Foreign Policy - Late Victorian - 1856-1901
The later Foreign Policy of Great Britain, so far as it has been called into activity, was concerned with the preservation and extension of her Empire in the continents of Asia, Africa, and America. In dealing with the great European nations and with the United States, it was one of non-interference, and possessed, therefore, no spark of the vital interest which characterised the mighty struggles through which the path of empire had been earlier traced. This policy adherence to the old principle of strengthening, as occasion seemed to require, the defences of the British Isles and their dependencies, and in a scrupulous care lest British interests should be endangered by the changes which were taking place among the nations.
When the impatience of Russia could no longer be restrained, and broke out in the Crimean War of 1854, it was under the belief that the French had delivered a challenge which could not be declined, and that Great Britain would not interfere. The unknown Sultan seemed to the British people a beneficent being compared with the bloodthirsty Russian and Austrian emperors, and so Britain drifted into the Crimean war in defence of the menaced "integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire." As time went on, an uneasy sensation came over the national mind, that while Britons were defending the Turks from the Russians they were riveting the chains on some millions of Christians; that the maltreatment of these formed the pretext for the czar's interference, an idea which Britons had laughed to scorn and called hypocrisy, had somewhat of truth in it after all. All these facts made a due impression on the British mind, and not unfrequently portions of the press spoke out, avowing that the Crimean war was a mistake, and that England would never again draw the sword for Turkey.
The great test of British Foreign Policy, the Crimean War, stained, through a series of blunders, the history of Europe. It was the Eastern Question again; but Palmerston was not Prime Minister nor even Foreign Secretary in the Government of Lord Aberdeen, which took office at the end of the year 1852. Whatever Lord Aberdeen's merits, he was not the man for the crisis, and no terms can be too strong to express the disgrace which rested both on British diplomacy and British administration. The country called on Lord Palmerston to retrieve its credit, and found him once more equal to the situation, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 concluded the war.
Great Britain could not keep entirely free from Continental and American affairs. The Civil War stirred the British people deeply, and the opinions and sympathies of statesmen and people alike were much divided. In the main the upper classes and government officials, even Gladstone among the number, upheld the cause of the South, while the working classes and radical leaders, like John Bright, who hated slavery, were almost to a man in sympathy with the North. Russell refused to join with Napoleon III in recognizing the Southern States, but came very near going to war in what is known as the Trent Affair.
In 1861 the Confederate government had sent two Southerners, Mason and Slidell, on an English mail steamer, The Trent, to seek aid abroad. Captain Wilkes of the United States navy stopped the steamer and took off the envoys. Great Britain, on the ground that the right to search neutral vessels in time of war had been given up by the European powers at the Congress of Paris, in 1856, demanded the surrender of the commissioners. The United States had not been represented at the Congress of Paris, and many in the North were inclined to resist Great Britain's demand. But President Lincoln declared that the United States had always opposed the right of search; and the queen and the prince consort threw their influence on the side of peace. The United States surrendered the commissioners and the crisis was safely passed.
When the Polish insurrection broke out, in 1863, Lord John Russell, foreign minister in Palmerston's cabinet, upheld the cause of the Poles, but refused to join Napoleon III in a war in their behalf with Russia. Russell also defended the integrity of Denmark, when in 1864 Bismarck made war on that kingdom and compelled the king, Christian IX, to renounce his right over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. After Palmerston's death, in 1865, Great Britain remained absolutely neutral during the AustroPrussian war of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871.
After war unexpectedly broke out between France and Prussia, the French empire fell; the German armies marched on Paris; and the Russian government, at Count Bismarck's instigation, took advantage of the collapse of France to repudiate the clause in the treaty of 1856 which neutralized the Black Sea. Lord Granville, who had succeeded Lord Clarendon at the foreign office, protested against this proceeding. But it was everywhere felt that his mere protest was not likely to affect the result; and the government at last consented to accept a suggestion made by Count Bismarck, and to take part in a conference to discuss the Russian proposal. Though this device enabled them to say that they had not yielded to the Russian demand, it was obvious that they entered the conference with the foregone conclusion of conceding the Russian claim. The attitude which the government thus chose to adopt was perhaps inevitable in the circumstances, but it confirmed the impression, which the abandonment of the cause of Denmark had produced in 1S64, that Great Britain was not prepared to maintain its principles by going to war.
The weakness of the British foreign office was emphasized by its consenting, almost at the same moment, to allow the claims of the United States, for the depredations of the "Alabama" to be settled under a rule only agreed upon in 1871. Lord John Russell had allowed the Confederate government to fit out in English ports a number of cruisers, of which the chief was the Alabama, and to send them out to prey on the commerce of the North. For this indiscretion England was compelled to pay $15,500,000 in 1871. The sympathy of the working class with the Northern cause was the more remarkable in that the Northern blockade of Southern ports brought on a cotton famine in Lancashire that caused terrible distress among the employees of the cotton mills, and affected workmen in other trades also. Yet their abhorrence of slavery outweighed their personal discomfort, and their noble self-sacrifice without doubt influenced the government, always susceptible to public opinion, to preserve strict neutrality.
Most Englishmen later appreciated the wisdom of a concession which gained for them the friendship of the United States. But in 1871 the country resented the manner in which Lord Granville had acted. Whatever credit the government might have derived from its domestic measures, it was discredited, or it was thought to be, by its foreign policy.
The Conservative policy, 1874-80, had endeavored to distract attention from domestic grievances by splendid demonstrations abroad. In 1880 Lord Beaconsfield was ready to continue the same policy. In order to accomplish his end, It was believed, Lord Beaconsfield would net hesitate to extend the frontiers of the Empire, if necessary by unscrupulous diplomacy or resort to arms. It was believed he was ready to sacrifice the weaker nations, unable to defend their rights with any chance of success, or to offend stronger nations, who might show any inclination to thwart his aims, for at this time, the Conservatives did not seek alliances but prided themselves on "a splendid isolation" natural to Great Britain.
The general election of 1880 was fought almost entirely on the general principles of foreign policy. Mr. Gladstone invaded the strongest Tory constituency in Scotland to run against the nominee of the Duke of Buccleuch. In his famous Midlothian speeches delivered on this occasion, he dictated the issues upon which Liberal candidates fought all over Great Britain. These speeches dealt almost entirely with Conservative egoism in foreign affairs. Gladstone, in his Midlothian speeches, declared that it was not the "right of England to be the censor of abuses and imperfections among the countries of the world, and the duty of England's Foreign Secretary to be that of a knight errant, ever pricking forth, armed at all points, to challenge all comers and to lay as many adversaries as possible sprawling. Gladstone laid down six principles by which Great Britain's foreign policy should be guided:
- To foster the strength of the empire by just legislation and economy at home, thereby producing wealth, union, contentment and strength of empire.
- To preserve to the world, the blessings of peace.
- To strive to cultivate and maintain to the very uttermost the so called Concert of Europe; to keep the powers of Europe in union together.
- To avoid needless and entangling engagements.
- To acknowledge the equal rights of all nations.
- Subject to these limitations, the foreign policy of England should always be inspired by the love of freedom.
The return of the polls pave a decisive victory to the Liberals. On April 23, 1880, the Liberals, after a six year exile from office, came back to power with a larger majority than they had had since the passage of the Reform Bill in 1832. Mr. Gladstone, as leader of the party, found himself, however, confronted with larger and more complicated difficulties than usually confront a prime minister. There were the difficulties in k.'est Asia, Egypt and South Africa inherited from his prediccessor in office. There were some men, of whom Mr. Bright was the most conspicuous, most necessary to a strong Liberal administration who were utterally opposed to any policy which aimed at extension of territory or warlike enterprises of any kind. There was the Radical element in political and social life, which advocated radical reform, democracy and home rule for Ireland, represented principally by Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Chamberlain.
The nation was not willing that Great Britain assume the character of a great military empire. The election may also be taken as emphatic proof that the nation was not ready to accept the Tory principle of "Personal Rule". "Personal Rule' asserted that public opinion, as represented by-Parliament, had no business to concern itself with foreign affairs. It was asserted that foreign affairs belonged to "monarchs and ministers conversant with the higher and permanent interests of the country.
The Liberals, during the next twelve years, in office and cut of office, continued to oppose "Personal Rule" and "Imperialism". The Gladstonian Ministry, 1860-1885, did not make a brilliant record in foreign affairs. It departed from the principles laid down in the Midlothian Speeches of 1880 and it even adopted the principle of "Imperialism" in the case of Egypt. This was perhaps its greatest blunder. The occupation of Egypt brought in its wake many catastrophes from which it seemed unable to extricate itself, and although not the immediate, it was the real cause cf the fall of the party from power in 1885. It seemed that imperialism was inevitable.
The Conservatives held power from 1885 to 1892, with the exception of about six months in 1886 when the Liberals regained office temporarily. During these six months there was no decided change in the foreign policy for the Liberals realized they could not hold office long and thcught it better to mark time rather than introduce measures they would have no opportunity to carry to completion. During these seven years there was scareely any criticism of the management of foreign affairs, either in parliament or without.
In 1893 the Liberals regained control which they held till 1895. Lord Rosebery, a Conservative Liberal, managed to practically emerge the policies of the two parties, as far as foreign affairs were concerned, and so there was little friction in parliament between Conservatives and Liberals. What opposition there was came from the Radicals who even accused Lord Rosebery, a Liberal, of being a "high-priest cf Imperial Jingoism."
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