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Armée de Terre - Personnel

Questions about Army strategy quickly surfaced after the 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall. Obsessed by the defense of the nation's eastern frontier since the 1870s, the army suddenly found itself without any enemies in that direction. What justification was there for universal military service if there was no longer any threat to the nation? But without a powerful army, how could France maintain its international stature next to the economic powerhouse of a reunited Germany?

The outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990 forced these contradictions into the open. Barred from most operations outside France since the early 1960s, conscripts could not be sent to the region without the approval of the National Assembly. But faced with fierce public opposition to military action, French President François Mitterand saw little advantage to a debate over the question.[6] Determined that France not remain on the sidelines, he decreed that only professional troops would fight.

The result was the opposite of what he intended. Ostensibly already organized for war, the army scrambled to cobble together an improvised all-professional force. Overnight some 5,000 professionals from throughout the army found themselves transferred to fill out an expeditionary division of 15,000. For a military of some 250,000, this was not an impressive contribution. Once in Saudi Arabia, moreover, the French remained gallingly dependent upon the United States for tactical intelligence and logistical support, and were ultimately relegated to a role of relative inconsequence.

Later, in the former Yugoslavia, French leaders were forced to relearn many of the same lessons. Unwilling to stand aside in the face of a war in Europe, France maintained over 8,000 troops with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia by 1995. And yet despite this impressive military commitment, and its determination to break the diplomatic deadlock by force if necessary after the July 1995 fall of Srebrenica, France failed to persuade its allies to follow its lead. Instead, lacking the capabilities to command a combined operation independent of NATO and the United States, it found itself compelled to cede the leadership role to Brussels, and ultimately to Washington.

In 1995, it began its transition to an all-volunteer army, which was completed in 2001.