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Succession

The relatively smooth transitions following the deaths of Faisal and Khalid seemed to have resolved the issue of succession among the sons of Abd al Aziz. In 1992, however, Fahd altered the procedure for designating future kings. In the same royal decree that announced the impending appointment of a majlis, Fahd declared that the king would henceforth name and could remove the crown prince. Furthermore, the crown prince would not automatically succeed on the death of the king, but serve as provisional ruler until he, or a descendant of Abd al Aziz deemed more suitable, was enthroned.

Fahd's 1992 decree on succession established two precedents: a royal prerogative to choose and to withdraw approval for the crown prince; and an acknowledgement that the more than sixty grandsons of Abd al Aziz were legitimate claimants to the throne. The leading figures among these 'Second Generation' princes include: Prince Bandar, his brother Khalid, Mohammed (son of Fahd and governor of the Eastern Province), Prince Saud (son of King Faisal and foreign minister), his brother Turki (chief of Foreign Intelligence), Lt. Gen. Sultan (son of Prince Salman), and Mitab (son of Abdullah).

Previously, Saudi kings had not asserted the right to dismiss a designated crown prince. By proclaiming such a right, Fahd revived persistent rumors originating in the 1970s that he and his half brother Abdullah disagreed on many political issues. To forestall speculation that his intent was to remove Abdullah as crown prince and replace him with his full brother Sultan, Fahd reaffirmed Abdullah's position. However, in declaring that successor kings would be chosen from the most suitable of Abd al Aziz's sons and grandsons, Fahd implied that Abdullah or any future crown prince was not necessarily the presumed heir to the throne. The decision to include the grandsons in the selection process and as potential candidates for the throne symbolized the readiness of Fahd and his surviving brothers to pass substantive decision-making responsibilities to a younger generation of the Al Saud. However, this decision also introduced more uncertainty into the succession process. At least a dozen men of this Al Saud younger generation, including sons of Faisal, Fahd, Abdullah, and Sultan, were actively involved in the Saudi government and presumably had a personal interest in the question of succession.

King Fahd's March 1992 edict on succession initiated a contentious struggle for power. Resolved in the fall of 1996, Saudi Arabia endured three years of internecine conflict between Abdullah, the Heir Apparent and commander-in-chief of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), pitted against Prince Sultan, second deputy prime minister and after Fahd the eldest of the Sudairi Seven. In December 1995 Sultan summoned members of the Ulema to seek their sanction of his claim to the throne and to dismiss Abdullah as Commander in Chief of the National Guard. In the aftermath of the failed coup, Abdullah ordered the National Guard's well trained Bedouins to engage in highly visible military maneuvers. The prospect of Abdullah's national guard engaging the better equipped regular Saudi armed forces was intolerable. On 01 January 1996, Fahd ended the crisis by announcing that because of ill health he was temporarily transferring the powers of state to Abdullah. Since 1997, Crown Prince Abdullah had taken on much of the day-to-day responsibilities of running the government.

The United States was said by some to be hostile towards Prince Abdallah. But the US could not avoid his being crowned successor to King Fahd. Instead, the US tried to reinforce the power of the "third generation" princes educated in the United States. These included Prince Muhammad, King Fahd's favorite son and governor of the East region, who was said to be strongly opposed to fundamentalism.

Others frequently mentioned were Prince Salman, a son of Abdelaziz who had been governor of Riyadh since 1962; Prince Saud bin Faisal, a grandson of Abdelaziz and son of the late King Faisal who has been foreign minister since 1975; and his brother, Prince Turki bin Faisal, who was head of the Department of General Intelligence from 1977 through 2001, later becoming abmassador to the United States in July 2005. Others seen by some as viable candidates were two other grandsons of Abdelaziz: Prince Khalid bin Faisal, governor of Asir since 1977, and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, son of Prince Sultan (Defense Minister and a Sudeiri) and ambassador to the United States since 1983.

On 01 August 2005 Saudi Arabia's ailing King Fahd died. The king's death was announced over the official Saudi media today. Aged in his 80's, Fahd was admitted to a hospital in May 2005, reportedly suffering from respiratory ailments. No cause of death was given. He was succeeded by his half-brother, Crown Prince Abdullah, who had managed the day-to-day affairs of the kingdom since Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995.

In November 2006, King Abdallah established an Allegiance Commission that will select future crown princes, a step designed to help formalize the selection process. A December 2007 royal decree named the initial members of the Commission, all of whom are sons, grandsons, or great-grandsons representing each branch of the descendants of the Kingdoms' founder, King Abdul Aziz. Only direct male descendants of Abdul Aziz are eligible to become crown prince or king.

The Allegiance Commission Law was touted by some foreign observers as a "reform" or innovation that reflected a desire on the part of King Abdullah to make the succession process more transparent. Some even went so far as to characterize the law as decreeing that the next king would be "elected" since members of the commission could vote to choose a candidate. However, the Al Saud themselves describe the Allegiance Commission as a codification of the unwritten rules that have governed the selection of Saudi rulers since the passing of King Abdulaziz in 1953.

Though the country defines itself as a monarchy, in practice the sons of Abdulaziz have governed through a unique system of collective rule. This leadership, probably the world's only system of government by half-brothers, is consensus-based and by nature cautious, conservative, and reactive. Though the 1992 Basic Law gave the King the sole power to appoint and relieve a Crown Prince, the process of selecting an heir always required extensive consultation with, and acceptance by, the family's senior members, usually brokered by one of the eldest.

The Allegiance Commission Law formalized these traditional practices: the Commission is made up of the princes entitled to a claim to the throne, chaired by the eldest, with protocol determined strictly by birth order, empowered to select the next rulers from among the sons and grandsons of the founding King. While attributed to King Abdullah, the Commission actually represents the family's consensus plan for gradually transferring power from the sons of Abdulaziz to his grandsons.

The law specifies that the King must formally seek the consent of the Commission to choose his successor. The Commission's 33 male members [as of 2009] included 15 of the 16 living sons of the kingdom's founder; and one son of each of the 16 deceased sons with male heirs (the King selects the son or grandson who represents each of his deceased brothers); and sons of both the current king and crown prince.

According to the law, the initiative for nominating a successor lies with the King, who can propose one, two or three candidates for Crown Prince to the Commission. Meeting behind closed doors and in deliberations kept secret, Commission members will attempt to reach consensus on the King's nominee. If this is not possible, the Commission may reject the King's nominees and propose its own candidate, whose qualifications must satisfy conditions stipulated in the Basic Law, i.e., be the "most upright" among the descendants of the founder king, rather than the most senior. If the King rejects this nominee, the Commission would vote by secret ballot to decide between its candidate and the King's candidates.

Since 1975 Saudi monarchs have appointed a second deputy prime minister to serve as next in line on the unofficial succession slate. Because of the advanced age of King AbdAllah and his half-brother Crown Prince Sultan, one of the powerful Sudairi Seven, the choice of a second deputy prime minister among Abd al Aziz's six remaining sons had increased significance, but King Abd Allah for a time chose to leave the position of second deputy prime minister vacant. In AH 1430/2009, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, leader of the Shammar branch of the Al Saud, appointed Prince Naif bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, one of the powerful Sudairi Seven, Second Deputy Premier. Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud died 16 June 2012.