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The French Army After the Great War

After the Great War it was necessary completely to reorganize the French army, both because the lessons of the war demanded it, and because public opinion insisted upon a shorter term of active service. Three important laws determine the organization, strength, and composition of the new army and its staff. Naturally, the new proposals were widely debated by army specialists. The first question was: which promises to prove most important in the next war, men or materials? There ias no question that the perfection of machinery for killing people, the invention of tanks, machine-guns, bombing planes, and gas, had radically changed our methods of fighting and have exalted machinery to a position it has never before occupied. But the machine alone was not yet the determining factor. Both men and machines' is France's answer to this problem.

It was necessary to drop the three years military service. That was an institution introduced in 1913, solely in view of the coming war with Germany. It could not be permanently maintained. On May 8, 1914, the Belgian Ambassador in Paris, Baron Guillaume, officially predicted in a dispatch to his government: 'Within two years France will have to abolish three-years service or fight.'

It is important to understand clearly the relation of the active period of service to both the peace strength and the war strength of the army. The peace strength depended, not only upon the number of recruits received each year, but also on the length of active service. France has decided to maintain a two-years service for the present; but after 1922 to reduce the length of service to eighteen months. However, this will not necessarily reduce the war strength of the army. That depends upon the number of recruits received each year and the number of trained soldiers who may be mobilized in time of war. Peace strength affects the army when placed upon a war footing mainly by the frame-work which the peace army provides for the latter. With this fact in view, France has decided to adopt the eighteen-months period of service, subject to certain qualifications: the number of reenlistments in excess of the soldiers undergoing training shall be raised from 50,000 to 100,000, and the number of black soldiers shall be raised from 200,000 to 300,000.

While the peace strength of the French army immediately before the war was 883,500 and after the war 840,000, it was reduced in 1921, after the two-years period of service went into effect, to about 670,000 men including native troops. After the eighteen-months period of service went into effect, in 1923, the strength of the army on a peace footing, including reenlistments, would fall to 450,000 men, were it not for the large increase in native troops.

However, the reduced size of the army on a peace footing did not imply an equivalent reduction on a war footing. The war strength was not be lessened, but increased by the addition of the 100,000 native troops. Furthermore, the age of active service was raised from twentyeight years to thirty, so that two years are added to the war strength at this point. At forty years of age reservists were transferred to the territorial army.

The most important change in the internal organization of the army was the reduction of the infantry and the cavalry, the great increase in artillery and engineers, and the tremendous additions to the airplane and tank services. Before the war France had 173 regiments of infantry. It now had 84 regiments plus two additional Zouave regiments and 31 additional regiments of native guards or Turcos. Serious opposition had arisen to this large increase of colored troops. It was proposed to compensate for the diminished infantry forces by increasing largely the number of tanks. There would be fourteen regiments of the latter.

Turning to the cavalry, the number of regiments in the new army was 67 instead of 89 as formerly. Among the regiments retained are 14 of African Spahis. Naturally, this reform also evoked bitter opposition, and one hears of the 'death of the cavalry.' Meanwhile, the number of artillery regiments has been increased from 75 in 1914 to 84 under the new plan.

In preparation for this reorganization, the infantry and cavalry were diminished in order to obtain men for the additional artillery, aviation, and tank formations. At the beginning of 1921, some 31 infantry regiments had been disbanded, and only 72 regiments were at full strength. One cavalry addition had likewise been disbanded.

When the war broke out, France had ten aviation sections and four airship sections. It was proposed to keep up in the future 80 sections of observation airplanes, 100 sections of battle-planes, and 19 sections of airships. The great preponderance of battle-planes was significant. By 1921, France maintained 468 bombing planes along the German border, ready for instant service.