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Buddhists - The 1966 Crisis

Despite administrative, social and economic reforms initiated by Prime Minister Ky's government, Buddhist opposition in early 1966 entered its most violent period since November 1963. The announced objective of the Buddhists was the resignation of the military regime of Prime Minister Ky and its replacement by a government headed by civilians. Apparently mollified somewhat by the Prime Minister's promise, on April 14, 1966, to hold national elections within 5 months, as a preliminary step to the transfer of power to a civilian government, the Buddhists announced that they would suspend their opposition campaign if the government met two conditions: first, to ensure fairly conducted elections; second, to gnarantee amnesty to those demonstrators who had been incarcerated during the preceding month-long political crisis. Governmental silence on the proposal was met within 24 hours by intensified disturbances, particularly in Da Nang where dissidents, mostly youths, joined by military and police elements, seized control of the radio stations and some other government buildings.

Faced with increasing Buddhist pressure, Prime Minister Ky on April 24 announced that preparations were under way to appoint an Electoral Law Drafting Commission. The Buddhist leaders, unappeased, charged the government with using delaying tactics and extended their demonstrations to Saigon, where the placards and chants of some participants took on Communist, neutralist and anti-American tones.

To meet the increasiug challenge, the Prime Minister, on May 16, sent, unannounced, about 1,000 South Vietnamese marines and 500 paratroopers to Da Naug by plane. They restored government authority and ended the disorders. Meanwhile, Buddhist agitation flared unopposed in Hue, where roaming bands of armed university students caused extensive property damage, including the sacking and burning of the United States Information Agency's library on May 26 and a similar assault on June 1 against the United States Consulate. These actions appeared, at the moment, to eliminate the possibility of a harmonious transition from military to civilian rule.

The government, nevertheless, proceeded with transition plans and announced on June 1 that elections for a constituent assembly were scheduled for September 11. On June 7 the Electoral Law Drafting Commission published a detailed schedule for election procedures. It fixed September 26 as the date for convening the elected constituent assembly, which was to draft a constitution within about 6 months. Under its plans the government envisaged retention of power for an additional 3 to 6 months, pending approval of the constitution and the election of a National Assembly. Buddhist leaders, however, seemed to expect that the constituent assembly would serve also as a legislative body authorized to appoint a new government. Charging the government with undue procrastination, the Buddhists, again manifesting impatience, called for the immediate resignation of the government's top leaders.

In protest against the alleged delaying tactics and the refusal of Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Ky to resign, the militant Buddhist monk, Thich Tri Quang, on June 8, began a well-publicized hunger strike in Hue. In the continuing riotous disturbances within the city, some 500 arniy troops participated with the Buddhist demonstrators. Police with substantial reinforcements failed to maintain order. Dissenters were virtually unopposed in their activities, which included the obstruction of basic governmental processes by resorting to various measures, such as absenteeism and placing ancestral altars in the streets and highways to block traffic. To placate civilian appeals for a voice in makiug national policy, the government, on June 6, added 10 civilians to The Directory (National Leadership Committee), the ruling body previously composed of 10 high-ranking military officers. Eight of the new members were laymen representing religious faiths: of the 8, 2 were Buddhists (unaffiliated with the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam), 2 were Catholics, and 2 each were from the Oao Dai and Hoo Hao sects. The remaining 2 were political personalities.

Unified Buddhist Church leaders, still unsatisfied, refused to be represented. Confronted with the continuing serious threat to governmental authority throughout the northern provinces and with virtual anarchy in Hue, the Prime Minister sent some 1,500 paratroopers and marines to the area between June 15 and 17 and declared martial law in the city. Government forces, in dealing with the dissidents, inflicted several casualities among the hard-core local Army insurgents attempting to march under Buddhist flags. With this evidence of loyalty within troop units stationed outside the trouble area, and of their effectiveness in dealing with unruly crowds, the influence of the agitators seemed to diminish. The disorders gradually subsided, and by June 20, Hue was again under government control. Thich Tri Quang was removed under police guard to a hospital in Saigon on June 22, and by the end of the month normal conditions were virtually restored in the major popUlation centers.

Meanwhile, on June 19, Chief of State Thieu sigued decrees establishing procedures for forming the constituent assembly, to be convened in September as previously announced. The decrees stipulated that the assembly would be dissolved upon promulgation of the new constitution. This ended speculation that the assembly might be given legislative powers and continue in service as a National Assembly.

Within the Unified Buddhist Church hierarchy the intensified antigovernment protests, such as those held at Hue, seemed to widen cleavages and develop new ones as various leaders competed for control of the organization. Street demonstrations by the militants aroused Catholic groups to organize counterdemonstrations. The Buddhist moderates denounced such manifestations and called for an attitude of tolerance toward the military government's leadership as long as it showed good faith in carrying out its promises for elections. By mid-summer 1966 the moderates appeared to be gaiuing predominant influeuce. In marked coutrast to their previous anti-government campaigns, the Buddhists this time lacked effective military support. Furthermore, factionalism and apparent disagreements among groups as to methods and objectives tended to detract from their influence on the public.