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Russia and the Amur - 1689-1902

The story of the Russian overland expansion in the Far East at the expense of China began at a very early date. Since 1689 the whole coast line of Northern and Central Manchuria bit by bit fell into the hands of Russia, and in the 19th Century Russia acquired the Maritime Provinces and the Port of Vladivostok, which gave her access to the Pacific Ocean. By 1900 the only seaboard remaining to the whole of Manchuria lay between the Ya-lu River (ie, Korea) and the Chinese province of Chihli.

When the Manchus were struggling with China the Russians were settling on the banks of the Upper Amur and in the neighboring regions, which then constituted part of Northern Manchuria. This encroachment, which was naturally resented, gave rise to a conflict, which resulted in the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, wherein the boundaries of the two Empires were laid down. The preamble of that treaty distinctly states that it was concluded "in order to repress the insolence of certain rascals who, making hunting incursions beyond the limits of their territories, pillage, murder and stir up trouble and quarrels, as well as to determine clearly and distinctly the boundaries of the two Empires of China and of Muscovy". The boundary of Russia and Northern Manchuria was intended to be the Argun and Gorbitza rivers and the Yablonoi Mountains from the source of the latter river to the sea.

In 1689 the treaty known under the name of the 'treaty of Golovin,' or of Nerchinsk left the question of the navigation upon the Amur (or Heilungkiang, Black Dragon River) undecided, as well as the question of the boundaries of Russia and China undetermined. The treaty of 1689 fixed the limits of the two empires in the manner following: The line of demarkation followed "the course of the Garbitza where it enters the Schilkah from the north, above its junction with the Argoon, to its source, and then followed the crest of the principal chain of the Hingan mountains." But the chain of the Hingan mountains, or, at least, the chain known by that name in China, and among the Russians under different names, diverges from the Gerbitza towards the east, and, after having turned the sources of the Zea and of the Booreya, turns abruptly to the south, parallel with the course of the latter stream, and but a short distance to the east of it, where it joins the Amoor. Here the range has been cut by the Amoor near the 130th degree of east longitude.

All the country from the Hingan mountains to the Eastern sea was, in consequence of the treaty of Nerchinsk, left, as it were, undetermined, because nothing was actually known of it by the parties. It rested solely acquired from China, or discharged from her jurisdiction, because China has since made no pretensions to the possession of the shores of the Amoor below the chain of the Hingan, that is to say, to the east of the 130th degree of east longitude; and, in consequence, by the Chinese as well as the Russians, the whole inferior course of the Amoor, from the passage of the Hingan, was considered as belonging to Russia of right; but, in fact, it rested unoccupied.

After the treaty of Nerchinsk, in the course of one hundred and fifty years, at every favorable occasion Russia insisted on the definitive regulation or settlement of her boundaries in the Amoor country. But the Chinese government as systematically and as constantly refused these demands, in consequence of which the Russian government decided or determined to make no settlement upon the lower Amoor, though she well knew that, according to the treaty of Nerchinsk, the country had been ceded to her by China. But the Chinese government, who loved rather, as was its wont, to bind its frontiers by a chain of wilderness or desert country, thus prolonged this question of boundary.

Ever since the day when the Treaty of Nerchinsk was concluded in 1689, which placed the whole of the Amur valley in the hands of the Chinese Emperor, and confined the Russian possessions to the north of the Aigun River,' the ambitious statesmen of Russia had been on the continuous watch for a convenient opportunity to alter the frontiers thus agreed upon. This desired opportunity arrived, after a lapse of more than two hundred years, when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, China was embroiled in the Taiping insurrection (1850-1867).

In 1851, a Russian warship, sailed up the Amur estuary, and founded the town of Nikolaievsk, and in 1853, Alexandrovsk and other towns were established on the Tartary Coast, all being well within the limits of the Chinese territory as defined by the Treaty of Nerchinsk. And, in a few years, thanks to General Mouraview, the sagacious and aggressive Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, Russian posts were established along the whole of the north bank of the Amur River.

The Chinese Government promptly protested against all these infractions of the Nerchinsk Treaty, but she was not in a position to back up her protests. The Taiping Rebellion had proved such a serious menace to the Manchu dynasty that all available troops in the country were sent to cope with the rebels. Taking advantage of this circumstance, and realizing that the "psychological moment" had arrived, for which she had waited for centuries, Russia, in 1858, sent a formal demand to the Peking Government for the "rectification" of the frontier. It was easy to understand what Russia really meant by the "rectification" of the frontier, but difficult for China to make an effective reply. She was then absolutely helpless and powerless. Menaced on the one hand by the serious insurrection, and harassed on the other by the difficulties then pending because of the "Arrow" War with Great Britain and France, China was in no position to resist the Russian demand. She had no choice but to consent to the rectification.

The result was the conclusion, on May 16, 1858, of the Treaty of Aigun, which reversed the Treaty of Nerchinsk, and placed in the hands of Russia the whole of Chinese territory north of the Amur River, a region, as a British writer had observed, covering an area eight times as large as Great Britain and Ireland. By the Treaty of Aigun, the whole of the country between the Yablonoi Mountains and the Amur fell to Russia, and the territory between the Ussuri and the sea was placed under the jurisdiction of both countries, pending, a delimitation of the frontier. In November 1860 a Supplementary Treaty was made which defined the whole of the frontier line of Russia and Manchuria with the exception of the western boundary of Northern Manchuria. The boundaries of Russia and Manchuria were the Ergune (Argun) River on the west, the Amur to the Ussuri on the north, and a line from the mouth of the Ussuri to the mouth of the Tumen on the east. From that time on her policy steadily gained a foothold in the Far East.

With this acquisition, Russia was not yet satisfied. Her ambition was to reach the seaboard, for the realization of which she had to watch for another chance. Having thus obtained possession of all the country north of the Amur River, Russia cast her eyes on that which lay to the south. After biding her time a while, she fixed on the presence of the allied French and English forces in Peking as a moment when the Chinese could not afford to be particular.

In 1860 then, General Ignatieff was despatched to the Celestial capital, where he without difficulty negotiated the Russian treaty of Peking, which since served as the basis of intenational relations between the two countries. Under this document the whole of Manchurian Coast line between Ussuri River and the sea was ceded to Russia without any restrictions whatever. In addition to this, it conveyed the right of Russian traders to go to Peking, and annulled the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Thus did Russia obtain an accession of close upon three quarters of a million square miles to her territory, and an extension southward to the Bay of Vladivostock. More than this, the treaty brought the Southern frontier of Russia into contact with that of Korea, and gave her an advance of two hundred miles in the direction of Peking.

Russia was bent upon aggression in Manchuria. Germany seized Kiaochau in November, 1897, with the express concurrence of the Czar of Russia. The question was whether Russia should seize Port Arthur and Talienwan, the ice-free ports of North China, which had been the goal of Russian territorial expansion in Asia. No sooner had Port Arthur and Talienwan been seized than another opportunity presented itself, which offered the irresistible temptation for the final consummation of the Russian design on Manchuria, and that was the Boxer Uprising in 1900. Quite in line with her traditional policy, and again taking advantage of the situation, Russia occupied Manchuria. Having done so, her task was to secure the recognition of the Chinese Government. The tactics employed in this move were paralleled by those of 1860, when she wrested the Amur and maritime regions from China. As she then pretended to be the friend and savior of the Manchu Dynasty, she now repeated the same strategy.

By posing as friend of China, as she had done so many times before, she expected that thereby she could win the cession of Manchuria, as she had won the Amur and the maritime regions in 1860. To this end, while the allies were negotiating the final protocol of peace, she entered, as we recall, into a separate convention with the Tartar General in Mukden, virtually making Manchuria a Russian protectorate. Frustrated by the protests of Great Britain, Germany, Japan and the United States, she entered into another convention known as the Lamdorff-Yangyu Convention, restricting the sovereign rights of China in Manchuria and North China. In addition, Russia later demanded the concession of the monopoly of the economic development of Manchuria to be granted to the Russo-Asiatic Bank. All these demands China resisted, and Great Britain, Japan and the United States entered vigorous protests.

The Russian avalanche soon, however, met an effective check. On January 30, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded, aiming directly at the Russian advance in Manchuria. Perceiving the peril of the opposition, she at once changed her front and concluded the Treaty of April 8, 1902 promising to restore the Shanhaikwan-Newchang-Sinminting Railway, and to complete the evacuation of Manchuria in three successive periods of six months each. When the first period of evacuation came, she fulfilled her pledge, but this only nominally, for she concentrated her withdrawn troops in the other strategic parts of Manchuria where she was yet allowed to remain. When, however, the second period of evacuation was due, she openly refused to effect the withdrawal, and in addition, presented to China, as conditions to further evacuation, Seven Articles, demanding, inter alia, the nonalienation of Manchuria and the closing of Manchuria against the economic enterprises of any other nation but Russia.




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