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Turkey-Iraq Relations

Working with the Turks on Iraqi issues can be frustrating and worse. On the macro level, both the US and Turkey want a unified, democratic Iraq at peace internally and with its neighbors. Turkey's actions and views about Iraq are strongly influenced by the continuing presence of PKK elements there, and that Turkey views northern Iraq and its Kurds through the prism of Turkey's long, bloody struggle against Kurdish separatism in its own southeast. Turkey will do what it believes is in Turkey's interest based on its assessments of northern Iraq, assessments that often exaggerate the threat posed to them by Iraqi Kurds and the size and competence of the Turkmen.

While the US thinks of northern Iraq as the most stable area in the country, and the Iraqi Kurds as friends and partners in building the new Iraq, the Turks see the region as fraught with threats to Turkish interests. US support for democracy and federalism in northern Iraq will result in Kurdish (probably KDP and PUK) leadership and administration of the three northern governorates for the foreseeable future, an outcome Turkey hoped to avoid and is only grudgingly coming to terms with.

The northern Iraq most Turks imagine is an ethnic-based autocracy run by Kurdish war lords (Barzani and Talabani), with more than a million Turkmen who are deprived of their rights by heavy-handed Kurds. Ankara has been reluctant to recognize Barzani and Talabani as legitimate Iraqi politicians and regularly refers to them as tribal leaders. Turkey insisted in the years leading up to the Iraq War and until the passage of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that the KDP and the PUK's administrations were de facto only and had no legitimate authority. Much of the Turkish unhappiness with the TAL was because it made the KDP and PUK's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) the legal authority in the north. Until Spring 2004, the Turks were loathe to relinquish their view.

The Turks made helpful contributions in Iraq (witness Operations Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, the Ground Line of Communication with northern Iraq (GLOC) and use of Incirlik to support OIF), but closing such deals with Turkey is always difficult and time consuming - and can be downright maddening. The engagement gives the Turks a sense of informed inclusion that tempers the ability of those with less helpful instincts to interfere, it is clearly worth the effort. But US expectations of the Turks must be realistic.

Perhaps the greatest impediment to a smoother relationship for the Turks with the Iraqi Kurds is the persistent presence of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL in northern Iraq. So long as these terrorists are present in the area, northern Iraq will be a source of concern for the Turks. This will keep alive disappointment with the US for not fulfilling a pledge to end the safehaven for terrorists in Iraq and will hamper Turkey's ability to accept and cooperate with the new Iraq, unless/until the new Iraq takes action to close down the PKK and its front organizations. In addition, the Turks will perpetually be tempted to cross the border and go after the PKK themselves (as they have on a pretty regular basis for at least 25 years), with all the problems that suggests. And the 1500 Turkish troops in northern Iraq will not be withdrawn until a solution is found to the PKK problem. Their presence remained an irritant with the Iraqis and a sore point in Turkey-Iraq relations.

Iraq was more concerned by the deployment of 650 Turkish troops to the Shaqlawa region in northern Iraq than by the 150 Turkish soldiers in Mosul's Bashiqa region. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu and opposition party leaders, including the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) in Ankara from 9 to 11 December 2015. Barzani expressed his and Bagdad's concerns to the Turkish authorities about the troops in Shaqlawa during his meetings in Ankara. Barzani was not fully convinced of the need for the 800 Turkish troops in Mosul and Shaqlawa in northern Iraq that sparked a crisis between Ankara and Baghdad.

Turkey increased the number of its troops in Mosul from 80 to 150 on 03 December 2015 and deployed 650 more troops to a deserted airport near the town of Harir in the Shaqlawa region that had strategic importance as it is along the route to the Kandil Mountains where the headquarters of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) are located.

Iraq said in early December 2015 hundreds of Turkish troops had arrived in its territory without its knowledge or approval, calling it a violation of its sovereignty. The Iraqi government demanded that Ankara withdraw the more than 100 Turkish forces that entered Iraq with tanks and artillery for alleged “training” of troops near Islamic State-occupied Mosul. Baghdad stressed the unsanctioned move was a breach of its sovereignty. The Iraqi foreign ministry said in a statement on 05 December 2015 that the Turkish troops were acting in violation of the country’s sovereignty and demanded the forces withdraw immediately. “Around one regiment armoured with tanks and artillery” has entered the northern Nineveh area, according to the statement from the Iraqi Prime Minister’s media office. “The Iraqi authorities call on Turkey to respect good neighbourly relations and to withdraw immediately from the Iraqi territory,” the statement said, stressing that the Turkish troops entered “without the request or authorization from the Iraqi federal authorities,” which is a “serious breach of Iraqi sovereignty.”

Turkey sought to ease the concerns of the central Iraqi government after it threatened to take action at the UN unless the Turkish troops were withdrawn immediately. On 06 December 2015 the Iraqi government issued a 48-hour ultimatum and demanded an immediate pullout of Turkish forces, saying the deployment took place without the knowledge and consent of Baghdad.

Along with 150 troops, Turkey also deployed about 25 tanks to a camp in the Bashiqa region near Mosul on 03 December 2015, calling it a routine rotation to train Iraqis to retake Mosul from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which captured Iraq's second-largest city in 2014.

Before his visit to Ankara, Barzani also downplayed the nature of Turkey's dispatch of a contingent of forces backed by armored vehicles, tanks and artillery to northern Iraq. The Kurdish leader said the issue was between the central government in Baghdad and Ankara, but did not show any reaction or unwelcoming sign against the presence of Turkish forces.

During a press conference along with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Arbil on 08 December 2015 Barzani told reporters Ankara and Baghdad have an existing agreement over troop deployment to train armed forces there as part of the mission to recapture Mosul from ISIL. Rivalries between Baghdad and Ankara over Turkish troops entering Iraq should be resolved at the negotiating table because "there is a misunderstanding between both countries, and we will work to ease the situation," Barzani said.

Turkey demanded Barzani's help to capture some of PKK leaders, while Barzani in return demanded to be part of the operation in Mosul to remove ISIL. He also gave assurances that they would protect the rights of Turkmens in Kirkuk in a referendum and requested that Turkey not interfere in this internal matter. In order to come to an understanding on the issues, Barzani also demanded financial assistance which Turkey agreed to; however, the amount and source of the funds were not mentioned.