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Political and Administrative Role

The tradition of maintaining a separation between military and civilian spheres has not taken root in Burma. Although capable of exerting great influence in national politics during the 1948-62 period, the military leadership by and large had accepted civilian rule and kept the armed forces' role in the national life limited primarily to that of a conventional defense force. After Ne Win led a military coup in 1962, however, the armed forces' leadership took over the running of the country. Thereafter, the military was assigned the dual mission of defending the national security and developing a socialist state. In consequence, a large portion of the armed forces began to perform what were essentially nonmilitary tasks.

From its inception, the BIA was essentially a political movement in military garb, and both before and after independence military officers kept in close contact with civilian politicians and filled posts in the national administration, particularly at local levels in areas where the government's structure was weak or nonexistent. Starting in 1951 a few officers gained experience in running economic enterprises through their involvement in the Defense Services Institute, which began as a modest organization responsible for obtaining food and uniforms for personnel. By the time it was nationalized in 1962, however, it controlled about 50 companies dealing in diverse pursuits such as domestic commerce, housing, international shipping, and book publishing. The performance of such nonmilitary roles was widely accepted as a legitimate extension of the armed forces' mission to maintain national security.

Moreover, within the military leadership and the civilian government as well, it was generally understood that the armed forces were entitled to share in national decisionmaking by virtue of having played the leading role in the struggle for independence. During the nation's first years the military was tied down with counterinsurgency campaigns and eschewed direct involvement in national politics. By the late 1950s, however, the rebel threat was at least temporarily within control, and the military was able to devote more attention to the state of the civilian government, which it soon concluded to be in considerable disarray. In 1958 after U Nu, with the support of the military, invited Ne Win to form a "caretaker" government, the armed forces took over the running of the country while the civilian government tried to reorganize itself to resume rule. Although some officers reportedly were reluctant, the military then peaceably returned power to U Nu in 1960.

As U Nu's new government took shape, however, a number of officers strongly disapproved of the nonsocialist orientation of the faction of AFPFL that U Nu headed, as well as certain policies his government was pursuing. In mid-1961 Ne Win reassigned two of the most prominent critics to posts overseas, but discontent with the civilian government continued to grow. The military leadership was particularly alarmed by U Nu's promotion of Buddhism as a state religion and his apparent intentions to grant more autonomy to some minorities; most officers feared both moves would seriously endanger the national unity that the armed forces had fought so long to preserve.

Convinced that the armed forces not only had a duty to protect the nation but also had been proved capable of governing efficiently, on March 2, 1962, Ne Win, with the support of all army regional commanders, staged a coup. The military leadership, calling itself the Revolutionary Council, then suspended the ,onstitution, announced it would launch a socialist revolution in the nation, and took over the running of the country. All political activity was confined within the framework of the newly created Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the membership of which over the 1962-72 period was predominantly military.

In keeping with the new national direction, General Ne Win declared in 1968 that the military had to draw closer to the people and contribute more directly to socialist construction. He renamed the armed forces the People's Armed Forces and gave them a new motto: "Fight while producing, produce while fighting." He also announced a new military doctrine of waging a war. After that time military units were called upon to aid in such projects as road and irrigation canal construction, bridge building, and rice harvesting. Village militias were formed, and national organizations throughout the nation began to be given regular military training.

The Revolutionary Council relied primarily on military officers to fill key administrative posts in the central and local government organs and the newly nationalized economic enterprises. Throughout the nation, military officers, schooled intensively in BSPP doctrine, took control of state- and division-level administration. At the township level, commanders served as chairmen of security and administrative committees--the basic unit of local government -- as well as chairmen of area party and mass organizations.

The dominance of the military in the BSPP and the national administration, combined with hierarchical command structures in both, effectively excluded civilian participation in either structure. In the late 1960s dissatisfaction over the nation's poor economic performance and concern that popular support for the military's revolution had not been forthcoming prompted the military government to reassess the system, and in the early 1970s a number of changes were instituted. In 1971-72 the BSPP began to be converted into a mass rather than a cadre party, causing the ratio of military participation to the total membership to fall. In 1972 an estimated 150 to 200 top military leaders in the government, including Ne Win, retired from the military to continue filling the same positions in mufti. Finally, a new constitution was enacted in 1974, establishing a socialist government in which the BSPP was mandated to take over the leadership of the nation.

Although these changes had the effect of lowering the visibility of the military, they did not substantially affect its influence in the government; the armed forces had launched the revolution in 1962 and as of early 1983 remained its central pillar. Although the 1974 Constitution had replaced the Revolutionary Council with the State Council, 26 of the latter's 29 members were active-duty or retired military officers, including its chairman, U San Yu, who also served as the nation's president after November 1981. Some 80 percent of the delegates to the national legislature, the People's Assembly, were also military or ex-military. U Ne Win continued to serve as chairman of the BSPP, and 14 of 15 members of the BSPP's top decisionmaking body, the Central Executive Committee, were active-duty or retired members of the armed forces. At the state and division levels, 12 of 14 chairmen of party committees were military: only at the township level and below had civilians come to dominate party leadership. Within the defense establishment itself, party organizing committees were maintained at every level of command from the Ministry of Defense to the platoon level. Some 80 percent of all armed forces personnel were BSPP members as of mid-1982.

Under the 2008 constitution the powers of the civilian authorities afforded little scope for controlling the actions of the Tatmadaw. Nor is there any indication that they directly participated in planning or implementing security operations or were part of the command structure, either in relation to operations in Rakhine State or in northern Myanmar. Security matters fall entirely within the purview of the Tatmadaw, without civilian oversight. The Commander-in-Chief, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, is the Supreme Commander of all armed forces in Myanmar, which deviates from most modern constitutional frameworks where the Head of State is usually the Supreme Commander to whom the highest ranking military officers and institutions are subordinated. The key Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs are appointed by the Tatmadaw. Through these appointments, the Commander-in-Chief also controls the majority of votes in the National Defence and Security Council.

The Commander-in-Chief asserted, in the context of the United Nations Security Council Mission visit to Myanmar, that, “though I am the head of the Tatmadaw, our country has the President. And we Tatmadaw take actions under the leadership of the President” and “Our Tatmadaw is under the guidance of the Myanmar government. We only take action according to the mandate given by the law and we are not authorized to do anything beyond the boundaries of law.” Nonetheless, the Mission has found no indication that the Tatmadaw has operated under orders from outside its own chain of command, specifically the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates.

Nothing indicated that civilian authorities at Union and State level used their limited powers to influence the situation on the ground in the country, in Rakhine State in particular, where the gravest crimes under international law were being perpetrated. The State Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had not used her de facto position as Head of Government, nor her moral authority, to stem or prevent the unfolding events, or seek alternative avenues to meet the Government’s responsibility to protect the civilian population or even to reveal and condemn what was happening. On the contrary, the civilian authorities spread false and hateful narratives; denied the Tatmadaw’s wrongdoing; blocked independent investigations, including of the Fact-Finding Mission; and overseen the bulldozing of burned Rohingya villages and the destruction of crime sites and evidence.

Ignorance on the part of the Myanmar civilian authorities was effectively impossible. The allegations of widespread human rights violations were widely covered in the media during the “clearance operations” in Rakhine State, and the military and civilian authorities were themselves providing live updates on developments, including on Facebook.

As such, through their acts and omissions, the civilian authorities tacitly accepted and approved the Tatmadaw’s brutal, criminal and grossly disproportionate actions. Moreover, in the period under review, the civilian authorities supported and publicly defended the severe, systemic and institutionalised oppression of the Rohingya; they condoned, mirrored and promoted the false, hateful and divisive narratives espoused by ultranationalist Buddhist groups; through silencing activists and critical voices, they fostered a climate in which hate speech thrives and incitement to discrimination and violence is facilitated; through their obstinate denials of credible allegations of human rights violations and abuses, they emboldened perpetrators. Such conduct was not only in violation of Myanmar’s obligations under international human rights law; it has also been profoundly damaging to the country and its democratic transition. Silence in the face of unfolding atrocity crimes amounts to a severe dereliction of duty.