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1945-1960 - Early Cold War - Marine Nationale

The French navy started the post-war era with a mixture of pre-war French warships, war-built British and American ships, and German and Italian prizes. The vast rearmament program for the years 1944 and 1945 submitted in Algiers by the National Defense Committee in mid-October 1943 envisaged the further buildup not only of the ground and air forces, but of the Navy as well. The entire program was based on the assumption that considerable numbers of effectives would become available as a result of operations in continental France.

The part relating to the Navy contemplated a substantial increase in the number of destroyers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, submarines, and other types of smaller vessels. The request was considered to be a postwar project and, like the rest of the program, had been turned down as inopportune.

When, in mid-September 1944, the first French naval vessels re-entered the battered port of Toulon, the earlier program initiated in December 1942 for the rehabilitation of the French Navy was nearly completed. A few ships were still being overhauled in North African dockyards under the general direction of French, British, and American naval authorities in the Mediterranean.

The more important problem now was that of restoring ports and naval installations in France, some of which had been greatly damaged before and during the landing operations. The French obtained before the end of the campaign in Europe substantial amounts of equipment, such as cranes, derricks, barges, and other materials, for the rehabilitation of their ports, Brest and Cherbourg in particular.

French naval vessels continued to operate throughout the world as part of the Allied naval pool. In April 1945 a number of them were released from Allied control for participation in the combined land, air, and sea operations launched, under the direction of Lt. Gen. Edgar de Larminat, for the purpose of reducing the German pockets of resistance on the Atlantic coast. Together with a flotilla of British mine sweepers, the French vessels, which included the battleship Lorraine, one cruiser, three destroyers, and several escorts and mine sweepers, were grouped into a naval task force commanded by Rear Adm. Joseph Rue.

By the time operations in Europe ended, the French Navy had increased further in size as a result of the acquisition of additional Allied ships and the refitting of salvaged French ships. The number of its vessels was now estimated at 350 including auxiliary craft, its air arm at 10 squadrons, and its effectives at close to 100,000 men. Its fighting power was regarded as being nearly equivalent to that of 1939.

In the winter of 1943-44, the French had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain equipment and planes for the rehabilitation of their Naval Air Arm (Aéronautique Navale). The CCS had turned down their requests largely because of the dearth of trained personnel. When, in the fall of 1944, the liberation of part of France produced a substantial increase in naval effectives, the French renewed their requests for equipment.

On 29 September 1944 Admiral Fénard submitted to Admiral King a plan for the complete rehabilitation of Aéronautique Navale. The plan contemplated the reequipping of existing squadrons, the formation and equipping of new units, and the rehabilitation of the naval air bases whose equipment and facilities had been destroyed in the course of operations. The existing number of squadrons had been raised from 4 in 1943 to 10. They included 2 dive bomber, 2 fighter, and 6 coastal command squadrons.

Except for 2 coastal command squadrons equipped with U.S. aircraft and the 2 fighter squadrons equipped with P-47's and Spitfires and currently engaged in operations as part of the FAF, the units were using obsolescent or obsolete French and British equipment. To standardize equipment and simplify maintenance problems, the program submitted by Admiral Fénard envisaged the utilization of American equipment exclusively. It contained also a request for clothing, tools, ground handling and ground training equipment, and other miscellaneous materials.

Admiral Fénard's proposal was immediately referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for study. On the recommendations of the committee, the JCS urged the CCS, on 31 October, to reject the proposal. The French plan, they pointed out, contained no substantial military advantage in the prosecution of the war or in the solution of immediate postwar problems in Europe. In addition it would have an adverse effect on the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.

The French Navy had to assume new responsibilities in Indochina. It settled its forces in the depths of enemy territory, which it had never been done before. Thus the Navy faced a problem it had never had to confront before. It must provide safety constantly.

According to the government proposals, debated since 09 July 1947, funds for the period of 1948 amounted to 32 billions, 390 millions (in round numbers) for ordinary expenses and 14 billions, 115 millions for reconstruction and equipment, and over 3 billions for the common section. But these figures constituted a budget for marking time, the only kind conceivable in the financial crisis the country was experiencing.

The work in progress included the completion of the Jean-Bart, and the laying clown of the Carrier 28, christened Clemenceau, whose plans had been completed and allotment of steel plate provided; the reconstruction of the port of Brest, where progress was being made on the rebuilding of the gravingdock, the dam, the shipping and flotilla wharves, the re-grouping of the demolished ships and the layout of a subterranean electric plant; and finally the fitting out of the major base of operations at Mers-el-Kebir, whose north pier is completed and the east one started, not to mention the beginning of the program of the tidal-basin and the future yard. After the National Assembly, the Council of the Republic took a strong stand against any dispersion of credits concerning yards and docks, insisting on their concentration, at least for the present, on the principal ports.

As for the future, the Secretary of State resolved to maintain a fleet of 400,000 tons and 20 aeronaval flotillas (presupposing the existence of 4 aircraft carriers), announced the submission to the Parliament in 1949 of a naval program, the "so-called transition plan of 1950," calling for 25,000 tons of light craft. The effort would concern chiefly naval aviation, submarines, and destroyers, which are scarcely represented in our fleet today, apart from units of foreign origin, German or Italian. Finally, whereas Dakar at this moment could do little but shelter convoys, refuel and supply an intervention force, and repair a few light ships, a plan has been established for transforming it, as soon as circumstances permit, into a first-class strategic base, capable of answering all the needs of fleets operating in the tropical Atlantic and of great transoceanic convoys.

By 1953 some observers argued that the French Navy went beyond the scope of its mission in Indochina by taking part in amphibian operations and by cooperating in the freeing of territory. The fundamental role of the Navy was to maintain the liberty and the safety of its maritime communications - the French Navy was the first military strength in Indochina. The usual road network was essentially a network of rivers and channels. The French Navy also supplied the troops with food and ammunition, gives first aid and evacuates wounded soldiers to hospitals.

Aircraft carriers proved their efficacy for all the operations waged on land. But the fundamental benefits of the aircraft carriers had not been used during the last part of the conflict. For Dien Bien Phû, the flotillas of the Arromanches had been landed for land operations, and the ship itself had been at a standstill, waiting for an amelioration of the situation. Nobody had recoursed neither to radars nor to radio contacts.

France and Great Britain needed two months of preparations for the expedition in Egypt in 1956. Why did it take so much time? Could the navy forces intervene first? On July 26th, just after the coup of Suez, British and French naval forces were not completely ready for an immediate intervention. The La Fayette aircraft carrier was in the United States while the Arromanches aircraft carrier were just back from a cruise. The French fleet was assembled on August 26th, named the Force Navale d’Intervention (F.N.I).

La Fayette and Arromanches from the very first day, on November 1st, were in charge of the attack of the Egyptian naval fleet. French and British aircraft carriers also attacked aerodromes, such as Doukeila near Alexandria and Almanza in Cairo, and offered close air support to ground troops.

The Clemenceau was put on blocks on December 1955 and was launched two years later. Though it could seem to be a long time, it is more than respectable. Aircraft carriers appear to be a master piece of the naval force intervention, a choice tool to wage a modern naval war and an instrument of a nuclear force.