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New Medium Helicopter

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) is considering the procurement of a New Medium Helicopter (NMH) package to replace existing rotorcraft systems for Army and Strategic Commands. The NMH is intended as a 15 to 20-year ‘stop-gap’ measure until future rotary ‘Next Generation’ solutions are available.

The UK MoD and Government have experienced a long struggle in attempting to recapitalise the UK's Medium Lift (ML) helicopter fleet. As early as the mid 1980s, the MoD was seeking replacement airframes for the aging Wessex fleet and, in turn, the Puma. Crafted as Air Staff Target 404 (AST404), for many in the service it was seen as a direct competition between the US Army's still relatively modern UH-60 Black Hawk (potentially to be licence manufactured in the UK by Westland Helicopters) and the emerging pan-European NH-90. Ultimately, AST404 foundered on political, capability and financial rocks.

The Secretary of State for Defence at the time, George Younger, spoke of these travails in a statement to The House on 29 Oct 1986. He acknowledged the frustration caused by the 'abeyance' on AST404, but reminded The House that: 'A staff target is no more than a broad statement of the functions and desired performance of a new piece of equipment, made before the feasibility or method of meeting such a need have been assessed. It is in no sense a fully defined requirement.1' Younger continued with what has become something of a common theme through the decades; stopping a helicopter procurement activity, and hence the Capital commitment, in favour telling the Defence Staffs to 'go back to the drawing board and to undertake a fundamental study to review the military requirement for support helicopters'.

These 'studies to nowhere' have included AST 404, Support Amphibious Battlefield Rotorcraft (SABR), Future Amphibious Support Helicopter (FASH), Future Rotorcraft Capability (FRC), Future Medium Lift (FML) and Defence Rotary Wing Capability Study (DRWCS). Each of these studies has consumed considerable Staff Time. Hansard is replete with questions from Members to successive Secretaries of State and Defence Ministers asking when these projects will deliver aircraft to the front line. The answer is invariably along the lines of 'we await the results of the XXXX study into future helicopter requirements before making any investment decsions....'

The nature of a Medium Lift helicopter also suffered from some political and industrial myopia. In 1987, Younger referred to a trial conducted by 6 Airmobile Brigade, focussed on support to the army in large airmobile operations in Germany, where the assessment was that larger helicopters capable of carrying 'about 30 men and their equipment' were required in greater numbers. He characterised this need as being fulfilled by either more US-sourced CH-47 Chinooks (already in service with the RAF) or to purchase a utility variant of the new EH101 helicopter, already on order for the Royal Navy in the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) role. To support UK and European industry Younger concluded; 'The Government have decided that the right choice is to introduce the utility EH101 to meet the requirement. The choice will build on the investment that we have already made in the naval version, and reflects our policy on European helicopter collaboration...'

Younger's statement also announced the UK's withdrawal from the NH-90 Medium Lift project as it was a smaller helicopter than EH101 and 'with the decision, we no longer have an early requirement for a helicopter in the NH90 class, nor is there the money to fund both participation in the NH90 definition and development programme...'.

The decision to buy the bigger EH101 and eschew the smaller NH90 in 1987 has proven fundamental to creating the bias towards bigger helicopters that sustains to this day. The utility version of the Merlin, introduced as the Merlin HC.2 by the RAF, struggled to shake off a reputation that, for its size and cost, it constantly underperformed in terms of 'lift' capability. The Merlin is in most dimensions bigger than a Chinook (only in overall length, front rotor tip to rear rotor tip is the Chinook larger), was more expensive to purchase and offered only a fraction of the payload potential of the Chinook. In simple numbers, the Merlin offered a disposable payload often less than half of the Chinook, and often barely a third, a gap exacerbated by high Density Altitude operations (such as Afghanistan). The Merlin could, indeed, carry more troops than a Puma, Wessex, or NH90, but the UK paid handsomely for the privilege.

The focus on Airmobile operations in Cold War Germany allowed thinking to atrophy on the true value of a 'small Medium', such as Puma, vice a 'big Medium' like the Merlin. With the Chinook labelled as Heavy Lift, and Merlin a Medium Lift, it made it simple to overlook many of the tasks, especially in urban environments, that smaller platforms were far better at conducting. Most landing sites big enough for a Merlin were also suitable for a Chinook, which could deliver far more payload with the tactical advantage of often being able to be more flexible with approach and departure paths due to the greater power reserve and wind tolerance, thanks to the lack of a conventional tail rotor.

As a result, the UK entered the 1990s with the same Medium Lift fleet they'd entered the decade with. Wessex and Puma in the RAF and the Sea King HC4 equipping the Royal Navy's Commando Helicopter Force (CHF). It was acknowledged that 25 Merlins would not adequately replace the Wessex/Puma fleets, and the Sea King would require replacement in due course. So began the 'Medium Lift Merry-go-round' of successive projects aimed at filling the 'Medium Gap'. FASH, SABR, FRC all came and went, haemorrhaging cash for zero discernible output. Despite a number of National Audit Office reports highlighting the 'Lift Deficit', little was done to transform studies into firm spending plans.

The Army’s battle-winning capability is to be bolstered with a new generation of high-speed medium helicopters. The announcement was made in the Defence Command Paper, released in March 2021 as part of the Integrated Review. It will form part of the Army’s programme of transformation, Future Soldier, which will deliver an Army that is leaner, lighter, faster to respond, and more effectively matched to current and future threats.

MoD had expected the new medium-lift helicopter to come in by 2025. MoD was confident about the 2025 timetable as the expected bidders in the new medium-lift helicopter programme were expected to bid mature products that have been in production not only in the United Kingdom, but in Europe and around the world. The only negotiation would therefore be around European content and European build and all the other factors that are very important.

The New Medium Helicopter Programme will see four of the medium-sized helicopters currently in service across Defence replaced by one new helicopter. This will include the Bell 212 that is used by the Army Air Corps in the jungle areas of Brunei. A broad range of recent advances in technology, production methods and operational concepts will be used in the design of the bespoke medium helicopter that will bring maximum capability and cost saving benefits to all three services, and keep the Army at the leading edge of technology.

Leonardo Helicopters, which employs more than 3,000 people in the heart of Yeovil, is hoping to secure the deal and has previously pledged to invest in a new production line in Somerset should the MOD choose its new AW149 helicopters. It faced competition from a number of rival firms, including American aviation giant Sikorsky and Bell and Boeing. European defence group Airbus, which is offering the H175M and pledged to build a final assembly line at Broughton in north Wales, where it already makes wings for commercial aircraft. Teesside-based AceHawk Aerospace offers the second-hand Black Hawk ML-70 solution, under which it supplies US military or non-US military helicopters and upgrades them with the new Dynamic Components, modernized COTS Glass Cockpit (MOSA), and “Customer Requirements”.

MoD should wait for the Bell 525 Relentless so as to field “a next-generation rotorcraft capability” for its New Medium Helicopter (NMH) requirement, Joel Best, director of EUMECAA global military sales and strategy, told Janes on 16 February 2022. Bell absolutely intends to bid its 525 for the UK NMH requirement, and with its current certification process with the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on track to conclude in the fourth quarter of 2022 (subject to all FAA submittals and approvals being returned in a ‘reasonable' timeframe), the MoD would not need to delay for long.

The defence and security industrial strategy will ensure that the UK can continue to have competitive, innovativeand world-class defence and security industries. The MOD is investing in emerging technology, utilising the UK’s strong industrial and research base.

The helicopters will be operated jointly by the Army and RAF under Joint Helicopter Command and will be able to be deployed rapidly and access terrain which is less accessible to heavy lift helicopters. As part of Future Soldier, the Army will become more agile, more integrated and more expeditionary, with more of the Army deployed across the globe more of the time. Work on this programme is at an early stage with effort primarily focused on developing and refining key user requirements. Details in relation to the procurement strategy, basing locations, fleet size, delivery schedule and organisational structure are all being assessed.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is considering the procurement of up to 44 New Medium Helicopters (NMH) to replace existing rotorcraft systems for Army and Strategic Commands. The scope of the contract will also include the provision of training capabilities and a maintenance/spares package as well as design organisation scope.

The purpose of the 18 May 2022 Contract Notice was to invite potential and interested suppliers to formally express interest in participating in this procurement by completing a DPQQ found on the Defence Sourcing Portal (DSP) linked to this Notice.

The high-level requirement for this procurement consists of:

• A range of up to 44 platforms.
• Design Organisation integration services for Government Furnished Assets (GFA) and Mission Role Equipment (MRE).
• Up to 2 x aircrew and rearcrew Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD) at the UK Main Operating Base (MOB).
• Training courses for Qualified Helicopter Instructors (QHIs), aircrew and groundcrew maintainers.
• Courseware material for enduring aircrew and maintainer training.

An Initial In-Service Support Package, to include:

• Initial Provisioning Spares.
• Deployed Support Packages (DSPs).
• Ground Support Equipment and Specialist Tooling.
• Technical Publications and Aircrew Publications.
• Logistics (Spares) Management.
• Forward and Depth Maintenance.
• Design Organisation (DO) modifications and technical support.

New Medium Helicopters (NMH) intends to rationalise its existing multiple rotary wing requirements into one platform-type, maximising commonality in order to improve efficiency and operational flexibility. NMH will provide a common medium lift multi-role helicopter, fitted for, but not with, specialist Mission Role Equipment (MRE) and able to operate in all environments in support of defence tasks. The Authority anticipates that there may be a requirement to procure additional work through this contract. Options that have a clearly defined scope will be defined in the ITN, and the Authority may seek costed options for additional work such as manufacture and Supply of additional aircraft and introduction of enhanced capability.

The contract duration is anticipated to be 7 years (as referred to in section II.3) but will be determined by the agreed production schedule that will reflect the supplier’s ability to complete delivery of aircraft and an initial support phase. The support solution duration is anticipated to be approximately 5 years from first aircraft delivery, taking into consideration the manufacturer’s delivery schedule, or until aircraft production is complete, whichever is later. Training services will commence prior to first aircraft delivery to support entry into service.