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Agacher Dispute

Burkina Faso and Mali had a long-standing dispute regarding the territory of Agacher Strip, a border region of about 1,150 square kilometers about 160 by 30 kilometers in size. The Agacher Strip, which was rumoured to hold oil reserves, is a territory in northeastern Burkina Faso, where considerable amounts of manganese, gas, titanium, and uranium were suspected. Both sides hoped that the exploitation of these natural resources would help improve their desperate economic situation. The government of the Republic of Mali attempted to change the border to own advantage. The two countries fought two wars (25 November 1974 - 18 December 1974 and 25-30 December 1985).

The Agacher Strip became a point of contention between the two countries, leading to two separate conflicts known as the Agacher Strip Wars. Both nations laid claim to the Agacher Strip due to its potential mineral resources, particularly gold. The disputes over this territory stem from the colonial era when the boundaries between Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) and Mali were ambiguously defined by their colonial rulers. First Conflict (1974) was relatively short-lived and did not resolve the territorial issue. Second Conflict (1985) flared up again in December 1985, leading to a more intense conflict known as the "Christmas War." Over the course of several days, both nations engaged in combat which resulted in casualties on both sides. Resolution: In 1986, both countries agreed to allow the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to arbitrate the dispute. The ICJ's verdict in December 1986 was a compromise, splitting the territory approximately in half between the two nations. Both countries accepted the ruling, and the conflict came to an end.

Francophone states feared the overwhelming influence which Nigeria might exert, and whether such influence would always be in pursuit of common objectives. These states widely believed that Nigeria's main interest was to whittle away the influence of France with whom they maintain defence agreements, the more easily to establish its own regional bigpower status.

Accord de Non Aggression et d' Assistance en matiere de Defense (ANAD) which was signed in 1977 was considered as the security arm of the West African EconomicCommunity (CEAO) having the same parties with the addition of Togo. The impulse for its conclusion was the same as led to the creation of the CEAO, that is the creation of a francophone security arrangement particularly after the border war between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1974 had shown that defence links with France could not necessarily deter all forms of local threats.

The Accord set out the general principles of the commitment of the parties not to use force to settle any dispute among them and to come to each others assistance in defence against aggression. It was the first multilateral African mutual defence mechanism to be established, and, remarkably, considerable effort was made for its implementation. The Protocol of Application was adopted in 1981 and all the envisaged institutions including the Secretariat were made functional. Between 1981 and 1987, 12 other Protocols and 7 related instruments were adopted. Thus unlike the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence, ANAD had enough commitment of parties for its implementation.

In Deember 1985 tensions rose in Malian scholastic circles as discontentment with the government over unpaid salaries causes the teachers' union, the National Union for Education and Culture (SNEC), to become increasingly militant. President Traore accused the SNEC leaders of acting in concert with Burkina on the eve of the Agacher border conflict to destabilize his regime. Traore's problems with the teachers and dissatisfaction among functionaries in general, together with the Burkinabe border flare-up, left him in a potentially vulnerable position.

The "Christmas War" between the two countries in pursuit of their irreconciled territorial claims in the Agacher region, broke out on 25 December 1985. Eventually several hundred combatants were killed. Hostilities over the ill-defined border had flared briefly in 1973 and 1974. Although both parties submitted the dispute for World Court arbitration in 1983, and delineated their long western border in 1985, relations had been strained. Malian President Traore increasingly viewed Sankara as naive and immature, while Sankara publicly depicts Traore as "inept”, “senile", and "corrupt." More-over, in late 1985 Sankara publicly commented that a "revolution" would benefit the Malian people, according to press reports.

Mali began mobilizing its forces in early December, about the same time Burkina publicly announced that census takers would visit four villages in the disputed zone. Burkinan military units were neither mobilized nor put on alert before Mali's attack on 25 December 1985.

In the six days of fighting, Mali's Army overran the poorly armed Burkinabe soldiers and civilians stationed in the north. According to sketchy reporting, Sankara chose not to mobilize the regular Army units based in the capital - some one-third of the Army is deployed there - but preferred to have lightly armed Committees for the Defense of the Revolution do some of the fighting. Moreover, Sankara reinforced his southern flank, mistakenly believing that Mali would attempt to seize Burkina's second-largest city, Bobo-Dioulasso. Burkina had no defense against Malian air attacks on its northern garrisons and airfields. According to a variety of press reports, about 300 Burkinan and Malian soldiers died in the war.

On December 29, the first extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers con-vened in the ANAD headquarters in Abidjan, and arranged a cease-fire which was signed by thePresidents of Burkina Faso and Mali on December 30. The following day the ANAD Truce ObservationForce composed of military officers from all member states except the two antagonistics, arrived on the of hostilities.

On 17 January 1986, the first extra-ordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government convened at Yamoussoukro to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. On 18 January 1986 the ANAD heads of state ended their summit meeting in the Ivory Coast with an agreement that called for the withdrawal of all troops from the disputed region on the border between Mali and Burkina. Malian President Traore and Burkinabe President Sankara exchanged warm embraces prior to leaving the Ivory Coast. The agreement represented a diplomatic setback for Mali, since -its troops had succeded in occupying almost all of the disputed Agacher region and were the only ones to withdraw. By january 31, 1986 it was possible to withdraw the Observer Mission. It is interesting to note that a simultaneous peace mission initiated by Nigeria and Libya was turned down in favour of the ANAD initiative.

Despite the territorial disagreements and skirmishes, the resolution of the Agacher Strip dispute is often cited as a successful example of peaceful conflict resolution in Africa. The decision by both nations to resort to international arbitration rather than prolonged conflict demonstrates a commitment to peace and stability in the region.

In December 1986 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the Agacher strip be divided equally between Burkina Faso and Mali; both countries accepted the ruling. In its Judgment delivered on 22 December 1986, the Chamber began by ascertaining the source of the rights claimed by the Parties. It noted that, in that case, the principles that ought to be applied were the principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization and the principle of uti possidetis juris, which accords pre-eminence to legal title over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty, and whose primary aim is to secure respect for the territorial boundaries which existed at the time when independence was achieved. The Chamber specified that, when those boundaries were no more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same sovereign, the application of the principle of uti possidetis juris resulted in their being transformed into international frontiers, as in the instant case.

Following the Judgment delivered on 22 December 1986 by the Chamber which was constituted by the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), the President of Burkina Faso, Captain Thomas Sankara, and the President of the Republic of Mali, General Moussa Traoré, sent to the President of the Chamber, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, messages which reiterate their acceptance of the decision and which undertake to facilitate its implementation on the ground.

A few days after the ICJ's opinion, Morocco organised the Green March (6 November 1975) to publicise its desire for Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.