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PM Nguyen Tan Dung / Nguyen Tan Dzung

Nguyen Tan Dung, born in 1949, was elected Prime Minister by the National Assembly on 27 June 2006 with 92.08 per cent of the total votes. A former deputy in the influential security ministry [which controls the secret police, as well as the regular force], he presided over a worsening rights record and activists predicted the one-party state will try to further tighten its grip on freedoms in the face of worries about Arab Spring-style unrest and economic discontent.

He was born on November 17, 1949 in Mau city, Ca Mau province, admitted to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) on June 10, 1967. Nguyen Tan Dung, aged 56, who had taken responsibility for economy as deputy prime minister in nearly past 10 years becomes the youngest prime minister in Vietnam in the past several decades. Dung was a high profile southerner and a protege of former PM Vo Van Kiet.

He committed to follow the tenth National Party Congress’s resolution and implement successfully the National Assembly’s resolution on socio-economic development. He would also devote to leading the implementation of the Government’s working programme in the 2002-2007 period presented by former Prime Minister Phan Van Khai at the first session of the eleventh National Assembly. He said he will try his best to realise the task and authority stipulated by the Constitutions so as to up to the Party and National Assembly’s trust worthiness. He stressed the fight against corruption and considers it as a key task in order to make the civil service healthy.

From November 1961 – September 1981 he served in the Army and the Military Medical Company in the southern province of Rach Gia. Senior Lieutenant – Chief Political Commissar of Infantry Battalion 207, Captain – Political Chief of Infantry Regiment 152, defending the southwestern border, Major – Head of the Personnel Board of Kien Giang Province's Military Command.

October 1981 – December 1994 : Enrolled at the High-level Nguyen Ai Quoc Party School. Member of the Kien Giang provincial Party Committee - Deputy Head of the provincial Party Committee’s Organisational Board. Member of the Standing Board of the Kien Giang provincial Party Committee - Secretary of the Ha Tien district Party Committee. Permanent Deputy Secretary of the Kien Giang provincial Party Committee - Chairman of the Kien Giang provincial People's Committee - Member of the provincial People's Council. Secretary of the Kien Giang provincial Party Committee - Secretary of the provincial Military Division's Party Committee - Member of the Military Zone 9 Party Committee.

January 1995 - May 1996 : Deputy Minister of Public Security, member of the Central Police Party Committee. June 1996 - August 1997 : Member of the Politburo and the Politburo’s Standing Committee. Director of the Party Central Committee's Economic Commission and in charge of financial affairs of the CPV.

September 1997 - June 2006 : Permanent Deputy Prime Minister - Member of the Politburo - Deputy Secretary of the Government Party Organisation. Also served as Chairman of the National Financial-Monetary Council, Head of the Steering Committee for Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands), Head of the Steering Committee for the Southwstern Region, Head of the Central Steering Committee for Renovating State-owned Enterprises, Head of the State Steering Committee for National Key Projects, Head of the Central Steering Committee for Crime Prevention and Fight, Chairman of the Central Amnesty Council and head of several other steering committees in different fields.

In 1998-1999 also served as Governor of the State Bank of Vietnam and Secretary of the State Bank of Vietnam Party Organisation. Until 2000 he served as acting head of the state bank and received generally good marks for his service, though he had no background in banking prior to that experience.

In 2001 First Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, then age 51, returned to the fifth-ranking slot he held three years earlier (before a nominal "demotion"), ranked as one of the "next generation" of leaders in the CPV. He played an important, behind-the-scenes role in reaching agreement to initial the bilateral trade agreement with the US. In the summer of 1999, and in that, and in other difficult issues, he played key "fix-it" roles to get things done.

Shortly after unrest broke out from large demonstrations in the central highlands in early February 2001, dung was dispatched to Gia Lai to monitor and help manage the situation on the ground. Little is known of what he actually did, and the visit was not reported in state media. However, these assignments revealed he was a key member of the leadership, though it appeared he has both strong supporters as well as opponents among the leadership. Some may resent his rapid rise: a politburo member only since 1996, Dung rose to fifth in the CPV ranks before being bounced to 15th in the formal order in 1997 around the time of Phieu's ascent to power.

President Tran Duc Luong, Danang Party Chief Phan Dien, Mass Mobilization Chief Truong Quang Duoc, And Economic Commission Chief Truong Tan Sang reportedly expressed their support within the Politburo for Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to move into the top spot in the summer of 2002. Dung was charged by the Politburo to oversee efforts to manage development and ethnic minority issues in the Central Highlands. He was also head of the Mekong Delta Development Commission and had a strong power-base in the Can Tho region.

As Prime Minister, Dung and his key supporters understood that the United States played a direct role in creating the conditions for their nation's success. Dung was thankful, in particular, for the key technical assistance the US gave over the years in reforming the system of economic governance. Dung battled to maintain his position in the complex political environment in Vietnam. Having staked his reputation on delivering solid economic growth, economic setbacks create definite political challenges. These woes exposed weaknesses in the economy and economic policy which were papered over in the go-go years of huge FDI inflows and increases in exports.

In addition, the passing of one of Dung's mentors, former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, robbed Dung of a strong advocate of reform at a sensitive time. All this aided Dung's more conservative counterparts in questioning the Prime Minister's embrace of the United States, while charging that Dung may not "have what it takes" even in economic matters.

Dung's motivation to seek stronger ties with the US was clear. The US is Vietnam's largest market and one of its closest trading partners. Dung and his colleagues also appropriately saw the United States as an important force in maintaining a stable regional environment and balancing a rising China. Domestic considerations play a role as well. As Vietnam continued its rapid economic and social transition, many Vietnamese view the strength of its relations with the United States as a key indicator of how much progress has been made in leaving the dark days of the 1970's and 1980's behind. For these reasons, Dung is committed to continued progress in bilateral relations.

As the Communist Party geared up for its Eleventh Party Congress in January 2011, conventional wisdom identified CPV Standing Secretary Truong Tan Sang and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung as the frontrunners to replace Nong Duc Manh as General Secretary. Neither PM Dung nor Standing Secretary Sang was a champion of political reform in the manner of the late PM Vo Van Kiet. But they are known commodities: pragmatic, market-oriented, and in favor of steady, incremental advances in Vietnam's relationship with the United States.

Politburo members since 1996, Dung and Sang had amassed unparalleled influence in Vietnam's Party-state apparatus; they were arguably the two most powerful political figures in the country today. Both had achieved dominant positions in what many now consider almost as competing wings within the Party- state apparatus: Dung through the Office of Government, government ministries, and his control over Vietnam's largest state-owned enterprises; Sang through the Central Committee Commissions. Dung and Sang were also in the best position to provide the continuity of leadership that the Party has consistently said it needed. The problem is that, though rivals, Dung and Sang were also too alike for comfort -- both are Southerners, both former HCMC Party Secretaries.

While PM Dung was frequently mentioned as a contender for General Secretary, a series of setbacks have frustrated his ambitions to ascend to the top spot. Dung appeared to have been stung by criticisms over his early advocacy for Chinese investment in bauxite projects in the Central Highlands, a controversy that was led publicly by General Vo Nguyen Giap, but which insiders said has been exploited by Sang and others as a proxy to undermine Dung. The Prime Minister reportedly also came under criticism for his government's poor performance on corruption, education, and health care.

Ultimately, Dung's biggest weakness was the simple fact that his power base derived from efforts to strengthen the government / state. Dung's efforts to consolidate power within the Office of Government alienated many in the Secretariat and the commissions of the Central Committee, the CPV's traditional centers of power, according to Eastern European diplomatic contacts with regular exposure to the upper/middle ranks of the CPV hierarchy.

Dung did not become General Secretary, and remained as Prime Minister. Though stung by criticism, the Prime Minister developed an unprecedentedly tight hold over the state bureaucracy. Just as critically, Dung -- a former wartime military medic and police official -- retained strong backing within the Ministries of Public Security and Defense, support that has likely only been reinforced during the crackdown on political dissent.

In January 2016 General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong faced a brief challenge from Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, his No. 2 who had ambitions for the top post. But Dung effectively withdrew from the contest, clearing the way for Trong. Dung, who rose through the ranks of the party and held senior positions, was a two-term prime minister. His economic reforms helped Vietnam attract a flood of foreign investment and helped triple the per capita GDP to $2,100 over the past 10 years.

Nguyen Tan Dung stepped down in april 2016 after a decade in office. Dung’s tenure was marked with unprecedented economic reforms as he looked to the West and particularly the United States for foreign that helped triple per capita GDP in 10 years. Dung was also viewed as standing up to China over the territorial claims in the South China Sea. Dung won praise for his economic plan and his stance toward China, but he was also accused of ignoring government corruption by allowing unhealthy doses of patronage and maintaining a lack of transparency.

Dung enacted a set of economic reforms that helped Vietnam attract a slew of new foreign investment, spoke out forcefully against China's aggressive expansion in the South China Sea, and strengthened ties with the United States. But he also leaft behind a legacy of crippling public debt, widespread corruption and inefficiency in state-run enterprises.