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Norway and NATO

Immediately after the Second World War, Norway seriously discussed with Denmark and Sweden the prospect of forming a Scandinavian union. These pan-Scandinavian talks fizzled out after less than a year, leaving Norwegian membership of NATO as the only apparent option, even though there was no pressure on either side, or even a great deal of enthusiasm, for such a move.

As an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU), in the mid-1990s Norway's was of the opinion that the WEU should be kept as an independent organization, but with strengthened relations to both the EU and NATO. As the Cold War waxed and waned, there were times when NATO membership would become a more controversial domestic issue. However, the major changes in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s took much of the heat out of the debate.

NATO has retained its position as a cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. While there is now far less military focus on the northern flank, Norway has drawn attention to the need for continued, strong transatlantic bonds and an allied commitment in the North. At the same time, most of Norway's self-imposed limitations are still in place. An exception is the special restrictions on military exercises in Finnmark which proved to be an obstacle to foreign visits and to military co-operation in the north both with allies and with Russia and other forces from the Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries. Starting in the autumn of 1995, the rules concerning military activity in Finnmark were relaxed.

In the wake of the Cold War NATO has sought the role of bridge-builder in Europe. The goal has been to strengthen European security and stability without undermining NATO's main capacities. The Norwegian authorities have given their support to further development of the organisation's relations with Central and East European countries. This has been achieved both through the establishment of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC, previously NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP). Increased NATO involvement in peace operations in Europe has alsi been welcomed. In this respect Norway has contributed sizeable contingents to NATO's peace-keeping forces in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR).

European integration has led to a stronger focus on NATO's European pillar. During the 1990s, the initiative was taken to develop a special European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). In 1992 Norway became an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU) and has supported a continuation of the process of strengthening European security and its crisis-handling capabilities. The goal is to develop European capability with respect to intervening in situations where NATO finds it unnecessary to become involved. At the same time, the Norwegian authorities are aware of the danger of becoming marginalized as the WEU is gradually integrated into the EU. Norwegian interests are therefore best served through close co-operation between NATO and the EU whereby the European crisis-handling capacity is part of a common transatlanticapproach as well as special co-operation agreements between EU and the NATO countries that are not EU members. For constitutional and political reasons, agreements of this kind will be necessary in order to facilitate Norwegian participation in EU operations.

Norway takes the view that NATO must, first and foremost, be a defence alliance and the primary organisation for dealing with security challenges faced by the Allies. The importance of the Alliance as a forum for dialogue between the United States and Europe must be maintained.

The Norwegian side has emphasised in particular that the concept must focus on NATO's core tasks. The ability of the Alliance to defend all the member states in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty must continue to be fundamental. In other words NATO must be in a position to give its member countries the security that lies in collective defence. Mutual assistance in the event of armed aggression is the rock on which NATO is built. All the member countries must be able to feel that their fundamental security interests are being safeguarded. NATO must therefore possess the relevant and credible capabilities that this requires.

In recent years the Alliance has focused on "out of area" operations - such as Afghanistan - to such an extent that emphasis on the real core tasks has been somewhat muted. Norway would not suggest that this is an 'either/or' situation. Norway takes the view that NATO should continue to undertake operations "out of area", and outside Article 5, provided that these operations are firmly based on a clear UN mandate. But the balance between "home" and "away" should be given fresh consideration. This balance between "home" and "away", and between "Article 5" and "non-Article 5" operations, is now one of the most important questions in the discussion of future strategy. There can be little doubt that Norway played a part in promoting this theme to a position high on the agenda.

A further aspect of this balance is not allowing whatever is most acute here and now to outweigh what is most important in the long run. This calls for the ability to look up and think long-term instead of simply assuming that the future will be purely an extrapolation of things as known today.

This thinking is summed up in what Norway calls the Core Area Initiative. The aims of this initiative are:

• to strengthen NATO's credibility where collective defence of its members is concerned,
• to strengthen the Alliance's situational awareness and intelligence cooperation,
• to raise the level of training and exercise activity in NATO's vicinity,
• and to ensure that the Alliance's structural and defence planning reflects these priorities.

The question of the Alliance's future deterrence capability, including the significance of nuclear weapons, will be a central theme in the negotiations. The Norwegian side was working for a solution in which the Alliance's core tasks and allied solidarity are maintained but where the role of nuclear weapons plays a reduced part in the Alliance's strategy. It is an obvious aim of Norway's security policy to contribute towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Norway is working actively with this as an objective in the run-up to the important Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Norway wishes to see an effective NATO with the emphasis on Article 5, to ensure effective deterrence but without the overwhelming emphasis on nuclear weapons which has been with us since the days of the Cold War. This in turn means that the NATO countries must possess the relevant conventional military capabilities that are necessary to demonstrate the solidarity of the Alliance in practical terms.

The Alliance is in need of a process of reform. It needs, first and foremost, to focus on a better balance between the level of ambition and the resources available. NATO should give priority to deployable capabilities which have the ability to cover the whole spectrum of threats and crises, including high intensity operations. The requirements of individual must not be allowed to govern long-term defence planning. For example, the acute needs of Afghanistan must not decide what NATO's priorities should be in the longer term.