Pzkpfw V (Kleinerpanzer befehlswagen) - Panther
The Panther was somewhat of a surprise, since it marked a departure from the conventional lines of German design, and in the arrangement of its armor showed strong signs of Russian influence. Its success in combat undoubtedly gave rise to the decision to redesign the Tiger, which to some extent had fallen short of expectations. The new version was the King Tiger.
In general, "Panther" is a very consistent embodiment of Heinz Guderian's idea that the main task of any tank is to destroy enemy tanks, and all other goals should be considered secondary. Considering the results of numerous battles of the Second World War, one can reasonably assume that such a formulation of the question is an obvious mistake. Statistics indicate that armored vehicles in those years were destroyed primarily by artillery. Tank-versus-tank clashes did not happen very often. The Panther was designed as a medium tank. This is how it was classified in German documents until the end of the war. Meanwhile, in other countries, in particular in the USSR and the USA, "Panzer V" was known as a heavy tank. The reason for this is the different approaches to the classification of combat vehicles. In the USSR, all tanks were evaluated very simply - by their mass. Machines weighing up to 20 tons were considered light, vehicles weighing up to 20 tons were considered medium, from 20 to 40 tons, and heavy - from 40 tons or more. The Panther's mass reached 46 tons, so from the point of view of Soviet designers it was, of course, a heavy tank.
In Germany, the purpose of a particular piece of equipment was considered a more important sign. In particular, there were such concepts as "line tank", aka Panzerkampfwagen (Pz Kpfw), and "breakthrough tank", aka Durchbruchwagen (DW). But the German tank builders did not strictly adhered to their own classification. So, the famous "Tiger" is officially designated as Panzerkampfwagen VI. Meanwhile, it is quite clear that this is by its purpose a "breakthrough tank", or "a tank of high-quality reinforcement," but by no means a universal "line tank" intended for mass arming of the army.
The main US tank in 1943, and for the rest of the war, was the M4 Sherman. the Sherman tank received a bad reputation as an inferior tank. One reason for this was its tendency to catch fire easily once it had been penetrated (consequently, the Sherman received the dubious nickname of "Ronson" after a famous lighter that had the motto of "lights first time, every time"). This problem, combined with the presence of German heavy tanks and superior anti-tank weapons (particularly the famed German '88') made the Sherman appear to be heavily outclassed. However the British had been employing the Sherman for months prior to Kasserine Pass with great success against the German Afrika Korps. The Sherman was in fact superior to the most numerous German tank of the time, the PanzerKampfwagon III (PzKpfw III)). The Sherman easily outgunned the PzKpfw III and was nearly the equal of the second most numerous tank, the PzKpfw IV.
The Panther, compared with the Soviet KV-1, which both in the USSR and in Germany was called a "breakthrough tank", it is clear that both vehicles are comparable in weight and armor, and the cannon of the Pz.V is much more powerful (with practically same caliber). Thus, if the "Panther" appeared in service with the Red Army, and not the Wehrmacht, then in Germany it would most likely also be classified as a heavy tank, not a medium one.
The USSR became the main goal of the Wehrmacht immediately after the defeat of France. The German military command was rather dismissive of the capabilities of the Soviet defense industry and the armament of the Red Army, especially after the Soviet-Finnish war in the winter of 1939-1940. Oddly enough, even intelligence reports about the appearance of the Soviet KV did not change anything. Henschel continued to develop a new medium tank that was to weigh 30 tons - more than any of the existing models. This proved to be insufficient. On June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Great Patriotic War began. Already in its first days, a number of German formations collided with the latest T-34 and KV tanks. The meeting with the Soviet T-34 was an unpleasant surprise for the Germans: on the first day of the war, it turned out that, on the one hand, the shells of the KwK 37 tank guns and, especially, the Kwk 38 did not penetrate the T-34 armor, on the other hand the shells from the cannon of Soviet tanks penetrate the armor of the Pz.III and Pz.IV from any aiming distances.
Quite quickly, literally panicky reports about the unprecedented capabilities of these combat vehicles went to the headquarters, but the Wehrmacht generals did not immediately respond to these messages. On July 18, 1941, Rheinmetall received an order for the development of a 75-millimeter long-barrel cannon capable of penetrating 140-mm armor at a distance of 1000 meters.
In October 1941, immediately after the start of Operation Typhoon, the 2nd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, commanded by Heinz Guderian, broke through the Soviet defenses, captured Orel, and its forward formations moved further towards Mtsensk. It was here that the German vanguard was attacked by T-34 tanks from the 4th brigade of M.E. Katukov and suffered heavy losses. The success of the 4th Armored Brigade of M.E. Katukova was due to the competent tactics of combat and the mistakes made by the enemy, and not at all the miraculous qualities of the T-34. This defeat, albeit a local one, came as a complete surprise to Guderian. Trying to somehow explain how this became possible, "fast Heinz" did not find anything better than to attribute his failure to the qualitative superiority of the T-34 tank.
So on November 25, Daimler Benz and MAN were ordered to develop a 35-ton tank. Even then the project received the conditional name Panther. The tank, designed by the firm Daimler Benz, externally strongly resembled the T-34. The Germans completely copied the T-34 layout with the rear location of the engine-transmission compartment and driving wheels. It differed only in the absence of a driver's hatch in the front armored sheet - the round hatch of the driver's mechanic was in the left side, and the running gear-eight large diameter support rollers were staggered. In addition, the tank provided for the commander's turret, which the T-34 manufacturers did not install, but which was often unauthorizedly welded to their tanks by Soviet tankmen, taking these turrets from the pitted German tanks.
Moreover, the Daimler tank was supposed to be equipped with the diesel engine Daimler-Benz MB 507, which could not arrange the military - the Wehrmacht suffered a chronic shortage of diesel fuel, the lion's share which absorbed Kriegsmarine. That is why the Germans, willingly using the captured BT and even the T-26 , did not put into use the captured T-34s . Despite the fact that the Daimler's machine was liked by the Fuhrer himself, the military sharply opposed its acceptance into service, believing that a silhouette similar to a thirty-four will lead to an erroneous shelling of the tank with its own anti-tank artillery. Therefore, the military preferred the project of MAN.
The Fuhrer was forced to agree with the opinion of the military, but immediately put forward his conditions: the first machine must be manufactured in July, and the next two in August 1942.
On February 3, 1942, MAN received a recommendation to complete the construction of a prototype within seventeen weeks, which it did. Tests of the prototype were carried out at the range of the 2nd Tank Regiment in Berke. Describing this conflict in his memoirs, Guderian entirely takes the side of the producers. He argues that the designers were motivated not by "aversion to imitation", but by a clear understanding of the technical task.
The first two tanks VI and V2 (V - Versuch - experience), differing from each other with minor details, were manufactured by September 1942. On November 3, one of the machines, with a layout instead of a real tower, was demonstrated to Speer at a training ground in Bad Berka. During the tests, there were significant shortcomings in the running gear. It took time to eliminate them, and this delayed the start of mass production. The order also provided for the production of 250 tanks in a relatively short time - by May 12, 1943.
The tank body was assembled from rolled superficially hardened armor plates of medium and low hardness, connected "in a spike" and welded with a double seam. In the roof of the hull above the control department there were manholes for the driver and the radio operator. The covers of the hatches rose upwards and moved to the side, as on modern tanks. The aft part of the tank's body was separated by armored partitions into 3 compartments, while overcoming water obstacles, the compartments close to the sides of the tank could be filled with water, but the water did not fall into the middle compartment where the engine was located. In the bottom of the hull there were technological hatches for access to suspension torsion bars, drainage cranes of the power supply system, cooling and lubrication.
The main armament of the Panther tank was a 75-mm KwK 42 tank gun manufactured by the firm Rheinmetall-Borzig. The length of its barrel was 70 calibers, which made it possible to disperse an armor-piercing high-explosive shell with a mass of 7.2 kg to 925 m / s, and a 4.75 kg sub-caliber projectile to 1120 m / s. The average penetrating power of these projectiles was determined by firing a rolled homogeneous steel plate installed at an angle of 30° to the vertical. The gun ammunition consisted of 79 shots for modifications A and D and 82 shots for the modification of G.
By the end of May 1943, the Wehrmacht received the long-awaited 324 Panthers, which enabled them to complete the 10th tank brigade, but the problems with the development of the TZF12 complex binocular sight by the tankers and the desire to put in operation 98 more tanks, produced in June, were forced to move the launch date from June 25 on the 5th of July.
. Of the 200 tanks that debuted near Kursk, 160 were out of action by the end of the first day, and after another 9 days only 43 Panthers remained in service. Many broke down on the way from the railway to the front line, and the heavy weight of the vehicles made towing much more difficult, Subsequently, most of these problems were successfully eliminated, and the "Panthers" earned a well-deserved fame as the best battle tank of the Panzerwaffe.
It was assumed that the Panthers would massively pour into gaps in the Soviet defense punched by the Tigers, and with rapid and powerful blows disorganize the Russian rear, suppressing any desire for resistance. However, the huge losses among the tank units of the first line forced the Panthers to enter the battle on the first day of the fighting. In total, from July 5, 1943 to April 10, 1945, 5629 Panthers were lost in combat operations. The last Panther was beaten in the Czech Republic on May 11, 1945, that is, after the official end of the war.
The Pz.Kpfw V Panther was an iconic vehicle which had completely different advantages and disadvantages. Despite the complexity and high cost of production, the number of Panthers produced almost reached 6,000, making the Pz.Kpfw V the second in mass production after the Pz.Kpfw IV.
The creation of the Pz.Kpfw V was a symbolic step - the German command really wanted to surpass the T-34. The prototype of the future "Panther" from Daimler-Benz completely adopted the layout of the Soviet tank (and its advantages). But for a number of reasons, preference was given to the MAN prototype. This tank was used in most significant battles of World War II, where it earned its formidable glory, and showed its vulnerability. Nevertheless, the controversy about the place of "Panther" in the list of "best tanks" does not subside to this day.
It is worth noting that the legendary T-34 also suffered from shortcomings for a long time: the air cleaner of the engine was ineffective, and the operating life of the first engines was negligible. But all this was a consequence of the poor quality of production, and not design flaws.
This complex and expensive tank strained the industry: it was planned to make 600 tanks a month, but only once did it reach the scale of 400 tanks. According to popular myth, the Panther was extremely expensive, making its production unjustified. The cost of one "Panther" was 117,000 Reichsmarks - this is the price of a "naked" tank without radio equipment and ammunition. The the Pz.Kpfw IV, was slightly cheaper - 103,400 Reichsmarks [about $2.5 million in modern 2020 money]. And the most massive German tank, Pz.Kpfw VI Tiger, beloved by propagandists, was already worth 250,000 Reichsmarks [about $6.5 million in modern 2020 money]. Despite the mass and complexity of manufacturing, the cost of the "Panther" slightly exceeded the cost of producing one Pz.Kpfw IV, and was half the price of a Pz.Kpfw VI Tiger.
In other words, in terms of price and combat effectiveness, the Panther was a perfectly balanced tank relative to other German vehicles of that period. However, compared to Soviet and American counterparts, its cost was not astronomical, despite German manufacturers using expensive and labor-intensive production methods. For comparison, the most perfect "Sherman" in 1945 cost $64,000 [probably about 160,000 Reichsmarks].
Another controversial point is the layout of the "Panther" - typical for German tanks of the time. The transmission was located in the front, behind it was the control compartment, in the middle of the hull there was a turret with a fighting compartment. The engine and fuel tanks were in the stern. When the frontal part of the hull was fired upon, the transmission frequently failed, immobilizing the tank - even without breaking through the armor. But it could also be additional protection for the driver and radio operator gunner. And the gasoline engine and tanks, separated in the stern from the crew, increased the chance of survival in the event of a fire and gave time for evacuation. The drive shaft from the gearbox to the motor increased the height of the vehicle. And the transmission itself could ignite - right at the feet of the "residents" of the control compartment.
A few critical defects appeared only with the first losses. An unsuccessful design of the gun mantlet led to a ricochet into the roof of the hull, and the 40-mm side armor without tilt made the 45-ton tank an easy target even for small-caliber guns. Between the rollers and the upper part of the side was the "Achilles heel" of the tank: 40-mm perpendicularly positioned armor, accessible even to the weakest anti-tank weapons.
The hydraulic turret rotation drive assembly was flammable. And its effectiveness was directly dependent on many factors: first of all, the coordination of the gunner and the mechanic drive was required, since the drive depended on the engine speed. In addition, precise finishing was done manually. And all would be fine, but if the hull was tilted to the side by more than 5 degrees, neither the hydraulic drive nor the gunner could budge the heavy turret.
The popular belief was that the production of Panther was impulsive and unnecessary. Say, it would be possible to increase the production of Pz.Kpfw IV and self-propelled guns based on them - the combat effectiveness was acceptable, and the cost of production and operation is incomparably lower. Over the three years of production of the Pz.Kpfw V, 5995 copies were created. And in the USSR in 1944-1945, more than 25,000 comparable T-34-85 were created. Add to this the 3,390 heavy IS-2s built before Victory Day. In other words, the production of "Panther" strained the German industry, which, in turn, could not bring the machine to an acceptable technological level.
The space inside the tank was "bought" by increasing the hull length and the amount of armor. It was because of this that the "Panther" turned from a medium tank to a heavy one. The increase in mass, in turn, reduced the reliability of the transmission.
One of the most subjective points is the reliability of the machine. In the first battle, the number of non-combat losses of the "Panthers" exceeded the number of destroyed tanks. In the spring of 1943, 192 tanks were transferred to the 39th regiment, which launched an offensive near Kursk on July 5. Six days later, the regiment had lost 162 vehicles: 31 were irretrievably lost, 131 tanks required repair. It is not known how many failures were caused by low reliability, and how many were caused by combat damage. On the way to the formation area of the 39th regiment, 18 vehicles were out of order, 16 were to be repaired, and two burned down due to a leaking fuel pump. And the operating life of the Maybach HL230 P30 engines did not exceed 700 hours.
Before the end of the war, the operating life of the machines increased significantly, and the percentage of defects fell - which did not cancel the technical flaws of the machine. Already in March 1945 (when the "Panthers", it seems, got rid of defects) it was reported that only half of the Pz.Kpfw V remained combat-ready on the Eastern Front (361 out of 740). According to Western historians, the peak of the "reliability" of these tanks came in 1944, when 78% of the vehicles did not require repair and could fully carry out combat missions. Six months before that, only 37% of the Panther fleet could boast of combat readiness.
The "Panther" problems began literally before the battle. So, a gasoline engine with a volume of 23 liters was distinguished by a great appetite: moreover, it extended not only to fuel, but also to oil. A low operating life and congestion excluded long marches. The commander of the 7th Army, General P. Hausser, noted that in Normandy, up to 30 percent of the cars broke down on the march. Frequent breakdowns made the units dependent on the timely supply of spare parts, tank evacuation, and the professionalism of the repairmen.
The "checkerboard" running gear advantages were a high smoothness and uniform distribution of mass. This was theory. But in practice, if the road wheels were destroyed, and to replace the inner one, it was necessary to dismantle half of the outer ones. It could take up to ten hours to replace one inner roller of the "checkerboard" suspension. The location of the "Panther" rollers gives a clear idea of the disadvantages of the "Knipkamp" suspension. The tank was out of order for a day (if no breakdown happened on the battlefield). And the dirt that got into the chassis in the cold caused problems for the crews.
Add to this the unsuccessful hatches of the driver and radio operator - in the first versions, they touched the turrets when turning, and the unreliable design led to jamming, therefore the tankers preferred not to close them at all. The fighting compartment was poorly ventilated, which, with intense firing, did not add comfort to the crew. As well as gasoline vapors escaping through the porous material of the fuel lines.
The Panthers that overcame design flaws and did not lose their combat effectiveness due to breakdowns, were the most dangerous enemy for almost any Allied vehicle. Powerful frontal armor, coupled with an excellent gun, gave an advantage to experienced crews - for these reasons, the Panther is sometimes called the "best" WWII tank.
But the Panther was a very expensive machine with disadvantages inherent in the design itself. And solving them would mean creating a new tank. Even the T-34s of the first years of production were maintainable, relatively simple and inexpensive machines. Until the end of the war, Soviet industry managed to do what the Germans could not - bring the design to the intended parameters.
The best combat vehicle the US Army had before the Normandy landing was the M4 Sherman. It is easy to see that the "Panther" tank had characteristics that made it possible to firmly count on victory over such an enemy at any distance of battle. The superiority of the Pz.V was clearly manifested after the very first clashes with American tanks. Nevertheless, after several months of battle, the Nazis were driven out of France.
After the end of the war, the surviving Panthers were used in the armies of several European countries until 1947. In Romania and Hungary, these tanks, apparently, remained from the time when they were satellites of Germany, in Czechoslovakia - from the time of the occupation. France is the only country that purposefully exported Pz.Vs from Germany for subsequent use. According to some sources, the French "Panthers" were used during the fighting in Vietnam during the anti-colonial war, but there is no exact information about this.
