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Foreign Military Relations

In light of its strong commitment to maintaining a nonaligned foreign policy, the nation had not entered into any defense treaties during the 1948-early 1983 period and had accepted miliary aid only when it was judged not to compromise the country's jealously guarded independence. Having little domestic defense industry, however, it has been necessary to obtain much military hardware from abroad. Both Britain and the United States made significant contributions to the development of the armed forces in their early years, but during the 1970s and early 1980s West Germany, which provided favorable financing terms but no grant aid, was the major source for military equipment.

The Burmese government allowed United States military aid programs initiated in 1958 to lapse over the 1966-80 period but did accept antinarcotics aid beginning in 1974. Totaling some US$47 million through late 1983, drug control aid has included helicopters, transport aircraft, and communications equipment iurnished under the United States Department of State International Narcotics Control Program. In October 1981 the Burmese government signed an accord with the United States to renew military aid and in December 1981 received a United States naval delegation, headed by the chief of the United States Naval Operations in the Pacific, the first visit by such an important military delegation in over 30 years. Under the aid agreement, six military officers were sent for training in the United States in 1981, 20 in 1982, and a proposed 44 in 1983. During 1983 the Burmese government was also expected to request to purchase spare parts and ammunition for previously supplied equipment using United States Foreign Military Sales credits.

China agreed to support an ambitious military expansion and modernisation program launched by the SLORC in 1989. By 1992, China had agreed to sell Burma arms and military equipment valued by some observers at more than US$1.4 billion. The deals covered fighter, ground attack and transport aircraft, tanks and armored personnel carriers, naval vessels and a variety of towed and self-propelled artillery pieces. Trucks and a wide range of infantry equipment were also being provided. The first deliveries were made in 1990, and by the end of 1992 the SLORC had received at least one squadron of F-7 "Airguard" fighters and six Hainan class offshore patrol boats.

Since the early 1990s, Rangoon has relied on China - which controls more than 60 percent of the Burmese economy-for diplomatic, military, and economic support. (In 2004 alone, China concluded 33 trade and aid agreements with Burma.) For China, the payoff went beyond geo-economics to geopolitics, gaining access through Burma to the Indian Ocean. While the Burmese military regime's pro-China tilt in the early 1990s was certainly not the result of some "grand plan" in Rangoon but because it had nowhere else to go, Beijing's forays into Burma were definitely a part of China's grand strategy and based on a careful assessment of China's strategic interests and economic needs in the 21st century. India and ASEAN's "constructive engagement" policy notwithstanding, China still remains Burma's main trading partner, arms supplier, and a steadfast supporter in international fora.

With much of China's energy resources sailing through the Strait of Malacca, Burma is in a strategic position to affect China's energy security design. If China were given access to port facilities in Burma to service the expanding Chinese naval fleet, it would give PLAN the ability to control maritime trade routes as well as the ability to command strategic chokepoints along those routes jeopardizing the security interests of the maritime powers that depend on these waters. The increase in PLAN's capabilities could generate an uncertain climate and prompt a build up of rival naval powers in the region. Though the PLA Navy will be able to ply China's extended sea lines of communication with the help of Burmese naval facilities, the Chinese naval vessels have not attained sufficient modernization to pose a major threat to the United States or the regional powers. It is also unlikely China would challenge the U.S., the current guarantor of freedom of navigation, for dominance of the sea.

In February 2001, it was reported that Chinahad opened a naval base near Yangon. China has been providing technical assitance to Myanmar Navy. The Chinese Navy has alsoestablished a SIGNIT base at Great Coco island and there are further rumours of Chinese presence at Man Aung, Hainggyi, Katan andZaduikyi islands. But in 2005 the Chairman of the Indian Defence Force's Chiefs of Staff Committee conceded that reports of a Chinese intelligence facility on one of Burma's offshore islands were incorrect. At the same time, he announced that there were no Chinese naval bases in Burma.