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Republic of Vietnam Navy - 1955-1975 Developments

The French Navy left the VNN with 14 ships, 6 Dinassauts (River Assault Groups), and a small cadre of well trained Vietnamese officers and petty officers. In 1955 USN advisors were assigned to assist in the development of the VNN. This effort had expanded as the VNN had embarked on a full scale insurgency. To counter sea infiltration of arms and men from the north, the VNN re-established the sea anti-infiltration force concept used by the French. A fleet of ten sail-only junks had been formed and assigned to operate in the area of the 17th parallel. It had been manned by paramilitary personnel.

A new plan for the development of the Vietnamese Naval Forces was forwarded to the Minister of Defense on 28 April 1955. This plan was concerned primarily with meeting a 3,000-man ceiling. The force levels thus continued to be unrealistic in terms of the missions contemplated and did little more than reveal that since the end of the war, the French had transferred to the Vietnamese Navy one LSSL, two LSILs and two LCUs to add to the three YMSs and two LCUs on hand at the end of hostilities.

The 1955 development plan called for an expansion of the naval forces to 9,000 men by the end of 1957 in order to provide for a Coastal Patrol Force and a River Force which, together with the required shore facilities, could deny coastal and inland waters to the Viet Minh and to other illicit traffic. In addition, there was to be a Transport Force to provide lift for an army regiment or permit the conduct of amphibious operations at up to regimental level. The Marine Corps was to be increased to a three-battalion regiment to constitute, along with the Parachute Regiment of the Army, a general reserve for the Armed Forces available on immediate call. The development plan concluded that to carry out the missions contemplated, the minimum forces required by the end of 1957 for the Coastal Patrol Force were four DEs, ten PCs, and 27 Motor Patrol Boats (CLUB type) ; the River Force was to include five dinassauts (each with nine LCMS and eight LCVPs), four LSILs, two LSSLs, and four LCUs, while the Transpor t Force was to comprise four LSTS and four LSMS. Finally, one squadron of amphibian patrol planes was to be activated.

From 1954 to 1959, the Vietnamese Navy, which grew from a force of 1,500 men, and a small number of ships and craft to a force of 5,000 men and 119 ships and craft. Controlled by the Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, the navy was organized into a Naval Staff; Sea Force, River Force, and Marine Corps operating forces; and a shore establishment. The latter group comprised the Naval Stations and Schools and the Naval Supply Center, Saigon. Patrol craft, escorts, minesweepers, and landing craft were acquired so that the South Vietnamese could carry out the priority mission of supporting its army with coastal patrol, escort and transportation, harbor defense, limited minelaying and minesweeping, and antisubmarine warfare. In addition, the naval trainers taught gunnery, navigation, and other subjects at the Nha Trang Naval School and worked to improve management skills at the Saigon Naval Shipyard.

By 1961 the VNN had a force of 23 ships, the largest of which were LSMs, 197 boats, and a personnel strength of 5,000 men. Morale had been high, but the VNN forces had not been sufficient to counter the growing enemy infiltration threat. Additional assets had been requested from the US. The years 1962-1964 had marked a rapid expansion of the VNN. Training facilities, repair bases, and logistics support facilities had been established; communications equipment and networks had been improved; and organization and administrative procedures were strengthened. The number of ships had increased to 44 and the personnel strength to 8,100.

The Republic of Vietnam Navy grew from 5,000 officers and men in 1959 to 8,162 in late 1964. During this same period the naval service doubled to a force of 44 seagoing ships and over 200 landing craft, patrol boats, and other vessels. Among the ships and craft provided between 1961 and 1964 by the United States to the Vietnamese Navy's Sea Force were an additional 5 escorts (PCE), 12 motor gunboats (PGM), 3 medium landing ships (LSM), and 3 tank landing ships (LST), 1 fuel barge (YOG), and 12 minesweeping launches (MLMS). These vessels gave the oceangoing force a greater capability to carry out its responsibility for patrol and transport along the 1,200-mile coastline, gunfire support of troops ashore, amphibious landings, minesweeping, and open sea operations.

By the end of 1965 the VNN had almost doubled its 1964 personnel strength. This was in part, the result of having integrated the paramilitary junk force into the Navy. This force, an off-shoot of the small anti-infiltration fleet established by the VNN in 1956, had been taken over by the Ministry of Defense in 1960.

By 1965 it had grown to well over 100 junks, and the RVN ordered it re-incorporated into the VNN. At the end of 1967 the personnel strength of the VNN had increased to 16,300. The number of ships had increased to 65, the River Assault Group (RAG) craft to 232, junks to 290 and 52 other miscellaneous craft. Throughout 1968 the VNN had placed emphasis on the improvement and expansion of their training programs. This action was predicated upon anticipation of gaining increased responsibility in the war effort as well as additional waterborne assets from the US. By the end of 1968 long range plans for the turnover of the majority of the USN waterborne assets in RVN had been formulated.

By 1969 the Navy had received 25 new gunboats costing US $7,700,000, designed especially for Delta patrols, and increased its personnel to 29,000 before the year is out. Minesweepers, Swift boats and a wide variety of riverine craft are being rapidly turned over to the Vietnamese Navy by the Americans. Soon the Navy assumed complete operational responsibility for river and canal patrolling in the Ha Tien area, including the Vien Te Canal. The Navy already had taken over responsibility for nearly all the coastal patrolling in the Fourth Coastal Zone, which embraces the Gulf of Thailand waters around Phu Quoc Island, and the inshore waters southward to the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula.

By 1973, both the logistic establishment and the combat arm of the Vietnamese Navy possessed the material resources to carry on the fight alone. The 42,000-man naval service marshalled a force of 1,500 ships and craft for warfare on the rivers and canals, in coastal waters, and far out to sea. The supply, training, and repair facilities were structured to man and support the operational navy for a long-term struggle.

Despite these advantages, the Vietnamese Navy still was burdened with the old problems of poor leadership, low morale, and lack of dedication on the part of many personnel. The departing Americans in the Naval Advisory Group concluded that the relatively young, recently expanded, and still developing Vietnamese Navy had the potential to add great strength to the defense of South Vietnam, but only if given the time to mature.

During the period from 29 March 1973 to 30 April 1975, the Defense Attaché Office (DAO), Saigon, administered the American military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. Limited by the Paris Agreement to 50 or fewer military personnel, the activity was staffed predominantly by civilians and contractors. The DAO was responsible for providing supplies and material to the 42,000-man Vietnamese Navy, which operated 672 amphibious ships and craft, 20 mine warfare vessels, 450 patrol craft, 56 service craft, and 242 junks. The quality of personnel in the naval service remained adequate over the two-year period.

A drastic cut in U.S. financial support, however, hurt the navy's overall readiness. The U.S. Congress appropriated only $700 million for fiscal year 1975, forcing the Vietnamese Navy to reduce its overall operations by 50 percent and its river combat and patrol activities by 70 percent. To conserve scarce ammunition and fuel, Saigon laid up over 600 river and harbor craft and 22 ships. The enemy did not target the waterways during 1973 and 1974, but such would not be the case in 1975 when the coastal areas of South Vietnam became the war's main operational theater.