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Samurai Misfortunes

The armies of the Daimio were composed of Samurai, military retainers of the chief, a greater or less number being maintained in each fief in proportion to its wealth and magnitude. Each Samurai wore two swords, and the right of wearing arms and of using them in their lord's service was solely vested in this class. From their lord they derived subsistence for themselves and their families, and in return they rendered him the most unquestioning loyalty and obedience, and were ready at any time to sacrifice their lives for his sake or at his command, either by their own or an enemy's hand. The majority devoted their time exclusively to military training; to fencing, riding, and learning the use of the spear and the bow; but the highest in rank and the more intelligent acted as counsellors to their lord, and as administrators of the public affairs of the fief, fulfilling the same functions that in a kingdom are discharged by Cabinet Ministers and permanent officials.

The Samurai, lyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa dynasty of the Shoguns, in the legacy or testament which he left for the guidance of his successors, thus defined the relative positions of the Samurai and the other three classes: "The Samurai are the masters of the four classes. Farmers, artisans, and merchants may not behave in a rude manner towards Samurai, and the Samurai is not to be interfered with in cutting down a fellow who has behaved to him in a manner other than is expected." These principles were guiding laws throughout the whole period of 265 years during which the Tokugawa dynasty held sway.

Ever since the establishment of Tokugawa rule there had been a party at the Kyoto Court, consisting of Court nobles, which championed the pretensions of the Throne, mourned over its lost glories, conducted its intrigues, and felt a common resentment against what in its eyes was an administration of usurpers. The party had by the mid=19th Century many powerful adherents. The anti-Shogunate movement derived help from the turbulent class of clanless samurai, known as ronin, which at this time was rapidly increasing in numbers owing to economic distress in feudal territories, and the growing weakness of the Shogunate.

When the fiefs were mediatised in 1871 by the new Meiji Emperor, and the chiefs deprived of their revenues, the Government, of necessity, undertook to provide for their retainers, who, unfitted as they were by their previous training and experience for bread-winning occupations, must otherwise have starved. One class — the most important at that time — the samurai, suffered greatly by the change. Accustomed for centuries to high rank in the social order, to a position of superiority over the rest of the people, from whom they were distinguished by privileges and customs of long standing, as well as by a traditional code of chivalry in which they took a legitimate pride, the samurai found themselves suddenly relegated to a status little differing from that of their former inferiors.

It is true that the military class, as a whole, had long been in an impoverished condition owing to the embarrassment of clan finances, which had led in several cases to the reduction of feudal establishments, and to the rigid rule which kept the members of this class from engaging in any of the profitable occupations open to the rest of the nation; and that the unrest and discontent which resulted from this state of things may have induced them to regard with favour any change which held out the prospect of a possible amelioration in their circumstances. There is some truth also in the view that the eager enthusiasm of the party of reform, inspired with a belief in the fulfilment of their cherished aspirations, may have found an echo in the minds of the military class and stirred the patriotic impulses so conspicuous in the nation; while, at the same time, the sentiment of feudal loyalty may have dictated implicit obedience to the decision of clan authorities. Making allowance for the influence of considerations of this nature, there can, nevertheless, be little doubt that the sudden change in the fortunes of the military class aroused a bitter feeling, which showed itself later in the outbreak of grave disturbances.

Pensions were assigned to them, based on their former hereditary or life allowances, and paid out of the revenues of the fiefs, now collected by the imperial Government in the form of land taxes. The unpopularity of the measure was increased by the commutation of pensions, which bore very hardly on the military class. In introducing in 1873 a scheme for this purpose the Government was influenced mainly by the pressing needs of the national exchequer. Under this scheme Government bonds bearing 8 percent interest were issued. Samurai with hereditary incomes of less than 100 koku of rice were enabled to commute their pensions, if they chose to do so, on the basis of six years' purchase, receiving half of the sum to which they were entitled in cash, and the remainder in bonds; while the basis for those in receipt of annuities was fixed at four and a half years' purchase, the low rates of purchase in both cases being accounted for by the high rates of interest then prevailing. This scheme naturally found no large acceptance on the part of the pensioners.

The financial difficulties increased rather than diminished during the succeeding two years, and the continued payments of the Samurai pensions became a serious burden on the resources of the nation. Three years later the voluntary character of commutation was made compulsory, and extended to all members of the military class irrespective of the amount of income involved. The current rate of interest having by that time fallen, the basis of commutation was increased to ten years' purchase for all alike, a slight reduction being made in the rate of interest payable on the bonds, which varied according to the amount of the income commuted. It was decided that commutation should be made on a basis varying from five years' purchase in the case of large pensions to fourteen years in those of the smallest, the payments being made in bonds bearing interest of from 5 to 7 percent.Indirectly this commutation resulted in further misfortune for the military class.

This measure was accepted without protest by the sufferers, though its results were in many instances cruel in the extreme. Unversed in business methods, without experience in trading operations, many samurai were tempted to employ the little capital they had received in unremunerative enterprises, the failure of which brought them to extreme poverty. The number of the Samurai who, either from natural capacity or through training, had a modicum of commercial or industrial aptitude was infinitesimal. In blind ignorance, many at once sold their bonds and, with the capital thus raised, entered into trade. Japan had never been wanting in adventurers who, in their unscrupulousness, cunning, and mercilessness to their victims, are worthy compeers of the worst products of the exchanges of Berlin and Paris. To these the Samurai, with their small capital, offered a ready prey. Some opened small shops, willing for a livelihood to accept what they had, only five years previously, regarded as contamination. But, as a Japanese writer said, " however skilful in wielding the halberd or the sabre, they know nothing of the abacus; they bought in the dearest and sold in the cheapest markets," and bankruptcy was soon the result.

New institutions and new pursuits afforded, on the other hand, humble occupations to many. The new police force was almost entirely recruited from them — a fine force, marvellously efficient in the performance of its duties and in the prevention and detection of crime, ready to undertake active military service when occasion called for it, incorruptible, and as courteous and ready to help the stranger as the police of London. The rapidly extending railways gave openings to others as guards and signalmen; and in the Press, yearly expanding at that period in quantity and in circulation, and in the public influence which it exercised, they were found not only as reporters and writers, but as compositors, printers, and doorkeepers. Instances were known of their serving as stokers on small coasting steamers, as domestics in the houses of foreign residents. These were the fortunate among their order.

Hopeless poverty and social ruin were the lot of many. An epidemic of burglaries of the worst form according to Japanese law, in which the offenders were armed with swords and ready to use them, broke out at this period in Tokio. Many of them were committed by destitute Samurai, who paid for their offence by felons' deaths on the scaffold. The ranks of licensed prostitutes were largely recruited from their daughters, who performed what was regarded as the noblest act of self-abnegation in order that their parents might be provided with the common necessaries of life.

Time atoned for much of what the Samurai underwent at this period. Those who survived it with honor, no matter how humble the means which enabled them to do so, continued to instil into the minds of their sons and daughters the ethical principles which they had imbibed in their own youth. The zealous and conscientious service which they formerly rendered to their feudal lords was by their sons given to the Emperor. All offices, both military and civil, were thrown open to all classes of the Emperor's subjects. The Samurai were, in feudal days, the brains of the country. That they retained a marked intellectual superiority over their fellow citizens was soon shown. From among them have come, not all, but a great majority of the successful candidates in open competition for appointments in the naval, military, and civil services. The most prominent members of the legal, medical, and engineering professions are Samurai; and, while all the outward and visible marks of their status are gone — their picturesque dress, their swords, their haughty demeanour — they are still a class apart in the general registers of the people and enjoy the social consideration which is given in the most democratic countries of the world to long descent and gentle blood.

While the edict for the commutation of pensions was received uncomplainingly, another, which had preceded it by a few months, proved too severe a test for many of those against whom it was directed. In 1873, the Samurai were permitted to discontinue the wearing of their swords. Some, in the general wave of democratic innovation that was inundating the country, had done so, but they were the exceptions rather than the rule. The majority still clung to the only outward mark that remained to them of their status, to the sword which was "the living soul of the Samurai." The new edict (1876) peremptorily forbade the continuance of the practice. Armed revolts on the part of those who refused to obey broke out hi three places. They were promptly suppressed; but they were soon followed by a fourth, the Satsuma Rebellion, which tested the resources of the Government to the utmost.