Peru - 2026 Elections
Peru's parliament on 10 October 2025 impeached President Dina Boluarte, who refused to appear before Congress during a hearing. "I have approved the impeachment of the president," Parliament Speaker José Khairy said at the end of a very short session. A large majority of parliamentarians voted to remove Boluarte from the presidency, with 118 out of 122 members in favor of the impeachment measure. Boluarte has been widely criticized for her inability to curb crime, and widespread demonstrations have taken place across the country since the start of her term in December 2022.
The Speaker of Parliament will assume power in an acting capacity until general elections are held in April 2026.
Peru's general elections scheduled for April 12, 2026 arrive at a pivotal and deeply uncertain moment for the nation's democracy. The vote will elect a new president, two vice presidents, and for the first time in decades, a bicameral Congress consisting of a 60-member Senate and a 130-member Chamber of Deputies, marking a significant institutional restructuring of Peruvian politics. This transition comes after President Dina Boluarte's announcement in March 2025, setting the official date after rejecting widespread calls to bring elections forward to 2023 or 2024 during the massive protests that followed Pedro Castillo's removal from power in December 2022.
The political landscape heading into these elections reflects extraordinary instability that had defined Peruvian governance for over a decade. Peru had cycled through seven presidents in the past ten years, with four forced from office before completing their terms through impeachment or resignation under threat of impeachment. Boluarte herself assumed the presidency after serving as Castillo's vice president, taking power when Castillo attempted an ill-fated self-coup by trying to dissolve Congress to avoid his own removal. She had governed with historically low approval ratings, hovering around just four percent according to polling conducted in early 2025, making her one of the world's most unpopular leaders. Despite intense public pressure and her profound unpopularity, Boluarte secured enough Congressional support to remain in office and complete the term, constitutionally barred from seeking reelection herself.
The restoration of bicameralism represents one of the most significant institutional changes in modern Peruvian political history. In March 2024, Congress voted 91 to 30 to approve the constitutional reform establishing the two-chamber system, overturning the results of a 2018 referendum in which over ninety percent of Peruvians had voted against such a change. The reform aims to address the chronic instability caused by the unicameral system established in 1993, which made presidential impeachment dangerously easy to execute. Under the previous arrangement, Congress could file an impeachment motion, secure a two-thirds vote, and remove a president within 72 hours from a single chamber. The new bicameral structure requires the Chamber of Deputies to initiate impeachment proceedings and the Senate to conduct the trial and render judgment, theoretically creating more institutional friction and deliberation before removing a sitting president. However, critics view the reform with deep suspicion, arguing it serves primarily to consolidate power within Congressional factions led by figures like Keiko Fujimori, who had unsuccessfully bid for the presidency multiple times between 2016 and the present while maintaining significant influence through her Fuerza Popular party and allied right-wing movements. The new Senate will wield considerable institutional power beyond its role in impeachment proceedings. Senators will appoint the presidents of the Central Reserve Bank and the Court of Auditors, provide final approval on legislation passed by the Chamber of Deputies, and meet in joint sessions with the lower chamber to approve national budgets. The Senate's composition reflects a mixed electoral system, with 33 senators elected nationally through proportional representation and 27 elected from individual departmental constituencies. Senators must be at least 45 years old, though current and former members of Congress are exempt from this age requirement. The Chamber of Deputies will be elected entirely through proportional representation from a single national constituency, with deputies required to be at least 25 years old. Both chambers serve five-year terms with the possibility of immediate reelection, a reversal of a 2019 law that had prevented legislators from consecutive service.
The presidential race operates under a two-round system requiring candidates to secure more than fifty percent of valid votes to win outright in the first round. If no candidate achieves this threshold, the top two vote-getters proceed to a runoff election. The extraordinary feature of the 2026 election is not any clear frontrunner but rather the stunning absence of popular leadership across the political spectrum. Recent polling consistently shows that approximately a third of voters, when asked who should be the next president, respond with variations of nobody, none of them, or similar expressions of rejection. No political party commands more than ten percent support in most surveys, and roughly sixty percent of voters express preference for a candidate with no prior political experience over someone currently holding office. This profound voter disillusionment creates conditions where the eventual winner may emerge less as a popular choice and more as the least objectionable option in a field devoid of inspiring figures.
As of polling conducted in mid to late 2025, several candidates have positioned themselves at the front of this crowded and fragmented field, though none commands anything approaching a decisive advantage. Rafael López Aliaga, Lima's current mayor and leader of the right-wing Renovación Popular party, had oscillated between first and second place in recent surveys, registering support ranging from seven to ten percent depending on the poll and timing. López Aliaga initially expressed admiration for El Salvador's Nayib Bukele and his harsh anti-gang policies, requesting military deployment to Lima's streets and calling for states of emergency. However, he subsequently moderated his rhetoric, acknowledging that Peru requires its own distinct approach rather than simply copying the Salvadoran model. As of late September 2025, López Aliaga stated he was still evaluating whether to formally declare his candidacy, indicating he would wait until the October 12 deadline set by the National Elections Board to make his final decision.
Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former president and convicted authoritarian Alberto Fujimori who died in September 2024, represents Fuerza Popular and had made her third or fourth bid for the presidency depending on how one counts her candidacies since 2011. Her support in recent polls ranges from seven to twelve percent, showing a gradual decline through 2025 as some of her base appears to have migrated toward López Aliaga. Fujimori faces the challenge of extraordinarily high rejection rates among the broader electorate, with López Aliaga himself categorically ruling out any alliance with her in February 2025, stating that forming a coalition would be like stabbing himself with a dagger because he senses wherever he goes that people simply do not want her. Despite these obstacles, Fuerza Popular maintains the strongest party organization among the competing factions, giving Fujimori institutional advantages even as her personal popularity stagnates.
Other notable figures in the race include Carlos Álvarez, a comedian whose País para Todos party registers around six percent support and whose candidacy reflects the electorate's hunger for outsider voices untainted by Peru's deeply dysfunctional political establishment. Francisco Sagasti, who served as interim president briefly in 2020 and 2021, represents the centrist Purple Party and appeals to voters seeking technocratic competence and stability. Verónika Mendoza of the leftist New Peru party consolidates support in southern and central regions of the country, though her national numbers remain modest. Former president Martín Vizcarra polled at around four percent in mid-2024 surveys, though his brother Mario Vizcarra had emerged as a more prominent contender by September 2025, registering seven percent in some polls and occupying third place behind López Aliaga and Fujimori.
The economic populist Hernando de Soto runs on a libertarian-green party platform, while César Acuña of Alianza Para el Progreso maintains a small but stable base of support. Numerous other candidates with minimal polling support include Phillip Butters of Avanza País, various representatives from the historic Peruvian Aprista Party including former prime ministers Jorge del Castillo and Javier Velásquez, and figures like Arturo Fernández Bazán, Wolfgang Grozo, and others scattered across dozens of registered parties. Several potential candidates have been disqualified or rendered ineligible through various mechanisms. Antauro Humala, brother of former president Ollanta Humala and a popular left-wing ethno-nationalist figure, saw his ANTAURO party disqualified by the Supreme Court in October 2024 due to his extremist ideology. Other candidates resigned from their parties after registration deadlines, making them ineligible to run.
A record 54 political parties initially registered to participate in the 2026 elections, though coalitions, alliances, and disqualifications are expected to narrow this number before the final ballot is set. Experts predict the ultimate candidate list could still exceed the 18 who ran in the 2021 election. The proliferation of parties stems from legislative changes that lowered barriers to party formation while simultaneously imposing regulatory restrictions that advantage established organizations with strong networks over newer movements. This creates a paradox where the field appears crowded but innovation remains limited, as most parties select candidates through indirect delegate systems rather than direct primary elections. Only the Peruvian Aprista Party opted for direct election of its nominees among the 39 registered political organizations.
Public safety and crime have emerged as the overwhelming dominant issue in the campaign, eclipsing even economic concerns despite Peru's relatively stable macroeconomic performance supported by strong metal prices and high export volumes. The security crisis that grips the nation represents a dramatic escalation of violence that had fundamentally altered daily life for millions of Peruvians. As of early 2025, police reported 459 killings between January 1 and March 16, with 1,909 extortion cases reported in January alone, though actual numbers are certainly much higher as many victims fear reporting crimes. Homicides in 2024 exceeded the total for 2023, with over 2,500 deaths recorded and increases exceeding 125 percent compared to 2019 levels. Extortion complaints increased fivefold between 2021 and 2023, devastating small business owners, transport operators, market vendors, and ordinary citizens who face deadly consequences for refusing to pay protection money to criminal organizations.
The March 2025 assassination of Paul Flores, a beloved cumbia singer killed when assailants attacked his bus in an apparent extortion attempt, became a catalyzing moment that crystallized public fury over the government's failure to provide basic security. Massive protests erupted on March 21, 2025 with Peruvians taking to the streets demanding action against the crime wave. In response, Boluarte declared the third state of emergency in less than a year on March 17, suspending basic constitutional liberties to allow police and military forces to make arrests without judicial orders and deploying troops to patrol Lima's neighborhoods. The government deployed an additional 3,500 police personnel across Lima in April, though these measures have proven largely ineffective according to security experts who argue that short-term crackdowns fail to address the institutional decay and corruption that enable criminal organizations to flourish.
The violence stems from multiple sources including domestic gangs, transnational criminal organizations like Venezuela's Tren de Aragua which operates in ten of Peru's 24 departments, narcotics trafficking networks, and groups involved in illegal mining. Contract killings have become routine, with more than half of Lima's 700 homicides in 2022 classified as hired assassinations, a trend that had accelerated through 2024 and 2025. Criminal groups have adapted sophisticated extortion networks that target everyone from street vendors to major companies, with victims receiving chilling threats of violence against themselves and their families if they fail to comply with payment demands. The breakdown of rule of law had been exacerbated by Congressional actions that deliberately weakened law enforcement and prosecutorial capacity, including a July 2024 law that narrowed the definition of organized crime to make it harder for prosecutors to investigate corruption and extortion, essentially rendering investigative searches ineffective for many offenses.
This security vacuum had created fertile ground for populist promises of mano dura iron fist approaches to combating crime, with El Salvador's Nayib Bukele serving as the regional model despite serious human rights concerns about his methods. Multiple candidates have explicitly styled themselves as potential Peruvian Bukeles, and campaign advertisements throughout Lima feature aspirants presenting themselves as strongman leaders willing to suspend democratic norms to restore order. Recent polling shows 43 percent of Peruvians prefer a strong leader willing to act with a heavy hand to reestablish order, up from 34 percent in April 2025, while 56 percent of respondents identify insecurity as their primary concern. Political analysts identify a geographic and ideological pattern emerging where more conservative candidates with support concentrated in Lima face off against left-leaning contenders who consolidate votes in southern and central regions, mirroring dynamics from recent elections. The fundamental question remains which candidate can successfully capture these key voting blocs and translate security concerns into electoral victory.
Beyond security, multiple institutional crises threaten the integrity of the upcoming election itself. Congress had made systematic efforts to capture independent institutions that will oversee the vote, including the National Elections Board. Lawmakers have gained control of several bodies involved in appointing electoral authorities, with only the National Justice Board remaining outside Congressional influence by early 2024. Congressional factions allied themselves with Attorney General Patricia Benavides, herself under investigation for corruption, to attempt removing National Justice Board leadership in maneuvers that critics characterize as efforts to ensure favorable oversight of the 2026 process. Two members of the National Justice Board were dismissed in March 2024, and attempts to impeach the head of the National Election Jury raised serious concerns among international observers including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and United States senators who issued warnings about democratic backsliding.
The Boluarte administration's own corruption scandals have further eroded public trust. The president disappeared for several weeks early in her term without informing the country, and she had been photographed wearing expensive Rolex watches that she could not possibly afford on her government salary, sparking investigations into illicit enrichment. Congress had systematically weakened the Attorney General's Office even as Boluarte herself faces corruption probes, creating a situation where officials accused of wrongdoing have effectively neutralized the institutions meant to hold them accountable. A September 2024 law transferred significant investigative functions from the Attorney General's Office to the police, a change legal experts warned would weaken investigative efficiency and professional prosecution of complex crimes.
Economic continuity represents perhaps the most critical decision facing the next president according to financial analysts, particularly regarding the future of Julio Velarde who had led Peru's Central Bank for the past two decades through a period of relative macroeconomic stability and sound monetary policy. Whether the bank continues along its successful path under Velarde's leadership or shifts direction under new management will profoundly impact investor confidence and Peru's economic trajectory. The country's extractive industries, particularly mining, continue to operate and attract international investment based on relatively strong property rights protections and institutional frameworks, though intermittent strikes and social conflicts periodically disrupt operations. Still, with the economy performing reasonably well compared to regional peers, economic policy had taken a back seat to security as the defining campaign issue.
The fragmentation and dysfunction extend to Congressional elections where polling reveals that 81 percent of voters prefer giving their support to a party with no representation in the current legislature, effectively expressing a desire to fire the entire political class. No party with current Congressional representation enjoys significant public confidence, reflecting the catastrophic approval ratings that see 90 percent of Peruvians disapproving of Congress as an institution. This creates conditions where completely new political movements could theoretically break through, though the structural barriers and electoral mechanics tend to favor established organizations despite their profound unpopularity. The inability of any political faction to build sustained public support across election cycles reflects deeper problems with representation, party institutionalization, and the personalistic nature of Peruvian political movements that center on individual leaders rather than coherent ideological platforms or programmatic agendas.
Looking forward, analysts broadly agree the most likely scenario involves a presidential runoff between two candidates perceived as the lesser evil rather than affirmatively popular choices, with high abstention rates reflecting widespread voter alienation. The eventual winner will likely face a divided and powerful Congress that continues to wield extraordinary influence over executive branch decisions, potentially reducing the presidency to a ceremonial role while real power remains concentrated in the legislature. The restoration of bicameralism may provide some additional institutional ballast and make snap impeachments more difficult procedurally, but without addressing underlying issues of party fragmentation, parliamentary defection, and the constitutional provision for presidential vacancy due to permanent moral incapacity, the structural conditions that produced a decade of instability remain essentially unchanged. The prospect of meaningful systemic reform appears remote given that the very political forces responsible for the current dysfunction will likely maintain significant influence regardless of which individual wins the presidency.
International actors, particularly the United States, face important decisions about engagement with Peru's electoral process. There are indications that the Trump administration and its allies view Peru's chaotic political environment as an opportunity for influence, potentially supporting conservative candidates like López Aliaga or tolerating another Fujimori presidency while actively opposing leftist candidates like Mendoza whom they perceive as aligned against American interests. Trump associates have reportedly already begun engaging with Peruvian political figures, signaling that external interference could shape the electoral landscape, though the ultimate impact of such involvement remains uncertain. Meanwhile, China's deepening economic ties with Peru, including major infrastructure projects like the Chancay megaport, have created strategic competition for influence that adds another dimension to the political calculations surrounding the election.
The fundamental tension facing Peruvian voters involves choosing between continuity of a system that had manifestly failed to provide either effective governance or personal security, and the risk of authoritarian populism that promises immediate solutions through the suspension of democratic norms and institutions. The appeal of a Bukele-style crackdown resonates powerfully in a society where extortion threats, contract killings, and gang violence have become part of daily existence for millions of citizens. Yet the institutional prerequisites for such an approach differ dramatically from El Salvador's context, and the human rights implications of mass arrests, suspended constitutional protections, and weakened judicial oversight create their own dangers for democratic stability. Finding rights-respecting and effective responses to organized crime and insecurity while strengthening rather than dismantling democratic checks and balances represents the core challenge that Peru had thus far been unable to meet.
With over 50 political parties competing, no candidate commanding more than ten percent support, a third of voters explicitly rejecting all options, and fundamental questions about electoral integrity unresolved, the April 2026 elections arrive at a moment of maximum uncertainty for Peruvian democracy. Whether the vote produces a leader capable of breaking the cycle of instability, or simply extends the pattern of weak executives, hostile Congresses, and premature presidential removals that had defined the past decade, will shape Peru's trajectory for years to come. The restoration of bicameralism, the security crisis driving voter preferences, and the profound institutional decay affecting everything from the judiciary to electoral authorities create conditions where outcomes ranging from genuine democratic renewal to further authoritarian consolidation all remain plausible. What seems least likely is that the 2026 elections will simply restore stability and effective governance without addressing the deeper structural and institutional failures that have brought Peru to this critical juncture.
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