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Admiral John Byng

John Byng (1704-1757), British admiral, was the fourth son of George Byng, Lord Torrington, and entered the navy in 1718. The powerful influence of his father accounts for his rapid rise in the service. He received his first appointment as lieutenant in 1723, and became captain in 1727. His career presents nothing of note till after his promotion as rear-admiral in 1745, and as vice-admiral in 1747. He served on the most comfortable stations, and avoided the more arduous work of the navy.

On the approach of the Seven Years' War the island of Minorca was threatened by an attack from Toulon and was actually invaded in 1756. Byng, who was then serving in the Channel with the rank of admiral, which he attained in 1755, was ordered to the Mediterranean to relieve the garrison of Fort St Philip, which was still holding out. The British Ministry was very negligent in the matter of Minorca. It is quite clear that as early as October 1755, it had received intelligence that the expedition preparing at Toulon was destined for that island ; and that French reports to the same effect reached it in November and December, as well as later. Yet it took no proper measures for the defence of the place, the reason apparently being that, at that time, it undervalued the importance of the position.

Minorca (Menorca), is the second in size of the group of Spanish islands in the Mediterranean Sea, known as the Balearic Islands, 27 m. E.N.E. of Majorca. The coast is deeply indented, especially on the north, with numerous creeks and bays - that of Port Mahon (17,144) being one of the finest in the Mediterranean, if not the best of them all. During the 18th Century Minorca was the center of strategic military importance in the Mediterranean Sea. Minorca was occupied mainly by the British, who were here from 1708-1756, when it was seised by the French, (1756-1763) when again it became under British rule until 1782, when it was taken by the Spanish, (1782-11798), and again taken by the British between 1798-1802, and finally given back to the Spanish in 1802 with the signing of the Treaty of Amiens. The British first occupied Menorca in 1708. During the 18th century, the British began the construction of a fort called the fort of St. Anne or St. Anne´s Fort, which was never completed. The British decided to concentrate on enlarging and modernising the existing castle of San Felipe on the south side of the entrance of the harbour. Menorca was finally handed back to the Spanish, after British sovereignty was brought to an end under the signing of the Treaty of Amiens. The British gained sovereignty in Menorca in 1713, with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht.

At length public opinion in England insisted that something must be done; and on March llth, 1756, Vice-Admiral the Hon. John Byng was appointed to the command of a fleet, which was then ordered to proceed to Minorca. The position of second in command was given to Rear-Admiral Temple West. But this fleet, which should have been a large and powerful one, was by no means of formidable proportions. It consisted only of ten sail of the line ; and even those few ships were not fitted out without the greatest difficulty and friction. At that late date the Ministry seems to have been still blind to tbe importance of Minorca.

He was directed to take on board the absent officers of the Minorca garrison and a reinforcement of troops, consisting of the Eoyal Regiment of Fusiliers, under the command of Colonel Lord Kobert Bertie. To make room for these men, all the Marines belonging to the squadron were sent on shore, with the result that, had Byng been successful in throwing troops into Port Mahon, he would, owing to the absence of Marines from his ships, have been in a condition unfit for subsequently fighting an action at sea.

Byng, with an easterly wind, sailed from Gibraltar on May 8th. The wind was for the most part easterly until 9 PM on 18 May 1756, when a brisk northerly breeze sprang up; and the squadron, having sailed large all night, sighted Minorca at daybreak next morning. The enemy's fleet appeared in the SE, and Vice-Admiral Byng then stood towards the foe and made the signal for a general chase. Both squadrons * made sail towards one another; and at 2 PM the British Commander-in-Chief made the signal for a line of battle ahead. But, the wind dropping, this order could not be properly carried out. The two fleets sighted each other on the morning of May 20th.

The attack which Byng by his own account meant to make, each ship against its opposite in the enemy's line, difficult to carry out under any circumstances, was here further impeded by the distance between the two rears being much greater than that between the vans ; so that his whole line could not come into action at the same moment. This undoubtedly was the time for Byng, having committed himself to the fight, to have set the example and borne down, just as Farragut later did at Mobile when his line was confused by the stopping of the next ahead. When the flag captain pointed out to Byng that by standing out of his line he could bring the centre of the enemy to closer action, he declined on the ground that Thomas Mathews had been condemned for so doing. The affair thus became indecisive; the English van was separated from the rear and got the brunt of the fight. The French, who were equal in number to the English, got away undamaged. The British ships suffered much more than the French in their masts, yards and rigging.

Byng deemed it right, before venturing to do anything further, to call a council of war on board the Ramillies. As a result, the squadron sailed for Gibraltar, and, on the way, occupied itself in repairing such damages as could be repaired at sea. On June 4th, 1756, Byng was promoted to be Admiral of the Blue.

It was unfortunate for Byng that the first detailed news of what had happened off Minorca reached the Government through French channels. This report made the British fleet to have been considerably superior to the French, whereas if there were any real difference between them it was only a very slight one.

The town of Port Mahon defended itself gallantly, but had to capitulate on June 29th. The Ministry which previously inclined to underrate the importance of Minorca, at length seemed disposed to attach the utmost significance to it. Byng sailed for England in the Antelope, on July 9th, and, upon arriving at Spithead on July 26th, he was put under arrest. His trial began on board the St. George in Portsmouth Harbour on December 27th, and continued until January 27th, 1757. On that day sentence was pronounced.

After hearing the evidence, the court agreed to thirty-seven resolutions or conclusions, which embodied, among others, the following. That when the British fleet, on the starboard tack, was stretched abreast, or was about abeam, of the enemy's line, Admiral Byng should have caused his ships to tack together, and should have immediately borne right down on the enemy. That the Admiral retarded the rear division of the British fleet from closing with and engaging the enemy, by shortening sail; whereas he should have made signals to those ships to make more sail.

That after the ships which had received damage in the action had been refitted as circumstances would permit, the Admiral ought to have returned with his squadron off Port Mahon, and endeavored to open communication with the castle, and to have used every means in his power for its relief, before returning to Gibraltar.

In short, the court considered that Byng had not done his utmost to relieve St. Philip's Castle. It also considered that during the engagement he had not done his utmost to take, sink, burn, and destroy the ships of the enemy, and to assist such of his own ships as were engaged; and it resolved that the Admiral had fallen under the 12th Article of War: "Every person in the fleet, who, through cowardice, negligence, or disaffection, shall, in time of action, withdraw, or keep back, or not come into fight, or engagement, or shall not do his utmost to take or destroy every ship which it shall be his duty to engage ; and to assist all and every of his Majesty's ships, or those of his allies, which it shall be his duty to assist and relieve; every such person, so offending, and being convicted thereof by the sentence of a court-martial, shall suffer death."

The court decided that, as the 12th Article of War positively prescribed death, without leaving any alternative to the discretion of the court under any variation of circumstances, Admiral Byng should be shot to death, at such time and on board such ship as the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty should direct. "But," concludes the thirty-seventh resolution, " as it appears by the evidence of Lord Robert Bertie, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, Captain Gardiner and other officers of the ship, who were near the person of the Admiral, that they did not perceive any backwardness in him during the action, or any marks of fear or confusion, either from his countenance or behaviour, but that he seemed to give his orders coolly and distinctly, and did not seem wanting in personal courage, and from other circumstances, tbe court do not believe that his misconduct arose either from cowardice or disaffection; and do therefore unanimously think it their duty most earnestly to recommend him as a proper object of mercy."

On March 14th, 1757, the day appointed for the carrying out of the sentence, a platoon of nine Marines was drawn up in three lines of three. On the other side of the quarterdeck of the Monarch was spread some saw-dust, on which was placed a cushion. The Admiral walked from his after cabin with a dignified pace and unmoved countenance. He went to the cushion and knelt down. One of his friends, following him, offered to tie the bandage over his eyes, but Byng declined the service and blindfolded himself. The Marines, in the meantime, advanced two paces and presented their muskets, waiting for the Admiral to give them the signal to fire. He remained upon his knees for about a minute, apparently praying, and then dropped a handkerchief, the signal agreed upon. Six of the Marines fired. One bullet missed; one passed through the heart; and four others struck different parts of the body. The Admiral sank to the deck, dead.

The severity of the penalty, aided by a not unjust suspicion that the ministry sought to cover themselves by throwing all the blame on the admiral, led in after time to a reaction in favour of Byng. It became a commonplace to say that he was put to death for an error of judgment. The court had indeed acquitted him of personal cowardice or of disaffection, and only condemned him for not having done his utmost. But it must be remembered that in consequence of many scandals which had taken place in the previous war the Articles of War had been deliberately revised so as to leave no punishment save death for the officer of any rank who did not do his utmost against the enemy either in battle or pursuit. That Byng had not done all he could is undeniable, and he therefore fell under the law. Neither must it be forgotten that in the previous war in 1745 an unhappy young lieutenant, Baker Phillips by name, whose captain had brought his ship into action unprepared, and who, when his superior was killed, surrendered the ship when she could no longer be defended, was shot by sentence of a courtmartial. This savage punishment was approved by the higher officers of the navy, who showed great lenity to men of their own rank. The contrast had angered the country, and the Articles of War had been amended precisely in order that there might be one law for all.