The Monarchy - Succession
The rule of succession is male agnatic primogeniture, where only males are accepted and inheritance is between male lines, from father to son. However the last two Constitutions of Thailand included provisions to permit for the amendment of the Palace Law to allow females to succeed. This seemed unlikely with the birth of Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti in 2005.
There would be no advance planning for how to respond to the King's death; the Privy Council would determine what to do after the event. There was speculation of a 1,000-day mourning period after the King's death. The Crown Prince, if he remained the designated successor, would immediately become King, although his coronation ceremony would take place after the mourning period and royal cremation.
The mode of succession was set forth in the Palace Law on Succession. In the absence of a crown prince, or if the crown prince declined succession, a princess could succeed, subject to parliamentary approval. When the throne became vacant, an heir was to be appointed by the Privy Council. Until the heir formally ascended the throne, the president of the Privy Council would act as regent. Prince Vajiralongkorn, the only son of King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit, was designated as heir on December 28, 1972, at the age of twenty.
The King's passing, whenever that may be, will shock Thailand. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn is the King's designated heir. However, the current King's enormous personal prestige, the lack of a precedent for royal succession during the modern era (King Bhumibol has been on the throne since 1946), and changing sentiment about the role of the institution in the 21st century suggest that the transition will be difficult. Succession would be a difficult transition time for Thailand. According to Palace Law, the Crown Prince would succeed his father, but if the Crown Prince were to die, anything could happen, and maybe Prathep Sirindhorn could succeed.
Observers do not rule out the possibility of a palace succession crisis sparking some type of unusual or extra-constitutional action by the military, which could be drawn into disputes between potential royal heirs. That said, it is most probable that the King's death would be followed -- at least initially -- by a period of genuine, widespread grief and an orderly succession.
For the royalist segment of the Bangkok-based political class, there is no clear path to perpetuating the monarchy's preeminence after the King's death. The 2007 constitution appeared designed to keep political parties weak and divided; some of the drafters likely hoped that this would not only preclude the reemergence of TRT in the near term but also prevent any civilian politician from rivaling the King's leadership. Nevertheless, PPP's success in 2007 signaled that Thaksin -- with his network, funds, and popularity in rural areas -- remained the dominant force in party politics.
Thais often acknowledge that they felt significantly more devotion to King Bhumibol than to the institution of the royal family, so it is not unreasonable for royalists to view Thaksin as an existential threat to the monarchy, particularly if he was in a position to fill the vacuum that will appear after Bhumibol's death.
The primary law governing the succession is the Palace Law on Succession of 1924. This law specified that the King's oldest son should be heir to the throne barring certain extraordinary circumstances (such as marriage to a foreigner, or mental illness), and then rank ordered other male relatives in the line of succession. For several decades, the various Thai constitutions either contained no provision for amending this law, or required any changes to follow the same procedures as a constitutional amendment. In the constitution of 1991, according to an account by a reputable academic, it was specified for the first time that the amendment of the Palace Law shall be the perogative of the King. This same provision has been carried over in the 2007 Constitution.
The King can declare his wish to change the law; the Privy Council will draft the amendment for his signature. Once he has signed, the Privy Council shall notify the President of the National Assembly to inform them of the change, and the Assembly president will countersign the Royal Command. In plain terms, this means that the King, on relatively short notice, can make significant changes in the Succession law. This has been interpreted to mean that he could, if he liked, designate his popular daughter to succeed him, rather than his reprobate and reviled only son.
The 2007 Constitution has other provisions relating to royal succession. Article 23 specifies that, when the throne becomes vacant, the National Assembly (consisting of the House and Senate), upon receipt by its President of notification from the cabinet, will convene to acknowledge the King's designated heir and invite him to ascend to the throne, proclaiming him as King. The Constitution does not delineate any timeline for this process. There is an expectation that the heir will be called very quickly, however. King Bhumibol was proclaimed King the same day that this older brother died of an unexplained gunshot wound in 1946 -- even under such alarming circumstances, the machinery of succession worked quickly.
Addressing the contingency of a vacancy on the throne when an heir has not been designated -- a scenario that does not currently apply -- the Constitution stipulates that the Privy Council is to submit a name of the King's successor to the cabinet, for onward submission to the National Assembly, and for the Assembly's approval. It is not clear whether the Assembly's approval would simply be pro forma (see para 9). Although the Palace Law on Succession currently states that the monarch must be a male, the 2007 Constitution, like several of its predecessors, states that the Privy Council may submit the name of a princess as the King's successor. As the constitution is the highest law of the land, a princess could be named under these conditions, even if the Palace Law were not amended.
The Constitution further specifies that the King may appoint a Regent in the event that he is unable to perform his functions; if required by circumstances (i.e., in the event of the King's incapacitation), the Privy Council may select a suitable person as Regent. If the King appoints the Regent himself, the President of the National Assembly simply countersigns the command. If the Privy Council selects a Regent, the person requires the approval of the National Assembly. One can certainly imagine that, if the King were incapacitated and a Regent had the authority to act on his behalf, that the succession process could be manipulated. The Crown Prince is the designated heir. None of these provisions matter much if he is still the designated heir when the Kings dies -- those provisions become relevant only if the Crown Prince is removed from contention somehow.
The Palace Law on Succession does contain a loophole that could, at least conceivably, be applied to this case. Section 10 of the law states that: "The Heir who is to succeed to the Throne should be fully respected by the people and the people should be able to rely on him happily. If he is considered by the majority of the people as objectionable, he should be out of the line to the Throne."
There do not appear to be any legal specifications for the length of the mourning period for the King; a period of one thousand days is often mentioned. The heir would still be monarch during this period, but the coronation ceremony -- a celebration -- would not be expected to happen during this period. The cremation ceremony for the King would probably occur at the end of the mourning period. Public celebrations would certainly be canceled, and most Thais would find it inappropriate to attend concerts or other entertainment events, at least during the early part of the mourning period. Thailand's modern economy could not shut down for 1000 days, however, and there would have to be provisions made for life in the country to go on. That means that schools, shops, and government offices would have to reopen relatively quickly.
There is no precedent for a Thai King's death in the modern era. Although the Constitution and the Palace Law on Succession establish certain procedures, their pace and susceptibility to manipulation remains unclear. What is certain is that the King's death will prove heart-wrenching for the millions of Thais who genuinely adore him, and normal political life will come to an immediate halt for a period of months and possibly longer.
The King Bhumibol's enormous personal prestige, the lack of a precedent for royal succession during the modern era (King Bhumibol has been on the throne since 1946), and changing sentiment about the proper role of the institution in the 21st century suggest that the transition will be difficult.
Underlying the political tension in Bangkok was the future of the monarchy. In the deep and general veneration for King Bhumibol reflects the Thai anxiety with modernity and globalisation. On the throne for over six decades, U.S.-born King Bhumibol is Thailand's most prestigious figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional mandate. Many actors, including in the military, are jockeying for position to shape the expected transition period in Thailand during royal succession after the eventual passing of the King. Few observers believe that the deep political and social divides can be bridged until after King Bhumibol passes and Thailand's tectonic plates shift.
There is a widespread, longstanding perception that Sirindhorn may somehow edge out the Crown Prince as successor to the King. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn neither commands the respect nor displays the charisma of his beloved father, who has greatly expanded the prestige and influence of the monarchy during his reign. Nearly everyone expects the monarchy to shrink and change in function after succession. The declining image of the royal family in Thailand stems from various factors, with something as simple as excessive motorcade-related traffic jams caused by minor royals was an unnecessary but enduring irritant. How much will change is open to question, with many institutions, figures, and political forces positioning for influence, not only over redefining the institution of monarchy but, equally fundamentally, what it means to be Thai.
By claiming the support of the King, the 2006 coup leaders likely preempted criticism if not outright rejection from some mainstream sectors of society. Bhumibol's designated successor, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, lacks the current King's extraordinary moral authority, however. Future military leaders may be less inclined to launch a coup, knowing they cannot count on a similarly effective royal blessing to inhibit critics. On the other hand, a weakened monarchy could imply that future coup leaders, without an effective check on their power or an imposing advocate for returning to democracy, would aim to assume the role of the country's supreme authority, resulting in a more assertive (and harder to dislodge) junta.
By 2010, rather than living overseas quietly, Thaksin had decided to fight, funding websites attacking the King and Queen to stir up anti-monarchy views. Thaksin attributed his court convictions to the judiciary's bias against him, alleging that King Bhumibol had conveyed to at least one Constitutional Court Justice during a royal audience that the Court should, in Thaksin's words, to do whatever was necessary to eliminate Thaksin. Thaksin was a threat to the monarchy and, by extension, to the Bangkok elite because he sought to concentrate power in his own hands. Thaksin's downfall was a result of a "lack of patience"; he should have just "waited the King out" and allowed the monarchy to fade away. The Crown Price would not have had the moral authority to counter Thaksin.
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