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Vietnamese Navy (VNN) Surface Combatants

Throughout 1971, the American naval command transferred seagoing ships, harbor control and mine craft, and logistic support craft of many types, including Coast Guard cutters Yakutat (WHEC 380), Bering Strait (WHEC 382), Castle Rock (WHEC 383), and Cook Inlet (WHEC 384), each equipped with 5-inch guns; radar escort picket Camp (DER 251); Garrett County, reconfigured as a small craft tender; and refrigerated storage craft YFR 889.

Despite the natural complications of a turnover process, the combined coastal patrol continued to perform successfully in 1971. Of the 11 Communist ships detected attempting infiltration during the year, only one delivered its cargo to the Viet Cong in An Xuyen Province, the usual destination of the trawlers. Another nine ships fled after being sighted by the allied patrol. The remaining vessel was tracked and sunk in coastal waters on 8 April 1971 through the coordinated effort of Coast Guard cutters Morgenthau (WHEC 722) and Rush (WHEC 723), the U.S. Navy's gunboat Antelope (PG 86) and air patrol units, and the Vietnamese Navy's motor gunboat Kien Vang (PGM 603).

The 311-foot cutters proved to be excellent high endurance cutters, "fine sea boats" in the words of one historian, and served the Coast Guard well. The Yakutat was in Coast Guard commission from 1948 through 1969 when, after duty in Vietnam, she was transferred to the South Vietnamese Navy. With the fall of South Vietnam, she fled to the Philippines where she was used for spare parts for the other South Vietnamese 311's that escaped the Communist takeover and "joined" the Philippine Navy. The Bering Strait was transferred to the South Vietnamese Navy in 1971. There she served as the Tran Quang Khai until she fled to the Philippines at the fall of South Vietnam. She was then commissioned into the Philippine Navy as the Diego Silang and served until 1985.

On 26 Feb 1969, JCS requested CINCPAC to furnish, if appropriate additional justification for the two DE. This request was passed on to COMUSMACV. The VNN had to patrol over 1,200 miles of coastline to prevent infiltration from the sea. The VNN had no ship capable of operating effectively in the 8-foot seas which occurred 15 percent of the time during the northeast monsoon, a highly probable infiltration period. The NVN historically preferred coastal infiltration into RVN and had repeatedly attempted to infiltrate trawlers which represented a potential VC resupply of 100 tons of war material per trawler. If not deterred, NVN could use coastal infiltration rather than the Ho Chi Minh Trail or the Sihanoukville- Cambodian border route. These DE would provide the VNN with the detection and intercept capability required.

The DE was the only all-weather ship capable of intercepting a 20-knot trawler. Indications were that for many years the VNAF would not be able to furnish assets for an air barrier similar to the MARKET TIME P3 barrier. For this reason the DEs were even more necessary in the outer surface barrier to provide an all-weather detection and intercept capability during periods of no air cover and a reaction capability in case the USN should fly a covert MARKET TIME patrol in the future. Should the NVN oppose coastal surveillance forces, the VNN was inferior in firepower, speed, and all-weather capability. In any attack, NVN would have the further advantage of being able to concentrate its forces while the VNN would be required to defend a 1,200 mile coastline.

There were no ships in the approved VNN that could successfully oppose PCEs or the torpedo boats of the north. In fact, a DE against these forces would be marginal, but what was proposed for the VNN was the minimum cost force that had at least a modest capability against the NVN Navy. If MARKET TIME forces were continued, it was argued that two DEs turned over to the VNN could replace USN DEs that would save over $1.6 million per year in US personnel costs and would release about 370 USN personnel for other duty.

CINCPACFLT strongly endorsed the requirement to provide two DEs to the VNN and on 13 Mar 1969 stated in a message to CINCPAC: "CINCPACFLT concurs with (COMUSMACV's) comments... A DE for VNN is approved in the JSOP." The seaborne infiltration threat to the SVN coastline is very real and the potential for a surge in enemy capabilities is quite evident. To counter this real and potential threat, it is incumbent on the US to provide the VNN with the necessary defensive equipment. The ships and craft currently approved for VNN are not adequate. The seaborne threat is more real to SVN than to other countries in PACOM which have DEs. On 15 Mar 1969, CINCPAC concurred in the justifications submitted by COMUSMACV and CINCPACF LT and recommended to the JCS that the two DEs deleted from the Phase II Plan be restored as a necessary augmentation in order to achieve and maintain a balanced VNN, capable of coastal patrol and fire support activities. He further requested early approval of the two DEs to permit commencement of the required training and associated planning necessary to accept these ships.