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Russian Cinema

Russian cinema has a rich history and has produced many influential films over the years. The development of Russian cinema can be divided into several periods, each characterized by different artistic styles and influences.

Silent Era (1896-1930s): The first films in Russia were introduced in the late 19th century, shortly after the invention of cinema. In the early 20th century, Russian filmmakers experimented with various techniques and storytelling methods. The most notable director of this era is Sergei Eisenstein, known for his groundbreaking films such as "Battleship Potemkin" (1925) and "October" (1927).

Soviet Era (1920s-1980s): Soviet cinema played a significant role in shaping Russian film history. The government heavily supported filmmaking, and many films were propaganda tools promoting Communist ideology. During the 1930s, Soviet cinema experienced a period of Stalinist censorship known as the "Socialist Realism" era. Notable directors from this era include Andrei Tarkovsky, whose works like "Solaris" (1972) and "Stalker" (1979) gained international acclaim for their philosophical and poetic nature.

Thaw and Post-Soviet Era (1950s-1990s): The period following the death of Stalin in the mid-1950s, known as the "Thaw," saw a relaxation of censorship and the emergence of more diverse and experimental filmmaking. Directors like Andrei Konchalovsky, Elem Klimov, and Nikita Mikhalkov gained prominence during this period. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian cinema underwent significant changes, reflecting the country's societal and political transformations.

Contemporary Russian Cinema (2000s-present): Russian cinema in the 21st century has showcased a diverse range of genres and styles. Filmmakers have explored themes such as historical events, social issues, and personal stories. Renowned directors of this period include Alexander Sokurov ("Russian Ark," 2002), Andrey Zvyagintsev ("Leviathan," 2014), and Kantemir Balagov ("Beanpole," 2019). These films have garnered critical acclaim and have been recognized at prestigious international film festivals.

A positive image of LGBT people is considered propaganda. If the frames do not cause positive emotions in the viewer and are accompanied by an appropriate explanation, they do not fall under the scope of the article. Movie theaters and online services should exclude gay propaganda material. And to limit children's access to materials about non-traditional relationships: this requires correct labeling of content and age limits on the service, which the child could not turn off on his own.

Articles prohibiting the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations and preferences, gender reassignment, pedophilia, as well as the demonstration of non-traditional relationships to children, were introduced into the Code of Administrative Offenses at the end of 2022. For example, the musical "Beauty and the Beast" was released on Russian screens with an increased marking of "16+" due to questions about the orientation of one of the characters. And in the Russian dubbing of the Avengers: Endgame tape, the mention of a date between two men was removed. "Brokeback Mountain" and "Call Me By Your Name" have completely disappeared from online platforms.

Under the second part of Article 6.21.2 "Dissemination among minors of information demonstrating non-traditional sexual relations and (or) preferences or capable of causing minors to desire to change sex," Premier and Start online cinemas were fined four and 3.8 million rubles, respectively, "Megafon TV" - for a million rubles, the distribution company "Russian Report" - for 500 thousand rubles.

Sex between a man and a woman should not be shown to persons under 18 years of age. For example, the Franco-Belgian "Love" never got into wide release: the Ministry of Culture did not issue a certificate, since the film contains "many scenes of a pornographic nature", which is generally prohibited from being shown.

In 2012, there were discussions about whether it was possible to show Soviet cartoons "Well, you wait!" without cuts. and "Cheburashka and Crocodile Gena". The fact is that their heroes - the Wolf and Gena the crocodile - smoke, which is contrary to the law "On the protection of children from information that is harmful to their health and development." The characters were not banned in the end, but in the modern continuation of the project, the Wolf got rid of the bad habit.

The anti-tobacco law also discourages smoking in adult films. Scenes in which this could not be avoided come with a warning about the dangers of tobacco.

At the stage of preparing films, producers separately study the script for compliance with the law. Sometimes they find cinematic tricks so as not to break the rules, Yulia Sumacheva, general producer of White Media. “Together with the writers and the director, we look at whether it is possible to replace, for example, smoking in a particular scene,” she explained. “If it doesn’t work out completely, different art forms are used: you can show a extinguished cigarette butt instead of a smoking person in the frame. If neither one nor the other fits, you have to raise the age limit of the project."

If the film occasionally mentions alcohol or other intoxicating substances, condemns their use, but does not show it, you can show the film to children from 12 years old. However, if the hero in the frame drinks without judgment, then the marking rises to "18+", as in the Danish director Thomas Vinterberg's comedy-drama One More Time. Showing the manufacture of drugs is prohibited at all. For this reason, the American series "Breaking Bad" cannot be found on Russian platforms.

Since 2014, it has been illegal to swear in movies. According to the law "On the state language of the Russian Federation", a rental certificate is not issued for tapes with profanity. The exception is screenings on terrestrial, cable, satellite television and the demonstration of foreign films at international festivals in the country. In online cinemas, such tapes are labeled "18+". Producers can make a second sound track without obscene language, that is, simply mute it. Experts are still arguing whether intermediate marking is needed from zero to 16 years.

Today, non-naturalistic depictions and descriptions of accidents, catastrophes, or non-violent deaths are legally allowed for audiences six years of age and older, but only without details that might frighten children. From the age of 12 - episodic depiction and description of cruelty (with the exception of sexual violence) without a naturalistic depiction of murder or mutilation. For this reason, horror movies are labeled "18+".

Producers are trying to do so as not to raise the age limit. But this cannot always be avoided. Failed in the TV series "The Librarian" based on the novel by Mikhail Elizarov. “Both in the novel and in the series there are a lot of scenes of satisfaction. Such battles cannot be removed from the script, it will simply lose its meaning. The whole story is built on the basis of this,” explained the general producer of White Media.

Films that distort historical facts are not welcome in Russia. For example, the anti-Soviet propaganda "Number 44" is banned. The British satire "Stalin's Death" also lost its rental license.

Vladimir Solovyov

Vladimir Solovyov may be the most energetic Kremlin propagandist around. Since 2010, he has served the Kremlin as a prominent radio and television presenter for the state-owned All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK). Solovyov, his producers Dina Ayrapetova and Margo Krzhizhevskaya, and his guests flood Russian-language audiences with Guinness World Record-breaking diatribes of anti-Western and anti-Ukraine disinformation, hatred, and vitriol on a daily basis.

Solovyov is not on the fringe of Russian politics. He is the star of Russia’s main television network, Russia-1, and one of a tiny pool of media figures trusted to interview President Vladimir Putin. His regular panel guest is Margarita Simonyan, head of the Kremlin’s international news network Russia Today, known in the West as RT. Solovyov positions himself as a patriot and often implores Russians to fight on the frontline. He has claimed to regularly go to the frontlines of the conflict himself.

During a typical broadcast, Solovyov might call for nuclear strikes on Washington and London, warn that the Earth will be reduced to ashes unless Ukraine surrenders, brand Germany’s chancellor the new Hitler, suggest Ukraine’s president is a paedophile or claim NATO is run by Satan. He not only calls Ukrainians Nazis, but insists they’re now working in league with LGBT activists to destroy Russia. “It’s one stage of an eight-year escalation by the Ukrainian Nazi authorities of genocide against the Russian people, against Russian speakers, against people who don’t accept LGBT transgender Nazi values.”

Vladimir Solovyov (born October 10, 1963) – journalist, radio and television presenter. Graduated MISIS and did postgraduate studies at Institute of World Economics and Public Relations, holds PhD in Economics. In the early 1990s lived and worked in the US.

Solovyev wrote a number of books, such as Emprie of Corruption, Enemies of Russia, Manipulations. Attack and Defend, We’re Russians. God is with Us, Putin. Medvedyev. What’s Next? Solovyev vs. Solovyev, Putin. Guidebook for the Empathetic, Russian Roulette, and others.

Solovyov is also very active on social media, especially on Telegram, where he reportedly runs an affiliated network of 17 Telegram channels. In March 2022, YouTube blocked Solovyov’s channels for violating the company’s “incitement to violence” rules because of content “encouraged more bombings in Kyiv, including of civilian targets.” The United Kingdom and the European Union have both sanctioned Solovyov for undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine.

Between 1997 and 2010 he hosted Solovyinie Treli on Serebryaniy Dozhd radio. Works on TV since 1999 where hosted a variety of shows such as Process (ORT), Strasti po Solovyevu (TNT), Zavtrak s Solovyevim and Solovyinaya Noch (TV-6), Smotrite Kto Prishel and Poedinok (TVC), Apelsinovy Sok and K Bar’eru (NTV). Since September, 2010 hosts Poedinok and Voskresny Vecher on Russia-1 TV channel and polniy Kontakt on Vesti FM radio.

Novaya Gazeta, an independent Russian newspaper headed by 2021 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dmitriy Muratov, described Solovyov’s main methods of work as “hate speech, screaming, personal insults and humiliation.” Legendary Russian musician Boris Grebenshikov ridiculed Solovyov’s ardent promotion of falsehoods on behalf of the Kremlin in a song loosely translated as “Evening Bull[crapp]er,” a reference to the “Evening with Vladimir Solovyov” television show.”

Some recent examples of disinformation and propaganda Solovyov spreads on his “Evening with Vladimir Solovyov” television show, the “Full Contact” radio show, and via social media include:

• March 16, 2022: Ukrainians are killing their own civilians to frame Russia, while Russia targets only military targets.
• March 12, 2022: Pentagon is developing biological weapons in Ukraine.
• March 6, 2022: Ukrainians are staging fake Russian attacks.
• February 2, 2022: The United States is planning to impose sanctions on Russian children and seeks to bring chaos to Europe.
• January 31, 2022: Anglo-Saxons dream of a war between Russia and Ukraine.
• January 30, 2022: The UK, Poland and Ukraine plan to attack Russia.
• January 29, 2022: President Zelenskyy is mentally ill, and Kyiv is preparing a massive terrorist attack on the Donbas.
• January 26, 2022: The United States is pushing Ukraine to war with Russia to destroy European economies and make them dependent upon U.S. liquified natural gas.
• January 25, 2022: Ukraine is a Nazi state.

As of 21 March 2022, the European Union’s counter-disinformation project EUvsDisinfo had documented 195 instances of disinformation originating from Solovyov’s programs, dating back to 2015.

Novaya Gazeta’s analysis of Solovyov’s career raises doubts about his current deep devotion to the values and the interests of the Kremlin. The newspaper points out that earlier in his career, Solovyov was a respected independent journalist, but he appears to have flip-flopped on certain issues to keep the favor of the Russian authorities. For example, in 2013 he rejected the idea of annexing Crimea, warning it could lead to an unjustifiable war and described the peninsula as “lawfully belonging to Ukraine.”

Yet only one year later, after Russia occupied Crimea, he declared: “We did all we could to hasten this day. Crimea and Sevastopol are once again a part of Russia. Historical justice has prevailed!” Solovyov admits to owning luxury real estate in Italy, which was seized under recent EU sanctions, even while he tirelessly demonizes European values and charges the West with “Russophobia.” For his hard pro-Kremlin work, the Kremlin awarded Solovyov a state medal, commending his “objective coverage of events in Crimea” in 2014.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said 25 April 2022 the Federal Security Service (FSB) had prevented a murder attempt by a “terrorist group” on Russian TV journalist Vladimir Solovyev. “They have moved to terror – to preparing the murder of our journalists,” Putin said of the West, without providing evidence. The FSB said it arrested members of a “neo-Nazi terrorist” group which was plotting to assassinate the pro-Kremlin TV anchor on orders from Ukraine. The FSB claimed the group of six Russians was planning the “murder” of Russian TV and radio journalist Solovyev “on the instructions of the Security Service of Ukraine”.

“What’s surprising about this? I am on view to everyone,” Solovyev said. “I am a Jew and an anti-Fascist so it’s obvious that I’m a target for [Ukrainian nationalist Stepan] Bandera-supporting, Nazi bastards,” he added.

Italian authorities impounded all of Solovyov’s villas and other properties in the country in early March 2022 as part of international sanctions imposed on those seen as close to Russian President Vladimir Putin over Moscow's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24. It was known from the investigations of the Navalny Anti-Corruption Foundation that Solovyov fully owns two houses, partially owns one, and his mother owns another. However, as it turned out, Irina Solovyova has not one, but two Italian villas registered in her name, and the second one is also located on Lake Como.

Two of Solovyov’s three Italian properties — worth an estimated €8 million — were sequestered in accordance with sanctions against Russian oligarchs. One villa, with sweeping views over one of Italy’s most idyllic lakes, is situated on the flanks of Lake Como. It was been confiscated by Italian officials due to sanctions, but still belongs to the Russian state TV presenter. The third, which is said to be in the name of a family member, has not yet been held by Italy’s financial police.

Unknown activists vandalized two of the villas. The Corriere della Sera newspaper reported on April 7 that unknown individuals threw red paint into the swimming pool at Solovyov's villa in Pianello del Lario near Lake Como. Walls also were splashed with red paint with the words "Killer" and "No War" scrawled on the villa's entrance. Separately, unknown persons tried to set fire to another villa belonging to Solovyov in the nearby town of Menaggio. Firefighters were called to extinguish the fire, Italian media reported.

Solovyov is married, with eight children, including two sons of military age, but they seem to be in no hurry to the front. Vladimir Solovyov urged Russians not to be afraid of death. “Life is greatly overestimated. Why be afraid of what is inevitable? Moreover, we’ll go to heaven!” commented Solovyov.

A 12 February 2023 tweet, by Kyiv Post special correspondent Jason Jay Smart and viewed two million times, alleged that Daniil Solovyov had dodged the draft to fight in Ukraine by instead working as a male model in London. It contrasted its claims about his son against the TV host's pro-war views and his criticism of youths who dodge the draft. Solovyov addressed the rumor, saying his son had previously studied in Britain, but for several years has been studying "in a good educational institution in Russia" and "has never concluded any contracts with any modeling agency in London." Solovyov said his son was living his life in his own way as an adult, and that it was irrelevant "whether his father likes it or not".

A photo purporting to be Daniil Solovyov in a fur jacket and black nail varnish was also doing the rounds online, but Newsweek Fact Check found that it is actually an image of an 18-year-old model called Tommy Solovyov. His modeling agency NotAnotherInt based in Dublin, Ireland, confirmed that "our model Tommy Solovyov who is no relation to Volodymyr Solovyov."

Daniil is Solovyov’s son from his third marriage to model Elga Sepp, daughter of comedian Viktor Koklyushkin. The only thing that is known about him is that he graduated from the prestigious Lomonosov school in Moscow.More is known about 34-year-old Alexander Solovyov, the son of the presenter from his first marriage: he studied in London as a director from the age of 18. In Russia, Alexander Solovyov is engaged in shooting commercials. In particular, he shot advertising for the state Sberbank.

Russia - Media - Structure

While the constitution provides for freedom of expression, including for the press and other media, the government increasingly restricted this right. Federal, regional, and local authorities used procedural violations and restrictive or vague legislation to detain, harass, or prosecute persons who criticized the government or institutions it favored. The government exercised editorial control over media, creating a media landscape in which most citizens were exposed to predominantly government-approved narratives. Significant government pressure on independent media constrained coverage of numerous topics, especially Russia’s war against Ukraine; political prisoners; treatment of LGBTQI+ persons; problems involving the environment, elections, COVID-19, and corruption; and criticism of local or federal leadership, as well as secessionism or federalism. The government used direct ownership or ownership by large private companies with government links to control or influence major national media and regional media outlets, especially television. Censorship and self-censorship in television and print media and on the internet was widespread, particularly regarding points of view critical of the government or its policies.

As is well known, most Russians get most of their news from television. Older Russians get most of their news from state-controlled television. All three principal national TV channels through which most Russians get most of their news are under government control. The Russian TV industry is a diverse and multifaceted entity that reflects both the country's rich cultural heritage and its contemporary political and social contexts.

• Channel One (Pervy Kanal): The oldest and one of the most popular television channels in Russia. It is majority state-owned and broadcasts a variety of programs, including news, drama, entertainment, and films.
• Rossiya 1: Another prominent state-owned channel, which is part of the larger VGTRK (All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company) holding. It offers a mix of news, entertainment, and series. Rossiya 1 is a national channel that broadcasts over most of the country. The channel's audience comprises 98.5 per cent of Russia's population and more than 50 million viewers in the CIS and Baltic countries.
• Russia 24 (Rossiya 24): A state-owned 24-hour news channel, also under VGTRK.
• Public Television of Russia (OTR): A public broadcaster established in the 2010s. Unlike state-owned broadcasters, OTR aims to represent the interests and views of the Russian public and is not tied directly to government objectives.
• NTV: Owned by Gazprom-Media, NTV was initially independent and known for its critical stance against the government in the 1990s. However, post-2000, after a controversial takeover, it has generally aligned more closely with government views.
• STS (STS Media): A private entertainment network known for its shows targeting a younger demographic.
• REN TV and Pyatnitsa!: Owned by National Media Group. REN TV is known for a mix of entertainment and news, while Pyatnitsa! is focused on entertainment.

With the global rise of OTT (over-the-top) platforms, Russia too has its players in the digital streaming sector. Platforms like Ivi.ru, Okko, and more.tv offer a variety of content, both domestic and international. Numerous production companies work either independently or in association with TV channels to produce content. These range from entities creating daily soaps to those producing big-budget series and films. Many international channels are available in Russia, either in their original form or as localized versions. There are also numerous Russian-specific cable and satellite channels that cater to niche audiences.

Roskomnadzor [the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies, and Mass Communications], is responsible for monitoring, censoring, and supervising the media and telecommunications sectors in Russia. The structure and dynamics of the Russian TV industry can be influenced by various factors, including government policies, technological advancements, and changing viewer preferences.

Russian newspapers have a long history and have seen shifts in their roles, reach, and independence over the years. Pravda means truth. Izvestia means news. It was a prevailing joke in Moscow that “there is no Pravda in Izvestia and no Izvestia in Pravda” [V Pravde nyet izvestii i v Izvestiakh nyet pravdy ]. Some of the most significant Russian newspapers, encompass both state-aligned and independent publications,

• Izvestia [News]: Established in 1917, it was initially the official newspaper of the Soviet government. Over the years, its ownership and editorial stance have changed several times. It's currently seen as being close to the Russian government.
• Pravda [Truth]: Founded in 1912, it was the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Today, it still retains ties to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation but is no longer a major force in Russian journalism.
• Kommersant [Businessman]: Founded in 1989, it's one of Russia's leading business dailies. It covers politics, business, and culture, and is known for its in-depth analysis and investigations.
• Rossiyskaya Gazeta [Russian Gazette]: This is the Russian government's official newspaper, publishing laws, decrees, and official statements. It's funded by the Russian state.
• Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper) It was founded in 1990 and is known for its independent and critical coverage of Russian politics and society.
• Novaya Gazeta [New Gazette]: A bi-weekly newspaper known for its critical stance towards the Russian government. It has gained international recognition for its investigative journalism and has often been a source of controversial reports on issues like corruption, human rights abuses, and political malfeasance.
• Vedomost [The Record]i: A daily business newspaper established in the late 1990s in collaboration between The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times. It's respected for its independent reporting on business and economics in Russia.
• Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star] The official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
• Moskovsky Komsomolets [Moscow member of the Komsomol, the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League]: A high-circulation daily paper that covers a broad range of topics, including politics, city news, entertainment, and sports.
• RBK Daily: Part of the RBK Group, this newspaper focuses on business news, offering insights into the Russian economy, industries, and major enterprises.

The Russian media landscape is multifaceted. While there are newspapers that maintain independence and sometimes offer critical views on government policies, others are closely aligned with or controlled by the state or powerful business entities. The freedom and independence of the press in Russia have been subjects of international concern, especially with reports of journalist persecutions, censorship, and increasing state control over media outlets.

The Russian radio landscape is diverse, offering a mix of state-owned, private, and independent stations catering to various interests and demographics. As of 2021, here are some prominent Russian radio networks and stations:

• Radio Rossii: Part of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), this is a national radio service that provides news, talk programs, and cultural broadcasts. It aims to serve the general public and covers all regions of Russia.
• Mayak (Beacon): Another radio station under VGTRK, Mayak has been broadcasting since the Soviet era. It's one of the oldest and most listened to stations, offering news, music, and talk shows.
• Vesti FM (News FM): A news-oriented radio station, also under the VGTRK umbrella, primarily focusing on current events and discussions.
• Radio Mir (Radio World): A station aimed at the Commonwealth of Independent States, it broadcasts in Russian and focuses on news, music, and discussions.
• Echo of Moscow: Known for its independent editorial stance, it's one of the few platforms in Russia that allows a diverse range of voices, including those critical of the government. It's mainly a talk radio station focusing on news, politics, and societal issues.
• Russkoe Radio (Russia Radio): A commercial station, it primarily plays Russian pop music and is one of the most popular networks for contemporary hits.
• Radio Record: Primarily focused on electronic music, it's a favorite for younger audiences and dance music enthusiasts.
• Europa Plus: A private commercial radio station that offers a mix of Russian and Western popular music, news, and entertainment programs.
• Business FM: As the name suggests, it's oriented towards the business community and provides updates on markets, economic news, and related discussions.
• Silver Rain A Moscow-based station known for its mix of music, news, and discussions, often showcasing non-mainstream views and music tracks.
• Dorozhnoe Radio (Traffic Radio): It focuses on providing traffic updates, news, and popular music, targeting drivers.
• Radio Dacha (Radio Cottage): Playing hits primarily from the 80s and 90s, it's popular among an older demographic.

The reach and popularity of these stations can vary, with some having a more regional focus while others broadcast nationally. Like other media segments in Russia, the radio landscape has stations that are state-controlled or aligned, as well as others that maintain varying degrees of independence. It's always advisable to understand the affiliations and potential biases of each outlet when tuning in.

Russia - Media - Regulation

On 05 March 2022, President Putin signed into effect laws that criminalize independent war reporting and “spreading false information” about Russia’s war in Ukraine, which provides for sentences of up to 15 years in prison. On March 23, the Duma adopted amendments to the laws, effectively expanding the ban on criticizing the armed forces to banning criticism of all government actions. Authorities used the new laws widely and indiscriminately to severely suppress freedom of expression, including by members of the press. Independent rights group OVD-Info reported that following the enactment of new censorship laws in March, as of December 20, authorities initiated 379 criminal cases for antiwar speech, including charges of spreading “false information” and “discrediting the military.” For example, journalist for the RusNews website Maria Ponomarenko was arrested in April for “discrediting” the Russian armed forces with “fake” social media posts. Ponomarenko was held in pretrial detention following her arrest until November 14, when she was placed under house arrest. She faced up to 10 years in prison for a Telegram post concerning the March 16 Russian air strike on a theater in the Ukrainian city of Mariupol that killed hundreds of civilians.

Authorities continued to misuse the country’s expansive definition of extremism, under which citizens may be punished for certain types of peaceful protests, affiliation with certain religious denominations, and even certain social media posts, as a tool to stifle dissent. According to the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, in 2020 authorities “inappropriately initiated” 145 new cases against individuals under antiextremism laws, including for exercising free speech on social media and elsewhere or for their religious beliefs.

The law prohibits the dissemination of false “socially significant information” online, in mass media, or during protests or public events, as well as the dissemination of “incorrect socially meaningful information, distributed under the guise of correct information, which creates the threat of damage to the lives and health of citizens or property, the threat of mass disruption of public order and public security, or the threat of the creation of an impediment to the functioning of life support facilities, transport infrastructure, banking, energy, industry, or communications.”

The law criminalizes “offending the religious feelings of believers” (blasphemy). Actions in public “demonstrating clear disrespect for society and committed with the intent to insult the religious feelings of believers” are subject to fines, compulsory labor for up to one year, or imprisonment for up to one year. If these actions are committed in places of worship, the punishment is a fine, compulsory labor for up to three years, or a prison sentence of up to three years.

The law prohibits showing “disrespect” online for the state, authorities, the public, flag, or constitution.

The government continued to enact new restrictions on the content that could be shared on the internet. Amendments adopted in 2020 allow Roskomnadzor, the country’s media oversight agency, to block websites that “violate the rights of [Russian citizens],” including by restricting the “dissemination of socially significant information.” Experts characterized the law as restricting “Russophobic” content and noted that it was adopted during a government public relations campaign against YouTube after it blocked content posted by progovernment media personality Vladimir Solovyov. A 2020 law prohibits journalists and websites from publishing the personal data of law enforcement officers and certain other state employees affiliated with the country’s security services. Expanding the definition of sensitive data, the FSB published in 2021 a list of topics that could be “used against the security” of Russia, including information and assessments of the country’s military, security sector, and space agency, Roscosmos. Individuals who collect information in the specified categories could be subject to designation as “foreign agents”.

During the year 2022 authorities invoked laws prohibiting “inciting minors to participate in dangerous activities” or “violations to the established procedure for organizing or holding a public event” to charge individuals who published material online related to demonstrations.

During the year 2022 authorities invoked a 2013 law prohibiting the distribution of “propaganda on nontraditional sexual relations” to minors to punish the exercise of free speech by LGBTQI+ persons and their supporters. On November 24, the Duma passed, and on December 5, President Putin signed, a law significantly expanding the scope of the prohibition on such speech.

The law bans the display of Nazi symbols and the symbols of groups placed on the government’s list of “extremist” organizations. There was no official register or list of banned symbols, although a 2021 law prohibits displaying images of individuals found guilty of committing crimes in accordance with the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal. During the year authorities enforced a law prohibiting the “propaganda of narcotics” to prosecute or threaten to block independent outlets and journalists.

During the year 2022 authorities used a law banning cooperation with “undesirable foreign organizations” to restrict free expression (see section 2.b.). For example, in July, investigative news outlets Bellingcat and The Insider, which had previously published multiple exposes on abuses or malfeasance by government officials, were added to the list of “undesirable organizations.”

Government-controlled media frequently used derogatory terms such as “traitor,” “foreign agent,” and “fifth column” to describe individuals expressing views critical of or different from government policy, leading to a societal climate intolerant of dissent.

Virtually all independent or opposition-leaning media outlets were blocked within the country or shut down, along with many independent NGOs. The Kremlin intensified efforts to block access to information that contradicts official narratives. Immediately following the February 24 invasion of Ukraine, the government cracked down on independent media in Russia, closing flagship liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and independent daily Novaya Gazeta.

Journalists continued to be subjected to arrest, imprisonment, physical attack, harassment, and intimidation as a result of their reporting. For example, on April 7, editor in chief of Novaya Gazeta and 2021 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dmitriy Muratov was attacked while on a train from Moscow to Samara. Two attackers threw red paint laced with acetone at Muratov and shouted, “this is for our boys!” while filming the incident. Journalists and bloggers who uncovered government malfeasance or who criticized the government often faced harassment, either in the form of direct threats to their physical safety or threats to their livelihood, frequently through legal prosecution.

There were reports of attacks on journalists by government officials and police and of police detaining journalists to interfere with or punish them for their reporting. For example, Amnesty International reported that RusNews journalist Matvey Golovanov was arrested on February 26, while he was live-streaming from a peaceful antiwar rally in Yekaterinburg, despite showing his press credentials. He served a 28-day sentence on charges of repeated violation of the rules of public assemblies.

There were reports of police framing journalists for serious crimes to interfere with or punish them for their reporting. For example, on September 5, a court sentenced Ivan Safronov, a former national security journalist for major national daily newspapers Kommersant and Vedomosti, to 22 years in prison for treason and divulging classified information. Safronov was arrested by the FSB in 2020. According to media, Safronov’s case itself was classified, and the FSB declined to disclose what information he allegedly shared with Czech intelligence in 2012. Observers speculated the charges might be related to a 2017 Kommersant article coauthored by Safronov, detailing the potential sale of Russian military aircraft to Egypt. Safronov also provoked a strong reaction from the government for a 2019 article in Kommersant speculating on a shakeup of the leadership in the Federation Council. Safronov’s legal team said it would appeal the verdict.

There were reports of police raids on the offices of independent media outlets that observers believed were designed to punish or pressure the outlets. For example, on 05 March 2022 in Pskov, riot police broke into the office of local media outlet Pskovskaya Guberniya, confiscating computers, mobile phones, and other equipment. The search was conducted under a law on discrediting the Russian Armed Forces that was introduced only one day earlier. The vast majority of the country’s mass media was funded by the government or progovernment actors. Government-friendly oligarchs owned most other outlets, which are permitted to determine what they publish within formal or informal boundaries set by the government. In the regions, each governor controlled regional media through direct or indirect funding or through affiliated structures. The federal government or progovernment individuals completely or partially owned all so-called federal television channels, the only stations with nationwide reach. The 29 most-watched stations together commanded 86 percent of television viewership; all were owned at least in part by the federal or local governments or by progovernment individuals. Government-owned media outlets often received preferential benefits, such as rent-free occupancy of government-owned buildings, and a preferential tax rate.

On a regional level, state-owned and progovernment television channels received subsidies from the Ministry of Finance for broadcasting in cities with a population of less than 100,000 and for the creation and production of content. At many government-owned or controlled outlets, the state increasingly dictated editorial policy. While the law restricts foreign ownership of media outlets to no more than 20 percent, another provision of the ambiguously worded law apparently bans foreign ownership entirely. The government used these provisions to consolidate ownership of independent outlets under progovernment oligarchs and to exert pressure on outlets that retained foreign backers.

By law the Ministry of Justice is required to maintain a list of media outlets that are designated “foreign agents.” The decision to designate media outlets or individual journalists as foreign agents may be made outside of court by other government bodies, including law enforcement agencies. The law allows authorities to label individuals (both Russian and foreign citizens) as “foreign agents” if they disseminate foreign media to an unspecified number of persons, receive funding from abroad, or, after a 2020 amendment, “carry out the interests of a foreign state.” The amendment specifies that a foreign journalist “performing the functions of a foreign agent, incompatible with his professional activities as a journalist” could be declared an individual foreign agent.

Russia - Internet

The government monitored all internet communications.

The law requires internet providers to install equipment to route web traffic through servers in the country. The government continued to employ its longstanding use of the System for Operative Investigative Activities, which requires internet service providers (ISPs) to install, at their own expense, a device that routes all customer traffic to an FSB terminal. The system enables police to track private email communications, identify internet users, and monitor their internet activity. Internet freedom advocates asserted the measure allows for surveillance by intelligence agencies and enables state authorities to control information and block content.

A 2021 law allows authorities to impose significant fines for internet providers and social media companies that became repeat violators of the “sovereign internet” law by failing to install and operate state-controlled software on their systems.

The “sovereign internet” law also prescribed the creation of an independent domain name system (DNS) for the country, separate from the global DNS, which would allow the country to isolate itself from the global internet, further restricting the free flow of information. The law requires domestic and foreign businesses to store citizens’ personal data on servers physically located in the country. Companies refusing to localize Russian users’ data may be fined, with heavier fines or being blocked from operating in the country for repeat offenses. In July, courts fined WhatsApp, Snapchat, Tinder, Spotify, and Hotels.com for refusing to keep data on Russian servers.

Telecommunications companies are required to temporarily retain user data and make it available to law enforcement bodies. Regulatory requirements specify users’ voice records must be stored for a period of six months, and electronic correspondence (audio, images, and video) for three months. Observers believed the country’s security services were able to intercept and decode encrypted messages on at least some messaging platforms. The law also requires telecommunications companies to provide authorities with “backdoors” around encryption technologies. Companies may be fined if they refuse to provide the FSB with decryption keys that would allow it to read users’ correspondence.

A 2021 law required foreign tech companies with a daily audience larger than 500,000 users in the country to open official representative offices in the country by the end of the year. Local representation affords authorities leverage to enforce fines and regulations through pressure on domestically located employees. If tech companies do not comply, Roskomnadzor is authorized to block their access to Russian users’ personal data. The preliminary list contained 20 companies, including social media networks, instant messenger platforms, search engines and mail services, hosting providers, and online stores.

The government blocked access to content and otherwise censored the internet. Roskomnadzor maintained a federal blacklist of internet sites and required ISPs to block access to web pages that the agency deemed offensive or illegal, including information that was already prohibited, such as items on the Federal List of Extremist Materials. The law gives the prosecutor general and Roskomnadzor authority to demand that ISPs block websites that promote extremist information and “mass public events that are conducted in violation of appropriate procedures.” A law requiring social media companies to independently block and remove “obscene language” or other prohibited content went into effect in 2021.

There was a growing trend of authorities seeking to pressure social media platforms to censor posts and remove content deemed objectionable. This was especially the case with posts and content related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. According to the internet freedom NGO Roskomsvoboda, as of December nearly 640,000 websites were unjustly blocked in the country, and authorities blocked an additional 7,000 websites due to military censorship measures following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Prosecutor General’s Office claimed it had removed or blocked more than 130,000 web resources since February 24.

According to Freedom House’s 2022 Freedom on the Net report, there were approximately 400,000 cases of the government interfering with internet freedom, a significant increase from the previous year. Freedom House noted that criminal prosecutions for violations of unauthorized online activity increased dramatically during the year primarily due to the new law on spreading “false information” about the Russian Armed Forces. Websites, news outlets, and journalists that refuse to comply with government censorship requests face the greatest risk of prosecution. The law requires owners of internet search engines (news aggregators) with more than one million daily users to be accountable for the truthfulness of “publicly important” information before its dissemination. Authorities may demand that content deemed in violation be removed and impose increasingly heavy fines for noncompliance.

Roskomnadzor also sought to pressure social media companies into unblocking certain progovernment sites or individuals.

A 2015 law on the “right to be forgotten” allows individuals in the country to request that search engine companies block search results that contain information about them. According to Freedom House’s 2021 Freedom on the Net report, the law was “routinely applied to require search engines to delete links to websites that contain personal information about an individual if it is no longer considered relevant.” The law fails to limit the “right to be forgotten” when the information requested for removal is in the public interest or concerns public figures impeding freedom of expression.

There was a growing trend of social media users being prosecuted for the political, religious, or other ideological content of posts, shares, and “likes,” especially content related to Ukraine, which resulted in fines or prison sentences (see section 2.a., Freedom of Expression for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media).

The government prohibited online anonymity. The law requires commercial virtual private network (VPN) services and internet anonymizers to block access to websites and internet content prohibited in the country. The law also authorizes law enforcement agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB, to identify VPN services that do not comply with the ban. By law Roskomnadzor may also block sites that provide instructions on how to circumvent government blocking.

The law prohibits companies registered as “organizers of information dissemination,” including online messaging applications, from allowing anonymous users. Messaging applications and platforms that fail to comply with the requirements to restrict anonymous accounts may be blocked.

There were reports of politically motivated cyberattacks. For example, the Novaya Gazeta website was targeted in distributed denial of service attacks throughout the year 2022.

https://uofa.ru/en/simonyan-televedushchaya-margarita-simonyan-keosayan-vorvalsya-kak/

Margarita Simonovna Simonyan

To succeed in Russia’s state media environment, individuals need to promote the Kremlin line. Margarita Simonyan learned that lesson at a young age. As a reporter covering the war in Chechnya in the early 2000s, she promoted the Kremlin’s viewpoint. The Kremlin seemed to reward Simonyan for her loyalty by appointing her head of Russia’s first state-funded English language media outlet, RT (then called Russia Today), when she was only 25.

She graduated from Kuban State University and the Vladimir Pozner School forTelevision Excellence. She then worked at the Krasnodar TV and radio company. Rostov-on-Don-based correspondent for VGTRK. Special correspondent for Vesti TV program. Member of the Presidential Journalists’ Pool. Covered the hostage drama in Beslan.

Simonovna has been the editor-in-chief of the Russia Today TV channel since 2005. When she took office, she was only 25 years old. At the end of 2013, Margarita Simonyan was appointed editor-in-chief of the international news agency Russia Today. This appointment became the most discussed topic at that time. A report from the US State Department called her “adept at serving up lies as truths — and with a smile” and says “her main function is Vladimir Putin’s loyal propagandist.” Simonyan is a protégé of Aleksey Gromov, an aide to Putin. A yellow government landline telephone sits on her desk and in 2015 she admitted that it is a secure connection directly to the Kremlin “to discuss secret things.”

The European Union sanctioned Simonyan in February 2022, calling her a “central figure” of Russian propaganda. And after Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine, Google prohibited RT and all Russian Federation state-funded media from collecting advertising revenue on its platforms.

In October 2022 the Armenian authorities banned RT editor-in-chief and propagandist Margarita Simonyan from entering the country, Simonyan had repeatedly provoked harsh reactions from the Armenian government with her remarks. In the summer of 2020, as another conflict unfolded in Nagorno-Karabakh, she wrote a post in which she called the current Armenian authorities “a handful of screaming politicians who betrayed the interests of the great Armenian people for a moment of power and petty personal revenge.” In 2020, Simonyan claimed that she considers Russia her homeland, even though she is a native Armenian. In 2010, in Moscow, the Armenian president presented the famous journalist with the Movses Khorenatsi medal, the highest government award of the Republic of Armenia. Margarita herself does not speak Armenian at all.

Simonyan was born on 06 April 1980, in the southern city of Krasnodar. Ancestors come from Crimea, where they fled at the beginning of the 20th century from the Turkish genocide. Grandfather - Sarkis Simonyan, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. The family of my grandparents was repressed in 1944. Margarita has a sister named Alice. Margarita Simonovna and her sister from childhood lived in rather modest conditions. Their father worked as a refrigerator repairman, and their mother worked as a flower girl and traded flowers at the market from morning till night. The money earned by the parents was enough only for food. Their house was very old and was located on one of the outskirts of Krasnodar streets. It was life at the “bottom” that pushed Margarita to an irresistible desire to break out of poverty and take place in life.

When the girl was 16 years old, and she studied in the 9th grade, then an excellent opportunity opened up for her to improve her knowledge of English to the proper one. She was sent to study in the United States, in the state of New Hampshire, as part of the student exchange program. She lived in a very friendly and warm family, went to an American school, talked with peers and comprehended the peculiarities of life in mysterious America.

She then entered the Faculty of Journalism of the Kuban State University, in parallel with this she studied at the V. Pozner School of Television Skills. In December 1999, she went to Chechnya to cover the hostilities. In December 1999, she went to Chechnya to cover the hostilities. In 2005, the Russia Today TV channel appeared in Moscow. The head of the service had to be so young not to remember what news was going on on Soviet television. She must have a new mindset, a modern outlook on what is happening. In addition, she knew English perfectly and could objectively assess the flow of information.

Russian President Vladimir Putin applauded Margarita Simonyan, the head of the Russian media outlet RT, after awarding her the Order of Alexander Nevsky during a ceremony at the Kremlin in Moscow May 23, 2019. In public statements, she mocks critics of Russia’s policies and makes wildly false claims about Ukraine, its history and its leaders.

Some examples of her propaganda include:

• Describing the war in Ukraine as a “civil war” on June 19, adding that Russia is supporting ethnic Russians against “Russophobes.”
• Calling for Russia to annex Ukraine’s Donbas region during a conference in January 2021.
• Ridiculing the world food crisis that is being exacerbated by Russia’s invasion during the June 18 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where she said people told her, “All our hope [to win the war] is in the famine.”
• During an April discussion with Russian broadcaster Vladimir Solovyov, the pair claimed to be targets of an assassination plot. She accused Aleksey Navalny, a jailed Russian opposition activist, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of plotting the assassination, calling them both “neo-Nazis.”

Her relatives also are part of Russia’s propaganda machine. Simonyan’s husband is television host Tigran Keosayan. He said on April 25 that “ungrateful” Kazakhstan could face the same consequences as Ukraine if it did not side with Russia.

On 15 July 2023, together with the Investigative Committee and the Ministry of the Interior, the Russian Federal Security Service reported that it had prevented preparations made by Ukrainian special services to assassinate Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of the RT channel and the Rossiya Segodnya International Media Group. Margarita Simonyan receives death threats regularly and was included in various hit lists; and this is not the first assassination attempt against her by the Ukrainian special services that had been prevented.