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South Vietnam - Training

Poor training or its complete absence was a continual handicap for all South Vietnam armed forces units. Many units had been formed and filled out with hastily drafted personnel with no formal training who were expected to learn by doing. High desertion rates also kept unit personnel in a constant state of flux and made unit retraining a pressing need. After 1960, owing to increasing force levels, the creation of many new units, and the need to acquire counterinsurgency capabilities, training activities took on added emphasis.

Paralleling the expansion of the South Vietnam armed forces massive efforts were made to improve the quality of the armed forces and training programs represented one of the most efficient ways to bring this about. While the old adage that units "learn to fight by fighting" is true, fighting alone was not enough. In Southeast Asia it was necessary to win and to keep winning a complex war where set-piece battles often gave only the illusion of victory. Thus, the advisory effort was devoted to creating not only an army that was tactically and technically proficient, but also a professional one that could cope with the social, economic, and political turmoil in which it operated and from which it was derived.

The greatest obstacle in improving and training the armed forces was the lack of qualified leadership at all levels, both officer and noncommissioned officer. This deficiency had been a continuing source of concern and one which seriously affected all efforts to create an effective combat force. Battalion and company commanders were often inexperienced and lacked initiative; few operations were conducted in the absence of detailed orders. Senior commanders issued directives, but failed to supervise their execution, and results were usually negligible. U.S. advisers continually cited poor leadership as the foremost reason for unit ineffectiveness. But with the lack of replacements, unsatisfactory commanders were seldom relieved. This situation was an unfortunate by-product of the rapid expansion of the military without a strong base of experienced leaders; the shortage of able personnel to occupy civil administrative positions only made the military problem more severe.

Preinduction training was given in high schools to physically fit males fifteen years of age or older. Graduates of this two-year compulsory training program received no military rank, but if they were later inducted they were often sent to officer candidate school. During the early 1960s, South Vietnamese trainees underwent a 31-week training program that had been developed by modifying appropriate U.S. Army training programs to conform to Vietnamese requirements. As in the United States, the training cycle consisted of four phases: basic individual, advanced individual, basic unit, and advanced unit training. To assist in the massive training process U.S. Army field manuals were translated, and both mobile training and contract civilian teams were active, despite ICC objections.

Paralleling the expansion of the South Vietnam armed forces massive efforts were made to improve the quality of the armed forces and training programs represented one of the most efficient ways to bring this about. While the old adage that units "learn to fight by fighting" is true, fighting alone was not enough. In Southeast Asia it was necessary to win and to keep winning a complex war where set-piece battles often gave only the illusion of victory. Thus, the advisory effort was devoted to creating not only an army that was tactically and technically proficient, but also a professional one that could cope with the social, economic, and political turmoil in which it operated and from which it was derived.

The Vietnamese soldier received 12 weeks of basic training (cut to nine weeks during the general mobilization drive of 1968) but often received advanced training in division camps, including taekwando, the Korean Karate or unarmed combat course. Unit training was continually emphasized but rarely undertaken by the Vietnamese combat units. In-place unit training was virtually nonexistent. Vietnamese Army commanders were normally required to conduct this type of instruction between combat operations. For the most part, the Vietnamese commanders disregarded this requirement and used the time for rest and recuperation. The relationship between training and operational efficiency was generally unappreciated, and continued emphasis by advisers at all levels failed to modify the indifferent attitude toward in-place training.

The technical expansion of the South Vietnam armed forces placed great demands on the schools and training centers. Military Assistance Command continuously sought to maintain and improve these institutions so that the Vietnamese forces would be more than an army on paper. New schools and training centers were established and existing facilities improved and expanded to upgrade their training capacity. Course content was constantly reviewed and revised to ensure it was meeting field requirements; Military Assistance Command continued to pay special attention to leadership training, small unit and night operations, marksmanship training, and ambush and patrol tactics. New courses of instruction, such as the special officer candidate, company commander, regional forces officer refresher, and methods of instruction, were established in all schools. At Regional Forces and Popular Forces training centers, consolidation programs were initiated in order to improve training facilities and standardize and upgrade training activities. Finally, MAC started programs to improve the leadership and cadre in the Vietnamese Army training base, and made vigorous efforts to place combat-experienced soldiers throughout these centers.

During 1968 the expansion and improvement of the training base enabled the South Vietnam Army to meet all of their training requirements. Service school inputs rose from 53,000 students in 1967 to 70,000 by the end of the year. The volume handled by the training centers was much larger and included some 168,335 Vietnamese Army and Regional Forces recruits, 19,174 OCS preparatory course students, 22,483 Popular Forces recruits, 13 new and 13 old infantry battalions (refresher training), 44 new Regional Forces heavy weapons platoons, 588 new Popular Forces platoons, and refresher training for 656 old Popular Forces platoons. With enemy activity low and mobilization efforts successful, this pace continued throughout the following years.

From 1968 to 1970 U.S. attempts to develop the size and scope of the training base also met with success. The service school system grew to a total of twenty-six schools offering training in 326 different courses of instruction with a normal capacity of 24,000 students expandable to an emergency capacity of 34,000. Training centers, including Regional and Popular Forces, Ranger, and the ten division training centers, numbered thirty-three and were located throughout the country. These centers provided instruction in a total of thirty-four different courses and had a normal capacity of approximately 65,000 students, with an emergency capacity of about 105,655. Formal training needs which could not be satisfied within the Vietnamese armed forces systems--pilots and operators of complex signal equipment for example--continued to be met by CONUS installations.

By 1966 the high standards required of US advisory personnel were abandoned and instead emphasis was placed on assigning the best men to U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam. Officers and noncommissioned officers began to look upon advisory duty as undesirable and avoided such duty if possible; promotions came through assignments to U.S. units, not through advisory service.

The most significant obstacle to effective training was poor leadership at the training center level. The most highly qualified officers should have been placed in training positions; but too often these posts were filled by officers who were relieved of combat commands. Their superiors often reasoned that such officers could do less damage in these positions of seemingly little responsibility than as combat officers and, in the short run, their logic was probably sound. But poor leadership at the top quickly affected lower echelons, starting a cycle of poor training and poor combat effectiveness.