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Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)
Islamic State of the Greater Sahel
ISIS in the Greater Sahel
ISIS in the Islamic Sahel

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) (also known as ISIS-GS) aims to replace regional governments with an Islamic state. area(s) of operation: mostly concentrated along the Mali-Niger border region; targets primarily security forces. The Malian government and its foreign partners vowed to defeat jihadists fighting under the banner of the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin [JNIM] or a smaller group calling itself the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, led by Sahrawis. The Malian army has mounted operations with this aim, alongside French troops under the auspices of Operation Barkhane.

The al-Murabitun jihadist group was created in 2013 with the merger of elements from the Movement of Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and al-Mulathamine, a movement led by the Algerian jihadist figure Mokhtar Belmokhtar. In short order, al-Mourabitun split in 2015 into a pro-ISIS faction, which later became the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and a pro-al-Qaeda faction, which soon merged with JNIM.

Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, and Executive Order 13284 of January 23, 2003, on 23 May 2018 John J. Sullivan, Deputy Secretary of State, determined that the person known as ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), also known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), also known as Islamic State of the Greater Sahel, also known as ISIS in the Greater Sahel, also known as ISIS in the Islamic Sahel, committed, or poses a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.

Consistent with the determination in section 10 of Executive Order 13224 that prior notice to persons determined to be subject to the Order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States would render ineffectual the blocking and other measures authorized in the Order because of the ability to transfer funds instantaneously, he determine that no prior notice needs to be provided to any person subject to this determination who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, because to do so would render ineffectual the measures authorized in the Order.

Further to the establishment of a single narrative for ISGS and ISWAP S/2019/570, para. 34), ISGS deploys tactics that are usually associated with ISWAP operations against the Nigerian military forces. These include attacks not just on small outposts but also on large military camps to seize a substantial number of weapons, ammunition, vehicles and gasoline. ISGS and ISWAP already have joint facilitators, which is assessed to presage an enhanced operational connection between the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin theatres. Nevertheless, although ISWAP now claims ISGS attacks, ISGS leader Adnan Abou Walid Al-Sahraoui (QDi.415) is expected to retain his operational independence from ISWAP commander Abu Abdullah Idris Ibn Umar Al-Barnawi (not listed) in the forthcoming 2020 period.



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