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British Army - Organization & Training

The organization of the British army during peace time was hitherto essentially an organization by stations — a stationary organization. The units composing the several garrisons of the stations were in a continual state of flux and reflux. There was hitherto no higher organization anywhere maintained as a whole complete in all its parts for more than a short time. In part this is an inevitable consequence of the different conditions of service between the army of a world-wide empire and that of countries like France and Germany, which had all their peace duties within a ring-fence of the borders of their fatherland. The corps which in Germany occupied a particular district was designed to move as a whole when it is required for war.

The troops, which in England were stationed in a certain locality, had two entirely distract functions. The several units were on a roster for foreign service, and each in their due turn would go to India or the Colonies, being replaced by other units from abroad. In the event of war they were formed with other units into brigades, divisions, and army corps, but they had not been in these organizations prior to the preparation of the expeditionary army. The generals to command and the staffs to direct them were appoiiited for the special purpose.

It was one of the peculiar characteristics of the service of the British army that, from the extent and dispersion of the empire over tne world, it was almost always at war on a greater or less scale. If the temple of Janus were, as an indication of peace, closed for one year, it would have the next to be opened at four doors for four different wars. Thus in 1900, independently of Indian frontier expeditions, of which there were more than one in the year, Great Britain had war in the Egyptian Sudan, war on the West Coast of Africa, two expeditions in East Africa, and war in China, whilst the war in South Africa was going on.

The practical training of the British infantry more than that of any other army was necessarily affected by this fact. Not only were the experiences through which officers and men pass in these wars very important in their effect on the preparation which they gave for future war, but they had a great influence on the permanent training of the army, and especially of the infantry, during peace time. The purchase of a large area of ground near Salisbury gave scope for manoeuvres on a much larger scale than was possible formerly.

Even in this one year, 1900, no two of the wars were alike in their circumstances; and, unless the comparison be made between some two Indian frontier expeditions, hardly in the thirty wars of the thirty years 1870-1901 would it be possible to find two of which the tactical conditions were identical. In these circumstances the actual views which dominated British schools of training are apt to be modified considerably by the most recent experience. This modification found expression to some extent in the successive drill books which were issued. It was in reality much more important in its influence through the decisions given by umpires and the comments on field days.

The influence of the experience of the great war between France and Germany in 1870 showed itself in the training of the British army for some years in a much more open order of fighting, in the continual study of ground with a view to cover, and in carefully-arranged turning movements. The influence of wars in which Zulus and Mahdists showed the power of determined attacks pushed home regardless of loss, had its effect on our training in a tendency to encourage frontal attacks provided that a certain numerical superiority was attained at a given point.

The actual training imparted at any given period in the camps at Aldershot or Salisbury has oscillated much between these extremes. The training of the other arms being largely dependent on the principles adopted for infantry in defence and attack, it is safe to say that there is this necessary contrast between the adequate training of the British army and that of any other European Power, that with the British army the officers at least, and to some extent the men, require to be prepared for many varied circumstances and conditions, whereas in the training of other European armies the conditions under which they will enter upon war are fixed and well known beforehand.

Shortly before the beginning of the Boer war, in the course of 1897, the cavalry underwent a new organization. Two cavalry regiments had been despatched to South Africa. There were then left in the United Kingdom eight regiments on a higher establishment and eight on a lower, which were each organization made up into three service squadrons and one reserve squadron. The higher establishment regiments had 670 men and 465 horses each, the lower 555 men and 343 horses. The 1st cavalry division was composed of five regiments on the higher establishment and a composite regiment of household cavalry. The 6th regiment of line cavalry was detailed as corps cavalry for the 1st army corps. Each squadron was 140 strong including officers.

The object of this reorganization was to enable the regiments to start on a campaign without drawing on other regiments for non-commissioned officers and men. When the regiments went abroad the "reserve squadrons" left behind became in fact each regimental depots. There were always about 200 "nongrooming" men in a cavalry regiment required for various purposes, so that this proportion of horses to men was deliberately arranged. During the war a great strain was thrown on the "reserve squadrons." As recruits and remounts were poured into them they virtually came to be, in point of men and horses to be trained, equal in numbers to a cavalry regiment. The supply of officers and noncommissioned officers and the "office" were wholly inadequate for dealing with such numbers.

The Boer war, in which the power of the new weapons made itself so conspicuous, naturally led to much discussion as to the future role of cavalry. There was a disposition to assume that cavalry should abandon its old position of looking upon manuvering facility as its ruling metier, and should become, like the American cavalry of the civil war, a manuvering mounted infantry. On one point all the experience of the past may doubtless be trusted. It is necessary to decide definitely whether cavalry was to rely on a knowledge of ground, on horsemanship, skill in manuvering, and the arme blanche, or whether it is to trust to dismounted fire. To train men both to charge home and to believe in victory in so doing, and at the same time to think that their only safety lies in dismounted fire, is a contradiction in terms. It would be wholly contrary to human nature if such training proved successful. That cavalry, if in the proper use of their arm they are to act effectively, must be supported and aided by mounted infantry, is not a new experience, though it has been much emphasized by the South African war. The immense numbers of mounted men ultimately employed were a necessary consequence of the peculiar nature of the contest, and not necessarily a certain element of future war under normal conditions.

The changes both in the organization and training of artillery had been very numerous. In the first place the old "royal regiment" was divided into two distinct branches, so that the promotion of officers was no longer carried out in one long list. The officers for the field and horse artillery stood on one seniority list for promotion, the garrison and mountain batteries on another.

Within each branch important changes of organization had been also made. In the field branch of the regiment, both for "field" and "horse" artillery, the battery was no longer the one "unit" for all purposes. A lieutenant-colonel's command, which had the anomalous name of a "brigade division," was created. It consisted of a group in the horse artillery of two, in the field artillery of three batteries. The lieutenant-colonels belonged to particular stations, the batteries moved from station to station. Thus the elements composing the "brigade divisions" were continually changing. Moreover, the "staff" of the brigade divisiqn only formed hy taking officers from the batteries temporarily attached to the command.

For the training of the horse and field artillery a large area of ground on the wild open country of Dartmoor, near Okehampton, had for some years been utilized. A similar school was started at Glen Iniaal in Ireland. There it was possible, to a large extent, to combine the actual firing with service ammunition, the bursting of shells and the practice at dummies representing artillery, cavalry, and infantry, with training in rapid changes of formation and field movements. For these purposes the brigade divisions moved together and trained together. An elaborate system of "fire discipline" had been worked out in order to bring the whole fire of a battery completely under the control of the officer commanding the battery, so that the officer commanding the brigade division may be able to use his unit for such purposes as may be required by the general's combinations.

During the winter and early months of the year the batteries were trained in elementary work at their own stations. During the summer the brigade divisions give practical effect to the training either by preference at Okehampton, or if there be not time for all to go there, then some were sent to Shoeburyness. A new training ground was opened on the area at Salisbury. There also actual firing with service ammunition was combined with field movements. This promised to become the most valuable field artillery school the army possesses.

Similarly, with the garrison artillery, a much more perfect system was devised for the regulation and practice of the fire. The invention and adoption of instruments known as "position finders" and "depression range finders " enabled the fire to be directed with great precision upon given spots likely to be passed by ships. To a large extent the actual organization of the defence depended on the special nature of the fortress. The organization of the defence of a fortress like Gibraltar or Malta must obviously differ from that of a tortuous channel such as gives approach to the harbour of Harwich.

In general terms the manning of the sea-board guns of the British islands depended upon militia and volunteer artillery, with only a small stiffening of regular garrison artillery and n proportion of officers of the royal garrison artillery. The militia and volunteer artillery are periodically trained in the different works to which they are assigned. A practice school for the garrison artillery has been established at Lydd, but the various coast fortresses themselves carry out regular practice with service ammunition.