Iraq Election 2025 - Parliament
Iraqis voted on Tuesday 11 Bovember 2025 to elect a new parliament in sixth election of its kind since the 2003 US invasion that came at a pivotal moment for the country and region. Both Iran and the United States are monitoring the outcome as Iraq, unusually stable in recent years, seeks to move beyond decades of war and repression.
Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The October 2021 parliamentary elections were generally considered technically sound and credible. The elections were observed by the European Union and domestic civil society organizations and monitored by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Domestic and international elections observers cited procedural and transparency improvements to the 2018 electoral process. They noted, however, that violence and intimidation by paramilitary militia groups in the months ahead of the elections likely affected voters’ choices and voter turnout. The elections came because of widespread protests that began in October 2019 and led to the resignation of former Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi in December 2019. On October 13, Iraqi Council of Representatives members elected Abdulatif Jamal Rashid as the president of Iraq. President Rashid named Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani as the prime minister-designate. On October 27, the Council of Representatives confirmed Sudani as prime minister along with 21 of 23 of his cabinet ministers. On December 3, the Council of Representatives confirmed Sudani’s two remaining cabinet ministers.
The country’s regular armed forces and domestic law enforcement bodies struggled to maintain order within the country, operating in parallel with the Popular Mobilization Commission, a state-sponsored umbrella military organization composed of approximately 60 militia groups referred to collectively and individually as Popular Mobilization Forces. Although the Popular Mobilization Forces are part of the Iraqi Security Forces and receive funding from the government’s defense budget, their operations are often outside government control and in opposition to government policies. Most popular mobilization unit members are composed of Shia Arabs, while Sunni Arab, Yezidi, Christian, and other minority groups run their own Popular Mobilization Forces units, generally operating within or near their home regions. All units officially report to the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission and are under the ultimate authority of the prime minister, but several units, however, were also responsive to Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps influence.
The two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, each maintain an independent security apparatus. The federal constitution provides the Kurdistan Regional Government the right to maintain internal security forces, but the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party separately controlled additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control. The constitution also allows for a centralized, separate Asayish internal security service; however, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also each maintain Asayish forces. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also maintain separate intelligence services, nominally organized under the Kurdistan Region Security Council.
Federal civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over some elements of the security forces, particularly certain Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Force units and the Popular Mobilization Commission. Poorly defined administrative boundaries and disputes between the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the central government regarding administration of certain areas led to confusion concerning the jurisdiction of security forces and the courts. Members of the security forces committed numerous documented abuses.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government; forced disappearances by the government; torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious abuses in a conflict, including attacks resulting in civilian deaths and harm; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests and prosecutions against journalists, censorship, and existence of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement of women; forced returns of internally displaced persons to locations where they faced threats to their lives and freedom; threats of violence against internally displaced persons and returnee populations perceived to have been affiliated with ISIS; serious government corruption; lack of investigation and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes involving violence targeting members of ethnic minority groups; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons; significant restrictions on worker freedom of association; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.
The government, including the Office of the Prime Minister, took some steps to identify, investigate, and prosecute officials responsible for perpetrating or authorizing human rights abuses, but rarely punished them. Many senior government officials and security force personnel, including the Iraqi Security Forces, Federal Police, Popular Mobilization Forces, and certain units of Kurdistan Regional Government Asayish internal security services, operated with impunity. The government took some steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who were involved in corruption.
Iraq’s governing Shia alliance reportedly emerged as the biggest winner in the country’s first elections for provincial councils in a decade on 18 December 2023. The loose coalition of Shia groups, called the Shia Coalition Framework (CF), took 101 of 285 council seats in the vote, Iraqi state media reports. The election result is seen as a boon to the Iran-aligned groups, which have been steadily gaining influence, in advance of a parliamentary election scheduled for 2025.
Iraq had been unusually stable in recent years, as the nation tries to move past decades of war and repression under slain dictator Saddam Hussein and since the US-led invasion that toppled him. But even now, the country of 46 million people suffers from poor infrastructure, failing public services and endemic corruption. Many have lost hope that elections can bring meaningful change to their daily lives and see the vote as a sham that only benefits political elites and regional powers.
Despite scepticism, more than 7,740 candidates, nearly a third of them women, are running for the 329-seat parliament. Only 75 independents are running under an electoral law that many believe favours larger parties. More than 21 million people are eligible to vote, but there are fears turnout could drop below the 41 percent registered in 2021 – the lowest since voting began.
The 2025 Iraqi House of Representatives elections are based on Law No. 4 of 2023, which is the third amendment to the Law on Elections of the House of Representatives and Provincial and District Councils No. 12 of 2018, which was approved by Parliament on March 27, 2023, on the open list method and proportional representation of participating entities.
The elections will be held within the "governorate as one electoral district" system, with the electoral quotient calculated at the governorate level based on the proportional system through the open list in the modified (Saint-Laguë 1.7) formula. This means that the number of valid votes for each party, list, or candidate is divided by a number greater than 1 (for example, 1.7 or 1.9, followed by odd numbers such as 3, 5, 7, etc.). The results are then ranked in descending order from highest to lowest, and the seats in the electoral district are allocated accordingly until the district is full. This amendment reduces the chances of smaller lists and independent candidates and benefits larger lists.
The 2021 elections were held in accordance with the second amendment to the above law, which made voting individual, thus preventing parties from benefiting from the votes of losing candidates. The Sairoon Alliance, led by the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, benefited the most from the law by achieving a historic victory, by nominating only two candidates in each district, which prevented the scattering of its votes, while the Shiite Coordination Framework parties pushed a large number of their candidates in each district, which caused a historic loss for those parties. After the Sadr bloc withdrew and all its members resigned from parliament, the new parliament rushed to amend the election law and return to the proportional representation system, according to which the current elections will be held.
Every Iraqi who has reached the age of 18 has the right to vote in the elections, and everyone who is over 28 years old and holds a recognized certificate has the right to run for parliament, provided that he has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or is subject to the procedures of what is known as the Commission for the De-Baathification of the dissolved Baath Party.
Over the years since US-led forces ousted Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, Iraq's long-oppressed Shiite majority still dominates, with most parties retaining ties to neighbouring Iran. By convention in post-invasion Iraq, a Shiite Muslim holds the powerful post of prime minister and a Sunni that of parliament speaker, while the largely ceremonial presidency goes to a Kurd. No new names have recently emerged, with the same Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish politicians remaining at the forefront.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who hoped for a second term, was likely to score a significant win. Al-Sudani told reporters after casting his vote at a polling station in the Karrada district of Baghdad that these elections are taking place in the presence of international observers and confirm the peaceful transfer of power, praising the role of the security forces in securing them. For his part, Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al-Shammari said that all polling stations in the country are fully secured, stressing that there is an integrated security plan to transport the ballot boxes after the end of the general voting process.
Sudani rose to power in 2022 by the Coordination Framework, a ruling alliance of Shiite parties and factions all linked to Iran. He highlighted his success in keeping Iraq relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East. His "Reconstruction and Development Coalition," included the Euphrates Movement led by him, the National Coalition led by Iyad Allawi, the Ata Movement led by Faleh al-Fayyad, the Jund al-Imam led by Ahmed al-Asadi, the Karbala Creativity led by its governor Nassif al-Khattabi, the Generations Gathering led by Mohammed al-Sayhoud, and the Solutions Alliance led by Mohammed Saheb al-Daraji.
But securing a big bloc does not guarantee him a second term: the next prime minister will be voted in by whichever coalition can secure enough allies to become the largest bloc. Although they run separately, Shiite parties within the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) are expected to reunite after elections and pick the next premier. Analysts believe al-Sudani's chances were slim due to deep divisions within the Framework, the principal Shia political bloc. The SCF was formed in 2021 and appointed al-Sudani as prime minister in 2022.
The State of Law Coalition, led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the Foundation Alliance, led by Mohsen al-Mandalawi, will enter with separate lists, as will the Supreme Council, led by Humam Hamoudi, and the National Power Party, led by former Minister of Sports Abdul Hussein Abtan. The leader of the Wisdom Movement, Ammar al-Hakim, is leading the "National State Forces Alliance," with the participation of candidates from the Victory Alliance led by Haider al-Abadi, who announced his boycott of the elections. As for Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, it is entering the elections with a separate list under the name “Sadiqun” led by the Minister of Higher Education, Naim al-Aboudi. The Services Alliance, led by Shibl al-Zaydi, is also participating in the elections.
According to the Atlantic Council, the larger player in the SCF is al-Maliki, who harbours ambitions to become prime minister for the third time despite being widely blamed during his two consecutive terms (2006-2014) for exacerbating sectarian grievances, which led to the rise of ISIL.
The ballot is marked by the absence of influential Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr, who urged his followers to boycott what he called a "flawed election". In 2021, Sadr secured the largest bloc before withdrawing from parliament following a dispute with Shiite parties that did not support his bid to form a government, and instead came together to form a larger alliance. The rift culminated in deadly fighting in the capital, Baghdad.
Sadr reportedly wants to replace the muhasasa system with a government formed by the blocs that win a majority in elections. Critics fear that abandoning proportional representation along sectarian lines could eventually pave the way for a new dictatorship. Nevertheless, the refusal of Sadrists to participate in the elections could damage the legitimacy of the next government, Tamer Badawi, an Iraq expert with the Royal United Services Institute, told the Atlantic Council. He added that any crisis of confidence in the next government could hurt its ability to provide adequate services.
Sunni parties are running separately, with their supporters mainly hailing from Sunni heartlands in the west and north of the country. Former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi leads the Progress Alliance, which achieved remarkable results in the 2021 elections and is expected to win a large number of seats in this election cycle as well. The National Sovereignty Alliance - Legislation includes Khamis al-Khanjar, head of the Sovereignty Alliance, Ziad al-Janabi, head of the Initiative Bloc, and Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament. For his part, the leader of the Sovereignty Alliance, Khamis al-Khanjar, told Al Jazeera that these elections represent a great opportunity for change, and called on everyone to actively participate in order to build the state and end the phenomenon of uncontrolled weapons.
The Alliance of Determination [Azm Alliance], led by Muthanna al-Samarrai, is also participating in the elections and is expected to enter into fierce competition with al-Halbousi for the 15 seats in Anbar province and the Sunni seats in Baghdad. Other Sunni alliances are competing for the remaining Sunni seats, most notably “Nineveh for its People” headed by Abdullah al-Yawar, and the Decisive Alliance headed by Defense Minister Thabit al-Abbasi, which includes the Solution Party led by Jamal al-Karbouli, the Free Iraqi Bloc led by Qutaiba al-Jubouri, and the Loyalty Party led by Qasim al-Fahdawi, in addition to prominent Sunni figures. The “National Identity” party also emerged, which includes Sunni candidates and is headed by Omar Namiq al-Mawla, the current deputy governor of Nineveh, even though the party is led by Ryan al-Kaldani, the head of the Babylon Movement.
In the autonomous Kurdistan region, the rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan remains fierce. The major Kurdish parties competing in the elections are the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which is trying to secure larger shares of oil reserves to boost the budget in the semiautonomous Kurdish region of Iraq. The rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which favours closer relations with the government in Baghdad, will also be competing for seats and influence. Other Kurdish parties are also participating in the elections, most notably the New Generation Movement, led by Shaswar Abdulwahid, and the Change Movement, headed by Nawshirwan Mustafa, a former member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The People's Front, led by Lahur Sheikh Jangi, another former PUK member, is also running. Other parties participating include the Kurdistan Islamic Union, led by Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaaddin; the Kurdistan Justice Group, led by Ali Bapir; and the Position Front, led by former parliamentarian Ali Hama Salih.
As for non-sectarian formations, Adnan al-Zurfi, leader of the Loyalty Movement and former governor of Najaf, announced the formation of an alliance that includes a number of civil forces under the name “Alternative Alliance.” It consists of the Loyalty Movement, the Communist Party headed by Raed Fahmi, the National House Party headed by Hussein al-Gharabi, the National Independence Party headed by Sajjad Salem, and a number of small civil parties. The Civil Democratic Alliance, headed by Ali Al-Rifai, is also participating in the elections. It includes the Social Democratic Current, the National Initiative, and the Renewed Horizon.
Christian political forces announced the formation of a unified alliance called the "Christian Alliance," which includes the Chaldean National Council, the Syriac Gathering Movement, the Chaldean Democratic Union, the Armenian Association, the World Chaldean League, the Shlama Movement, and the administrative body of the Armenian Orthodox community. This alliance stands in opposition to the Babylon Movement, led by Rayan al-Kaldani.
The Yazidi Cause Alliance is one of the most prominent blocs participating in the elections with 31 candidates, in addition to 7 candidates for the “Yazidi quota” seat, 17 candidates with each of the two Kurdish parties, the Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union, one candidate with the “Reconstruction and Development Coalition” led by Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, and one candidate from the Babylon Movement.
Political and strategic affairs researcher Amir Al-Saadi told Al Jazeera Net that there are several issues of concern to the Iraqi voter, including political ones. The Iraqi citizen wants to see real and significant reform, starting with changing the way the political system works, moving away from the political quota system and consensus that has been emptied of its democratic content and has become a disgrace to political work in Iraq. He also wants to see a serious and clearly defined effort to change the Iraqi constitution to overcome many of the errors that emerged during the implementation process, according to what was set in the original Iraqi constitution of 2005, in Article 142.
Other issues include basic services. The Iraqi voter is focused on improving basic services such as electricity, water, health and education, which remain a major challenge in the country. Voters are seeking economic stability and the creation of new job opportunities, especially for young people, given the high unemployment rates. Fighting rampant corruption is one of the most prominent issues that concerns the Iraqi public, because its danger to state-building has become close to terrorism, and there is a desire to hold corrupt officials accountable and reform state institutions.
Voters are concerned with preserving Iraq’s national sovereignty and closely monitor the influence of external powers on domestic political decision-making. Iraq, which has long been a fertile land for proxy wars, is a close ally of Iran and the United States. It has long sought to maintain a balance between the two foes, and even more so now that the Middle East is undergoing an avalanche of change, with new alliances forming and old powers weakening.
Even as its influence wanes, Iran hopes to preserve its power in Iraq – the only close ally that stayed out of Israel's crosshairs after the heavy losses its other allies have incurred in Lebanon, Yemen and Gaza since 2023. Earlyin 2024, pro-Iran factions listed as terrorist groups by Washington yielded to internal and US pressure and stopped targeting American forces in Iraq after months of attacks over the Gaza war.
Iraq had been under pressure from the United States to disarm the pro-Iran groups. Al-Sudani’s first term saw him under increasing US pressure to crack down on the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), or Hashd al-Shaabi, a quasi-state paramilitary group that fought and defeated ISIL in 2017 and that the US views as aligned with Iran, which has been influential in Iraq since the US invasion. Al-Sudani has promised to integrate PMF units into the government and fully submit them to the chain of command of the Iraqi army and other conventional security forces.
Regarding integrity guarantees, the Electoral Commission adopts multiple mechanisms that include extensive local and international supervision and monitoring, the participation of representatives of political entities and their agents in all stages of the electoral process, as well as transparency and openness of procedures to the media. All these factors represent real guarantees for more fair and credible elections, enhancing the confidence of the voter and the international community in the democratic process in Iraq. What distinguishes these elections is the addition of a facial camera system to verify the voter’s identity, which is a new technical step added to the system of previous procedures that have proven effective in strengthening the electoral process.
All procedures adopted by the commission, from the use of biometric cards and updating the voter registry to electronic counting and sorting systems, are sufficient to guarantee the accuracy and integrity of the electoral process. The facial recognition camera is a significant addition to ensure that no voter is deprived of their right to vote if their biometric fingerprint is not detected during verification.
Analysts and observers believe the voter turnout will indicate whether Iraqis have any confidence left in the current political system to provide security and improve basic services. Both issues have plagued Iraqis since the United States invaded in 2003 to topple then-President Saddam Hussein, an invasion that ruptured Iraq’s social fabric and prompted a rebellion against the US occupation.
Only 21.4 million out of a total of 32 million eligible voters have signed up from 19 provinces to partake in the elections, down from four years ago when 24 million people registered. Reuters quoted analysts and polling experts as saying that turnout is expected to fall below the record low of 41% in 2021. They attributed this in part to general disappointment and the boycott by the leader of the Sadrist movement, who represents a large support base comprising hundreds of thousands of voters.
Haider Al-Barzanji, an academic and researcher in Iraqi political affairs, expected the voter turnout to increase significantly compared to the previous election cycle, reaching more than 45%. He points out that this is due to the single-district law, which unified competition across Iraq, the political stability in the country in recent years, the encouragement of political alliances to their supporters, and the relative satisfaction of citizens. Al-Barzanji pointed out that the Sadrist movement’s boycott of the elections will negatively affect the turnout of its supporters in Baghdad and some southern provinces.
Voters select 329 members of parliament. Of this number, at least 25 percent – 83 seats – will go to women. These seats are won by the female candidates who receive the highest number of votes in each district. If this quota is not met by the winning candidates directly, it is supplemented by the losing candidates who received the highest number of votes on the non-winning list, to ensure the required percentage is achieved in each governorate.
There are 7,744 candidates running, most affiliated with sectarian political parties and blocs – a direct outcome of the “muhasasa” (quota) system ushered in after the US invasion. The law also stipulates that nine seats be allocated to specific ethnic and religious groups at the provincial or national level, including five seats for Christians, and one seat each for the Mandaean Sabeans, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Faili Kurds. These seats are won by candidates from these groups who receive the highest number of votes within the allocated quota.
Given the expectation that no political force will secure a majority of parliamentary seats, forming a new government could take several months, similar to what happened after the 2021 elections. The elections will increase the complications of forming a government, and the process may be delayed due to the lack of a clear majority, raising concerns about continued political deadlock. The balance of power between the major parties will witness significant changes, with the possibility of new alliances emerging or some traditional forces weakening.
The elections were expected to have a significant impact on Baghdad’s relationship with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Disputes over issues such as oil and resource distribution may worsen, or they may lead to new agreements based on the new balance of power. The new prime minister was likely to seek a pragmatic settlement that restores confidence with the region through long-term economic and development agreements, while preserving the prestige of the state. This is teh outcome favroed by some international actors.
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