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French Navy - Age of Revolution - 1789-1814

In 1791, their naval force consisted of 73 men of war, 67 frigates, 19 cutters, 29 armed brigs, 7 gun-boats, besides several galliots, and hospital-ships ; but the war of the Revolution annihilated the navy of France. In 1793 on the outbreak of the revolutionary war, it was estimated to consist of 82 ships of the line, mostly fine vessels, and of frigates with lesser craft which brought it to a total of 250. The French Revolution resulted in the disbanding of the General Naval Staff, disorder broke out among the men and the material was allowed to deteriorate.

When the French Revolution broke out the long accumulated hatred felt for the noble officers had free play. Louis XVI had indeed relaxed the rule imposing the presentation of proofs of nobility on all naval officers, but the change was made only in 1786 and it came too late. The French navy, unlike the army, was thoroughly loyal ; and after the execution of the king, the best officers emigrated in great numbers, and those who remained were guillotined. The majority of the noble officers were massacred by the Jacobins or driven into exile. Thus the French navy was deprived of all its able commanders, and the government had to replace them with inferior, or, at least, inexperienced men. The Revolution subjected the French navy to a series of disorganizations and reorganizations by which all tradition and discipline were destroyed. Old privileges and the office of Grand Admiral were suppressed. The attempt to revive the navy in the face of the superior power of England was hopeless. Neither the Republic nor the Empire was able to create an effective navy. They had no opportunity to form a new body of officers out of the lads they educated.

The complete anarchy on board French ships from the beginning of the Revolution placed the French fleet at a grave disadvantage in every battle against a disciplined foe. Even when face to face with the enemy the men at times refused to fight, and could never be trusted to obey. Instances of gross cowardice were not uncommon. Early in 1793, on a cruise of the Brest squadron, the Tourville was dismasted with the loss of her captain and twelve men. Thereupon her crew, in sheer fright, refused to work the ship. In the Republicain, while tacking, the foresails were carried away. Several attempts to get her round failed, owing to the inexperience of the officers and men, of whom only thirty could be induced by threats or promises to put in an appearance on deck. The cowardice, ignorance, and inexperience of the officers and men were rendered even more disastrous by ignorance at headquarters. The instructions sent to the squadrons from Paris were often confused and contradictory.

At the commencement of the contest, the French navy consisted of seventy-five ships of the line and seventy frigates. On the other hand, England had one hundred and twenty-nine ships of the line and more than a hundred frigates ; ninety of each class were immediately put in commission, and seamen of the best description, to the number of eighty- five thousand, were drawn from the inexhaustible merchant-service. Unable to face the English in large squadrons, the French navy remained for a time in total inactivity ; but the French merchants, not having any pacific means of employing their capital, fitted out an immense number of privateers which proved extremely injurious to British commerce.

Under the Republic the whole condition of affairs was much altered; the navy was no longer a close borough, service in which was rigidly reserved for the nobility. It was thrown open alike to gentle and simple, and any sturdy seaman who displayed sufficiently advanced views was sure of advancement in the commissioned grades.

The Battle of the First of June is name of the great naval victory won by Lord Howe over the French fleet of Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, on the ist of June 1794. No place name can be given to it because the battle was fought 429 miles to the west of Ushant. The French people were suffering much distress from the bad harvest of the previous year, and a great convoy of merchant ships laden with corn was expected from America. The British force designed to intercept the convoy was under Lord Howe.

What the navy of the new Republic lacked in doctrinal development, it madeup for in spirit. The Battle of the Thirteenth Prairial [known in Britain as the Glorious First of June] (1794) was one of the greatest convoy battles in navy history. Rear Admiral Louis Thomas, Comte de Villaret de Joyeuse, commanded the Brest fleet. Villaret de Joyeuse's objective was to ensure the safe arrival ofa 130 ship convoy with supplies from America. According to both strategy and doctrine, the loss of the Brest fleet at the Battle of the Thirteenth Prairial was an acceptable price to pay for the safe arrival of this convoy. British doctrine emphasized combat over the escort force, hence today we have histories in two nations which use this same battleto illustrate victories.

To realise the havoc that cruisers of an enemy can work when ably commanded, significant damage was inflicted on British commerce by the French under commanders of energy and determination, such as were Surcouf and Lememe. It was stated that in the years 1793 and 1794, no less than 788 British vessels were captured by the French cruisers.

Under Napoleon the mere number was very much more considerable and included ships built in the annexed territories, but they were largely constructed of green timber, were meant merely to force England to maintain blockades, and were never sent to sea. The efforts made by Napoleon to regain the ground lost were almost a complete failure. This organizing genius was unable to understand - among other essential things - that squadrons are not formed by mere exercises while at anchor, but that to be able to fight well at sea, it is first of all necessary to know how to navigate without suffering too much damage.

Napoleon had resolved very speedily to execute his plan to invade England. He wished to cross the Straits towards the month of July or August, 1804. All the vessels composing the flotilla were assembled at Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse. An important question had arisen among the professional men, as to whether the gun-boats composing the flotilla, nutshells, as they were called, could brave the English fleet. Admiral Bruix, and admiral Verhuell had the utmost confidence in those boats. Both of them had exchanged cannon shots with the English frigates, had gone out of port in all weathers, and had acquired the conviction that these light craft were sufficient for clearing the Strait.

Admiral Decres, inclined to contradict every one, and especially inclined to contradict admiral Bruix, thought the reverse. "Undoubtedly," said he, " a twenty-four pound shot has the same force, whether discharged from a gun-boat or from a ship of the line. It causes the same damage, often even more, when discharged from a slight vessel, which it is difficult to hit, and whose horizontal fire takes effect between wind and water. Add to this the musketry, destructive at a short distance, and the facility for boarding, and the value of the gun-boats cannot be doubted. They carry above three thousand guns of large calibre, that is to say, as many as a fleet of from thirty to thirty-five sail of the line, a fleet which it is not often easy to assemble. But where have these boats been seen to measure themselves with the large vessels of the English ? In but one situation, that is to say, close in shore, in shallows, amidst which those large craft dared not trust themselves, to follow an enemy which, numerrous though individually weak, was prepared to riddle them with balls."

The French Naval strategy since the days of Louis XIV was one of keeping a battlefleet "in being" while conducting an aggressive war of commerce raiding with smaller vessels. This "guerre du course" was waged by small groups of fast ships which darted out from protected ports, prowled the sea lanes, struck at enemy merchantmen and dashed back to a safe harbor. For a country whose power is based on its army and whose major territorial foes and goals lie along her land borders, this strategy is one meant to neutralize, not conquer, a naval foe.

The successful privateer Surcouf was never weary of impressing upon the naval authorities of France the necessity of avoiding general engagements. Light vessels, swift vessels and small vessels in abundance, was the tenor of his cry. Strike at England's commerce; pour out your cruisers in every sea ; let them find shelter in every colonial harbor. A powerfully worded memorandum on the subject which he submitted to Napoleon was the signal of his summons to Paris. On the renewal of the war with England, Surcouf, who had been one of the first recipients of the Legion of Honour, was sent for to Paris and offered by Napoleon the command of a small squadron for the purpose of destroying England's commerce in eastern waters. The idea was one which readily fitted in with Napoleon's views, and he at once proceeded to give effect to them by offering Surcouf the command of one of these light squadrons, and by the issue of fresh rules for the guidance of the naval commandants at each port in the matter of granting commissions to privateers. [Surcouf 's views were but the reflex of those held by Cassard, by Jean Bart, by Duguay Trouin. They have found an echo in a more recent work by the late lamented Monsieur Gabriel Charmes, of the Debats, and they had a stout supporter in the person of Admiral Aube, French Minister of Marine].

What that change of system was to meet may be gathered from various works published at that time. It was the adoption of a desultory system of naval warfare, as recommended to Napoleon in August 1805 by Admiral Denis Decrès [the French Minister of Marine and the Colonies from October 3, 1801 to April 1, 1814], by sending out numerous small active squadrons, or quick-sailing frigates and other vessels singly, to act against British commerce, and the remote possessions of Britain's widely extended empire, to attract thither as much of Britain's naval force as might be required to protect and defend those possessions. Napoleon entirely gave up the idea of recalling the fleet immediately from Cadiz, if, indeed, it was there. With his own hand he thus endorsed this despatch: "To form seven squadrons, with the following destinations: Africa, Surinam, list. Helena, the Gape, the Windward Islands, the United States, the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, and the mouth of the Thames."

Napoleon made incessant, though fruitless efforts, to retrieve his naval force, which suffered an irreparable defeat at Trafalgar, in October 1805. But from the shock of Trafalgar the French navy never recovered, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Napoleon.

According to the exposé for 1814, the most absurd of Buonaparte's schemes were those which related to the establishment of a numerous and formidable navy. "Paris itself," says that report, "saw a dock-yard erected within its walls ; and what now remains of all these armaments ? The wrecks of some of the vessels and gun-boats ; which prove, that for the successive creation and destruction of this monstrous and useless flotilla, upwards of 150,000,000 francs have been sacrificed since 1803. The grand works executed at Cherburgh, and the fine squadron of Toulon, alone present useful results. All the arsenals are completely dilapidated ; the immense naval stores collected by Louis XVI are squandered ; and, during the last 15 years, France lost 43 ships of the line, 82 frigates, and 76 corvettes ; which could not be replaced at an expense of 200,000,000 francs."

In the Napoleonic Wars all the navies of Europe disappeared except the French, which was broken by defeat and rendered inept by inaction, and the victorious British navy. When Napoleon fell, the navy of Great Britain was not merely the first in the world; it was the only powerful navy in existence.