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Mizrahi [Oriental] Jews

Most pre-modern Diaspora communities are categorized into four major ethnic groups (in Hebrew, sometimes called eidot, “communities”). Whereas the Ashkenazi-Sephardi division is a very old one, the Ashkenazi-Oriental division was new to Israel. The term "Oriental" refers specifically to Israelis of North African or Asian origin. This geographical distinction has developed over the years into a euphemism for talking about the poor, underprivileged, or educationally disadvantaged (those "in need of fostering," in the Hebrew phrase). Some social scientists as well as some Sephardi activists have seen a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy in this classification. Many Sephardim will not refer to themselves as Orientals.

Hebrew for "East", Mizrahi is literally translated as "Oriental", "Eastern". Although often confused with Sephardic Jews (because they share many religious customs), Mizrahi Jews have a separate heritage. Mizrahi Jews come from Middle Eastern ancestry. Their earliest communities date from Late Antiquity, and the oldest and largest of these communities were in modern Iraq (Babylonia), Iran (Persia), and Yemen.

Zionism was decidedly colonial, and that meant that Jews of the Arab world were seen as incomplete, barbaric, dirty, uncivilised. Za’ev Jabotinsky, one of the forefathers of Zionism said, “We Jews have nothing in common with what is called the Orient, thank God. To the extent that our uneducated masses [Arab Jews] have ancient spiritual traditions and laws that call the Orient, they must be weaned away from them, and this is in fact what we are doing in every decent school, what life itself is doing with great success. We are going in Palestine, first for our national convenience, [second] to sweep out thoroughly all traces of the Oriental soul.”

Zionists were trying to create a new nation with a unified people. So, they could not abide allowing parts of this population to continue to identify as Iraqi, Moroccan, Persian, Tunisian, and so on, and certainly not as Arab Jews.

Before the founding of the state of Israel, Jews of Iraq identified as Iraqi, of Morocco as Moroccan, of Tunisia as Tunisian, of Iran as Persian, of Syria as Syrian, of Egypt as Egyptian, and of Palestine as Palestinian. They spoke Arabic, ate the same foods as their Christian and Muslim compatriots, celebrated and partook in the same national events and traditions, lived by the same social protocols, and moved through their respective cultures as other natives did. And despite the similarities of their cultures, Tunisians were distinct from Egyptians, who were both distinct from Iraqis, who were distinct from Moroccans, etc. But Israel collapsed them all under a single identity, which was to be distinguished only from Ashkenazis, European Jews, who were higher up on the social order.

While most of the pre-state population was committed to strong ideological convictions, a pioneering spirit, and a democratic way of life, many of the Jews who had lived for centuries in Arab lands adhered to a patriarchal social organization, and found it difficult to integrate into Israel's society and rapidly developing economy.

In the late 1950s, the two groups coexisted virtually without social and cultural interaction, with the Jews of North African and Middle Eastern backgrounds expressing their frustration and alienation in anti-government protests, which, in the 1960s and 1970s, became demands for greater political participation, compensatory allocations of resources and affirmative action to help close the gaps between them and mainstream Israelis. In addition to the tensions generated by the diversity of its population during these years, Israeli society was also called upon to struggle for economic independence and to defend itself against belligerent actions by Arabs across the border. Still, the common denominators of religion, historical memory, and national cohesion within the Jewish society proved strong enough to meet the challenges facing it.

Oriental Jews came to be referred to in the 1960s as "the Second Israel"--the numerically larger but socially, culturally, economically, and politically disadvantaged half of the nation. Not all Orientals were economically deprived, but nearly all of those who were relatively poor belonged to Sephardic communities. The communal gap and attendant tensions between Ashkenazic and Oriental Jews have naturally engaged the remedial efforts of successive governments, but results have fallen far short of Oriental expectations. The problem was partly rooted in the country's political institutions and processes. Ashkenazic dominance of sociopolitical and economic life had been firmly institutionalized before independence. Over the years, however, Oriental Jews representation substantially increased in the country's major political parties, and as of the 1980s, Oriental Jews occupied leadership positions in many municipalities.

Between 1948 and 1952 about 300,000 Oriental immigrants came to Israel. Thousands from Jewish enclaves in Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Cochin in southwest India) were poorly educated, impoverished, and culturally very different from the country's dominant European culture. They were religious Jews who had worked primarily in petty trade, while the ruling Ashkenazim of the Labor Party were secular socialists. As a result, the Ashkenazim-dominated kibbutz movement spurned them, and Mapai leadership as a whole viewed the new immigrants as "raw material" for their socialist program. In the late 1950s, a new flood of 400,000 mainly undereducated Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, and Egyptian Jews immigrated to Israel following Israel's Sinai Campaign.

In the pre-state period Arabs were the majority; in fact the population of Palestine in 1947 was 67% Arab, 25% Ashkenazi, and 8% Oriental. By 1949, following the mass exodus of Arabs from Palestine, Ashkenazim became a majority of 60%, Orientals 26% and Arabs 14%. The mass immigration of Orientals (about 750,000 came in the years 1948-69) and their high birthrate won them a majority status by the mid 1960s.

The Israeli population of 3.2 million persons in 1974 was divided into three major ethnic groups: Arabs (in Israel proper, not in the occupied territories) who constitute 13%, Orientals (Jews from the Middle East and North Africa) 48%, and Ashkenazi (European Jews) 39%. This division has existed for a long time, but numerical majority positions have changed hands.

The numerical preponderance of Orientals had implications for the ethnic status quo. Israel is a three-tier society: Ashkenazim are at the top, Arabs at the bottom, and Orientals in between. Where exactly do Orientals belong? Are they closer to the Arab minority or to the Ashkenazi dominant group? What characteristics or interests do they share with which group? Are they likely to shift allegiances and forces and effect the existing ethnic hierarchy? Two perspectives about the ethnic status of Orientals prevail.

One viewed Orientals as "Arab Jews", having been quite close to Israeli Arabs. The other considers them as "modernizing Jews", located adjacent to Ashkenazi Jews. According to one perspective the "real" dividing line is between Europeans and non-Europeans whereas according to the other the "true" line separates Jews from non-Jews. Since Orientals are Jews who lived for generations among Arabs both perspectives appear to have at least "face validity".

By the early 1970s, Oriental Jews outnumbered their Ashkenazic counterparts as a demographic group. The older Oriental Jews were, in general, from politically authoritarian and religiously traditional North African and Middle Eastern societies that regarded the Central European and West European secular and social democratic political value spectrum as too modern and far-reaching as compared to their own. They were accustomed to strong authoritarian leaders rather than ideals emphasizing social democratic collectivism and popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, a sizable proportion of Sephardim joined Labor's ranks both as leaders and rank-and-file party members.

Not surprisingly, beginning in the 1950s, most Oriental Jews tended to vote against Mapai and its successor, Labor. Both were perceived as representing the Ashkenazic establishment, even though Sephardim were always represented among the ranks of party leaders. In the 1950s and early 1960s, while many Oriental Jews were impressed with Ben-Gurion's charismatic and authoritative leadership, they nevertheless tended to support Herut, the major opposition party led by Menachem Begin, whose right-wing populism and ultranationalist, anti-Arab national security posture appealed to them. Paradoxically, the socialist-inspired social welfare system, a system built by Mapai and sustained by Labor and the Labor-dominated Histadrut, benefited the Oriental Jews particularly. In general, the Oriental Jews tended to support the right-wing Gahal/Likud blocs that for years had advocated a substantial modification of the welfare system so as to decrease its socialist emphasis. In terms of long-range electoral trends, the Oriental Jews position did not augur well for the Labor Zionist elite of the Labor Party.

The heterogenous nature of the Oriental segment of Israeli Jewry is sometimes lost when someone speaks of "the" Oriental community, or collects census data (as does the Central Bureau of Statistics) on the basis of the "continent of origin" ("Europe-America versus Africa-Asia") of its citizens and residents. The category "Oriental" includes Jews from Moroccan and Yemeni backgrounds--to take only two examples that span the range of the Arabic-speaking world. These two communities see themselves, and are seen by other Israelis -- particularly Ashkenazim -- very differently. Yemenis enjoy a positive self-image, and they are likewise viewed positively by other Israelis; the Moroccans' self-image has been more ambivalent, and they are often viewed by others as instigators of violence and crime. Although this image has become something of a stereotype, Moroccan Jews did instigate acts of violence against the Labor Party in the 1981 elections, and statistically their communities have tended to have a high crime rate.

In a similar way, Iraqi, Iranian, and Kurdish Jewish ethnic groups all differ from one another in matters of self-perception and perception by other Israelis. They differ also according to such indices as income (for example, Iraqis are more concentrated in the middle class, Kurds in the lower classes), orientation to tradition (Yemenis are probably the most religious of all non-Ashkenazi groups, Iranians are relatively secular), and so on. These differences are likely to continue, moreover, as marriage statistics in the 1980s indicate a higher rate of endogamy among members of Oriental ethnic groups, as compared to the Ashkenazim. As an ethnic group in the 1980s, Ashkenazim have become much more culturally homogeneous than the Orientals.

Avishay Ben Haim – the influential journalist and writer about ultra-Orthodoxy – proposed that that the Mizrahim are a ‘Second Israel’ and oppressed. Sociologist Guy Abutbul-Selinger noted the "middle-class group resides in the more peripheral cities, such as Ashdod, Ashkelon, Kiryat Gat. It has created a strong Mizrahi culture, which took the identity that in the past was perceived as aggressive, macho and violent, and transformed it into a cool identity that’s strong, authentic, warm and happy, in contrast to the Ashkenazi identity, which is perceived as nerdy, cold and alienated. It’s an Israeli identity alternative that is unapologetic and very sure of itself....

”The rise of Likud toppled a great many barriers that existed in national and municipal politics, as well as in the economy. So Likud has a large share of that, of course. There is no doubt that Likud is a Mizrahi party, both in terms of its voters and in terms of MKs and ministers.... Ashkenazim still have an advantage in academia, the Supreme Court and certain sectors of the labor market.... The undergraduate degree has become truly legitimate, but the glass ceiling of advanced degrees is still there in all its intensity....

”The central worldview that has guided Israel in the past few decades is a liberal one. ... In contrast, a large part of the Mizrahi population, as well as the Haredim and the religious-Zionist movement, have a communitarian worldview, which sees the world as being based on a collection of groups that live next to one another, and that have boundary lines and hierarchies between them.... the contention that Arabs are equal to Jews is taken as an offense to the Jewish people.... The Mizrahim perceive themselves as looking after the Jewish collective, and Netanyahu time after time invokes that Mizrahi sentiment for the Jewish collective."

Now, Arab foods (like falafel, hummus, shakshouka), traditional Arab clothing (like tatreez, galabiyas, keffiyehs), and Arab folkloric dances are all being rebranded as “Israeli”.