Presidential Election - March 2024
On 07 December 2023, the Russian Federation Council (upper house, or "senate," of the Federal Assembly, Russia’s parliament since 1993) adopted a resolution to officially designate March 17, 2024 as the date for the next election of Russia’s head of state. On 08 December 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his plans to run for reelection in 2024. The announcement was made during an informal conversation with participants of his country's special military operation. "We have proven that we are capable of tackling some of the most complex challenges," the Russian president said.
The Russian leader confirmed that his country supports the establishment of a new "truly democratic" model of global economic development. "The entire global system of economic relations is undergoing fundamental irreversible changes. This is because the previous model of globalization is being replaced by a multipolar model," Putin said at the plenary session of the 14th VTB "Russia Calling!" Investment Forum.
Presidential elections can be held on the anniversary of the approval of the draft treaty on the "accession" of Crimea to Russia. They are scheduled to be appointed on March 17, 2024. In particular, on March 17, 2014, the Russian president approved the draft treaty on the "accession" of Crimea to Russia.
The Russian Federation has a highly centralized, authoritarian political system dominated by President Vladimir Putin. The bicameral Federal Assembly consists of a directly elected lower house (State Duma) and an appointed upper house (Federation Council), both of which lack independence from the executive. The 2018 presidential election and the September 19 State Duma elections were marked by accusations of government interference and manipulation of the electoral process, including the exclusion of meaningful opposition candidates.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: extrajudicial killings and attempted extrajudicial killings, including of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons in Chechnya by local government authorities; enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities; pervasive torture by government law enforcement officers that sometimes resulted in death and occasionally involved sexual violence or punitive psychiatric incarceration; harsh and life-threatening conditions in prisons; arbitrary arrest and detention; political and religious prisoners and detainees; politically motivated reprisals against individuals located outside the country; severe arbitrary interference with privacy; severe suppression of freedom of expression and media, including violence against journalists and the use of "antiextremism" and other laws to prosecute peaceful dissent and religious minorities; severe restrictions on internet freedom; severe suppression of the freedom of peaceful assembly; severe suppression of freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on "foreign agents" and "undesirable foreign organizations"; severe restrictions of religious freedom; refoulement of refugees; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; severe limits on participation in the political process, including restrictions on opposition candidates' ability to seek public office and conduct political campaigns, and on the ability of civil society to monitor election processes.
Government-controlled media frequently used derogatory terms such as "traitor," "foreign agent," and "fifth column" to describe individuals expressing views critical of or different from government policy, leading to a societal climate intolerant of dissent. The government continued to restrict press and media freedom. More than 80 percent of country's mass media was funded by the government or progovernment actors. Government-friendly oligarchs owned most other outlets, which are permitted to determine what they publish within formal or informal boundaries set by the government. Journalists continued to be subjected to arrest, imprisonment, physical attack, harassment, and intimidation as a result of their reporting.
The law provides for freedom of assembly, but local authorities restricted this right. The law requires organizers of public meetings, demonstrations, or marches by more than one person to notify the government, although authorities maintained that protest organizers must receive government permission, not just provide notification. Failure to obtain official permission to hold a protest resulted in the demonstration being viewed as unlawful by law enforcement officials, who routinely dispersed such protests.
Although they do not require official approval, authorities restricted single-person pickets and required that there be at least 164 feet [50 meters] separating protesters from each other. By law police officers may stop a single-person picket to protect the health and safety of the picketer.
For the purposes of implementing the "foreign agents" law, the government considered "political activities" to include: organizing public events, rallies, demonstrations, marches, and pickets; organizing and conducting public debates, discussions, or presentations; ‎participating in election activities aimed at influencing the result, including election observation and forming commissions; public calls to influence local and state government bodies, including calling for changes to legislation; disseminating opinions and decisions of state bodies by technology; and attempting to shape public political views, including public opinion polls or other sociological research.
Authorities continued to misuse the country's expansive definition of extremism to stifle freedom of association. On 04 June 2021, President Putin signed a law that prohibits members of "extremist" organizations from participating in elections at all levels – municipal, regional, and federal. On 09 June 2021, a Moscow city court designated Navalny's Anticorruption Foundation, his political operations, and the affiliated Citizens' Rights Protection Fund as "extremist" in a move that experts said was designed to prohibit those affiliated with Navalny and the Anticorruption Foundation from running for office.
While the law provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, citizens could not fully do so because the government limited the ability of opposition parties to organize, register candidates for public office, access media outlets, and conduct political campaigns.
"There are no clear outlines of the ideological component yet, although it is assumed that it will be based on the theme of unity," Kommersant writes. The Kremlin intends to test various technologies and "meaningful ideas" for 2024 in the regional elections in the fall of 2023. Kommersant's interlocutors note that attention will be paid to the "new stratum" - those who participated in the war in Ukraine and their relatives; in addition, the Kremlin expects to work with the electorate in the recently annexed territories of four regions of Ukraine, believing that elections will be held there as well.
The Nestka publication also reported the day before that the Kremlin "moved to a new phase of preparations for the 2024 presidential election." In particular, the authorities of the Russian regions received orders to prepare for the campaign. Their heads are recommended now to draw up lists of the most important social problems for residents that they will have to solve in the coming months, as well as "to assess the mood in social networks and take measures to improve them." Possible candidates, besides Putin, are representatives of the parties represented in the State Duma - they all support the war.
Nyurstka also wrote, citing anonymous sources close to the authorities in Moscow and another, unnamed region, that the Kremlin recommended that the heads of Russian regions go to the war zone with Ukraine "as publicly as possible" before the regional elections in September 2022. The recommendation concerns the heads of the regions who are going to have an election campaign. Vedomosti recently wrote that at the end of January-February 2023, special seminars for vice-governors on domestic policy will be held in the Moscow region, which, among other things, may also touch upon the topic of presidential elections.
In February 2023, the Levada Center found that the approval ratings of the main public authorities remained virtually unchanged and remain high. The ratings of United Russia and the Communist Party have slightly risen. The ratings of politicians have hardly changed during the month. At the end of March, the share of those who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction slightly decreased. In February there were 68% of them, this month – 66%. 23% of respondents believe that the country is moving on the wrong path (21% in February).
In comparison with January 2023, the ratings of the United Russia and the Communist Party have slightly increased, the ratings of the LDPR, New People and the Just Russia have decreased. Among all respondents, the level of support for United Russia was 39% (in January – 37%), the Communist Party – 10% (in January – 9%), the LDPR – 7% (in January – 8%), the Just Russia — 4% (in January – 5%), “New People” – 3% (in January – 4%).
It is the first presidential election in which voting will take place over three days, not only at polling stations, but also online. Moreover, it is the first election in which the residents of four new Russian regions will participate – Kherson and Zaporozhye, and the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics.
It is not the first time that Russia has held a presidential vote during an active conflict; the elections of 1996 and 2000, the latter of which saw Putin elected president for the first time, took place during the wars in Chechnya. Nevertheless, the scale of the current conflict with Ukraine cannot be compared to what happened in the 1990s; the military engagement in the North Caucasus was an internal Russian affair and was more of an anti-terrorist operation.
Perhaps for this reason, campaigning ahead of the current election was somewhat low-key. One of the main points of contention was how many signatures opposition politicians could gather, and which of them would be registered by the Central Election Commission (CEC). Some hopefuls, such as Irina Sviridova (a young mother from Tambov), and Vladivostok-born environmental activist Anatoly Batashev, failed to collect the required number of signatures, while the documents of others, such as prominent liberal Boris Nadezhdin and Siberian communist Sergey Malenkovich, contained too many errors and failed to meet the CEC’s requirements, meaning their registration was rejected. Others such as ultra-conservative Sergey Baburin or Russia's chief mason Andrey Bogdanov withdraw their candidacies even before the verification of signatures had begun.
Vladimir Putin
The 2024 election is the fifth for Russia’s incumbent leader, and it’s entirely possible that it won’t be his last. According to constitutional amendments adopted in 2020, in the event of victory this year, Putin will also be able to run for president again in the 2030 election. Amendments to the Constitution adopted in 2020 "nullified" Putin's presidential terms and gave him the opportunity to run for president in the 2024 and 2030 elections. Putin himself, who has been president since 2000 (with a break for 2008-2012), has not yet announced whether he will be elected or not.
Officials of the Presidential Administration proceed from the fact that the elections, despite the war, will be held on time - and that Vladimir Putin will participate in them. This was reported 13 January 2023 by Kommersant, citing sources close to the Kremlin. The fact that the Kremlin proceeds from the participation in the elections of the incumbent president is also reported by the Nestka edition.
In May 2023, as in the past few months, the assessments of the activities of the main state authorities did not change significantly, the level of approval remains high. Most of the respondents still believe that things in the country are going in the right direction. Trust in key public and state figures also remained virtually unchanged, with Yevgeny Prigozhin making it into the top ten for the first time. According to an open-ended question (respondents were asked to name several politicians they trust the most), in May the level of confidence in Vladimir Putin was 42% (in April - 40%), Mikhail Mishustin - 18% (in April - 15%), Sergey Lavrov - 14% (as in April), Sergei Shoigu - 11% (in April - 10%). For the first time, Yevgeny Prigozhin was in the top ten - 4% of respondents trust him (in April - 1%), placing him fifth after Shoigu, and tied with Mevedev.
Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov has accused the New York Times of “mistranslating” a quote by him implying that Russian elections are rigged. While the election will be democratic, Peskov suggested that President Vladimir Putin’s public support is so high that he will almost certainly win another term. In a lengthy feature on the impact of the conflict in Ukraine on life in Russia, the New York Times quoted Peskov as saying “our presidential election is not really democracy, it is costly bureaucracy. Mr. Putin will be re-elected next year with more than 90 percent of the vote.”
The quote came amid a section of the story talking about how the ongoing military operation in Ukraine has consolidated support for Putin. According to Russia’s Levada polling center – an organization generally cited favorably by Western media – Putin has enjoyed an 80% approval rating through the entire conflict, except for immediately after he announced a partial mobilization last September.
Speaking to Russia’s ‘Podiom’ media on 06 August 2023, Peskov said his words were “conveyed incorrectly.” While the New York Times’ version of the quote implies that the Russia does not hold democratic elections, Peskov actually said that, when Putin’s popularity and the “consolidation of society” due to the conflict are considered, “it can be said with confidence that if Putin is nominated, he will be re-elected with a huge advantage.”
“But elections are democratic, the president himself spoke about this,” he continued. “Although, on the other hand, they cost a lot of money, and it is clear in advance that Putin will be re-elected by a huge margin. This is what was discussed, and the published quote is, of course, a mistranslation.”
Putin’s popularity remained higher than ever according to Levada. Putin’s popularity had been hovering in the mid- to high-60s for much of the pandemic years, falling to a one-time low of 53 points in April 2020 when the first lockdowns were introduced before recovering to 66 in August that year. However, following the invasion of Ukraine his popularity leaped over 10 points to 83 in March 2022 and has remained at between 81 and 83 points throughout the duration of the war, with the exception of September to November when it fell to 77-79 following Ukraine’s successful Kharkiv counter-offensive.
United Russia approved the incumbent leader’s run as an independent candidate. In his political career of more than 20 years, Putin has run for president four times, mostly as an independent. The only exception was in 2012, when he was nominated by the United Russia party.
The convention of the ruling United Russia party has unanimously approved President Vladimir Putin’s bid to seek reelection next year as an independent candidate. If the incumbent leader wins the vote, it will be his fifth term in office. The motion was put to a vote by former president and United Russia chair Dmitry Medvedev during the party's congress, held at the All-Russian Exhibition Center in Moscow on Sunday. When asked who supported Putin’s candidacy, the entire audience raised their hands, with no nays or abstentions.
During his speech, Medvedev also stated that “there is not a vestige doubt who should be at the helm of the Russian state in this turbulent period,” suggesting that Putin enjoys overwhelming public support. When election day comes, he continued, United Russia “would do its best to help incumbent President Vladimir Putin secure a landslide victory once again.” Speaking at the same convention, Putin thanked United Russia for its consistent support, noting that the country still has to solve “historic tasks,” including protecting the nation's independence and place in the global arena.
The only non-major party candidate to meet the CEC’s requirements was Putin. As in 2018, he is running as an independent, with his candidacy supported by three factions: the governing United Russia and the opposition Fair Russia – For Truth and Rodina. Putin faceed three other politicians on the ballot, each of whom is from a parliamentary party, meaning they were not required to collect signatures to be nominated. Two of them are presidential election first-timers, while the other is returning to the fray after two decades.
Nikolay Kharitonov
The Communist Party’s Nikolay Kharitonov is the only other candidate who has past experience of a presidential campaign. He turned 75 last October, making him the oldest participant in the race. Kharitonov is a veteran of Russian politics, and was first elected to parliament in 1990, even before the collapse of the USSR. In the early part of that decade, he was among the founders of the Agrarian Party of Russia, but left in 2007 to join the Communists. In the current State Duma, he heads the committee on the development of the Far East and Arctic.
The biggest surprise of Kharitonov’s candidacy is that he was nominated ahead of long-time Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov. The Communists have already bet on Kharitonov before, selecting him as their candidate in the 2004 election, even prior to him officially joining the party. On that occasion he finished second with 13.69% of the vote, behind only Putin.
This time round, Kharitonov’s pre-election program is “We tried capitalism – and we've had enough!” His main proposals include introducing a progressive tax scale, abolishing taxes for low-income citizens, and lowering the retirement age. He has cited China as an example to follow due to its ability to combine elements of capitalism and socialism. Kharitonov advocates Russia’s withdrawal from the WTO, IMF, and other Western-led international organizations. He supports the current government’s position on the Ukraine conflict.
“We don’t scare anyone, but we have what it takes to defend ourselves, our country. We say once again that those who think they can conquer Russia are deeply mistaken,” Kharitonov has declared.
Leonid Slutsky
When the long-time leader of the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Vladimir Zhirinovsky, died in 2022 due to complications caused by Covid-19, his allies faced the question of who would become his successor and represent the country’s oldest party. Indeed, Zhirinovsky had a been a familiar face in Russian presidential elections down the years. It did not surprise many, however, when the LDPR nominated Leonid Slutsky as its new leader.
Slutsky has held various positions throughout his political career, serving as deputy head of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and head of the Russian Peace Fund. He is campaigning for president under the slogans “Zhirinovsky’s legacy lives on” and “Slutsky is always nearby.”
As the head of the parliamentary committee on international relations, Slutsky firmly believes in the policy of greater cooperation with Asian countries, while considering the West to be a threat. He is seen as hawkish in numerous areas, including calling for tighter legislation on ‘foreign agents’ and accelerating the military operation against Ukraine.
Slutsky has echoed the predictions of the late Zhirinovsky, who five years ago declared that Ukraine would lose part of its territory and that several of its regions would join Russia. Slutsky’s campaign program talks about intensifying the military offensive to “finish this conflict with a victory of Russian weaponry.”
Vladislav Davankov
At 40 years old, Vladislav Davankov is the youngest of the four presidential candidates. He represents the New People party, created ahead of the 2021 parliamentary election, where it came fifth. By passing the 5% threshold to gain seats, it disrupted the four-party composition of the State Duma that had been in place for almost 15 years.
Davankov’s political career began with the creation of New People, prior to which he was involved in business and educational programs. In 2021, he became a State Duma deputy and joined the budget and tax committee, as well as the commission for reviewing federal budget expenditures. He also became a State Duma vice chairman under United Russia's Vyacheslav Volodin.
This is the second time Davankov has run for significant office, after he participated in the Moscow mayoral election last year, finishing fourth with 5.34% of the vote. He has promoted liberal views, although his campaign program mainly focuses on economic issues and includes proposals to redistribute tax revenues in favor of provincial cities and regions, expanding benefits for businesses, and conducting a “large economic amnesty.”
Davankov believes Russia cannot be cut off from either the rest of Europe or Asia, and argues that instead of looking for enemies, it is necessary to seek new partners and establish mutually beneficial relationships. Davankov has proposed simplifying the repatriation of Russians and representatives of the other indigenous peoples of Russia, and conducting a review of diplomatic policy.
His program is centered on peace and negotiations, with the caveat “on our terms, not a step back” [echoing Comrade Stalin's famous order in the Great Patriotic War] At the same time, he insists Western nations are not yet ready for discussions, as many of them view military actions in Ukraine as a lucrative business opportunity.
Election Results
the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), and the Institute of Social Marketing (INSOMAR) each presented their forecasts for the results of the vote. According to their overall assessment, turnout will exceed 70% and Putin will win over 80% of the vote. The remaining candidates are closely matched, although Kharitonov is currently predicted to finish second. Experts have put the predicted outcome down to various reasons, including “consolidation around the flag” and a lack of attractive candidates other than Putin.
More specifically, VCIOM predicted that turnout will be 71%; Putin will receive 82% of the vote; Kharitonov, 6%; Davankov, 6% (but slightly less than the communist candidate); Slutsky, 5%; while 1% of voters are expected to spoil their ballots.
According to FOM, the expected turnout is 69.8%, and Putin could garner 80.8% of the vote. Like VCIOM, it forecast tight gaps between the other candidates: Kharitonov is predicted to claim second place with 5.7%, followed by Slutsky (5.6%) and Davankov (4.6%), with 3.3% of voters spoiling their ballots.
INSOMAR issued a similar forecast: turnout will be 71.7%, Putin will receive 80.2% of the vote, Kharitonov – 6.3%, Slutsky – 5.6%, Davankov – 5.1%, and 2.8% will spoil their ballots.
Valery Fedorov, the head of VCIOM, believes that the “key to understanding this campaign is its referendum-like nature.” “It was exactly designed this way. Given that we have had a 'special military operation' for two years and it is unknown how much longer it will last, there couldn’t have been another campaign. Some other countries cancel elections altogether in such situations.”
The predictions of a resounding win for Putin are to be expected, according to Alexey Chesnakov, head of the Center for Political Conjuncture’s scientific council. He is confident that Putin’s dominance is directly related to social consolidation, indicating a high level of trust in the electoral system. “It can be said that only Vladimir Putin demonstrated leadership qualities. Candidates from the second tier had too strong a connection with parties, which holds them back a bit in presidential elections,” Chesnakov believes. “The intrigue of the elections lies in how regions will behave; voting in new regions that will be electing a president for the first time as part of the Russian Federation is of interest.”
By 18 Marach 2024 Russia's Central Election Commission had counted 95.04 percent of the votes cast in the election. President Vladimir Putin had obtained 87.32 percent of the votes, which allows his re-election to hold office during the period 2024-2030. Putin won in 2018 with 76.69, in 2012 he won with 63.6% of votes, in 2004 he got 71.31%, and his first presidential election won with 52% of votes.
The second most voted candidate was Communist Party leader Nikolai Kharitonov with 4.19% of the vote, followed by New People’s Party representative Vladislav Davankov with 4.8%. The last candidate is ultra-nationalist Leonid Slutski, which adds up to 3.15% of the ballots.
"It is a truly exceptional result for President Putin," said Russian Presidency spokesman Dmitri Peskov, who rejected doubts sown by the United States and its allies about the legitimacy of the elections and their results. "We didn't expect anything else from them," he said, referring to statements by White House spokesman John Kirby, who said the Russian elections were "neither free nor fair."
Central Electoral Commission President Ela Pamfilova indicated that 87.1 million citizens out of 112.3 million authorized voters participated in the presidential elections. "An unprecedented record was established," she said, recalling that turnout exceeded 77 percent of the electoral roll, the highest figure in the Russian electoral history since 1991.
The American magazine Politico mentioned 5 scenarios that Russia may face during Putin’s new presidency, which will end in 2030.
First scenario: “Pro-democracy movements flourish in Russia.”
Probability of occurrence: 5 - 10 percentAs demonstrated by the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 across Eastern Europe, totalitarian regimes can collapse quickly in the face of democratic movements. The disastrous decisions taken by Putin and his administration in Ukraine have already had unexpected effects on Russian citizens, and some experts expect that they will only generate more discontent in the future and prompt the flourishing of pro-democracy movements in the country.
Although Alexei Navalny was perhaps the most prominent leader of democratic movements in Russia, his killing did not eliminate the country's pro-democracy energies. As Navalny transforms from activist to “martyr” in the eyes of many Russian citizens, such momentum for democratic reform — and even democratic revolution — may actually begin to reignite.
Second scenario: “Russia’s disintegration”
Probability of occurrence: 10 - 15 percentAgainst the backdrop of Russia's devastating war on Ukraine, which has resulted in the deaths of thousands of soldiers, Russians may come out en masse to protest Putin and his policies, and seek to oust him. Frictions may spread and long-buried frustrations across the country may come to light, disintegrating and dividing the nation. , which was supposedly united in Putin's grip, suddenly fell along ethno-nationalist lines.
In this case, chaos may spread throughout the country, leading to regional fragmentation and violence that will leave no region or family untouched. However, many Russian analysts still view this scenario as far-fetched, given Putin's tight grip on power.
Third scenario: “rebellion and military defection”
Probability of occurrence: 15 - 20 percentA year ago, the idea that Russian nationalists or soldiers would defect or rebel and march on Moscow was a laughable fantasy. However, last June, the late leader of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was known to be very close to Putin, launched a large-scale military rebellion and pushed his soldiers towards Moscow, which represented the largest direct challenge to the authority of the Russian president since he came to power. It caused an internal earthquake in Russia. Last August, Prigozhin's plane exploded over Russian airspace, killing him and much of his inner circle, in what is widely seen as retaliation against Putin.
Despite this, many analysts believe that the kind of rebellion that Putin experienced from Prigozhin may be repeated again by other people, even though there is no other force at the moment that can compare to Prigozhin's “Wagner” group.
Fourth scenario: “Asking Putin to retire”
Probability of occurrence: 20-25 percentIt has now been two years since Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, which had a negative impact on many citizens of Russia and their economic situation. The costs of war will continue to pile up, according to analysts, both in terms of a declining economy and rising soldier deaths. For this reason, the idea of an inner circle of Kremlin officials meeting with Putin and telling him that they appreciate his service, and that they wish him well in retirement, is another possible scenario that could happen over time.
In fact, analysts believe that there is a clear possibility that a new regime will emerge in Russia by 2030. This does not necessarily mean an internal conspiracy against Putin, as it is possible, of course, for the Russian president, whose poor health has been rumored recently, to die. In this case, the new government will not necessarily be democratic. But it will be headed by a small number of Western-trained technocratic elites, experts expect, who will start saying many of the things that Western officials and businessmen like to hear. They will place much of the blame for the war on Putin alone, and promise a return to a sense of normalcy in Moscow. They may go so far as to release some political prisoners and opponents.
However, the possibility of this scenario occurring is still weak, given that Putin still controls all the tools of the state, and cultivates competition among his followers to uncover any conspiracy against him. Add to this the fact that Putin still enjoys widespread support among Russian officials, especially since Russia may actually win the war in Ukraine.
Fifth scenario: “Putin tightens his grip on power”
Probability of occurrence: 45 - 50 percentThis was always the most likely scenario. Some analysts believe that with Navalny's death, the democratic opposition has fallen into disarray, and that the Russian economy, despite the barrage of Western sanctions, has barely collapsed. Compared to American presidents, Putin, who is only 71 years old, still enjoys. With “relative” youth. He has already become one of the longest-ruling leaders in Russia, and a number of analysts expect him to tighten his grip on power in the coming period and intensify crackdowns on the opposition to consolidate his rule.
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