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Iraq Election 2025 - Parliament

The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Election is expected by October 2025

Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The October 2021 parliamentary elections were generally considered technically sound and credible. The elections were observed by the European Union and domestic civil society organizations and monitored by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Domestic and international elections observers cited procedural and transparency improvements to the 2018 electoral process. They noted, however, that violence and intimidation by paramilitary militia groups in the months ahead of the elections likely affected voters’ choices and voter turnout. The elections came because of widespread protests that began in October 2019 and led to the resignation of former Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi in December 2019. On October 13, Iraqi Council of Representatives members elected Abdulatif Jamal Rashid as the president of Iraq. President Rashid named Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani as the prime minister-designate. On October 27, the Council of Representatives confirmed Sudani as prime minister along with 21 of 23 of his cabinet ministers. On December 3, the Council of Representatives confirmed Sudani’s two remaining cabinet ministers.

The country’s regular armed forces and domestic law enforcement bodies struggled to maintain order within the country, operating in parallel with the Popular Mobilization Commission, a state-sponsored umbrella military organization composed of approximately 60 militia groups referred to collectively and individually as Popular Mobilization Forces. Although the Popular Mobilization Forces are part of the Iraqi Security Forces and receive funding from the government’s defense budget, their operations are often outside government control and in opposition to government policies. Most popular mobilization unit members are composed of Shia Arabs, while Sunni Arab, Yezidi, Christian, and other minority groups run their own Popular Mobilization Forces units, generally operating within or near their home regions. All units officially report to the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission and are under the ultimate authority of the prime minister, but several units, however, were also responsive to Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps influence.

The two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, each maintain an independent security apparatus. The federal constitution provides the Kurdistan Regional Government the right to maintain internal security forces, but the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party separately controlled additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control. The constitution also allows for a centralized, separate Asayish internal security service; however, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also each maintain Asayish forces. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also maintain separate intelligence services, nominally organized under the Kurdistan Region Security Council.

Federal civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over some elements of the security forces, particularly certain Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Force units and the Popular Mobilization Commission. Poorly defined administrative boundaries and disputes between the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the central government regarding administration of certain areas led to confusion concerning the jurisdiction of security forces and the courts. Members of the security forces committed numerous documented abuses.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government; forced disappearances by the government; torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious abuses in a conflict, including attacks resulting in civilian deaths and harm; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests and prosecutions against journalists, censorship, and existence of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement of women; forced returns of internally displaced persons to locations where they faced threats to their lives and freedom; threats of violence against internally displaced persons and returnee populations perceived to have been affiliated with ISIS; serious government corruption; lack of investigation and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes involving violence targeting members of ethnic minority groups; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons; significant restrictions on worker freedom of association; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.

The government, including the Office of the Prime Minister, took some steps to identify, investigate, and prosecute officials responsible for perpetrating or authorizing human rights abuses, but rarely punished them. Many senior government officials and security force personnel, including the Iraqi Security Forces, Federal Police, Popular Mobilization Forces, and certain units of Kurdistan Regional Government Asayish internal security services, operated with impunity. The government took some steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who were involved in corruption.

Iraq’s governing Shia alliance reportedly emerged as the biggest winner in the country’s first elections for provincial councils in a decade on 18 December 2023. The loose coalition of Shia groups, called the Shia Coalition Framework (CF), took 101 of 285 council seats in the vote, Iraqi state media reports. The election result is seen as a boon to the Iran-aligned groups, which have been steadily gaining influence, in advance of a parliamentary election scheduled for 2025.