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T-37A Amphibious Tank

The operational experience in the troops of the T-27 tanket showed that in order to use the weapon effectively it should be placed in a turret of circular rotation. In addition, to perform reconnaissance missions, it is desirable that the combat vehicle be floating. In 1933, such a machine was adopted by the Red Army under the name "small amphibious tank T-37A." The tank had a riveted (or welded) sealed hull of rolled armor plates. The transmission was located in the front of the case; the combat compartment and the control compartment were combined, the driver was on the left, the commander was on the right in the direction of travel.

Automobile engine "Ford-AA" was located behind, along the axis of the tank. To increase the buoyancy, floaters filled with cork were attached to the fenders on the left and right. Movement afloat was provided by the propeller, maneuvering - by the rudder. In this case, the blades of the propeller could be rotated, thus providing a reverse course afloat. During serial production, 1909 line tanks were produced, 643 T-37 TU radio tanks with radio stations, as well as 75 so-called "chemical" tanks with a flame-thrower.

At the end of 1930, the British firm Vickers Armstrong developed a project for a light amphibious tank. His prototype, made by the beginning of April next year, was successfully tested on the River Thames near Chelsea. Initially, the new machine was named in the documents as "Vickers-Carden-Loyd amphibious tank".

Like Many pre-war specimens of Soviet-made armored vehicles, the floating tanks of the 1930s had English roots. At the end of 1930, the English Company "Vickers-Armstrong" developed a project of A small floating tank. Its prototype, manufactured in April 1931, was shown on the Thames River near Chelsea by the press. The Tank had a hermetic trough body with ballfloats on the boards and a small turret, an armed machine gun, unified with the turrets of the 6-ton "Vickers" Mk A. The Suspension of the tank was borrowed from the 3-ton tractor of the same firm. The amphibious Motor "Medusa", which had a capacity of about 90 hp, which allowed the tank weighing 2.75 tons to develop on land speed up to 50 km/h, and afloat up to 9 km/h. However, the British Military Department was not interested in the amphibian. Then the Company "Vickers" began to conduct a wide advertising campaign to promote new products in the countries of the "Second World".

The tank had a riveted trough-shaped hull and a turret with a machine gun, borrowed from the 6-ton Vickers Model A. The buoyancy of the vehicle was ensured by the displacement of the hull and the massive balsa floats installed along its sides. Blocked suspension consisted of two dvukhkatkovyh carts (on board). Quarter-elliptic leaf springs were used as an elastic element. The drive wheels were located in front, and the second rollers of the rear carts were used as the guide wheels (it should be noted that the design of the undercarriage was largely borrowed from the lightweight 3-tonne tractor developed by Vickers in 1929). The tank was equipped with a 90-horsepower carburetor EAST engine, allowing the 2.75-ton machine to reach speeds of up to 50 km / h on land and up to 9 km / h afloat. Movement afloat was carried out with the help of the propeller and the ring steering. The engine with a radiator and a four-speed gearbox were placed in the housing on the right, and the driver’s cabin and the turret were on the left.

After the tests of the prototype were completed, a number of changes were made to the amphibian design, and in September 1931, Vickers Armstrong manufactured two tanks, designated A4E11 and A4E12, differing in design of propellers and rudders. However, the British War Department did not show much interest in the floating vehicles, limiting itself to the purchase of the two above-mentioned samples. Therefore, the firm Vickers showed active advertising for its floating car, photos of which were often flashed in military magazines and newspapers of the time. As in the case of the 6-ton tank Vickers Model A, the company relied on foreign orders from the countries of the "second world". The hopes of Vickers Armstrong executives were justified, however, the volume of purchases was significantly less than in the case of the 6-ton Vickers tank.

A total of 29 amphibians were bought by China, two tanks were purchased by Holland and Siam (Thailand). One floating Vickers-Carden-Loyd was sent for testing to Finland, whose military showed an interest in an amphibious tank. But after extensive testing, the Finns refused to buy the machine and returned it to the UK.

Among the countries that were interested in amphibian Vickery-Cardin-Loyd was the Soviet Union. After receiving information about the tests of the new English amphibious tank, on February 5, 1932, the management of the Mechanization and Motorization Directorate of the Red Army ordered Vickers through representatives of the Soviet foreign trade company Arcos Ltd. (All Russian Cooperative Society Limited) Eight Amphibians. In June 1932, the first tanks ordered were sent to the USSR, and the last vehicles arrived on October 22 of the same year.

Amphibians arrived at the NIBT test site near Moscow, and were sent to factories and tank units for study. The first amphibious Vickers-Carden-Loyd arrived in the Soviet Union when the prototypes of the Soviet amphibious tanks T-33, T-41 and T-37 were made and tested. Therefore, the statement that most of the technical solutions of the first samples of domestic amphibians (especially the T-33) were copied from the English machine is incorrect. Considering the experience gained in designing the T-41 and T-37 machines. The Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army decided to develop a new amphibious tank for adoption by the Red Army. It was assumed that the machine layout will be similar to the T-41, but with the suspension of the T-37 tank. The Resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR was adopted on August 11, 1932,

The creation and organization of serial production of the T-37A was entrusted to the 2nd plant of the Moscow Aviation Regulatory Service in Moscow. All material on T-37 OKMO development, as well as one amphibian Vickers-Carden-Loyd arrived from England were transferred here. The works were supervised by the chief designer of the T-41 tank N. Kozyrev.

In spite of the experience of serial production of T-27 tankettes that already existed at plant No. 37, the deployment of the production of the T-37A tank went with great difficulty. The new machine was harder than the T-27, and the plant’s capabilities were rather limited. Nevertheless, the finished plan for amphibious tanks for 1933, received from the leadership of Spetsmashrestrest, was 1,200 machines. In addition, in parallel with the development of the T-37A tank, plant No. 37 continued to produce the T-27 (with the plan for 1933, 507 units produced the plant with 914 T-27) - which naturally created additional difficulties.

There were problems with the production of armored T-37A at the Podolsk cracking-electric locomotive building plant (before that it produced the hull of the T-27 tankette). The fact is that the T-37A hulls should have been manufactured using stamping followed by cementation. The first experienced pressed case made of ordinary (not armor) steel was ready on February 25, 1933, but failed to adjust their production at the plant. I had to look for other ways, for example - bending armor plates on special devices, which required additional time and money. Naturally, all this was reflected in the fulfillment of the task for the production of the T-37A at Plant No. 37: in the first half of 1933, only 30 tanks were manufactured (12 of them were T-41) instead of the planned 225 vehicles.

Regarding this, Deputy Commissar of Defense of the USSR M. Tukhachevsky reported in his report "On the progress of the implementation of the tank program for the first half of 1933": "... Reasons for non-fulfillment of the program ... for the T-37 tank: the Podolsky cracking-plant did not supply cases, lack of preparation of the technical process, the supply of poor-quality steel casting armor. The program for the T-27 cases was completed, according to T-37 filed during the first half of the year instead of 250 planned, only one standard body. The main reason for this situation is the transition to stamping and cementation without sufficiently serious preliminary experiments and preparatory work. At present, it can be said that the plant has mastered a. Further implementation of the program depends From supplying conditioned bronelista with Kulebaki plant that bronelista not filed until May and June due to lack of ferro-alloys. The plant currently has conditioning and ferroalloys plant began feeding armor plate. "

However, the production of T-37A went with great difficulty. Representatives of the Red Army UMM, who visited Plant No. 37 in the middle of October 1933, reported: "The delivery of the first experimental T-37 group ends, altogether, along with the T-41, 45 vehicles. By the end of the year there will probably be no more than 800 tanks" . However, the forecast was optimistic - by January 1, 1934, Plant No. 37 manufactured only 126 T-37A (of which 2 are radial) and 12 T-41.7 November 1933, the first T-37A amphibious tanks along with T-41 were demonstrated during parade on Red Square.

In the "Report on the work of the factories of Spetsmashtrest for 1933," the production of tanks at plant No. 37 said the following: "To replace the production of the T-27 tankkin, the plant has a completely new type of floating machine T-37 T-27. The reasons for the non-fulfillment of the plan are as follows: the lack of a precisely developed technological process, the absolute lack of organization of production, the unsatisfactory state of production planning, the late delivery of semi-fabr to the co-operated plants Katov and their poor quality. The lack of system in the plant caused the plant to resort to rush work, that is the hard work at the end of the month, quarter and year, and absolutely quiet operation at the beginning of these periods. "

The summer-autumn 1933 T-37A machines (sometimes referred to as tanks of the first batch or first release in documents of that time) were somewhat different from later machines; hulls and floats above the tracks (instead of the latter, flat fences were installed).

All tanks of the first batch had a large number of flaws and were taken with great difficulty by representatives of the military acceptance team. Given their poor workmanship, the management of the Mechanization and Motorization Directorate of the Red Army decided to "transfer all these machines to training units for crew training."

In 1934, the leadership of Spetsmashtrest took measures to improve the production of amphibious tanks, the construction of two new workshops began at plant No. 37, which were equipped with equipment purchased abroad, and the number of workers and engineers increased slightly. But despite this, the production of T-37A went with great difficulties.

Thus, in the reporting documents of the special engineering trust for 1934, the work of plant No. 37 reported the following: "The technical and general management of the plant, which was absolutely unsatisfactory in late 1933 and early 1934, created a serious breakthrough in the first half of 1934 ... The change in the management of the plant and the management of individual sections during the tense and hard work of the whole team created a change in work at the beginning of the second half of the year, which served as the main factor in the implementation of the program for the main products. "

During serial production, a number of changes were made to the T-37A. Thus, initially the tank hulls were assembled from armor 4 mm-6 mm-8 mm thick, and from March 1934 the hearth switched to sheets of 4 mm-6 mm-8 mm-10 mm, increasing the thickness of the boards from 8 -mm to 10mm. Starting in 1935, the T-37A tanks began to use stamped aft hull sheet (before it was bent on a special press), the front sheet of the turret was mounted on bolts, and the nadgusenichnye floats were made empty, without corking of time were sometimes called "float-free".

In the course of serial production, the T-37A tanks were equipped with two types of hulls and turrets — riveted and welded. The first type was manufactured at the Podolsk Ordzhonikidze Electric Locomotive Plant and was the most widespread. During the acceptance tests, all the tanks, loaded up to the full combat mass and with a crew of two, made a 25-kilometer march to Bear Lake, situated near Moscow, where they were tested afloat.

The welded hulls were made by the Izhora plant in Leningrad, but the volume of their production was small. The fact is that the Podolsk plant in 1933-1935 could not provide the manufacture of the necessary number of buildings to ensure the production of T-37A tanks. To eliminate this, in the production of amphibious tanks in 1934, the Izhora plant was connected to the production of T-37A armored corpses, which had a strong production base and extensive experience in this area.

However, the Izhora plant, already loaded with the manufacture of hulls for BT, T-26, T-28 and armored machines (not counting orders from the navy), could not cope with the lowered plan for T-37A. Only by 1936, after the reorganization and the commissioning of the new workshops, did the Podolsk Ordzhonikidze Cracking-Electric Locomotive Plant have been able to fully provide the armored hull program for the production of amphibious tanks.

Along with line tanks, radio-powered tanks equipped with a 71-TK radio station were also produced in 1934. The first two radio T-37A were ready in the autumn of 1933 and participated in the November parade on Red Square. They had a handrail antenna mounted on fenders. Entering the antenna was behind the hatch of the driver’s mechanic, and with the introduction of treadmills, it was moved forward to the top sheet of the hull. To protect the antenna when the tank moves through the forest and bushes in front of the floats, special protective fences in the form of triangular frames were installed.

In total for 1932–1936, 1909 line and 643 T-37A radio tanks were manufactured.

In 1935, a set of removable chemical equipment for the T-37A tank was developed in the design office of the Kompressor plant. Depending on the refueling, it could be used for flame throwing or setting smoke screens. On May 21 of the same year, a tank with this equipment was tested at a scientific testing chemical testing site. It consisted of a tank with a capacity of 37 liters, a cylinder of compressed air - 3 liters, a device for giving pressure (pressure regulator, pressure gauges), a hose with a rubber hose, an incendiary device and a burner, and a pipeline for smoke exhaust. The mass of the entire apparatus was 89 kg. When the tank was fully charged with fire mixture, it was possible to make 15 shots at a distance of up to 25 meters.

The installation hoses were placed on the upper right inclined front sheet of the case to the right and due to the swivel joint, they had pointing angles from -5 to +15 degrees vertically and 180 degrees horizontally. For the production of a shot or a smoke suppressor, a foot pedal was inserted, which was located at the tank commander.

All equipment was made removable, it could be installed on the T-37A with minimal modifications. After the tests, 75 such tanks were manufactured (34 in 1935 and 41 in 1936). The documents of the time, these tanks were like the "T-37 chemical." However, the operation of chemical T-37A was short-lived - already in 1938 -1939, most of the equipment from them was dismantled. As of April 1, 1941, there were only 10 T-37 chemical in the Red Army, of which 4 were in warehouses.

Around 1934, various options for the delivery of T-37A tanks by air by landing method began to be developed. Thus it was supposed to use these machines as part of airborne units, to capture various objects in the enemy's rear. The delivery of tanks was supposed to be carried out by their suspension under the fuselage of TB-3 bombers. In the 1930s, a large number of different suspension variants were developed, most of which remained in the test samples. Only the PG-12 variant, developed at the NKTP Experimental Institute under the guidance of P. Grokhovsky, was used to deliver several tanks by air during the so-called large Kiev maneuvers that took place in September 1935. It should be noted that during the flight, the crews of the T-37A were not in tanks, as some sources say, but in an airplane.

Another interesting job on dropping the T-37A were experiments on dumping tanks on the water. Such tests were conducted in October 1936 at the Bear Lakes near Moscow. Work on the design of the suspension and discharge mechanism was carried out under the direction of the chief of the design and engineering sector of the scientific and testing department of the AMM Plant named for Stalin, military engineer of 3rd rank J. Kotin (in two years he would head the Kirovsky design bureau in Leningrad). The dumping of the tank into the water was carried out from the lowest possible height - 15-20 meters. To protect the tank when hitting the water under the bottom of the machine, special shock absorbing devices of various types were mounted: oak bars, a tarpaulin screen with pine slats and a spruce fir branches. During the tests, three T-37A were discharged into the water with various depreciation options. of which the most successful was the option with spruce branches. Nevertheless, all three tanks suffered serious damage to the bottom when they hit the water and sank. Therefore, further experiments on the discharge of water T-37A were discontinued.

Electrical equipment is made by a single-wire circuit, the voltage of the onboard network is 6V. Battery ignition system. The engine was started from the control compartment using an electric starter or a special start mechanism lever. The crew of the tank consisted of two people: the commander-gunner and driver. The commander was located in the fighting compartment or department of management next to the driver. Since the management of the T-37A was duplicated, both crew members could drive, which increased the survivability of the vehicle. The tank was equipped with special equipment: a water-pumping gear pump driven by a transmission gearbox, ensuring the preservation of buoyancy of the hull when receiving holes in the part under water.

To create and organize the serial production of the new machine was supposed to be the 2nd machine factory VATO in Cherkizovo (later Factory #37). All the materials for the T-33 and T-37 tanks were transferred Here, as well as one of the amphibians purchased in the Uk. N. Kozyrev was appointed Chief designer of T-37. The Military very much wanted that even before the end of the year the plant would release at least 30 tanks T-37 A, but these expectations were not justified. The Tank was very complex, and the material equipment of the plant wsas inadequate. But despite this, even after clarifying the possibilities of the plant (very modest, by the way) the plan of production of floating tanks T-37 A in 1933 from the leadership of Spetmashtresta made 1200 machines. Naturally, these plans were not destined to come true.

The tank was in mass production from 1933 to 1936. During this time, plant No. 37 produced 1909 linear tanks, 643 T-37TU radio tanks and 75 OT-37 chemical tanks. With the latter, however, not everything is clear. The fact is that flame-throwing tanks were called chemical at that time. However, no additional data on the existence of a flamethrower version of the T-37 have so far been found. As part of the development of the tank design, prototypes T-37B and T-37B were manufactured, and in addition, an experimental self-propelled gun Su-37 with a 45-mm gun.

As of June 1, 1941, there were 2,331 T-37A tanks in the Red Army. Not all of these vehicles were on alert, a significant amount were being repaired or in reserve. The bulk of the tanks were lost in the first month of the fighting. Mostly, the tanks undermined their own crews due to breakdowns and malfunctions. Only in a few cases, with proper use, were these machines able to provide effective support to Soviet infantry.

From Soviet (and German) memoirs, it becomes clear that throwing the T-37A into a counterattack while supporting the infantry is simply idiocy. T-37A are good against infantry and motorcycles, for example, but absolutely useless if the enemy had at least one 37-mm gun or tank with a 20-mm cannon. So it is not surprising that by the spring of 1942, there were very few T-37As in combat units.

But on the Leningrad front, the T-37A held out for a long time, until about the end of 1943. There, in Leningrad, it was possible to repair machines at local enterprises. On the Leningrad front, one of two operations conducted during the entire war (the second was carried out in 1944 on the Karelian front) was carried out, in which amphibious tanks were used to force water obstacles and capture the bridgehead on the opposite bank.

One operation, to force the Neva, began on the night of September 26, 1942. In the first echelon there was a company OLTB - 10 cars. At 4.30 am the tanks descended to the water, while one of them broke down, and the other two flew out while maneuvering tracks (later evacuated to the rear). The remaining seven cars entered the Neva and rushed to the left bank. The Germans, noticing the crossing, lit up the river with rockets and opened up strong artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire on the tanks. As a result, only three tanks reached the left bank. But due to the fact that the infantry of the 70th Infantry Division was delayed with the crossing, all three vehicles were quickly hit. Their crews attempted to swim across the water to the right bank, but were shot by the enemy in the water and died. The operation to force the Svir River was the last known episode of the participation of Soviet amphibious tanks in the Great Patriotic War.

The T-37A fought the longest on the Karelian front. By the summer of 1944, all remaining T-37A in the ranks, as well as vehicles transferred from the Leningrad Front, were reduced to the 92nd separate tank regiment. In preparation for the offensive in Karelia, the front command decided to use this regiment "to force the Svir River and capture the bridgehead to ensure the crossing of the remaining troops." This operation was the second (and most successful) episode in which amphibious tanks were used to cross the water barrier.

In modern (especially in modern) opinions, the T-37A and other similar tanks are very often criticized for thin armor and weak weapons. The main advantage of the T-37A is the ability to force water barriers without assistance. It is to cross the river / lake, grab the caterpillars on the opposite bank, to support the infantry with fire and armor (yes, not much, but much better than nothing) - this is the main task in my opinion, the task of a small amphibious tank. Alas, this did not happen. It was possible to use the floating tanks correctly only two times in 4 years of war. Of these, once - successfully, and the Svir operation became the only successful war.

The commanders of the Red Army simply did not understand what the value is and how it can be effectively used. Therefore, instead of throwing through a water barrier with access to the rear, the tanks rushed into the land frontal attacks on the enemy. After which, pretty quickly ended. And when the offensive operations began, through the numerous rivers of the European part, amphibians should be used here, but they were no longer available.