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Bougainville - Defense Forces

There is no discernable public discussion of what sort of military establishment might be required by an independent Bougainville. Some areas of Bougainville were effectively controlled by armed groups that had not joined the peace process, which includes the Me’ekamui Defence Force. There is a profound and longstanding character of local resistance to imposed organisational forms, including in the areas of policing and justice, as well as the strong Bougainvillean desire to develop governance and regulatory systems that build on indigenous forms of social organisation, leadership and customary authority.

Since 1997, Bougainville has been engaged in what has turned to be one of the world’s most successful peace processes.12 Led by local actors and supported by international donors and neighbouring countries, including New Zealand, Australia and the United Nations, this has included extensive reliance on traditional reconciliation and peacemaking processes at local levels,13 as well as the signing of a comprehensive Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) with Papua New Guinea in 2001.

The major types of security challenges include gang violence in the urban centers, banditry in some rural areas and along the major highways, so-called tribal fighting in parts of the highlands, conflicts around large-scale resource development, and election related violence. High levels of personal insecurity are reflected in the flourishing local security industry and in the great lengths to which many go to protect their persons and property. Distinctions between crime and political insurgency, and the roles of civilian police and military forces, have become increasignly blurred.

Independent Bougainville would have a populaton of about 300,000, compared to 7,000,000 of the remainder of Papua New Guinea - twenty times larger. The PNGDF is currently [as of 2019] a 3,600 personnel-strong force; with aspirations to expand to 5000 by 2020 in order to better execute its security, surveillance and nation building/HADR mandates. Taking a one-to-twenty ratio in population would suggest a Bougainville Defense Force headcount of about 200 service members. Fiji, by far the most populous and economically powerful of the South Pacific island nations, has a population of 915,000 (July 2016 est.), and a defense force with 3,500 service members. With Fiji as a model, Bouganiville might aspire to a BDF of about 1,000 service members.

The BDF might eventually consist of a honor guard, an infantry battallion, a few speedboats donated by Australia, and a handful of helicopters and light fixed wing aircraft.

In the decade before Papua New Guinea's independence there was some debate as to whether PNG needed a defence force, and especially about whether an army, if there were to be one, should have any role other than that of defending the country against external aggression. There were some who supported the idea of a paramilitary force with police and military functions.

The Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) proposed that Papua New Guinea have a defence force, but it expressed the view that the defence force should be ‘firmly oriented towards external defence’ and added: …we have very serious reservations about the possibility of a future Papua New Guinea Government using the army against its own people in any but the most extreme cases of civil disorder, and then subject also to specific conditions (CPC 1974, chapter 13 p.3). At independence, the basic assumption of defence policy in PNG was that if the country were attacked, the PNG Defence Force’s role would be to mount a holding operation until its allies — principally Australia — arrived to assist.

A lot of ink has been spilled over Bougainville, but seemingly not even a few drops to rehearse such quesitons. This reflects a failure of imagination on the part of all actors involved to take advantage of the opportunity presented by Bougainville’s new political dispensation and move beyond the ‘comfort zone’ to actively flesh out and implement a Bougainville model of security. Even policing in Bougainville has always suffered from a low level of legitimacy and this already low base was eroded further by the alleged actions of the RPNGC during the conflict.

Following years of conflict, the Government of PNG (GoPNG) and Bougainville actors signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) in 2001. In addition to providing a legal base for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG), the Agreement addressed issues of political significance, including weapons disposal, autonomy, and a referendum on the political status of Bougainville.

The United Nations Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB), established in August 1998 to monitor the implementation of the Lincoln and Arawa Agreements , was entrusted with supervising the implementation of the weapons disposal plan to be executed in three stages: (1) collection and secure storage of weapons in containers by unit commanders, (2) delivery of weapons to company commanders and storage in containers under UNPOB supervision with the latter holding one of the two keys of the containers, and (3) decision on the final fate of the weapons and certification by UNPOB on whether the security of weapons is conducive to holding elections.

On 30 July 2003, UNPOB certified the completion of Stage II of weapons disposal, paving the way for the PNG government to make fully operational the constitutional amendments on elections, the establishment of an autonomous Bougainville government and on the holding of a referendum on the future political status of the autonomous region. In December 2003, the parties agreed to destroy all contained weapons. With the completion of UNPOB’s mandate, the UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) was established in December 2003 to finish the outstanding tasks of UNPOB. In May 2005, UNOMB determined that a substantial level of compliance by the parties with the implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan had been achieved, and that, consequently, elections could be held as planned. Subsequently, on 20 May – 2 June 2005 the first Bougainville general elections were held.

A major obstacle to the full achievement of weapons disposal in Bougainville under the Weapons Disposal Plan was the non-involvement of the Mekamui Defense Force (MDF) in the peace process. According to a United Nations report, “the Bougainville parties believe that ex-combatants associated with the MDF have played a role in the de-containment of collected weapons”. Of all the weapons destroyed under the Weapons Disposal Plan, almost all (97.5 percent) belonged Bougainville Revolutionary Army [BRA] and Bougainville Resistance Force [BRF] fighters. Only 2.5 percent of the total were relinquished by MDF elements. These were mostly homemade and none were modern, high-powered weapons

A significant number of people in Bougainville consider weapons control in the current climate to be a law-and-order issue, since most weapons are being kept silent. It would seem to be the case that a significant proportion of weapons (perhaps even the majority) now held in Bougainville are in the hands of businesses, arms traffickers and civilians who are not ex-combatants. These weapons holders, and the weapons they hold, would indeed seem to fall under the purview of law enforcement rather than under the political umbrella of the Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, these weapons will need to be taken into consideration when developing a comprehensive plan to address the continued presence of weapons.

The presence of significant numbers of serviceable World War II era weapons, ammunition and explosives around Torokina on Bougainville’s west coast was a stumbling block for weapons disposal efforts unless addressed in an intensive and sustained manner. Given the likely high volume of such World War II remnants and their location in dense jungle and swampland, there can be no quick solution to this problem.

Ex-combatants in Bougainville are becoming more organized and politically more active and, as such, will likely be an important factor in determining the success or failure of future weapons disposal efforts. Ex-combatants of the BRA, BRF and MDF have recently organized themselves into 3 Ex-Combatant Associations, one each for the North, Central and South Districts of Bougainville.

The customs component of law enforcement in Bougainville is severely underdeveloped. With only a handful of Customs Officers, who face recurring threats and intimidation from traffickers, the capacity to control Bougainville’s sea border with the Solomon Islands is very weak. Traditional border crossers travel between the Solomon Islands and Bougainville without restriction. This facilitates a low-level but persistent illicit trade in weapons between the Solomon Islands and Bougainville, with Bougainville being used as a transit point to move weapons from the Solomon Islands, as well as those sourced domestically in Bougainville, to other provinces of PNG and beyond.

The Bougainville Community Policing Project (BCPP) was launched in 1998. The BCPP aims to assist the Bougainville Police Service [BPS] “to operate as an effective community policing agency and to assist the BPS to integrate, and support a strong and sustainable Community Auxiliary Police programme”. The BCPP Is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade (MFAT), and managed and implemented by the New Zealand Police (NZPol).

Strong local aspirations for strengthening community governance systems based on traditional and customary authority have been evident in many parts of the island during both colonial times and following PNG’s independence. These aspirations are currently reflected in the role afforded Councils of Elders (CoEs) in the local government system operating in the Autonomous Region. While Bougainville, like the rest of PNG since 1975, had formal courts and a national police force, most local disputes and infractions have always been managed through ‘traditional’ approaches.

In much of rural Bougainville ‘traditional’ leaders continued to deal with most local conflicts even in the 1980s, including acts which the Papua New Guinea legal system classified as criminal offences… Disputes tended to be regarded in much the same way as they had for thousands of years – as disturbing community balance. The response of ‘traditional’ leadership was directed largely to restoring balance.

The combined Bougainville leadership that negotiated the Bougainville Peace Agreement agreed that almost all power in relation to law and justice should be in the hands of the autonomous Bougainville government (ABG). They envisaged as much as possible conflict and disputes being resolved through chiefs and other traditional leaders.

Through management, training, supervision and accountability initiatives, the program has contributed significantly to the success of the CAP. Over 300 CAP personnel are involved in policing at the local, village-based level throughout rural Bougainville, operating through local systems. But a lack of basic BPS professionalism was far from unusual. In a village consultation the view was expressed that the CAP reflected “black-man culture” whereas the BPS reflected “white-man culture”.

Reconciliation is a central, formalized and highly developed characteristic of Bougainville society. Traditional reconciliation provides a means for both parties to a dispute to put their conflict behind them and to move forward in a spirit of mutual respect. Reconciliation is a prerequisite for widespread weapons disposal since it can reduce the feelings of insecurity (e.g. fear of retaliation for acts committed during the crisis) that cause many people to hold guns. However, traditional processes of reconciliation have been undermined to some extent in Bougainville by the expectation, now widely held, that reconciliation ceremonies should be supported financially by the ABG – by paying for not only such things as mediation services and logistics (transport, meals, etc.), but also for the pigs, shell money and other items of value that are traditionally exchanged during such ceremonies. This practice is not sustainable and threatens to undermine the effectiveness of traditional reconciliation.