and international effort to stabilize the geopolitically sensitive hotspot in the Arabian Peninsula. The Saudi-brokered, US and UN-backed Gulf country initiative has achieved progress toward its stated goals of restructuring the military and government in preparation for multiparty elections in early 2014.
The law mandates that political parties be national organizations that cannot restrict their membership to a particular region, tribe, religious sect, class, or profession. The General People’s Congress party did not exclude adherents of any religion from its membership. The Islamist Islah party, the dominant member of the Joint Meetings Party (JMP) coalition, required that a member be “committed” to Islamic teachings. The JMP itself did not impose a religious test. Al-Rashad, the country’s Salafi political party, required members to support its Islamist platform. Members of the small al-Haq and al-Umma parties represented adherents of Zaydi Islam. There were other minor political parties said to be Islamist in nature, although it was not clear if they restricted their membership to Muslims.
During 2012, the implementation of the 50-50 power sharing agreement outlined in the GCC initiative allowed a range of political parties to organize and operate without undue limitation. Although instances of harassment of political party members were reported in the media, parties for the most part operated without restriction or outside interference. The constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are contrary to Islam, “oppose the goals of the country’s revolutions,” or violate the country’s international commitments.
Although the the General People’s Congress Party, or GPC, had been the dominant party since unification in 1990, the power sharing agreement and ascendency of the Islah Party, the major “opposition” party in the JMP, began to erode the GPC’s influence. New political parties formed in the wake of the 2011 uprising, some apparently testing the constitutional prohibition against sectarian parties. The Rashad Party, representing Salafi conservative Islamists was formed and officially recognized in March. The Umma Party, representing moderate Zaydi Shias, also was recognized during the year. In addition the Watan Party, Liberal Party, and Arab Spring Party also were formed and recognized during the year, representing various youth and women’s groups seeking a voice in the political process.
Tribalism distorted political participation in previous years and still had an impact, influencing the composition of parliament and various ministries within the central government. Observers noted that elections and positions in government ministries sometimes were based on tribal affiliation. Patriarchal systems dominated in tribal areas, providing some tribal leaders with the reported ability to influence other tribal members’ votes.
The so-called “southern question” was considered by many to be the greatest challenge. In only five years, the Southern Movement or Hirak, based out of the southern port city of Aden, has transformed itself from a simple alliance of disgruntled workers from the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) into a formidable, although divided, political bloc whose more radical elements are calling for nothing short of secession from the “northern” government in Sanaa. Internal divisions among southerners in general has been a sensitive topic for both the committee and the Yemeni population at large.
Another major obstacle to the plan for a unified Yemen lay north of the capital in Saada governorate, which borders Saudi Arabia. There, a Zaidi Shi’ite movement, known as Al-Huthi, has been beating back government forces for control of the territory for most of the past decade. Last year’s anti-government revolts created an opening for the rebels not only to solidify their stronghold in Saada but to expand southward into the capital. President Hadi has routinely accused the Huthis of accepting Iranian support aimed at destabilizing the transition process. And the group continues to lambast what it perceives to be American and Saudi meddling in Yemeni affairs. Its caustic slogan, “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam,” has flooded Sana'a.
President Hadi, for his part, had insisted that he would relinquish his post in February 2014, in an apparent gesture to his domestic audience and the international community that the days of power grabs in Yemen have given way to the rule of law. President Hadi has made commitments to respond to citizens’ grievances. For example, in January 2013, he established two committees to address land disputes and resolve cases of early dismissal or retirement of civil, security, and military personnel in the southern provinces, where grievances have persisted since the civil war in 1994.
Yemen continued to be plagued by frequent kidnappings, which have traditionally been used as a means for tribes to pressure the government to accede to their demands for resources or improved services. A government crackdown in recent years had reduced the number of kidnappings however. Investment projects outside the capital often succeed or fail solely based on the strength of relations with the surrounding tribes. Tribes frequently hijack vehicles belonging to foreign companies in order to pressure the central government to provide additional social services in the area. Attacks on oil pipelines are common in Yemen. These types of attacks occur most frequently in oil exploration and production areas, including, but not limited to, the outlying governorates of Marib and Shabwah. Tribes in these regions claim they are not getting their fair share of economic activity in their areas, and investors should be very sensitive to their need to build strong and lasting community relations. The provision of community-based services, such as healthcare and education, can contribute to protecting investments in isolated areas.
In addition to AQAP, other destabilizing elements were active in Yemen. For example, the Houthi tribe based in northern Yemen is another security challenge. Similarly, in January 2013, the US ambassador to Yemen stated that Iran was destabilizing the region by assisting secessionists in southern Yemen. As of November 2012, the US State Department described the threat level in Yemen as “extremely high” due to terrorist activities and civil unrest. As indicators of the continuing tenuous security environment in Yemen, State noted the mob attack on the US embassy compound in September 2012, the murders of several US citizens in 2012, a growing trend in violent crime, and continuing piracy near Yemen’s shores.
The Conference of National Reconciliation struggled with demands by separatists from what was South Yemen, which merged with North Yemen in 1990. A group of separatists led by Mohammed Ali Ahmed, a former interior minister, quit the talks in November 2013, dimming prospects that the conference might produce a new constitution in time for the elections originally expected to be held in February 2014.
On 27 November 2013 the UN Security Council pledged to support the Government’s efforts to rebuild the economy and promote national dialogue while warning all those intent on derailing the exercise that it is ready to consider “further measures in response to any actions by individuals or parties that are aimed at disrupting the transition process.” The Council also welcomed the Yemeni Government’s efforts to safeguard security, “including the National Dialogue Conference which has generated a peaceful, inclusive and meaningful dialogue about the country’s future amongst diverse actors, including youth, women, civil society representatives, the Houthi Movement and the Hiraak Southern Movement.” The Council futher emphasized the importance of concluding it “as soon as possible” to move to constitutional drafting and electoral preparations, as the next steps in the transition.
Yemen's prime minister resigned September 21, 2014 as the government and Shiite opposition members were poised to sign a peace agreement after a week of intense clashes around the capital. Mohamed Basindawa stepped down amid reports that Houthi rebels had taken over several government buildings without resistance. In a resignation letter to President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the outgoing leader said he was leaving to pave the way for the formation of a national unity government.
Representatives of the main political parties, including a wing of the southern separatist Herak group, the Houthis and the Islamist Islah party signed the accord. The agreement called for the formation of a government of technocrats within one month. Under the deal, Hadi would also appoint advisers from the Shi'ite Ansarullah rebels and southern separatists within three days.
A showdown between the Houthis and President Abd-Rabbu Mansour forced Prime Minister-designate Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, whose appointment on 07 October 2014 under a power-sharing deal signed in September had angered Houthi leaders, to turn down the post.
On 13 October 2014 Yemen's president appointed Khaled Bahah, the country's envoy to the United Nations, as prime minister. The move was welcomed by the Shi'ite Muslim Houthi group which controlled the capital Sana'a.
Yemen's political factions, including Shi'ite Muslim rebels who control the capital, signed an agreement 01 November 2014 to allow the president and prime minister to form a new government. The deal called on all sides to ask President Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah to form a "competent national government" committed to human rights and neutrality in national affairs.
Yemen President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi resigned 22 January 2015, throwing the country deeper into chaos days after Houthi rebels battled their way into his presidential palace. Hadi submitted his resignation to parliament after being pressured to make further concessions to the rebels, saying he had reached a “deadlock” in talks with the militant group who rule the capital and had confined him to his home.
Yemen's powerful Shi'ite rebels finalized their takeover of the country 06 February 2015. The Houthi's revolutionary committee would chose an interim national assembly, replacing the old parliament. The new 551-members assembly would chose a five member presidential council to govern the county.
A Saudi-led military coalition entered the conflict in March 2015, bombing Houthi targets and obliterating entire Yemen communities. The Yemeni economy would collapse without the financial aid provided by neighboring Saudi Arabia. The country would become a failed state the day it was unable to pay salaries to its public service employees. Saudi Arabia would not be willing to pour more money into Yemen if it is controlled by the Houthis. Iran provded the finances needed for the Houthis to gain control.
On April 03, 2016 Yemen President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi dismissed his prime minister and vice president, Khaled Bahah, in a major government shakeup ahead of United Nations-brokered peace talks with Iran-backed Houthi militants later in themonth. Hadi replaced Bahah with politically powerful army General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar as the embattled government's new vice president. He also appointed lawmaker Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr as prime minister. The president offered no public explanations for the moves by early Monday. But the moves likely reflected differences between Hadi and Bahah over tactics and strategies for ending the country's protracted civil war. Unlike the more hardline Hadi, analysts have described Bahah as favoring a political settlement to the conflict, which erupted in September 2014.
Yemen Politics
The conflict that began in 2014 between the government and Ansar Allah, a movement more commonly known as the Houthis whose revolutionary ideology is grounded in interpretations of Zaydi Shi’ism, continued. The Houthi “government” and its institutions did not receive international recognition, and elections for parliament were not held. Houthis continued to control approximately one-third of the country’s territory, including 70 to 80 percent of the population. In areas they controlled, the Houthis enforced a strict interpretation of Zaydism, that is not shared by other Zaydi Shia in the country, and discriminated against individuals who did not follow their interpretation of those practices and doctrines, particularly religious minorities and women. NGO Freedom House criticized the situation in the country, based on Houthi authorities’ “growing assertion of ideological control over education in recent years, including through replacement of staff, suppression of dissent, and political indoctrination.” According to the NGO, this was a continuation of the widely reported trend in 2021 of the Houthis changing textbooks to indoctrinate students in what they considered the “true Islam” and to incite violence and hate through persistent antisemitic rhetoric. In 2015, the Houthis overturned the constitution, disbanded parliament, and announced the formation of an appointed Supreme Revolutionary Committee as the highest governing body. Houthi-aligned members of the General People’s Congress, the largest political party, announced the formation of a Supreme Political Council in 2016, and the reconvening of parliament in Sana’a, followed by the announcement of a “national salvation government.” The Supreme Political Council is a 10-member entity that purports to establish and determine a governing structure for the country under the Houthi-led regime in Sana’a. The international community deems the Supreme Political Council unconstitutional and illegitimate, Analysis in September 2022 by the Middle East Institute (MEI) stated, “Throughout the war, the country has undergone a radical political, religious, and cultural makeover, partially overturning the Yemeni Republic [in the north of the country] and opening a new chapter as a theological state presided over by a religious leader, Abdul Malek al-Houthi.” Individuals reported being taken from their jobs to attend religious workshops in which they were taught about the Zaydi faith and the Houthis’ moral leadership. They were ushered into buses from their workplace without notice and given no choice. Through peer pressure or willingly, some parents sent their children to Houthi summer camps held in mosques and schools, mainly in Sa’dah and other territories under the movement’s control. All parties to the conflict routinely imposed severe restrictions on the movement of persons, goods, and humanitarian assistance. Continued clashes, fuel shortages, damage to civilian infrastructure (including the food supply chain), and lack of access for and bureaucratic constraints on humanitarian and human rights organizations’ ability to reach vulnerable populations contributed to the worsening humanitarian situation. Houthi-controlled entities went to the homes of activists and political leaders opposed to the Houthis and used the threat of arrest to intimidate perceived opponents and to silence dissent. Many adults participated in Houthi-organized summer camps or cultural courses due to fear of losing employment benefits or humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the Houthis threatened to treat nonparticipants as foreign collaborators, arresting several activists who refused to attend Houthi-sponsored events in April 2022. Censorship affected internet freedom, and there were notable cases of Houthi intrusion into cyberspace. The Houthi-controlled “Public Telecommunications Corporation” and internet service providers systematically blocked user access to websites and internet domains that the Houthis deemed dangerous to their political agenda. Houthis significantly inhibited academic freedom and asserted their influence on cultural events. According to Scholars at Risk (SAR), the presence of armed groups “severely undermined the right to education, academic freedom, and institutional autonomy.” On some campuses, Houthi forces took control of operations and interfered in teaching and other academic activities, and faculty and students were also subjected to detentions and dismissals for being critical of their authority. The Houthis politicized course content to bolster Houthi influence and quash opposition. The January POE report documented cases in which humanitarian assistance was provided or denied to teachers based on whether they taught the Houthi curriculum. There were reports the Houthis harassed and detained activists and shut down numerous NGOs, often citing treason or conspiracy with foreign powers. Houthi-controlled entities created the “Executive Office for Monitoring Operations of International Organizations,” reportedly to monitor NGO activity. Several NGOs originally based in Sana’a moved to Aden or other cities in government-controlled areas, or abroad. Houthi mahram guardianship restrictions on movement by women and application of mahram restrictions in other areas of the country significantly constrained humanitarian and NGO activities, and in some cases deliberately targeted women working for NGOs and humanitarian organizations. Houthi “authorities” continued to require women to show guardianship permission and have their guardian (father, brother, husband, or son) present to obtain or renew personal identity cards, despite the law not requiring such conditions. During the year 2022, the Houthis increased the enforcement of mahram requirements. The requirement for women to be accompanied by a mahram is not contained in the law, and authorities had not made any formal changes to legislation. As of year’s end, the Houthis were largely enforcing mahram through verbal directives and governorate-level localized circulars. In August 2022, Houthi Land Transport Regulatory “Authority” (LTRA) issued a verbal directive stating that women were not permitted to travel unaccompanied by a mahram within Houthi-controlled governorates, to government-controlled areas, or outside the country. Consequently, reports were received from women in Sana’a indicating that car rental agencies were refusing to rent vehicles to women without a mahram to drive from Sana’a to Aden or sell spaces for travel in vehicles. Possibly as many as oen hundred thousand Yemeni demonstrators backing Shi'ite Houthi rebels marched 20 August 2016 in the rebel-held capital, Sana'a, in a show of support for a controversial new governing council already opposed by the United Nations and many Western governments. Organizers also billed the march as a rally of support for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Shi'ite leader driven from power in 2012 after ruling for more than three decades.
During his group’s celebration of the ninth anniversary of its coup against power and the political consensus in the country, Abdul Malik Al Houthi announced making changes that he described as radical, targeting corruption, which has become one of the most important manifestations that characterize the group’s dominance over public life and its management of state institutions. This announcement came after the escalation of popular protests. To oppose these practices and demand salaries.
Thousands of public employees in areas controlled by the Houthi group fear losing their jobs under the name of “radical changes” announced by the group’s leader six weeks ago, after public employment became the monopoly of its supporters, as they actively sought to seize all administrative positions in institutions. Public employees in Sanaa said that escalating measures are being practiced by the leaders of the Houthi leaders aimed at removing them from their jobs and replacing the group’s followers in those positions. These measures began a year ago by forcing them to pledge to adhere to everything stated in the texts of what was known as the “Code of Employment Conduct,” and the matter reached To threaten them with expulsion under the justification of “radical changes.”
The Houthi militia dismissed its unrecognized government, after the militia leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, was forced to dismiss the coup government in Sanaa, headed by Abdulaziz bin Habtoor, on 27 September 2023, and assigned it to conduct business only until a new government was formed, which has not happened. Press sources said that intense conflicts have been taking place behind the scenes between the leaders of the Houthi militia and its wings for more than a month, over the nomination of representatives of these wings in the coup government that the militia leader intends to form, according to security sources in Sanaa. The sources stated that the names submitted so far to the leader of the Houthi militias by Houthi leaders representing conflicting wings reached 340 names, a record number that reveals the level of conflict and competition between the militia leaders to win a share in the new coup formation.
Tribal sources reported November 10, 2023 that a tribal sheikh was killed while trying to resolve an armed conflict in one of the villages of the Sanhan District in the capital Sana'a Governorate. The sources told Al-Mashhad Al-Yemeni that Sheikh Ahmed Saleh Muhammad Al-Jaki was killed by mistake (08 November 2023) by a gunshot while trying to resolve an armed conflict in the village of Beit Al-Jaki in the Sanhan District of Sana’a Governorate. It added that the brothers of Sheikh Ahmed Saleh Al-Jaki today pardoned the accused, Ahmed Ali Muhammad Faraj, for the sake of God, in the murder that targeted their brother.
The sources confirmed that the sheikhs, chiefs, and notables of Beit Faraj in particular, and a quarter of the attendees in general, raised the white flag for the victim’s brothers, uncles, and all of the Al-Jaki family, in an absolute pardon in the quarrel that resulted in the killing of their brother. It should be noted that raising the white flag is one of the authentic tribal customs and traditions in Yemen, and it means thanking the perpetrator’s family and tribe after pardoning him, especially in manslaughter crimes, and this is announced on white boards in a public place.
The Abductees’ Mothers Association reported in 2022 on poor conditions in the Houthi-run “Security and Intelligence Prison” in Sana’a. Detainees were reportedly subjected to starvation, solitary confinement, and beatings. Detainee family members were frequently subject to abuses and assaults while visiting detention centers. Detainees also reportedly lacked access to health care. The SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties (SAM) found that at times when detainees were taken to the hospital, the detainees’ families were forced to cover their medical expenses, although the Abductees’ Mothers Association noted at times prisoners were denied medicine provided by families. The group also reported that prisoners lacked blankets at several prisons under Houthi control. The Abductees’ Mothers Association reported cases of partial paralysis, loss of hearing and sight, and death as the result of inadequate health care in detention centers. Many detainees also raised complaints before the court regarding the lack of health care in detention centers. Some detainees contracted diseases during their arrests, resulting in the deterioration of their health. Decisions were issued to refer detainees to doctors in some cases, but these decisions were rarely implemented, according to the Abductees’ Mothers Association. Houthi-controlled entities and “courts” were accused of granting bail only if they received a bribe. Tribal mediators commonly settled cases in rural areas without reference to the formal court system. In addition to established courts, there is a tribal justice system for noncriminal matters. Tribal judges, usually respected sheikhs, often adjudicated noncriminal cases under tribal law, which usually involved public accusation without the formal filing of charges. Tribal mediation often emphasized social cohesion more than punishment, sometimes at the expense of the accused’s due process rights. The public often respected the outcomes of tribal processes more than the formal court system, which was viewed by many as corrupt and lacking independence. According to ACLED’s Mapping Religious Repression in Yemen report, Houthi forces were responsible for more than two-thirds of recorded cases of religious repression in the country in 2021. ACLED also stated that incidents of religious repression in Houthi-controlled areas increased by 52 percent from 2020 to 2021 and attributed the increase to “a surge in the repression of Sunni and Salafi groups, the suppression of non-Zaydi religious rituals, and the imposition of Houthi ideology.” Repression against non-Muslim religious minorities, including Baha’is, Jews, and Christians, was concentrated in the Houthi-controlled areas of Amran, Ta’iz, and Amanat al-Asimah. According to ACLED, although non-Muslim minorities constituted less than 1 percent of the population, approximately 5 percent of religious repression events in the country targeted religious minorities. In his March 2022 report, UN Special Rapporteur Shaheed stated the Houthis coerced Jewish and Baha’i communities into leaving the country through blackmail and intimidation, arbitrarily detaining Jewish and Baha’i religious leaders and community members. According to the report of UN Special Rapporteur Shaheed, the Houthis spread “hateful rhetoric” against religious minorities in the educational curriculum. The Houthis added anti-Israel slogans and rhetoric into the elementary education curriculum and books. Sources reported to the United Nations that leaders in Houthi-held areas amended school curricula to solely reflect the Houthi understanding of Islam. The Houthis continued to use the antisemitic slogan, “Allah is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam.” The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen stated children in Houthi summer camps were instructed to shout this slogan. Houthi-controlled media also broadcast antisemitic statements and sermons. On June 22, in an address televised on the Houthi propaganda television outlet al-Masirah, Houthi leader Badreddin al-Houthi said the Prophet Muhammad emphasized keeping living spaces clean as part of one’s faith and that Jewish neighborhoods were “the dirtiest place in Medina” during the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime. Badreddin al-Houthi also stated that the Prophet told his followers, “Do not be like the Jews.” On 14 March 2022, Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, a member of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, said in an interview on the Lebanese television station al-Mayadeen that the Russian war on Ukraine was “the result of the evil-doing of the Jews.” He said, “If the president of Ukraine was someone else rather than that Jew [Volodymyr Zelenskyy], perhaps they would not have ended up in war.” On April 5, the official Houthi website Ansarollah.com published an article in which the author stated Jews and Christians refused to convert to Islam out of “arrogance” and that Jews rejected the Prophet Muhammad because he was an Arab. The author said, “Allah’s curse be upon the unbelievers.” On April 25 on al-Masirah, Houthi Deputy Minister of Higher Education Ali Yahya Sharaf al-Din said the Israeli flag “consists of two entwined triangles, representing religion and state, and two blue stripes, one at the bottom and one at the top, representing the efforts of Israel, that religious state, to take large parts of our Arab countries, from the Euphrates to the Nile.” On April 26, a program on al-Masirah featured university professor Abd al-Wahud Muqasher, who stated that Muslims’ conflict with Jews is religious and “an existential conflict of civilizations.” He added that Muslims “are fighting Israel and those behind it – America and the crusader West.” According to the Quran, Muqasher said, Jews are the “filthiest and most evil human beings.” Muslims must exterminate the Jews, he claimed, and every Muslim must fight in order to liberate Palestine and Jerusalem “from the filth of the Jews.” On 04 September 2022, al-Masirah broadcast a music video threatening Israel, with captions in both Arabic and Hebrew. The lyrics included the words, “Tell the Zionists that they will be disgraced…. Israel will come to an end…. We will disfigure their faces [and] let them taste our might and the heat of the piercing swords…. Tomorrow we will see Jerusalem cleansed of the filth of the Jews.”
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