Koninklijke Luchtmacht - History - World War II
In 1937, under pressure of the international situation and the aggressive policies of Hitler-Germany, the Netherlands government started a modernization program for the Dutch air force. Fokker had developed a new monoplane, the D-21, thirty-six of which were ordered. The D-21 was simple in construction and maintenance and easy to fly but not as fast as its contemporaries: the Messerschmitt 109, the Hurricane, and the Spitfire. Another new Fokker product was the twin-engine T-5 bomber, sixteen of which were ordered for the new bombing wing. The increasing international political pressures forced the government to place contracts with other companies beside Fokker Industries, e.g., Douglas, which delivered, in 1939, eighteen Douglas 8-A aircraft. The pride of the Dutch, however, became the Fokker G-1 fighter, a slender, twin-engine, twin-tail aircraft, which carried no less than eight forward machine guns and one gun in the taildome. It was secretly developed in 1934 and was demonstrated for the first time at the 1936 Paris air show. The government ordered thirty-six of these fast aircraft.
On 1 September 1939, Hitler attacked Poland––an event that marked the beginning of World War II. It soon became clear that, unlike 1914, the Nazi government would not refrain from violating Dutch neutrality, when, on 10 January 1940, a German aircraft made an emergency landing in Belgium and plans were found for a German attack on Belgium and the Netherlands. The Netherlands air arm, now consisting of two operational air regiments, accordingly prepared itself for war.
Number one regiment consisted of a staff and two groups: a strategic group of ten G-10 strategic reconnaissance aircraft at Bergen and nine T-5 bombers at Schiphol, plus a fighter group made up of four sections (squadrons) of eleven and nine D-21 aircraft and ten and thirteen G-1 aircraft respectively. The second regiment consisted of four reconnaissance groups, which had nine, twelve, thirteen, and eight aircraft (both Fokker C-5 and Koolhoven FK-51 aircraft), and a fighter group with one section of nine D-21 aircraft and another section with eleven Douglas D-8A aircraft. Fighters and reconnaissance aircraft were dispersed over several airfields in the Netherlands. The grand total was 124 operational-ready aircraft. But what about their value in a struggle against the Luftwaffe? The Douglas D-8A was a light bomber-reconnaissance plane; to use it in a fighter role was a good aircraft but not fast enough; the Fokker C-10's range and speed were insufficient for a strategic reconnaissance plane; and the Fokker T-5 bomber was not quite ready for operational use, only one aircraft having been equipped with a good bomb rack. All in all, only seventy-two modern aircraft were available to withstand an overwhelming majority.
The German plans included two attacks by the airborne corps under General Karl Student's command. One group was to land near The Hague in order to capture the Royal family and the government; the second group received orders to attack the river crossings south of Rotterdam to facilitate the advance of the German 18th Army. Not less than 430 Ju-52 transport aircraft were made available to General Student; air support was to be given by General R. Putzier's units, totaling approximately 160 serviceable bombers (Heinkel 111, Ju-88, and Ju-87) and 240 fighters (Me-109 and Me- 110).
The German attack did not come wholly unexpected. As of 8 May, each morning from three to eight o'clock, all aircraft were on quick-reaction alert status. During the night of 9-10 May, many German aircraft flew over Holland in a westerly direction. The Dutch air defense command did not possess radar but received its reports from an air observer corps. The Dutch thought that the Germans had violated their neutrality for the purpose of mounting an air attack against Great Britain––as had happened before. However, over the North Sea the German planes made a 180° turn and approached the Dutch coast at very low altitudes in order to attack the airfields of Bergen (G-1 fighters and C-10 recce aircraft), Schiphol (D-21 and T-5 aircraft), Valkenburg, and Ypenburg (C-5, FK-51, D-21, and D-8A aircraft). Other airfields were attacked simultaneously by fighter aircraft. The unexpected bombardments caused moderate to severe damage but demoralized the airfield defense forces. At Bergen, the recce aircraft had been dispersed and thus remained undamaged, but the thirteen G-1 fighters had been closely packed together so that only one aircraft had been able to take off. At Schiphol and Ypenburg, practically all aircraft were able to take off in time. Fifty minutes after this attack, many German transport planes appeared near The Hague and south of Rotterdam. Paratroopers were dropped by the hundreds, with orders to conquer the four main airfields in their regions within thirty minutes so that other transport planes could bring in reinforcements.
For five hectic days, the Dutch fought against the German invaders. During this period, Dutch pilots and antiaircraft gunners succeeded in bringing down 345 enemy aircraft, including 222 Junkers 52 transport planes––more than 75 percent of the then-existing Luftwaffe transport fleet. Dutch losses were heavy, however: nearly all aircraft were lost, and seventy-five men were killed in action. On 18 May 1940, the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Netherlands Army, who had capitulated when the Germans bombed Rotterdam on 14 May, and who represented the Netherlands government in occupied Netherlands, awarded to the Netherlands air arm the "Militaire Willemsorde," the highest award for courage, conduct, and loyalty.
The cadets of two Dutch flying schools and some instructors and other personnel succeeded in escaping to France, from where they were brought to England. The group consisted of some 250 men, soon to be reinforced by others who had succeeded in escaping occupied Holland. Some of these men were attached to the Dutch Naval Air Arm (320th Squadron and 321st Squadron), the backbone of which consisted of naval personnel who had taken refuge in England with their aircraft, Fokker T-8W seaplanes. In 1941, Dutch prince consort Bernhard persuaded the British government of the desirability to form a Dutch squadron within the Royal Air Force organization––the 322d Dutch Spitfire Squadron. Many more Dutchmen were trained and enrolled in all sorts of allied squadrons; they flew Mosquitos, Lancasters, Halifaxes, Typhoons, etc. The 322d Squadron later became part of the 2d Allied Tactical Air Force and as such returned to the Netherlands in the wake of allied ground forces on 3 January 1945.
So far, nothing has been said about the Dutch possessions in the Far East, the Netherlands-Indies (now the Republic of Indonesia). The Dutch armed forces in this territory––with the exception of the Royal Dutch Navy––did not come under the competency of the Netherlands War Ministry but belonged to the Ministry for Colonies. The buildup of the Netherlands-Indies air arm, like that of forces in the Netherlands, had suffered from the Dutch policy of strict neutrality and the lack of funds in the years before 1940. But contrary to the homeland, the Netherlands-Indies government had one more year in which it could make preparations for the struggle against imperial Japan. Thus when––on 30 November 1941––the air arm was fully mobilized, it consisted of 224 first-line combat aircraft––80 Glenn Martin bombers, 72 Brewster Buffalo, 16 Curtiss Hawk and 20 Curtiss Interceptor aircraft, and 36 Curtiss Falcon recce aircraft––plus an additional 19 Lockheed Lodestar transport planes. On order––but not delivered in time–were 162 B-25 Mitchell and 162 Brewster Bermuda aircraft. The Dutch Navy possessed in the Indies another 60 seaplanes (Dornier and Catalina flying boats).
The first Japanese landing came on 17 December 1941 near Miri in the Sarawak province of Borneo. The struggle lasted until 7 March 1942, when the Dutch commander-in-chief was forced to capitulate. Before this date, however, nearly 500 pilot-students with their instructors had been evacuated to Australia. This group was reinforced with remnants of the army and naval air arms and with a number of experienced pilots who had been sent to Australia to collect B-25 aircraft but who found that these aircraft had not yet arrived. Thus, a considerable number of personnel were available to continue the fighting against the Axis powers.
In April 1942, the Dutch government in exile (London) decided that the flying school should continue its activities in the United States. Thanks to the cooperation of U.S. authorities, the Dutch could settle down in Jackson, Mississippi, under the command of Major-General L. H. van Oyen. The base commander at that time was Colonel Mayer, USAAF. All aircraft were made available by the U.S. government under the conditions of the lend-lease program, with the exception of all twin-engined aircraft, which were bought by the Dutch government. The flying school became a tremendous success with army and navy personnel brought together in one organization. The school included not only flying training but also training for navigators, bombardiers, air gunners, and other specialists. For these additional training programs, detachments were formed in Sioux Falls, San Antonio, Midland, Corpus Christi, Panama City, Pensacola, and Myrtle Beach. The total strength of the Dutch organization amounted to some 700 people.
The first group of pilots was honored by U.S. officials, who allowed the group to make a "goodwill" tour of the United States with a formation of twelve B-25 bombers. Also, these pilots were to ferry their own aircraft across the Pacific Ocean without the help of U.S. ferry pilots. The trip of approximately 17,000 miles went according to plans, and this first ferry flight was followed by a second one. Much to their regret, the fighter pilots, with their P-40 aircraft, had to cross the ocean by ship because of the short range of their aircraft. On 8 February 1944, the Dutch flag was lowered at Jackson for the last time: the training program was finished.
In the meantime, the Dutch had formed No. 18 Bomber Squadron in Australia, but because of difficulties it was not until January 1943 that this squadron became operational. Initially, squadron losses were high due to insufficient familiarity with the new aircraft, unreliable armament, and injudicious tactical utilization by the Royal Australian Air Force headquarters, which was in operational command of No. 18 Squadron. No wonder that everybody was happy when new crews arrived from the United States to relieve the first group after an overextended operational tour. The fighters were brought together in No. 120 P-40 Squadron, which operated most of the time from Merauke, and––as of April 1945––from Biak on New Guinea.
The third Netherlands-Indies squadron that became operational during the war was No. 19 C-47 'Transport Squadron. Crews for this squadron were in part recruited from USAAF 374th Troopcarrier Group under Colonel Ray T. Elsmore: they were Dutch airline pilots who had escaped from the Indies at the beginning of the war.
