NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR)
|NBMR-1||lightweight strike fighter(1953) FIAT G.91|
|NBMR-2||NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft|
|NBMR-3||V/STOL strike reconnaissance aircraft|
|NBMR-4||V/STOL medium range transport aircraft|
|NBMR-5||long-range shipborne ASW weapon system|
|NBMR-7||air/air missile (collision course)|
|NBMR-9||land mine warfare|
|NBMR-10||armor-plated transport vehicle|
|NBMR-11||medium-arranges ship/air missile for small ships (short term)|
|NBMR-13||close-arranges ship/air missile for small ships (short term)|
|NBMR-17||data-handling for equipment small ships (naval units)|
|NBMR-18||close-range ship/air missile for small ships (long run) (1973)|
|NBMR-21||long-range shipborne ASW weapon system (1966)|
|NBMR-22||V/STOL short range transport aircraft|
|NBMR-23||establishing needs in the field of night vision|
|NBMR-24||low altitude surfaces/air weapon system|
|NBMR-26||"Calculators for terrestrial forces (1965)"|
|NBMR-27||"information matÚriel on the battle field"|
|NBMR-28||recoverable exercise groundmines|
|NBMR-29||medium-arranges ship/air missile for small ships (long term)|
|NBMR-30||"system of identification of submerged submarines (1967)"|
|NBMR-31||long-range shipborne ASW weapon system (1970-1975)|
|NBMR-32||main battle tank|
|NBMR-33||combat infantry armored vehicle|
|NBMR-34||for an armored vehicle of transport|
|NBMR-36||"systems of identification of the friendly planes" (long term)|
|NBMR-37||material for NBC defense|
|NBMR-38||system of machines for fast patrol boats|
|NBMR-39||"short range artillery support matÚriel 1970-1975"|
|NBMR-40||system of engines for fast patrol boats|
For nearly half a century following the Second World War, the military establishments of West Europe and the United States spent most of their resources preparing for a massive war with the Soviet Union, in the hopes that preparation would prevent such a cataclysm from actually occurring. As the allied forces prepared for war in the Central European theater, it became increasingly obvious that the logistics of conducting such warfare would be vastly simpli?ed if forces ?ghting side by side could use the same type of fuel, ammunition, and even parts. As weapons systems grew more costly and complex, it also became apparent that greater economies of scale could be obtained from longer production runs, which argued for common weapons systems among allies.
For the countries of the Warsaw Pact this standardization was largely fulfilled through the common use of Russian weapons. For logistical and deployment reasons a similar standardization was necessary within NATO. A first step along this path was the effort of various NATO groups to agree on the development of common military equipment via the NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) procedure in the late 1950s. In 1953, NATO issued a requirement designated "NATO Basic Military Requirement 1 (NBMR-1)" for a "light weight tactical strike fighter" (LWTSF).
The North Atlantic Council established an ad-hoc working group to structurally reorganize cooperation in research, development, and production of militaryequipment. The joint working group submitted a report that was adopted by the Council on 4 November 1959. This document - C-M(59)82 - would bethe basis for cooperative efforts over the next seven years. The procedure consisted of seven steps in the development of new military equipment, starting with research and the formulation of basic military requirements, to testing and evaluation, to a production program. The procedure became known as the NATO basic military requirement (NBMR) approach. A basic military requirement was "an indication in general terms of the kind and type of equipment required, and also of the quantities needed and the date when it was desirable that the equipment should be in service."
By 1962 there was only one success, NATO's Breguet Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft, a project in which five nations participated. Several other projects awaited decisions. By 1963, it had become clear that realizing cooperative efforts in research, development, and production was very difficult. Expectations lowered, and cooperative efforts continued at a slower pace.
The requirements for artillery, for instance, were laid down in fundamental concepts in the "NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR 39)" in mid-1963. This document proposed that future artillery generations have a tube and a rocket weapon (with a range of around 30km) which could engage hard targets with direct fire. In working up the detailed individual requirements (operational characteristics) for NBMR 39, the NATO group established the 155-mm tube artillery as the standard caliber. In contrast to ballistics and ammunition, however, NATO partners could not agree on a common artillery piece, because of different tactical requirements. Both versions of the 155-mm caliber (the wheeled and the self-propelled) were needed - for a field piece and for an armored howitzer.
After less successful NBMRs on aircraft, in 1967 NATO established the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD), which is the primary policy-making body in NATO for procurement. It was intended to encourage greater standardization andinteroperability of weapons systems, and to stimulate joint programs for research, development,and production of weapons systems.
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