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Sudan - Saudi Relations

The Saudis' interest in Sudan is pragmatic, as instability in Sudan can lead to instability at home. First, the Saudis invest in Sudan not just for financial gain, but as a strategic path to future food security. Second, over one million Sudanese live in the Kingdom, and some Saudis trace their ancestry to Sudan. The Saudi government is unlikely to risk antagonizing this large constituency which adamantly supports President Bashir and vehemently opposes the ICC warrant.

While shunning the spotlight, Saudi Arabia, more than any other country, played a critical economic role in bolstering Sudan through large-scale remittance-producing employment, direct government aid, trade and private investment. With an estimated 350,000 Sudanese documented expatriate workers as of 1990 (plus another 150,000 or so who never returned from Haj), Saudi Arabia provided the largest share of remittances. Because the bulk of remittances have come to Sudan through unofficial channels, they have been difficult to calculate. According to one study in 1985, total remittances amounted to US$ 2.9 billion, one-third of Sudan's gnp. Official expatriate remittances in 1988 totaled US$ 445 million which constituted 78 percent of Sudan's hard currency budget. Since the coup however, not only has official remittances declined to an annual 0arget of US$ 300 million (and probably much less), but unofficial remittances, providing much needed private investment, also have dried up in the face of the anti-corruption zeal of the RCC. Expatriates have preferred to keep their savings in foreign accounts which their families use when they are able to travel outside of Sudan.

With its relatively high salaries, Saudi Arabia was the favored destination for ambitious and enterprising Sudanese. Throngs of visa applicants can always be seen outside the Saudi embassy in Khartoum during working hours. Sudanese workers in Saudi Arabia range from professionals (two-thirds of Sudanese doctors are overseas) to manual laborers. The Saudi government has provided irregular doses of aid, most recently releasing 207 million riyals (US$ 55.2 million) to rebuild the road from Khartoum to port Sudan. The Saudis have generally avoided military assistance. They recently turned down, for example, Government of Sudan requests for small naval craft for antismuggling patrols on the red sea. They reportedly financed, however, the Sudanese purchase from china in 1989 of 40 tanks and 40 armored personnel carriers (APC's), along with field and antiaircraft artillery and small arms. The Saudi monetary fund and Saudi fund for development have funded numerous economic development projects including about fifty that are ongoing. Rehabilitation of the gezira agricultural scheme and a new airport in port Sudan are examples of major projects underway. According to 1988 figures, Saudi agencies had over US$ 1.2 billion in outstanding loans to Sudan, by far the largest loan commitment of any nation. Reportedly, Saudi willingness to provide aid has languished recently because of Saudi dismay with RCC political and economic mismanagement.

Official trade figures confirmed that by teh edn of the Cold War Saudi Arabia was Sudan's largest trade partner. For the first six months of 1989, Sudanese exports - largely livestock (camels and goats), sesame seeds and sorghum - totaled 276,624,000 pounds (US$ 22,674,000) and imports - petroleum products and transportation equipment - came to 316,627,000 pounds (US$ 25,953,000). Saudis have also been important private investors in Sudan, including prince mohammad al faisal (faisal Islamic bank), sheikh mahfouz salem bin mahfouz (Saudi-Sudanese bank), sheikh abdel latif ghorab (dallah al-baraka group), sheikh omer bin laden (bin laden companies) and ibrahim al-affandi. Although Saudi investors have been assiduously courted by the RCC privately and at the recent investment conference, businessmen report that Saudis and other Arab investors have exhibited a marked reluctance to risk their funds in Sudan. Saudi private investment seems to be shrinking rather than expanding.

Sudan's links to Saudi Arabia were both strengthened and weakened by Islamic connections. All but the most secular of Sudanese Muslims participate at least once in the Haj, the pilgrimage to mecca. Saudi Arabia also contributes substantially to Islamic organizations in Sudan including an Islamic institute in Khartoum. Paradoxically, Sudan's religious tendencies are among the elements that most disconcert the Saudis. Religious leaders of the purist wahabi sect in Saudi Arabia frown on mystical Muslim practices common in Sudan including veneration of saintly forefathers, consultations with living fakis (holy men) and magical (fortune telling, healing) forms of folk religion. Politically, the Saudis disdain Islamic competition arising from sufi sects and the indigenous national Islamic front.

Because Islamic fundamentalism has often included an anti-Saudi strain, they reportedly are uncomfortable with militant proclivities, including Iranian sympathies, apparent in some Sudanese officials. This also reflects lack of Saudi enthusiasm for supporting any Arab country which attempts to follow a stricter form of Islam than that of the keeper of the holy cities. Saudis are also said to be distressed at the furor in Sudan over the hudud, which draws unwanted attention to Saudi application of sharia law. Saudis, distinguishing their homogenous Muslim nation from a mixed religious society like Sudan, would prefer that Sudan compromise on sharia to produce peace, religious harmony and stability. Sudan's associations with radical Libya only aggravate Saudi discomfort with Sudan, a discomfort that has already diminished Saudi assistance for Sudan.

Virtual neighbors except for the narrow Red Sea, Saudi Arabia and Sudan share close ties. An estimated one million Sudanese lived in the Kingdom by 2009, and Saudi Arabia sharply increased investment in Sudan. Hail Agricultural Development Co. (Hadco) announced in February a $45.3 million plan to develop over 22 thousand acres in northern Sudan. The SAG-owned Saudi Industrial Development Fund will fund 60 percent of the project. On 03 March 2009, Saudi Finance Minister Ibrahim al-Assaf traveled to Sudan to attend the inauguration of the Marawi dam with President Bashir. The dam project received Saudi funding.

In early February 2009, a consortium of Saudi investors indicated plans to invest $267 million in agricultural projects in Ethiopia and Sudan after completing feasibility studies. Also, Hail Agricultural Development Co (HADCO), one of the six large private agricultural companies in Saudi Arabia, announced its intention to invest $45.3 million in Sudan to produce wheat and corn. It was announced that the Saudi government-owned Saudi Industrial Development Fund would provide soft loans to cover 60 percent of the total investment cost. HADCC, which was established in northern Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, produces wheat, corn, dates, grapes, olives, animal feed, broiler meat, and table eggs.

The Saudi Council of Ministers issued a statement on 09 March 2009 expressing "concern and displeasure" over the ICC warrant, which he said will not solve Sudan's problems but increase them. The Kingdom would stand by Sudan in confronting "whatever undermines its sovereignty, stability and territorial integrity." The Kingdom viewed this initial statement as insufficient. Prince Saud held a 15 March 2009 press conference where, according to press reports, he "toughened the tone" of Saudi Arabia's opposition. "It's a politically motivated decision, otherwise it would not have come at this particular time," declared the Prince.

Scattered reports indicated that the Saudis were increasing assistance to Sudan and Darfur, though the Saudis themselves have not announced any increase. Sporadic reports have come from Sudanese press sources, including one unattributed (and unlikely) claim that investment projects worth US $4 billion were under review by Sudan's Jeddah Consulate (Sudanese Media Center, 09 April 2009).

The Saudis hold closely the amounts of assistance they provide to other countries. In a notable exception, the SAG publicly announced aid to Gaza Palestinians in the face of public outrage, although this was portrayed as a donation from individual royals. Many Saudis criticize foreign aid and believe the money could be better spent at home. Aid to Sudan would likely flow through the Saudi Red Crescent, or possibly other mechanisms such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference or Islamic Development Bank. However, the exact figures will likely remain secret.

The Saudis view themselves as already surrounded by diplomatic headaches, a list to which Sudan only adds. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq and Yemen require the Saudi's full attention, not to mention the Iran-Syria-Lebanon nexus. Volatility among Bahrain's Shi'a literally hits close to home. The Saudis would likely welcome any development that stabilizes Sudan and subtracts it from their list of concerns.

Sudan joined the Saudi-led military operations against Houthi rebels in Yemen in 2015, contributing four aircraft and promising up to 6,000 soldiers to join the fight. The move was a major talking point during Bashir’s re-election campaign and was seen as part of a broader foreign policy strategy to cozy up to Saudi Arabia.