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French Navy - Bourbon Monarchy - 1626-1789

Despite a splendid line of seaboard along the Channel, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the French are not, instinctively, a sea-faring folk. Independent of an extensive and flourishing commerce, no country can attain to a high degree of naval power. Commerce is the nursery of seamen.

Richelieu, the great minister of Louis XIII, found the navy extinct in 1624. When he came into office there was practically no navy at all, and in time of war the government had to depend upon the vessels it could hire from individuals. He was reduced to seeking the help of English ships against the Huguenots. From him dates the creation of the modern French navy. In 1626 he abolished the office of admiral oí France, which had long been no more than a lucrative place held by a noble who was too great a man to obey orders. Richelieu assumed the entire charge of the marine, with the new title of Grand Master of Navigation and Commerce. Richelieu's energetic will was equal to all difficulties. By the time of his death France possessed thirty-two men of war in the Mediterranean, and twenty-four on the Atlantic coast, without counting the smaller vessels. And this force had shown itself fully capable on more than one occasion of holding its own against the naval power of Spain.

Richelieu's maritime establishment shrivelled after his death. What Richelieu had done in this respect had been undone in the period of Mazarin's domination. The navy suffered under Mazarin after 1647. His attention was so absorbed in foreign politics that he often neglected the internal interests in France. A few ships were constructed in 1655, one of them of two thousand tons burthen, and Mazarin gave careful instructions as to their equipment and the pay and care of the sailors. In 1657, at the time of the agreement arranged between Cromwell and Mazarin, France, as a naval power, had no existence ; scarcely emerged from that terrible internal crisis, the war of the Fronde, still struggling with a war against Spain, she was sufficiently occupied besides with the work of recuperation not to be able to give offence to the Protector. In 1661 there were only twenty-two vessels of war, and but 1,045 cannon for them. The navy had been reduced by fully one half, and the ships that still remained were in bad repair.

The Navy was raised from its ruins by the pride and policy of Louis XIV (1643-1715). When Louis XIV became king in 1643, he inherited a united kingdom that was generally well financed. However, to field the type of army he would need to make France a great power and bring himself personal glory, Louis needed far more money. Colbert helped to provide Louis with a bountiful war chest by implementing his concept of mercantilism. Mercantilism was based on the premise that national wealth and power were best served by increasing exports and collecting precious metals in return.

Under his direction a numerous and strongly organized navy was created. Colbert's vision of a France, colonial, industrial, and commercial, necessarily included a strong navy. Colbert took up the work with more than his usual energy, and here all his great qualities were seen at their best. Colbert furnished Louis with the force that enabled him to meet the fleets of England on the sea, and almost to dominate Europe on land. When he began, the warships of the French navy were, he tells us, only twenty in number; and of these not more than two or three were really serviceable. But by 1671 the number had risen to 196 effective vessels, and by 1677 the figure had risen to 270.

Credit for doctrinal development in the French Navy belongsto that great combat leader Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tourville. Tourville was not only a victorious warrior,but also the driving force behind the development of the FrenchNavy into a modern fighting force. His Signals and Instructions (1690) and other tactical and signaling manuals were the first such written French Navy doctrine and were credited, in part, for his victories. This theme of written doctrine contributing tocombat success is one that repeats itself over the subsequent centuries.

In 1690, the French navy amounted to 63 ships of the line, 7 frigates, 36 vessels armed in flute, and 14 cutters, under the command of Tourville ; and was very formidable to the naval power of Great Britain. To guard against British naval forces, the French moved from major fleet confrontations to "guerre de course" (or commerce-raiding), whereby combat ships and privateers licensed by France attacked only commercial vessels. This change in strategy did not mean that the French were outclassed-far from it. French fleets were equal in design and gun power to the English and the Dutch. The decision was based primarily on logistics and money or, rather, the lack thereof.

The decisive victory of La Hogue, achieved by admiral Russel, settled the contest in favor of England. The consequences of this naval defeat were considerable, for it was the beginning of a period of almost complete eclipse of the French navy. And yet never perhaps would a powerful and formidable fleet have been more necessary to France, to sustain the long and important war of the Spanish Succession, which was to begin very soon and to open anew the question of maritime supremacy.

In 1704, the French made another great effort to regain their naval superiority ; their fleet, which engaged the combined fleets of England and Holland, amounted to 50 sail of the line, 8 frigates, and 9 armed vessels, but the struggle was unavailing, and they were again compelled to yield the palm of naval superiority to their rivals.

By Louis XV (1715-1774) the navy was neglected till the last years of his reign, when it was revived by the duc de Choiscul. Small, by degrees, the French navy became, and, to its enemies at least, beautifully less. The war of 1741, however successful on the part of France by land, was, particularly towards its close, unfortunate to her at sea. In the succeeding interval of peace, great efforts were made to reinstate the French navy.

French Navy doctrine generally made the object of combatclear to the on-scene commander-the defense of the convoy ratherthan the defeat of the attacking force. During the Second Battleoff Cape Finisterre (1747), a significantly smaller escort forceunder Commodore Desherbiers, Marquis de Létenduère, foughtgallantly to allow the convoy of 250 merchants to escape captureby British Rear Admiral Edward Hawke.

At the opening of the Seven Years' War [1754-1763] the French had but sixty ships-of-the-line and thirty-one frigates. Of the sixty ships three were unfit for service ; eight were being overhauled ; four stood unfinished on the slips ; of the forty-five others the greater part needed to be repaired before putting out to sea. In 1755 the French took Minorca. No blow could be more damaging to England than the loss of this post whence she dominated the western basin of the Mediterranean. As an offensive position Port Mahon was more formidable than Gibraltar itself. The French set foot on Corsica the 1st of November, 1756, and thus with Toulon, Corsica, and Minorca, France found herself mistress of the whole western basin of the Mediterranean.

The whole campaign had shown what the French navy might become on two conditions : namely, that the chief financial resources of France should be devoted to it and that the bad spirit of the officers of noble rank should be repressed by severe examples. Brave and highly trained, but imbued with the most senseless and reprehensible prejudices, they disdained the important duty of protecting the mercantile marine, and there were certain among them who pushed to the verge of treason the ill will they cherished against the officers who were not obliged to prove their nobility.

The great interest of France was the maintenance of the peace of the continent, in order to have both arms free on the seas. It was once more possible, by devoting France to that task alone, to retrieve the fortune which the French had allowed to escape them in India and to dispute the empire of the seas and of America. The contrary course was to be taken, an example of folly, of imbecile treason to self such as has scarcely a parallel in history. All that was needed was to abstain from carrying the war into Germany ; no one was in a position to attack France on the continent. Unfortunately, another power thought it to its advantage to relight the torch in Europe : this was Austria.

The year 1759 marked the failure of a French attempt to invade England. Le Havre was bombarded by an English fleet. Admiral Boscawen defeated Admiral La Clue in Lagos Bay. Admiral Conflans was defeated by Admiral Hawke in Quiberon Bay, and his was fleet destroyed. This deplorable catastrophe completed the humiliation of France; the fleet, which had hitherto preserved its honor intact, fell to the level of the land army. The corruption and selfishness of the court had spread from the military to the maritime nobility.

The Dunkirk squadron had set out a month before the disaster of the Vilaine under the orders of an ex-pirate named Thurot, and much dreaded by English merchants. After various adventures this intrepid sailor effected a descent on Ireland in the month of February, 1760, and took the town of Carrickfergus. It was simply an effort of despair and could only mean the sacrifice of brave men. Thurot was slain and his squadron captured. The cabinet of Versailles, overcome by these decisive reverses, renounced all further maritime enterprises.

The war of 1754, terminated in 1763, by the peace of Paris, may be said to have swept French vessels almost altogether out of the bosom of the ocean. A very different scene opened in the war of 1778, when France, unembarrassed by a continental struggle, was enabled to direct all her disposable resources to her marine.

Under Louis XVI (1774-1792) the American struggle for independence roused the government from an apathetic and hopeless indifference to maritime affairs to new exertions and sacrifices. In the interval between 1778 and 1783, the maritime forces of France, if not so prosperous and powerful as in the earlier portion of the reign of Louis XIV., were at least placed on what maybe called a respectable footing.

By 1778 the French navy had risen to 78 ships of the line with frigates and smaller vessels which brought the total to 264. At the conclusion of the American War of Independence the French fleet could be considered as almost equal to the English fleet. Although it did not possess quite as many vessels and frigates, it was better organized than its rival, and its chiefs, officers and men had on several occasions shown their worth. France was then enabled to keep in an effective state about seventy sail of the line, the crews of which, added to those of the frigates and corvettes, formed a total of 60,000 seamen. The blows given to this force by the British Navy, towards the end of the war, were repaired with great diligence in the peace ; and to prepare young officers for the sea in preference to the land service, became a favourite object in several of the government schools.