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1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR)

The Labour Government began its Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in May 1997. After longer than expected, an SDR White Paper was published on 8 July 1998 as Command Paper 3999. In line with the greater emphasis on rapid deployment, the Royal Navy was to change its bias from open-ocean warfare, as formally envisaged in the North Atlantic, to force protection and near coast (littoral) operations. Shallow water operations in UK waters would also be given less importance.

The centerpiece of the new strategy of force projection was the planned acquisition of two large 40,000 ton aircraft carriers, with a complement of up to 50 aircraft and helicopters each. The first was to have an in-service date of 2012. The fixed-wing component could be provided by the Joint Strike Fighter but the MOD was also studying a marinised Eurofighter 2000, an upgraded Sea Harrier and other existing US and French naval jets for its Future Carrier Borne Aircraft requirement. The two new carriers would replace the three existing Invincible class light carriers, which would be retained in the meantime. The latter, of 20,000 tons, only deploy a maximum of 24 aircraft and helicopters and were originally designed for anti-submarine warfare operations rather than force projection.

Deployment capabilities will be improved by the acquisition, possibly as part of a Private-Public Partnership, of four additional 'roll-on roll-off' container ships to add to the existing two (Sea Chieftain and Sea Crusader). The 3rd Commando Brigade will be retained in its present form. Modernisation of the amphibious squadron will continue with the recent addition of a helicopter carrier (HMS Ocean) and the construction of two replacement Landing Platforms Dock (HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark). A tender will be invited for two replacement Landing Ships Logistic (LSL); refurbishment of two older LSLs had proved more expensive and time-consuming than originally intended.

As planned, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary will also acquire 2 Auxiliary Oilers. A 200-bed hospital ship will be procured with provision made for a second.

Due to the reduced threat in UK waters and new flexibility in certain deployments, the size of the destroyer/frigate force will be cut from 35 ships to 32. This will be achieved over the following three years by paying-off five Type 22 frigates (HMS Boxer, Beaver andLondon in 1999, HMS Brave in 2000 and HMS Coventry in 2001) and, as previously intended, one Type 42 destroyer (HMS Birmingham in 1999) and bringing three Type 23 frigates into service over the same period. There will be no further order for Merlin ASW helicopters; the RN will only procure 44. In order to fill the gap left by an earlier expected order for 24 Merlins, 10 Lynxs will be upgraded from Mk 3 to Mk 8 standard. The MOD remained committed to the Horizon anti-air frigate as a replacement for the Type 42. A Future Escort was planned to replace the Type 22 and 23s.

The attack submarine fleet will be cut from 12 to 10 with the paying off of HMS Splendid in 2003, when it was due for refit, and HMS Spartan in 2006, after a refit in 1999. All remaining attack submarines will be fitted with (conventionally-armed) Tomahawk cruisemissiles, rather than only seven as originally planned. Despite the cut in the fleet size, two further Astute class submarines will be ordered after 2000 to join the three already on order, which will start to enter service in 2005.

Due to a reduced mine threat in home waters, the Mine Counter Measures Vessel (MCMV) fleet will increase from a current 19 to only 22 ships, rather than 25 as previously intended. This will be achieved by continuing to commission Sandown MCMVs while paying off three Hunt class ships after 2000. Although the often reviewed Fishery Protection Squadron will remain in being, the decision of the Scottish Fishery Protection Agency that it no longer required a dedicated RN ship meant that HMS Orkney will pay off in 1999.

Overall, personnel freed from reductions in the fleet willbe used to fill gaps elsewhere. However, the net effect of the force changes will be a cut of 1,400 posts.

The decision to acquire two large carriers had a certain irony, in that it was an earlier Labour government which decided to scrap plans for a new generation of large fixed-wing carriers in 1966. The new ships will also be expensive, costing perhaps £2bn not including aircraft, and it remained to be seen whether the MOD will be able to afford them, even if, as with HMS Ocean, commercial rather than military specifications were used. Given that the first is not intended to enter service until 2012, it stood outside the MOD's current long-term costings. Indeed, a future government could well review this decision on economic grounds. It is also open to question whether Britain should place so many of its financial and weaponry eggs in one carrier basket, which may be vulnerable to attack from mines, missiles and aircraft. Still, the reluctance of all the Gulf States but Kuwait to sanction the use of their airfields for potential air strikes on Iraq severely hampered the organisation of a projected air campaign. In international waters, aircraft carriers offer independence and mobility as command and force platforms.

However, it is notable that the MOD has only decided to plan for two carriers. Although this may be all that Britain can afford, the provision of two ships will mean that when one is in refit and another undergoing a period of regular maintenance, none will be available. In these circumstances, a naval task force would lack its most potent element or, more likely, opt to deploy HMS Ocean in a task for which it had not been designed.

Within a fixed Naval budget, as with the other services, new capabilities have been bought with cuts elsewhere. In the RN these fall primarily on the submarine and destroyer/frigates fleets. The decision to continue with the £150m refit of HMS Spartan at the Rosyth dockyard, for only an additional four years of service life was the subject of criticism by the Opposition.

NATO, overseas, training and other destroyer/frigate commitments have not been changed. The cuts in the destroyer/frigate force were partly gained by altering the manner in which some of these commitments are discharged. With new 'flexibility' the Falklands and Caribbean guardships and Armilla patrol are maintained, but, in the former two cases, 12-month cover will no longer be instantly available, and for the latter a reduction from two ships to one. It remained to be seen whether these changes are entirely consistent with the UK's ostensible commitments to the defence of its Overseas Territories and its reaffirmed defence interest in the Gulf.

Moreover, the paying off early of a number of frigates is not reversible. Rather than perhaps being placed in reserve for future eventualities, as for example, certain ships are in the US Navy, these frigates will be sold abroad. A reduction of the national anti-submarine warfare capability must also be balanced against the proliferation of submarine technology, particularly in the Middle and Far East. Forty countries now operate diesel-electric submarines. Iran, for example, has acquired such submarines from Russia. And given the commitment to rapid deployment, it seemed odd that there is no mention of a replacement for the Sea King helicopters in either their commando or early warning role.