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Tatmadaw - Threat Perceptions

An integrated GOB political, military, and economic strategy has matured as the GOB has moved away from the simple-minded defense strategies of the Ne Win and U Nu years. Ne Win basically believed that the greatest threats to Burma would arise from its nearest neighbors (China, India, and Thailand) and that its greatest strength lay in its natural defenses -- the mountains and forests that surround the Burman heartland. Burma, he believed, could rely on natural obstacles to hold up any attacker and on a lightly armed people's army to cut the enemy to pieces in the forests. It became, as a consequence, policy under both the U Nu and Ne Win governments to leave the wilderness areas intact -- in effect, to sacrifice the development of those border areas to Burma's national defense priorities.

That approach, however, had disastrous side-effects, providing both the motive and the opportunity for ethnic rebellions. It antagonized the ethnic inhabitants of the outlying regions, who found themselves cut off from any hope of development. It also limited the government's writ in those areas, as the wilderness that the Burmese created proved equally impenetrable from the Burmese side. The Burmese Army could mount dry season sweeps through these regions, but it could not maintain a presence in the face of popular resistance. As a result, the GOB rapidly found itself surrounded not by buffers to invasion, but by safe-havens from which bandits and insurgents could operate with impunity. Law and order broke down and ethnic insurgencies spread to the point where, by the mid-1980s, virtually all of Burma's inland borders were in the hands of insurgents.

Even before 1988, Burma’s government feared an invasion of the country. The danger was seen to emanate mainly from China, but over the years after 1988 the US and major EU countries were viewed as Burma’s greatest military threat. The Burmese fear a U.S. invasion, however illogical that may seem to Americans. The fear of invasion, however unrealistic to the outside world, is palpable in Myanmar among the tatmadaw.

In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis’s landfall on 03 May 2008, Burma (Myanmar) was hit by a 3.6 meter storm surge which devastated the area. At least 140,000 deaths were reported, with over 1 million left homeless and about 2.4 million others severely affected. The Delta region, Myanmar's Rice Bowl, was severely damaged by this most devastating cyclone in Asia since 1991. The State Peace and Development Council military government initially blocked most international access to the affected region; however, amidst international pressure, it slowly began allowing aid to be delivered.

Senior General Than Shwe was above all concerned with saving face and holding on to power. He did not want the Burma Army to be seen as needing assistance to deliver relief, and would rather let thousands of Burmese die than accept massive international assistance. Than Shwe remained worried about a US invasion and was determined to hold on to power for the last few years of his life.

That's why some said it was ... time to consider a more serious option: invading Burma. Some observers, including former USAID director Andrew Natsios, have called on the U.S. to unilaterally begin air drops to the Burmese people regardless of what the junta says. The Bush Administration has so far rejected the idea — "I can't imagine us going in without the permission of the Myanmar government," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday — but it's not without precedent: as Natsios pointed out to the Wall Street Journal, the U.S. has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid without the host government's consent in places like Bosnia and Sudan. A coercive humanitarian intervention would be complicated and costly.

The unprecedented devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis succeeded in doing what no other situation has done before: uniting the West and Burma's Asian neighbors to bring unprecedented pressure on the regime to open up and allow international humanitarian workers unfettered access. This pressure has gradually produced results, but was resisted by regime hard-liners who likely recognized the potential threat to their continued grip on power if the international community succeeded in establishing an impartial support network that genuinely responds to the victim's needs, rather than the regime's.

But the American cry for regime change in Myanmar and the ‘‘outpost of tyranny’’ characterization are not forgotten. American support for dissident groups along the Thai border reinforced these fears, as did the potential role of Thailand as a perceived surrogate and ally of US policy in the region. The United States held the Burmese to a different, and more stringent, standard than for other authoritarian regimes with which it dealt in terms of the political parties, religious freedom, and even human rights.