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Conditions of Service

The Tatmadaw has been more cohesive than any other Southeast Asian military institution and for a much longer period, and will only get stronger and bigger left unchecked. Despite continuing problems, the quality of core personnel can be expected gradually to improve. Already the closure of other avenues of education and social advancement has forced many young Burmese to consider a military career.

Military service has received widely varying degrees of acceptance, but by and large in the 1980s the military was considered a desirable and respected career. Pay was generally commensurate with or higher than that received for comparable civilian employment, and perquisites raised the standard of living above that enjoyed by most civilians. Military posts were usually of tropical construction as benefitted the services' needs. Families often resided in these installations along with their service sponsor.

Living conditions differed sharply between those assigned to combat units and those serving in the national administration and the BSPP. For the former, daily routine was exacting and dangerous. The constant state of hostilities and shortages of logistics support forced many units to spend much of their time in the field living off the land under very harsh conditions. Casualties and deaths were a constant threat. In contrast, those filling nonmilitary positions lived in the comparative comfort of Rangoon or other cities, where more amenities were available and life was far less dangerous.

All personnel and their families received free medical attention, rations, transportation during assignment transfers, and accommodations. Housing varied according to rank, but ration allotments were standard for all ranks. Personnel assigned to outlying regions, where it was difficult to procure supplies for their families, could at the discretion of area commanders receive extra ration allotments to provide for their dependents. Leave policies were liberal, all personnel accruing 30 days of leave each year. Retirement could be for disability, length of service, or age and could be statutorily mandated according to rank upon request. Retirement pay varied, reaching a maximum of 75 percent of the active-duty rate.

Although detailed surveys of attitudes within the officer corps have not been conducted, one observer of Burma has posited that there were two lines of cleavage among officers. The first and most important, in his opinion, was a functional division between officers who have been assigned to conventional military tasks, such as commanders of field units, and those who have filled positions in the government, the national administration, and the "BSPP. Before the 1962 coup the officer corps was unified by its common experience and enjoyed great solidarity within its ranks.

After the coup, however, hundreds of officers were needed to fill nonmilitary assignments. When instructed to select personnel for these duties, commanders often took the opportunity to weed out those considered incompetent or troublemakers. By the late 1960s it had become apparent that officer corps solidarity had been undermined by the opening of this second, very different career path, in which those assigned to nonmilitary tasks exercised more influence in the national leadership and lived in far more comfortable surroundings than did officers in the field.

Competition between the two wings of the armed forces was since apparent, one side or the other gaining ascendancy according to which stood in better favor with U Ne Win at the time. The political-administrative wing seems to have been stronger in 1971 during the first Congress of the BSPP, but line officers displaced them two years later at the Second Congress. The political faction attempted to stage a resurgence in 1977 at the Third Congress in February, but after some members reportedly sought to replace U Ne Win as party chairman, the BSPP convened an extraordinary congress in November in order to bolster U Ne Win's position. The wing of the armed forces representing line officers continued to exercise greater influence at the Fourth Congress in 1981.

As of early 1983 it was difficult to evaluate the depth of the division between the two groups. Certain senior officers appeared to have the support of both. Brigadier General Tin Oo, for instance, the joint general secretary of the BSPP since 1981, rose to his position through assignments in the intelligence services and as chief military assistant to U Ne Win. He also maintained close and friendly contacts with several influential line officers A second, generational line of cleavage was believed to separate officers identified with the struggle for independence from those who entered the military after that time and made a career fighting insurgents or, after 1962, serving in political or administrative positions. Although many of the older generation have retired, they maintained control over decisionmaking positions in both the armed forces and the government, sometimes to the frustration of ambitious younger officers. The older group has drawn upon the struggle for independence, the Thirty Comrades, and Aung San himself to provide national inspiration and to form the basis for the country's military traditions. Younger officers have reportedly found such symbolism to be outside their own experience and to overwhelm their own role in preserving the national unity and in launching and carrying out a socialist revolution.