Chinese Organized Crime
The Chinese Communist Party [CCP] has been tightening its alliance with Chinese organized crime to gain influence outside of China, and U.S. law enforcement investigating Chinese money laundering have found evidence indicating that some schemes involve Chinese Government officials and Communist Party elites. Organized crime in China has a long and complex history, evolving significantly over time. Modern organized crime in China involves a range of illicit activities, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, extortion, and money laundering.
The triad, a form of secret society that first appeared in the seventeenth century in southern China in opposition to emperors of the Qing Dynasty, is the organizational form most often associated with Chinese organized crime. Historically, Chinese organized crime has been dominated by triads, which are secret societies that originated in the 17th century. They were initially formed as mutual aid societies but eventually became involved in criminal activities. The oldest and most structured Chinese criminal organizations are the Hong Kong-based triads, which evolved from secret societies organized during the 17th century to overthrow the Manchu Ching Dynasty. To protect themselves, the societies took vows of secrecy, and created initiation rites and special poems and signs to identify each other. Many of these rituals are still observed. However, while the original initiation ceremonies could last from one to two days, ceremonies today seldom last more than an hour due to the need to maintain secrecv and avoid nolice attention.
Triads evolved from secret societies originally formed as resistance groups to the Manchu dynasty. Most Triad societies participate in a wide range of criminal activities, including money laundering, drug trafficking, gambling, extortion, prostitution, loan sharking, pornography, alien smuggling, and various protection schemes. After the Communist takeover on the mainland, most Triads fled to Hong Kong and Formosa, now Taiwan. They are responsible for the importation of much of the heroin that enters the United States from the “Golden Triangle” area of Southeast Asia. Hong Kong Triads also have increasingly become involved in the smuggling of illegal aliens into the United States. The Sun Yee On is the largest triad society in known to have an active faction in the USA. However, individual members of the 14K, the Wo Hop To, the Wo On Lok. and the Luen Kung Lok triads have been identified operating in the United States.
In the twentieth century, after centuries of existence as guilds and benevolent societies, the triads lost their political raison d’etre when the Manchu Empire ended in 1911. Some triads then turned to narcotics trafficking, extortion, gambling, and loan sharking. The Vietnam War brought significant overseas expansion of the groups’ narcotics activities. Hong Kong now is the center of triad activity in China, although triad membership there is a criminal offense. As many as 57 triads, varying greatly in size, have been identified in Hong Kong—although only 15 to 20 of those organizations are currently involved in criminal activity.
Although the triad is a hierarchical organization with fixed rituals and division of labor, the upper levels function more as resolvers of disputes and sources of international prestige and financing than as direct managers of criminal activity. Compared with the strict hierarchical structure of Italian crime groups, for example, the triads are “loose affiliations in the extreme,” offering full autonomy to members in their selection of criminal activities.9 Top individuals in the triad structure often have established reputations as legitimate businessmen.
All transnational Chinese crime groups do not owe their membership or their structure to the triad model. Narcotics syndicates, for example, may include both members and non-members of a triad. In contrast to the triads, the syndicates tend to be pragmatic assemblages that dissipate and reconfigure over time, making detection more difficult.
The Tongs, which originated from the Triad societies of China, are business and fraternal organizations active in may cities with large Chinese populations. Triads and Tongs are similarly organized and have many similar ceremonies and traditions. Tongs originated on the American West Coast primarily to protect Chinese immigrants from marauding white racists, who periodically raided San Francisco and 58New York City’s “Chinatown” areas during the 19th Century. Today, the Tongs thrive chiefly on business affiliations heavily influenced by criminals. Tongs provide illegal gambling opportunities, and some use Chinese gangs to protect their extortion, gambling and narcotics operations.
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Communist Party sought to eliminate organized crime. Many triad members fled to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other regions. Triads continue to operate in Hong Kong, Macau, and overseas Chinese communities. They are involved in various criminal enterprises, including drug trafficking, prostitution, and illegal gambling. Within mainland China, organized crime groups are less formalized than traditional triads but are still involved in a wide range of criminal activities. These groups often have connections to local businesses and officials.
Other types of ethnic Chinese criminal groups also have appeared. One such type, the Taiwanese organized gang, originated in Taiwan in the 1950s and adopted some triad-like rituals and structure. By the 1980s, the Taiwanese gangs had diversified significantly in activity and spread to other parts of the world. Characterized by one crime expert as “the most powerful and important ethnic group in transnational Chinese organized crime,” Taiwan-based groups are active in transnational trafficking of arms, narcotics, and people, as well as financial crimes.12 The two largest such groups are United Bamboo and the Four Seas, both of which are present in the United States.
Economic reforms and openings to the West since the 1980s encouraged criminal groups based in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan to expand into the southern China provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejian, and Yunnan. Having established narcotics connections in the Golden Triangle adjacent to Yunnan Province and a strong demand for migrant trafficking in Fujian and Zhejian provinces, these groups now constitute a third source of transnational Chinese crime.
Organized crime groups, also referred to in China as "black societies" and "underworld groups", have become a growing concern in China. In 2004, an organized crime expert at the University of Nanjing [in Jiangsu province] estimated that there were approximately one million black society members in China (Reuters 24 Aug. 2004). The prevalence of organized crime groups and criminal activity in the country has been attributed to corrupt Chinese authorities and widespread poverty.
Their collaboration of black societies in China with government and justice system officials has become closer with the turn of the century. A greater number of organized crime groups are receiving political protection and manage to escape detection or prosecution. Most organized crime groups are reportedly protected by authorities, referred to as "baohusan, or protecting umbrella". Baohusan is a government official who takes bribes from criminals and in turn provides protection to the criminals and their illegal activities.
A 2001 report on black societies in China noted that the number of criminal groups has been increasing and that the "violence, ruthlessness, and scale" of their activities have intensified. According to a book by He Bingsong,, the "most serious" organized crime problems for Chinese authorities are "drug distribution, gambling, prostitution, and violence". Other foremost organized crime problems of concern to Chinese officials are drug manufacturing, political-criminal connections (i.e., bribery, corruption), and the penetration of organized crime groups into legitimate businesses.
Rates of organized crime, or black society activity, vary geographically as a result of such factors as economic development, effectiveness of local authorities, and differences in local culture and customs. Major or serious crimes are more prevalent in the north and west of China than in the south and east. The types of crime committed in each region tend to remain fairly stable: homicides most prevalent in the north, drug trafficking in the south, robbery in the west and theft in the east. Serious organized crime is most prevalent in small and medium-sized cities where the economy is underdeveloped. Road robbery is often seen in remote areas whereas criminal enterprises are often established in wealthy areas. The coastal province of Guangdong is reportedly among the Chinese provinces with the most criminal organizations.
A number of general characteristics of organised crime in China suggest that local market vendors may be forced by criminal groups to pay protection money. Organised crime in China tends to be made up of a small group of individuals no greater than 200 people, who operate in an extremely localised area – such as townships – and who rely on local corrupt politicians, authorities and police. Growth beyond a localised area is restricted as it receives greater attention from the central government authorities.
State protection from criminal gang activity is limited in China by the strong association that can exist between criminals and officials, increasing the likelihood that police may not act against gangsters. The "gangsterisation" of Chinese villages results from rural communities falling under the control of thugs, often with the support of local officials. The authorities in Beijing rail from time to time against village-level thuggery, but their ability to control it is clearly limited because of the close connection at the local level between officials and criminals.
The extent of police involvement is evidenced by the fact that in the nine years to 2006, over 10,000 policemen were suspended on account of affiliation with organised crime.
The term “Chinese” refers to individuals of purely Chinese ethnic origin living in any part of the world. The criminal groups vary in size and degree of structure; they include syndicates, triads, gangs, and ad hoc combinations of organization members and non-members. Because of this variety, an increasing tendency toward ad hoc activity, and the lack of specificity in many open sources, the term “group” is used when a criminal activity is not attributed to a specific type of organization.
China is a major player in the global drug trade. China's story of itself and the CCP's grievance against the West often centers around the century of humiliation. During the century of humiliation, the Western world, particularly the British empire, once destabilized China with opium. Now, China is the one destabilizing the world with opioids like fentanyl.
Synthetic drugs like methamphetamine and fentanyl are significant issues, with production often centered in Guangdong and other regions. s the dangerous shift from plant-based drugs to synthetic drugs. This shift has resulted in the most dangerous and deadly drug crisis the United States has ever faced. These synthetic drugs, such as fentanyl and methamphetamine, are responsible for nearly all of the fatal drug poisonings. The Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels are at the heart of this crisis. These two Cartels are global criminal enterprises that have developed global supply chain networks.
Despite controls levied by both the Mexican and Chinese governments, the flow of precursor chemicals into Mexico continues unabated. China-based suppliers are still the main source for the precursor chemicals used by the cartels in Mexico to produce illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine, but India is also emerging as a major source country for these chemicals. The Sinaloa Cartel uses a variety of tactics to conceal precursor chemical shipments coming into Mexico, including hiding the chemicals among legitimate commercial goods, mislabeling the containers, using front companies to create the appearance of legitimacy, or shipping through third-party countries. DEA reporting also indicates that the Sinaloa Cartel has contracted with Mexico-based brokers who work independently of any drug cartel to purchase large quantities of fentanyl precursor chemicals directly from China.
The Sinaloa Cartel has built a mutually profitable partnership with China-based precursor chemical suppliers to obtain the ingredients they need to make synthetic drugs, and with Chinese money laundering organizations (MLOs) to return “clean” drug proceeds to the cartel in Mexico. They rely on chemical companies and pill press companies in China to supply the precursor chemicals and pill presses needed to manufacture the drugs. They operate clandestine labs in Mexico where they manufacture these drugs, and then utilize their vast distribution networks to transport the drugs into the United States. They rely on associates in the United States to distribute the drugs at a retail level on the streets and on social media. Finally, the Cartels utilize Chinese Money Laundering Organizations to move their profits from the United States back to Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations based in Mexico and South America are increasingly utilizing China based underground banking systems as their primary money laundering mechanism.
Asian investors have emerged as a new source of funding for illegal marijuana production in the United States, and site owners, eager to protect and oversee those investments, have been encountered at illegal grows seized in Oklahoma, California, Oregon, and Maine. Asian drug trafficking organizations have been involved in illegal marijuana cultivation for decades, operating industrial-scale indoor marijuana grows in residential homes, primarily in the western United States. Many of these home-grows pretend to operate under business registrations granted by state licensing authorities in jurisdictions where marijuana cultivation and sales are “legal” at the state level but, absent overt evidence such as the trafficking of marijuana across state lines or the DEA’s Dallas Division Seized Over $2.8 Million Linked to Marijuana Site Operated by Chinese Organized Crime Group On August 8, 2023, the DEA Dallas Division, along with several local law enforcement agencies and the Internal Revenue Service, executed eight search warrants on residential and business locations associated with four Chinese nationals who were trafficking marijuana into the Dallas/Ft. Worth metroplex from a grow operation in Oklahoma. The warrants netted more than $2.8 million, in addition to firearms and marijuana. commission of non-drug crimes such as money laundering and human trafficking, it can be difficult for law enforcement to immediately identify violations or discover an illegal grow
Human trafficking for labor and sexual exploitation is a serious problem. Victims are often lured with promises of legitimate employment and then forced into illegal activities. Highly organized criminal syndicates and local gangs subject PRC women and girls to sex trafficking within the PRC and abroad. Traffickers typically recruit them from rural areas and take them to urban centers, using a combination of fraudulent job offers and coercion by imposing large travel fees, confiscating passports, confining victims, or physically and financially threatening victims to compel their engagement in commercial sex.
The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. Authorities continued to prioritize the identification of women and girls in sex trafficking to the near total exclusion of efforts to identify forced labor victims. The overly narrow definitions inherent to the PRC’s anti-trafficking statutes significantly limited the scope of victim identification among key demographics. Authorities penalized victims of trafficking for commercial sex and immigration offenses committed as a direct result of being trafficked. The PRC government ignored abusive and potentially illegal contract stipulations, including fees and provisions requiring immediate repatriation for pregnancies or illnesses, which placed some PRC workers at higher risk of debt or punitive deportation as coercive measures to retain their labor; the government did not take steps to address these vulnerabilities.
The PRC government’s birth-limitation policy and a cultural preference for sons created a skewed sex ratio of 105 boys to 100 girls in the PRC, which observers assert continues to drive the demand for commercial sex and for foreign women to enter or be deceived into brokered marriages with PRC men – both of which may be procured and retained by force or coercion. PRC traffickers operating abroad subject local populations to sex trafficking in several countries in Africa, the Mediterranean region, and South America. PRC traffickers also subject women and girls in other Asian countries to sex trafficking and forced labor in sham businesses and entertainment establishments, including PRC national-owned casinos, constructed in close proximity to large-scale PRC-affiliated infrastructure and investment projects – at times under the auspices of the BRI – and in SEZs with limited local government oversight.
Traffickers, including those working for PRC national-run crime syndicates and with facilitation from PRC national-owned businesses, subject PRC men, women, and children to forced labor and sex trafficking in more than 80 other countries. They force PRC men, women, and girls to work in restaurants, shops, agricultural operations, and factories in overseas Chinese diaspora communities. Traffickers fraudulently recruit some PRC nationals as well as men, women, and children from countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, and South America, for high-paying technical jobs abroad and then force them to engage in online gambling, internet, and telephone scams, primarily in casinos and commercial compounds in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. Traffickers also reportedly subject some PRC nationals to forced criminality in cryptocurrency mining and in the cultivation, processing, and distribution of recreational drugs. PRC men in Africa, Europe, Maritime Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and South America experience conditions indicative of forced labor in factories, construction sites, and logging and mining operations; these conditions include non-payment of wages, restrictions on movement, withholding of passports, and physical abuse.
Workers employed at large-scale BRI and other PRC-affiliated construction projects, mining operations, and factories in African, European, Middle Eastern, Asian and Pacific, and Latin American and Caribbean countries experience conditions indicative of forced labor. These include deceptive recruitment into debt bondage; arbitrary wage garnishing or withholding; contract irregularities, including absence of contracts; confiscation of travel and identity documentation; forced overtime; resignation penalties; false promises of payment for return flights, which traffickers then use as collateral to retain their labor beyond the length of the original contracts; intimidation and threats; physical violence; denial of access to urgent medical care; poor working and living conditions; restricted freedom of movement and external communication; and retaliatory firings, including after refusing to have sexual relations with employers and reporting sexual abuse. Coercive conditions reportedly include threats of physical violence, confiscation of travel and identity documents, forcible drug intake, physical and sexual abuse, and torture, among others.
Many men from countries in Africa, Asia (especially Indonesia and the Philippines), and other regions employed on many of the 2,900 PRC-flagged DWF fishing vessels operating worldwide experience contract discrepancies, excessive working hours, degrading living conditions, severe verbal and physical abuse, sexual abuse, denial of access to healthcare, restricted communication, document retention, arbitrary garnishing or nonpayment of wages, and other forced labor indicators, often while being forced to remain at sea for months or years at a time.
Smuggling of goods such as electronics, luxury items, and endangered wildlife is prevalent. This activity is often facilitated by corrupt officials. Asian organized crime groups and gangs, particularly those with ethnic Chinese backgrounds, derive a lucrative source of revenue from heavy involvement in the illicit cigarette trade. On one level, high-quality, hard-to-detect counterfeit cigarettes bearing popular brand names are fabricated in Hong Kong and elsewhere and packaged by the millions for smuggling amid legitimate cargo through the region’s ports. On another level, Asian gangs reap substantial sums of money through schemes that subvert cigarette taxation.
With China's rapid technological advancement, cybercrime has become a growing concern. This includes online fraud, hacking, and the sale of illegal goods and services on the dark web. Modern and sophisticated cybercriminal groups are run like companies. Most cybercrime originates from small teams bringing in moderate revenues. They advertise and recruit, track revenues, form partnerships, and track and mimic competition. Larger cybercriminal groups can be organized and operate like a corporation (various departments, staffing challenges, overhead, quality control, etc.). Many groups have political connections and are generally aware of their public relations. They grow capabilities organically/internally and also leverage the black market to bring in new capabilities. China’s courts handled less than 300,000 cybercrime cases from 2017 to 2021. Mostly online fraud including bogus loans, fake recruitments and impersonation.
The Ministry of State Security [MSS] has substantial in-house talent it draws on to conduct global cyberespionage operations. The MSS pays contractors to conduct state-sponsored cyberespionage operations while overlooking the collateral damage created by their criminal activities. An additional benefit of using contractors is that the MSS has a ready scapegoat if an operation goes awry. The MSS can rely on its partners within the MPS to make arrests if they feel like they need to trot out some victims or [assign] some blame.
Money brokers who operate within the Chinabased underground banking systems (CUBS) increasingly act as money launderers for Mexico- and South America-based drug trafficking organizations in order to maintain liquidity in the CUBS. Chinese nationals use these underground banking systems to surreptitiously convert their cash assets in China into equivalent cash assets in the United States. Money processors who work for CUBS brokers collect cash from transnational drug traffickers operating in the United States. They use the cash collected from drug traffickers to benefit the China-based clients of the CUBS broker who are attempting to circumvent China’s capital flight laws. The cash is structured into U.S. accounts for individuals, shell companies, or cash-based businesses. The CUBS brokers then arrange for their money processors in Mexico or South America to pay cash directly to the drug trafficking organization.
Chinese foreign exchange rules cap the maximum amount of yuan individuals are allowed to convert into other currencies at approximately $50,000 each year and restrict them from transferring yuan abroad directly without prior approval from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. A variety of money laundering techniques are used to circumvent the restrictions, including structuring, using networks of family and friends, transferring value with the help of loved ones emigrating abroad, overseas cash withdrawals using credit cards, TBML, underground remittance systems such as fei-qian or “flying money,” and organized gaming junkets to Macau and elsewhere. Chinese organized crime is also involved. In addition to capital flight, a substantial amount of money is laundered through the purchase of overseas properties in places such as Vancouver, Sydney, London, San Diego, and New York.
The Chinese government has launched numerous crackdowns on organized crime, often focusing on high-profile cases to set an example. Anti-Corruption Campaigns: President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign has targeted both organized crime figures and the officials who protect them. This has led to the arrest and prosecution of many high-ranking individuals. China has increased cooperation with international law enforcement agencies to combat transnational organized crime.
Corruption within law enforcement and government agencies can hinder efforts to combat organized crime. Officials may be bribed or coerced into turning a blind eye to criminal activities. The Chinese legal and judicial system's transparency and consistency can be issues, affecting the effective prosecution of organized crime. Economic disparities and rapid urbanization can create environments where organized crime can thrive, especially in marginalized communities.
Chinese organized crime is described by law enforcement officials as a complex relationship between foreign-based criminal organizations, American-based criminal gangs, and fraternal and business associations in the United States. According to federal officials, members of some of these groups are career criminals who frequently engage in short-term ventures, sometimes acting on their own behalf and sometimes on behalf of an organization. According to some federal officials, Chinese organized crime controls and dominates the Chinese communities in the United States, and is engaged in a variety of criminal activities. Through prostitution rings and narcotics networks, Chinese organized crime has expanded its sphere of influence beyond the Chinatown communities of major metro- politan areas into communities throughout the country. Investigators also report several instances where Chinese organized crime is behind political corruption. As a result of changes in the United States immigration laws in the mid- 1960’s, Asian immigration has dramatically increased. The majority of the ethnic Chinese in the United States are now foreign born.
The activities of Chinese criminal groups have caused increasing alarm among law enforcement officials in Australia, Japan, North America, Russia, South Africa, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. Exhibiting substantial flexibility and pragmatism, such groups have expanded their territory and their range of activities to take advantage of conditions and markets in host countries. Chinese groups around the world are active in trafficking of narcotics, arms, people, and endangered animals and plants; financial fraud; software piracy; prostitution; gambling; loan sharking; robbery; and high-tech theft.1 The two most widespread and profitable criminal activities are trafficking narcotics and people.
Chinese criminal groups are transnational in the most literal sense. Their members may have been born in the People’s Republic of China (which now includes Hong Kong and Macau), Taiwan, or one of many overseas Chinese communities located throughout the world. Émigré members have migrated widely without losing touch with their home base. International crime expert Roger Faligot says of the Teochow, which from its base in Guangdong Province has become one of the most powerful crime groups in Europe: “Organized on the basis of tight links and featuring great loyalty, all the Teochow in the world are connected today by a dialect and a common origin from seven villages near the city of Swatow [Shantou].”
Despite this context of organizational loyalty, even in today’s Hong Kong Chinese transnational crime enterprises show a strong tendency toward overlapping membership and pragmatic, ad hoc cooperation that defies categorization of the participants. The major triads of Hong Kong all have members from the Big Circle, which is a large, loose triad-like crime group.
Asian criminal enterprises have been operating in the U.S. since the early 1900s. The first of these groups evolved from Chinese tongs—social organizations formed by early Chinese-American immigrants. A century later, the criminalized tongs are thriving and have been joined by similar organizations with ties to East and Southeast Asia.
The organizational structure of Chinese organized crime in the United States is quite complex. Broadly defined, there is a great variety of Chinese criminal organizations. These include gangs, secret societies, triads, tongs, Taiwanese organized crime groups, and strictly US-based tongs and gangs. According to Ko-lin Chin, the foremost academic expert in the U.S. on Chinese organized crime, there is no empirical support for the belief that there is a well-organized, monolithic, hierarchical criminal cartel called the “Chinese Mafia.” Chin says: “My findings...do not support the notion that a chain of command exists among these various crime groups or that they coordinate with one another routinely in international crimes such as heroin trafficking, money laundering, and the smuggling of aliens”.
Tong-affiliated gangs, like the Fuk Ching, have an ah kung (grandfather) or shuk foo (uncle) who is their tong leader. The top gang position is the dai dai lo (big big brother). Communicationbetween the tong and the gang occurs principally between these two individuals. Below the dai dai lo in descending order are the dai lo(s) or big brothers, the yee lo/saam lo (clique leaders), and at the bottom the ma jai or little horses. There are a variety of norms and rules that govern the gangs. These include respecting the ah kung, beating up members of other gangs on your turf, not using drugs, following the orders of the dai lo, and not betraying the gang. Rules violators are punished, sometimes severely, such as through physical assault and killing.
Violence is a defining characteristic of Chinese criminal gangs. Use of violence within the group and against other organized crime groups is very prevalent. Disputes over territory and criminal markets among the gangs are typically resolved using kong so, a process of peaceful negotiation. When this does not occur, however, the resolution is usually a violent one, in which guns are used against rival gang members.
Rep. Dan Newhouse stated 25 July 2028 : "Chinese money launderers have taken the terrorist money laundering playbook and digitized it. They use modern technologies—messaging and payment apps, e-commerce sites, digital assets, and the opaque nature of the Chinese banking system—to move large sums of money and facilitate trade-based money laundering with impunity. This system largely evades the formal banking system in the United States, Mexico, and elsewhere, making it particularly difficult to counter with traditional anti-money laundering tools. But make no mistake, the CCP financing system runs right through Chinese banks—and the CCP knows all about it. Retired Admiral Craig Faller, the former head of U.S. Southern Command, has warned that the Chinese government is “at least tacitly supporting” money laundering. I’d go one step further: the illicit financing of the fentanyl trade is state-sponsored by the PRC."
Mr. Don Im, Former Assistant Special Agent in Charge with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Operations Division described the process of Chinese money laundering of drug profits: “So now what happens to that million dollars held by the Chinese New York network? That person in their network will then structurally deposit that million dollars of cash throughout various bank accounts, restaurants, little shops, gas stations, laundry stores, and that one million dollars will then get pulled into one or two bank accounts... This happens every day, every week, throughout major drug markets in North America and Europe, and you're seeing literally half a trillion to three-quarters of a trillion dollars worth of drug proceeds generated every year."
Mr. John Cassara, Former Central Intelligence Agency officer and Special Agent with the U.S. Department of the Treasury stated 25 July 2028: “In 12 most significant categories of transnational crime, I found criminal activity has become part of the CCP’s overall strategy to grow its power. By measuring the proceeds of crime generated, China leads the world in all criminal categories… CCP inks involving in the transnational crime is at least $2 trillion dollars and I think that's an understatement, or at least approximately half of the $4 trillion that is laundered annually around the world every year.”
Organized crime in China is a multifaceted issue involving both traditional criminal organizations and newer, less formalized groups. While the Chinese government has made significant efforts to combat these activities, challenges such as corruption and economic disparities continue to complicate these efforts.
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